



**DYNAMICS OF MILITARY CULTURE  
AND  
MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION  
A STUDY OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES**



**CRISTINA-RODICA POPONETE**

Dynamics of military culture  
and  
multinational cooperation

- A study of the Romanian Armed Forces -

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# Dynamics of military culture and multinational cooperation

- A study of the Romanian Armed Forces -

## **Proefschrift**

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Tilburg University,  
op gezag van de rector magnificus,  
prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander,  
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te Tirgu-Mureş, Roemenië

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Prof. dr. M.J.D. Schalk

Prof. dr. J. van der Meulen

*I dedicate this book to the memory of the Romanian Air Force pilots who have died in the last 22 years, whose youth and lives paid the price of mistakes yet loudly unspoken. While writing, my former Air Force cadets, now officers in the Romanian Armed Forces, inspired me with their hope that Sociology could make a difference to life in the military organization.*

Motto:

„Dragostea ce avem pentru patria noastră ne îndeamnă pe de o parte să lăudăm neamul din care ne-am născut și să înfățișăm pe locuitorii țării din care ne tragem, iar pe de altă parte, dragostea de adevăr ne împiedică, într-aceeași măsură, să lăudăm ceea ce ar fi după dreptate de osîndit. Le va fi lor mai folositor dacă le vom arăta limpede în față cusururile care îi slutesc, decât dacă i-am înșela cu lingușiri blajine și cu dezvinovățiri dibace, în vreme ce toată lumea mai luminată, văzîndu-le le osîndește.”

Dimitrie Cantemir – *Descriptio Moldaviae*, scrisă în 1716 la cererea Academiei din Berlin  
(*Partea politică – Despre orânduirea de stat – Capitolul XVII Despre năravurile moldovenilor*)

“The love of our Country requires us to praise the nation of which we were born and to present the people we are related to, while our love of Truth prevents us from praising that which should be rejected. Rather than deceive them with vain flattery and clever exculpations, it is better to present our fellow countrymen with the realities which degrade them, because the wiser, seeing with clearer vision, would condemn these.”

Dimitrie Cantemir – *Descriptio Moldaviae*, written in 1716 on request of the Academy of Berlin  
(*The Political Part – On the organization of The State – Chapter XVII Over the Manners of the Moldavians*)



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***List of abbreviations***

- ROAF – Romanian Armed Forces
- RRAF – Romanian Royal Armed Forces
- AFA – Air Forces Academy
- AFCO – Air Force Career Officers
- AFN – Naval Forces Academy
- AFT – Land Forces Academy
- ATM – Technical Military Academy
- AVF – All-volunteer force
- CADA – Committee in Action for the Democratization of the Military
- CNSAS – The National Council for Research on the Communist Secret Service Archive
- CPADCR – The Commission of the analysis of the Communist Regime in Romania
- CSAT – Defense Supreme Council
- CWNATOF – Committee on Women in the NATO Forces
- CY (1,2,3,4,5) – Cadet Year (1,2,3,4,5)
- DLEN – Directorate for Labor in the National Economy
- DSECP - The Higher Directorate for Education, Culture and Propaganda
- EU – European Union
- EUFOR – European Union Force
- IDV – individualism
- ICCR – The Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania
- IPP – The Institute for Public Policies
- KGB – Soviet Secret Services
- LTO – Long Term Orientation
- M – Average
- MAP – Member Action Plans
- MAS - Masculinity
- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NATOCGP – NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives
- NDS – National Defense Strategy
- NDU – National Defense University
- NR – National Reports on women percentages in ROAF to NATO
- OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- PDI – Power Distance Index
- PTAP – Youth Training for the Defense of the Country
- RCP – Romanian Communist Party
- RME – Romanian military exile
- RO – Romanian Soldiers
- NL – Dutch Soldiers
- ROAF – Romanian Armed Forces
- RPAM – Romanian People’s Armed Forces
- SD – standard deviation
- STAR –The Strategy for Transforming the Romanian Armed Forces
- SPDAF – The Higher Political Directorate of Armed Forces
- UAI – Uncertainty Avoidance Index
- US – United States of America
- USSCoCA – United States Congress Committee on Communist Aggression
- USSRp11CTOR – United States Congress Special Report n.11 Communist Takeover and Occupation in Rumania
- WTO – Warsaw Treaty Organization
- WVS – World Value Survey
- WW2 – World War Two



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Cristina-Rodica Poponete

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### **Cha(lle)nges for contemporary military organizations**

#### *Old and new missions for the military*

The beginning of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain are landmarks for the contemporary evolution of the armed forces as project, construction and significance for the entire society (Palin, 1995). In this respect, two common developments of military forces resulting from several macro-analyses (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000; Schmidl, 2000; King, 2011), are relevant. The first defines the change of the military purpose, from fighting toward operations other than war, sometimes less connected to traditional military activity. The second pattern concerns the internationalization of armed forces.

Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000) examine the changes of perceived security threats connected to changes in mission definitions. Prior to and during the Cold War, the invasion of another nation and an ally was the major threat to national security. As a consequence, the appropriate answer to homeland defense was large armies based on conscription, able to launch a large-scale counter attack, at short notice. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the external threat was replaced by more internal security challenges. Ethnic and religious violence or famine and natural calamities shaped the composition and mission orientation of the armed forces deployed in places like Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. After September 11, 2001 in the USA, and in subsequent years in Europe (Spain, UK), the actions promoted by Al Qaeda, ETA and other terrorist groups completed the picture of threats requiring different types of answers. Scholars identified a new type of war that covers small areas, includes non-state actors, using unconventional means, to deliberately break the traditional war codes, to create chaos and high uncertainty (Biehl & Kümmel, 2004). These conditions made mass armies obsolete and required small, mobile, flexible, well-trained and motivated troops (Dandeker, 2002, King 2011). Military consolidation, through downsizing and structural change, was a process launched within national armed forces across all Europe and North America, to better prepare them for the new missions (Manigart, 2003; King, 2005).

As Moskos (1976: 18) noted, in the first UN international actions in Congo, Egypt, India-Pakistan, Korea or Cyprus, the forces deployed in these areas were named “peacekeeping agents” with the specific tasks to separate fighting groups, maintain a buffer zone between them and/or monitor the end of hostilities with a neutral and non-offensive troop presence. In this vein, these first missions were literally about keeping the peace within national borders (Eide, 2001: 6). Since then, an entire spectrum of military operations other than war (MOOTW) has been defined to describe non-traditional, peace support

operations (PSO) for modern forces. Using traditional peacekeeping as a point of reference, Druckman, Singer and van Cott (1997: 155) describe, in their taxonomy, five clusters of missions. The monitoring function includes observation, election supervision and arms control, while the emergencies cluster concerns aid to domestic population and disaster relief. Combat-oriented coercive missions mean sanctions enforcement, drug eradication, anti-terrorism and collective enforcement. The restoring of functioning civil society encompasses protective services, intervention to support democracy, pacification and nation building. Finally, damage limitation within a society in conflict comprises humanitarian assistance and deterrent deployment.

The study of recent international military actions (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo) suggests the emergence of another generation of peace operations, encompassing traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions (with a focus on coercive use of military force). This violent dimension led researchers such as Mockaitis (2000: 24) to compare today's peace operations with counterinsurgency. In these "strategic peacekeeping" operations (Dandeker & Gow, 2000: 65-66), soldiers use a mixture of coercive and non-coercive actions combined with diplomatic and political efforts to diminish the conflict and destruction, and to generate a settlement. Recent peace operations are carried out in more fluid and opaque situations; so, the new missions encompass more vigorous forms than was initially acknowledged. It is their dependencies and density which made the United Nations launch the concept of "complex peacekeeping" to consolidate the efforts of all participants: international or regional organizations (e.g. NATO, UN, and OSCE), national military and foreign affairs ministries of contributor nations, non-governmental and humanitarian aid/relief organizations and even private military companies (Brahimi Report<sup>1</sup>, 2000). Although the search for a precise terminology to describe current efforts in the military missions' agenda still seems open, the most important fact is that these nuances are challenging (but not completely replacing) the traditional definition of violence management as the main or only task for the armed forces. With all these changes, contemporary armed forces are designed to be pro-active, to prevent and defend the national interests and the international peace in high complexity environments. This is a description consistent with what Janowitz (1960) called the "constabulary force". As Haltiner (2003: 364) observes, the function of protecting the international peace and security engaged world-wide military organizations, more often than before the Cold War, in missions outside of national territory.

Contemporary operations were the subject of passionate debate with pro and con arguments to clarify soldiers' skills and identity while the missions were moving "from Sparta toward Athens"

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<sup>1</sup> Report of the panel of the United Nations Peace Operations at [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/) accessed in July 2008

(Kirkels, Klinker & Moelker, 2003; Kümmel, 2003; NATO Review, 2001). As a consequence of the intricate environment (military, but also political, humanitarian, electoral, civil-police, human-rights, and logistical activities) the basic essential, fighting military skills appeared to be doubled by contact skills - communication and language, public affairs, negotiation and related discussions, civil-military relations and inter-agency cooperation (Druckman, Singer & Van Cott, 1997: 166, Sion, 2003: 141-177).

<i>Traditional Military Behavior</i>	<i>Peacekeeping / Conflict Resolution</i>
No contact with civilians	Intense interaction with civilians (control of hostile crowds, distribution of humanitarian relief to civilian population, disarmament of local militias, etc.); co-operation with civilian mission components
Basic military skills employed; fighting function primary importance; soldier-warrior (non-contact skills)	Negotiation skills employed; achievement of viable international relations (social - contact skills)
Destruction of opposing armed elements including civilian population	Negotiation with opposing armed elements, less casualties civilian population protection
Adversary role	Pacific role
Identified enemy	No identified enemy; impartial role
End goal: military victory	End goal: resolving underlying conflict causes, shaping a positive basis for peace
Forcible	Consent based

**Table 1** Comparing classical military operations and peacekeeping in behavior displayed and skills required (Adapted from Dandeker & Gow, 2000; Wibke, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2001)

The new mission type entails a more pacifying role, impartiality and focus on the goal of the mission to stop the causes of conflict (Wibke, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2001: 12), although these are combined with classical qualities specific to military professionalism (Moskos, 1975: 399-400). The warrior military cultures are under pressure of change to prepare soldiers to operate in an unstable environment which requires the ability to switch between roles according to mission demands because of the blurred boundary between war and peace (Close, 2007: 112). Facing these realities the processes of organizational downsizing had to be sustained by a process of enhancing the quality of military forces. It is this „concentration of the forces” achieved through professionalization, increased investments and strategic priority secured at the national level (King, 2011: 11, 33) that made today’s multinational forces to be considered an organization form superior to any other form known throughout history.

To conclude, there is a complex profile needed by today’s soldiers to face successfully the challenges raised by the former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld in his famous quote: “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it”.

### ***Current developments: the internationalization of military life***

The developments of the first half of the 20th century offered conditions for the embryonic institutional developments of “conventional national forces [...] welded into ad hoc organization, and given political and administrative direction” (Janowitz, 1975: 131) by supranational or international organizations. The United Nations (UN), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The Warsaw

Organization Treaty (WOT) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brought under the same umbrella different national forces with the declared purpose to protect regional or international security. With the Cold War going on, in a time of relative stability, the military forces brought together in these structures displayed a high level of national autonomy.

Instead, today, we have a somewhat different picture. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, international military relations, especially international military cooperation, received a great impetus, both quantitatively and qualitatively (Rubinstein, 1993; Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari, 1999; Wibke, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2001; Soeters & Manigart, 2008, King, 2011). Facing serious budget cuts, expensive modern military technology and rising intra-state violence, national armed forces needed to bring together their capabilities. After September 11, 2001, the acknowledgment of terrorism as a common threat to world security gave another impulse toward national decisions to pool military efforts.

First, intense activity within the security institutions network was observed, especially because the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991. One after the other, the Eastern-European countries were accepted as full NATO members after applying and following the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP): in 1999 The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and, in 2009, Albania and Croatia. During these years, the experience of the original NATO countries was transferred to all the new candidates to assist with the reform of national defense systems through information exchanges, joint training (classes and exercises) and missions in different areas (Balkans, Africa, Middle East). From the initial project of 12 countries in 1949, NATO has today 28 nations working together. Since 2003, the development of the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP), as a pillar in the construction of the European Union, has demonstrated the willingness of the European countries to join their military capabilities in order to address their collective security interests.

The second major development concerns multinational military constructs and their test in action (Palin, 1995). The year 1988 brought the Franco-German Brigade which united for the first time soldiers from different nations in a common permanent structure. Two years later, the NATO declaration in London stated that the Alliance: “[...] will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units”<sup>2</sup>. This gave impulse toward new fusions of European military units in permanent or temporary structures with diverse national composition. In 1991, the defense ministers of The Netherlands and Germany decided to establish a bi-national unit creating the 1<sup>st</sup> German-Dutch Corps. It followed the creation of EUROCORPS in 1992 (with troops from France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxemburg),

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<sup>2</sup> London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, paragraph 14, retrieved at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm> accessed in June 2008

EUROFOR in 1995 (France, Italy, Portugal or Spain), the Multinational Corps Northeast (with military personnel from Germany, Denmark and Poland) in 1997 and the South East European Brigade SEEBRIG (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey) in 1999, just to mention a few other structures with multinational contributions. The project to build the NATO Response Force with multinational forces, able to react at short notice and the intention of the European Defense Force to have multinational battle groups specialized on different type of military operations, represent another step in the internationalization of the military forces.

Similar quantitative developments were observed by Elron, Shamir & Ben-Ari (1999) in their analysis of UN international actions after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The increased frequency of missions with soldiers from various countries is matched by a constantly increased number of countries involved in peace operations: from the eight nations that joined their efforts in 1949 in the UN mission in India and Pakistan, to about 50 nations involved in the UN mission in Namibia and Angola in 1989. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan gathered in 2010 the capabilities of about 46 nations (Rasmussen, 2010).

Contemporary military actions have new, specific features: they are joint, multidimensional and multilateral and at the same time, multinational and multicultural (Wibke, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2001; Yanakiev, 2007). These require cooperation of all military forces in joint structures in order to accomplish the mission aims. People from different nations and cultures working together to accomplish a common goal give a multinational and multicultural character to military actions. The multidimensionality and multilaterality suppose a variety of actors and their interactions within a fuzzy and complex environment. Concentrated armed forces (air, land or sea) from different nations, civilian police, government agencies, international and non-governmental organizations and civilian companies are the main actors of military operations today, each of them with specific functions in dealing with a crisis. The multiplicity of their interactions and the management of interagency relations transform multinational operations into complex endeavors (Yanakiev, 2007: 213).

As can be seen today, the globalization processes include multinational military cooperation as a main tool to internationalize uniformed life in various forms (actions, missions and structures) with the purpose of responding to the tasks politicians set to be accomplished (Ben-Ari & Elron, 2001; Soeters & Szvircev-Tresch, 2010). “The assertion of a new permanent dimension of military actions” (Delanche, 2001: 1), multinational military cooperation is defined as making more efficient the use of scarce national resources by many nation’s concentrated forces while ensuring support for more political legitimacy of national military organizations (NATO Handbook, 2006).

### ***Factors influencing international military cooperation***

In 1975, the American military sociologist Morris Janowitz emphasized the need to study the UN (peacekeeping) operations from a sociological perspective. More specifically, he directed attention toward the implications of “military experiences on member nations and their constituent forces” or on the “internal processes on a particular member nation involved” (p. 131). In time, not only a change in the vocabulary for defining these experiences and the forces involved took place: “multinational operations / missions,” “multinational force/coalition,” and “combined joint task force” (multinational deployable task force formed by different military services from different countries), but their challenges, also, are topics in the curricula of military academies, national defense colleges and international military schools. After more than two decades of using interdisciplinary and cross-national approaches, social scientists identified some of those conditions which enhance successful multinational military cooperation (Febbraro, McKee & Riedel, 2008; Soeters & Manigart, 2008).

International military cooperation is mainly organized around two inter-connected nuclei of input: human and technological.

*Technology* is historically connected to warfare because each innovation could bring an advantage toward victory. National armed forces, conditioned by national political aspirations, social needs and economic possibilities, developed their own level of technology in order to be able to accomplish the social imperative: defense of homeland security. With the internationalization of military life, multinational cooperation meant bringing together these national technical capabilities and using them in the best way toward mission achievement. This is not an easy task. The asymmetries in technology among multinational partners pose a great challenge to cohesion and effectiveness during combat operations (Mazakowski, 2008). Even the air forces, which are characterized by a high degree of uniformity of their operating procedures, experience challenges due to differences in weaponry, fighting systems and the various philosophies of use (Soeters et al., 2006).

Over the years, during a range of cooperative military efforts a real “Tower of Babel” of various data types and formats was acquired and it became increasingly impossible to interconnect and use these for network-centric warfare which requires high accuracy, speed and reliability of information systems and cyberspace. In a recent case-study on a European military helicopter program, Uiterwijk, Soeters and Fenema (2013) identified the lack of standardization as one of the impediments to military cooperation success. According to Christman & Postal (2006), the adoption of common specifications and standards, the initiation of projects to define and commence convergence on a common data exchange approach for situational awareness systems, and the creation of an automated system to develop and share the common tactical picture of the battle space, were realistic solutions for multinational military alliances to evolve

and manage information at the command and control level. In the European Union, the Battle Group concept offered each nation, despite their size, the possibility of negotiating its contribution according to its best military technical capabilities (Lindstrom, 2008).

Secondly, cooperative international military effort was meant to bring soldiers from various nations into a single operational structure, to function as teams to accomplish various missions in foreign territories. In this respect, *language* is a critical tool for the success of multinational military cooperation, becoming a major explanation of organizational misunderstandings and problems (Soeters, Resteigne, Moelker & Manigart, 2008; Van Dijk, 2008). Soldiers (first and second language speakers) have to communicate with each other and to the local populace most of the times in difficult and stressful conditions. Insufficient proficiency for the second language speakers or their literal difficulties in understanding the slang of the war can create unintentionally miscommunication, and amplify the strain on the cooperation between soldiers (Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008). Soeters et al. (2008: 148) observed at Kabul Airport the case of: “[...] medics who did not master the English language sufficiently, inducing people in case of emergency to seek medical help outside the base at [...] ISAF HQ”, which exposed troops traveling through a dangerous route. Thus, the lack of language proficiency hindered soldiers who had to save the lives of their buddies. In similar circumstances, soldiers practiced two other solutions, noticed by Van Dijk (2008): (a) the face-saving strategy, by keeping a low profile and pretending to handle the situation or (b) the switching-code strategy, by using native language to communicate with the fellows, to make sure that everybody understands. However, as the autor observes, neither is a good solution, especially not when “the switching of codes during times of negotiations and decision-making [...] is often (unjustly) perceived as a manifestation of ‘conspiring behavior’, which in turn triggers a whole new gamut of sentiments of exclusion and hostility” (p. 76).

To be competent in the language of the mission, and also to master other languages, transforms every participant into a power node, a key-player who has the advantage of involvement in interaction and decision, especially in strategic organizational positions (Szvircsev-Tresch, 2007). This ability can generate a parallel informal network and, continue Van Dijk & Soeters (2008), “it would be unwise to perceive the shadow structure as a convenient shortcut in the communication process for it might as well corrode the formal channels of communication and undermine the managerial positions of persons involved” (p. 311).

Next, the use of multiple languages (French, Spanish, and/or English) in the same mission impedes the integration of the troops in a multinational setting, as well as an effective communication, especially by affecting managerial processes within the multinational military force (Febbraro, McKee & Riedel, 2008; Resteigne & Soeters, 2009). Sometimes, problems happen even among native speakers of



the same language family (e.g. the US, Canada, Australia and UK- English language<sup>3</sup>, France, Belgium and Canada – French language) or between non-native and native English language speakers due to different accents and dialects, different meanings of words, acronyms, slang, colloquialism, and jargon (Moskos, 2007; Hedlund, Weillbull & Soeters, 2008; Poteet et al., 2008; Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008).

<i>HUMAN RELATED DIMENSIONS</i>	<i>MILITARY TECHNOLOGY</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Language :</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Multiples official languages</li> <li>➢ Insufficient/ lack of proficiency for second-language speakers</li> <li>➢ Communication with locals</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Culture</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Internal cultural differences</li> <li>➢ External cultural differences</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Structuring of the force</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ National demographic distribution within multinational force</li> <li>➢ National conditioning of soldiers</li> <li>➢ Life-threatening conditions</li> <li>➢ Shift in bargaining power</li> <li>➢ Difficulties in managing the organizing of task</li> <li>➢ Differences in organizational status</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Asymmetries between weapons</b></li> <li>• <b>Incompatibilities between technology support for modern warfare</b></li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Lack of common training prior to deployment</b></li> <li>○ <b>Differences in training prior to deployment</b></li> </ul>	

**Table 2** Main nucleus of factors affecting international military cooperation (Adapted from Soeters et. al, 2008; Duffey, 2000)

In the light of recent military operations (especially Iraq and Afghanistan) communication with locals appears to be crucial for ensuring that people have a good understanding of the soldiers’ presence, for winning their support and, in the end, for fulfilling the mission. The practice of using various types of interpreters (local, home-based or embedded) in order to facilitate communication is differently defined by national doctrines thus conditioning each national contingent practice and attitude as mentioned in Van Dijk and Soeters work (2008: 314), while the multiple roles played by interpreters in a military operation recommends a careful selection to avoid any damage to the security, expertise and the ethics of the missions (p. 315). Interpreters are considered more than the linguistic bridge between soldiers and locals; they are “cultural mediators” and their knowledge of the mission appears crucial for successful operations (Soeters, 2012: 52-54). They can perceive signals undetectable by soldiers and thus help armed forces to avoid a wide spectrum of negative situations with potentially disastrous consequences. Despite their difficulties, sometimes, in comprehending local culture (Griffeth & Bally, 2006: 258) still the major

<sup>3</sup> American, British, Canadian and Australian cultures share a common language and a long tradition of military relations. The interoperability of their forces, since 1946, became a subject of a common coalition according to Richard and Maginnis (2006)

challenges related to a mission are the divided/multiple loyalties, especially as the practice of these years was, rather, the use of local and embedded interpreters.


All the above are enough reasons to understand essential recommendations like: “there should be one official language”, “deployed soldiers should be willing to learn languages” or “military personnel should have a basic knowledge of the local language” (Szvircsev-Tresch, 2007: 41) and “military personnel should acquire a more sophisticated conception of the role of interpreter” (Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008), mainly due to their practical implications for the success of each mission.

Another challenge for current military cooperation arises from soldiers’ different social background where they are exposed to different cognitive schema, values, traditions, habits, practices, norms, procedures, rules and taboos. All these components of the *culture* enable them to organize and perceive military life differently. “It is the cultural understanding at base of [...] missions that shape the concrete arrangements and practices founding them and have a bearing on the kinds of tensions and frictions characterizing them”, assert Ben Ari and Elron (2001: 275). To describe the cultural dimension of military actions, two main levels of cultural interaction were identified (Duffey, 2000: 146).

The *internal level* comprises (a) the cultural interactions among different troops composing the multinational force deployed added with (b) those between military personnel and civilian agencies of the force. The world viewed through cultural lenses can enhance the problem solving process by offering diverse perspectives and solutions to a conflict situation. At times, the cultural diversity might have its own peculiarities, especially when defending its own cultural perspective becomes more important than the solution itself. It is a double-edged sword and a challenge for the management of multinational military operations. Several researchers identified tensions and frictions between soldiers of different nationalities (Elron et al., 1999; Duffey, 2000; Soeters, Op den Buijs & Vogelaar, 2001; Soeters & Bos-Bakx, 2003; Soeters & Moelker, 2003; Soeters et al., 2004; Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006; Moelker & Ruiten, 2007; Soeters et al., 2008). These generated the question of how multinational units can operate in a coherent and coordinated manner in the fuzzy environment of complex peacekeeping operations. This question is also legitimate in peacetime conditions, for permanent and temporary military structures.

Of no less importance is the impact of technology in the acquisition of the skills for multinational cooperation through professional training. It is difficult to assemble different armed forces with the settings described above and ask them to successfully work together in a peacekeeping or peace enforcing mission with no prior common training. Although there is not always an opportunity for multinational forces to train together, differences in training content (based on the national experiences and updates with recent developments) prepare different soldiers to be fit for the same mission. In this respect Soederberg & Weddel-Weddelsborg (2008) found a positive connection between training and

cooperation: the multinational structures whose members benefited from modern technology training (computer modeling and simulations) experienced fewer difficulties in cooperating with others.



**Figure 1** Culturally related issues in a peacekeeping mission with multinational forces  
(Adapted from Duffey, 2000; Chandler, 2005; Wunderle, 2006)

At the *external level*, the troops’ significant interactions are with the local society (military, governmental and non-governmental agencies), civilian agencies and the opposing forces. The most neglected variable in recent military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was the local culture and its connection with the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The culture of local society should matter to the military because ethnocentrism and analytical bias can affect success (Chandler, 2005). Culture understanding requires long-term contact (Wunderle, 2006: 1) and any failure to accomplish this requirement can generate alienation of the people who seek protection. If a military action violates the local cultural and social assumptions, post-conflict stability is hampered, as McFate (2005: 45) states:

*“Misunderstanding culture at a strategic level can produce policies which exacerbate an insurgency; lack of cultural knowledge at an operational level can lead to the development of negative public opinion; and a lack of cultural knowledge at a tactical level endangers both civilians and troops.”*

In many aspects, people are a decisive factor in the mission’s success, and for this reason the knowledge of the ‘cultural terrain’ can be, in certain situations, as important as that of the geographical terrain, as General David Petraeus (2006), the former commander of the Multi-national Force in Iraq, acknowledged. His statement is valid for the culture of both the local population as well as the enemy. All

these demonstrate that cultural differences represent a challenge at all levels of interaction in multinational military operations: from the formal level of command to informal interactions of the soldiers and to those with the local and international community. Everybody needs to be aware of one's presence and need of understanding. To navigate within another culture, "caution, understanding and respect" are vital (Wunderle, 2006: 4).

Other studies (Soeters et al., 2008) suggested further factors that influence multinational military operations: *the structuring of the force* and the way the human factor can handle the situation. The national demographic distribution within a multinational force, more specifically, the ratio between different national contingents/soldiers influences the quality of cooperation. Earley and Mosakowski (2000) compared moderate homogeneous teams (few nations of equal size) with the teams displaying high (many nations with equal size) and low (few nations outnumbering the others) heterogeneity. The last two seemed to show "the least amount of conflict, the most effective communication patterns and the highest level of satisfaction, planning and cooperation" (p. 201). This conclusion as observed Soeters and Manigart (2008) becomes relevant for both, permanent multinational structures and ad-hoc multinational forces deployed for operations at short notice.

The tensions emerging from the national and multinational command demands were acknowledged from the very beginning in studies of actions under multinational flag by Moskos (1976). Later when multinational missions became more frequent, Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir (1999), Ben-Ari & Elron (2001), Fitz-Gerald (2002), Moskos (2004) and Elron (2008) underlined the soldiers' double loyalties in multinational missions and the tensions these generate because troops experience difficulties in surrendering their autonomy to a foreign command. The dependence on the interpretation of Rules Of Engagement by the national authority while working under a multinational command as well as different levels of willingness to engage in combat situations seem to be major challenges in such missions. Senior officers from headquarters and contingent commanders in direct touch with the national countries experience the same tensions (Elron, 2008: 31-32).

Another variable, the socio-psychological aspects related to group dynamics can either facilitate or impede the cooperation. The pretended or perceived differences in organizational status (e.g. elite vs. non-elite troops) can create tensions if groups develop a strong sense of pride, tend to emphasize group bonding and, as consequence, look down upon the other troops (Winslow, 1999). No less difficult to handle are the soldiers' fissures in social representations of the other nationalities' troops (especially negative stereotypes) which are detrimental to trust development (Vom Hagen et al., 2003; Soeters & Moelker, 2003).

If conditions are or are perceived as life threatening, multinational cooperation is also affected. Multinational missions take place in areas with harsh conditions and the troops are normally trained to face them. But, under *life-threatening conditions*, people experience forms of mental and organizational rigidity, less flexibility, and even stereotypical thinking when they realize the fragility of their life (Dechesne, Van den Berg & Soeters, 2007; Soeters et al., 2008; Van den Berg, 2009). Multinational military missions require open minded, flexible and cooperative troops, but situational factors, like a *shift in bargaining power*; or a difficult-to-manage *organization of tasks*, can lead to an intricate cooperation process.

These factors act synergistically, thus rendering cooperation even more difficult (Uiterwijk, Soeters & Fenema, 2013). To counter the many sources of centrifugal tendencies within international cooperation, several integrative mechanisms were recommended (Elron, Shamir & Ben-Ari, 1999: 87-90; Soeters, op den Buijs & Vogelaar, 2000; 60-64; Vom Hagen, 2006: 59; Elron, 2008: 36-47):

(a) Seeking and establishing the accomplishment of super-ordinate goals and striving to focus at all levels on higher values (e.g. “peace”);

(b) Using common symbols (uniforms, helmets, berets) which transcend national establishment and create the sense of togetherness;

(c) Cultivating soldiers’ responsibility and stating accountability as a way of motivating them to achieve a high standard of behavior toward each other and the local population;

(d) Standardizing command, control and staff operating procedures for the effective management and transnational rules of engagement;

(e) Exploiting all forms of knowledge sharing and mutual learning in order to develop better practices and solutions to all challenges raised by each multinational mission (including lesson learning structures);

(f) Initiating joint mission analysis cells, the products of which (long-, medium- and short-term strategic assessments, risk and threat, early warning and critical information as well as thematic reports) should be used in decisions’ management;

(g) Organizing cohesion building activities in the form of cultural, educational and sports events to provide space for spontaneous social interactions and create esprit de corps; and

(h) Training soldiers, prior to the mission, in the cultural differences within multinational forces, to facilitate their adaptation to cultural diversity.

The fact that today these mechanisms are partially used with success by several nations, at various levels and in different missions gives confidence for the future of multinational military cooperation.

## Where is Romania in this trend?

### *A short history of sociology and sociological research in Romania*

The period after the First World War was fertile for the development of the Romanian school of sociology, led by Dimitrie Gusti, whose interdisciplinary approach under the name of “social anthropology”, unique at that time, became famous and adopted worldwide<sup>4</sup>. This golden period was shortlived, until 1948, when the Soviet Union installed its instrument, the communist party, to rule Romania. Sociology was declared a “bourgeois and reactionary” science, undesirable for the new social communist construction in Romania and its profession and institutions were abolished, by any means (Zamfir et al., 2010). Former graduates had to renounce the title of “Sociologist”, were forced to work under other professional designations and were refused publication when expressing views contrary to the official political lines<sup>5</sup>, as the Romanian sociologist Stahl recalled in an interview (Alexandrescu, 2000). As a consequence of his research, correlating significant increases in tuberculosis cases with the famous socialist competitions launched by the communist party, Stahl was systematically dismissed from all positions he occupied, until 1969, when he decided to emigrate (Alexandrescu, 2000).

Larionescu (2001) stated that the official position on sociology was later reconsidered, according internal or international political developments. It is only possible to explain in this context the creation of the National Centre for Sociology (Centrul Național de Sociologie) in 1960, and other institutions – the so called “laboratories of sociology” - throughout the country, and the graduation of about 500 sociologists, who entered the labor market up to 1977 (Gavrilescu, 2006: 182). In academia, after the 1960s, sociology became a second specialization for the graduates of philosophy faculties, as reflected in the biographies of the senior sociologists in leadership positions at the main sociology faculties in the country.

Starting in 1977, communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu locked the doors to all sociology departments in Romanian universities for good, while some social research institutions<sup>6</sup> were still maintained by the communists to help the regime monitor ethnic minorities and other social groups who

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<sup>4</sup> As Paul H. Stahl (1925-2008), the Romanian sociologist-author of the first public opinion research in Romania stated in an interview in 2008, retrieved at [http://www.observatorcultural.ro/Antropologia-sociala-o-stiinta-a-interdisciplinaritatii.-Interviu-cu-Paul-STAHL\\*articleID\\_5010-articles\\_details.html](http://www.observatorcultural.ro/Antropologia-sociala-o-stiinta-a-interdisciplinaritatii.-Interviu-cu-Paul-STAHL*articleID_5010-articles_details.html) accessed in October 2010. Paul Stahl left Romania in 1969 because his work came into wide and open conflict with the newly installed communist political authorities. In France he worked with Claude Levi Strauss, about whom he recalls that he used the term “social anthropology”, launched by Romanian sociologist Dimitrie Gusti

<sup>5</sup> Sociological surveys revealed Romanians’ dissatisfaction with participatory outlets designed for them by the party, the rejection by peasants of forced collectivization and the refusal of youth in the mid-1960s to adopt collective values (Nelson, 1988: 61-81)

<sup>6</sup> Such as the Institute for Sociology subordinated to the national Academy for Social and Political Science (Bucuresti), the Institute for the Study of Inter-ethnic Relations from Tg. Mures and the Social Institute from Tg. Jiu, The Office for Research of Romanian Radio and Television or the Laboratory of Urban Sociological Research, just to mention few. The Institute for Political Sciences became integrated in the Political Academy “Ștefan Gheorghiu”, today the National School for Political and Administrative Sciences (SNSPA)

could raise opposition. Thus, there were no sociological studies to evidence people's rejection of the austerity imposed in the 1980s and their urge to rebel against the lack of basic necessities (Nelson, 1988: xiii), and the abuses of human liberty. However, the elimination of sociology from academic life had even more subtle and profound effects on the normal development of Romanian society. In this vein, Onuț (2009) observes that communist society preferred to produce engineers in universities, not 'humanist' intellectuals capable of doubt, or critics, who could become dangerous for the state. This approach destroyed any subtle plurality of thinking within Romanian society. Sociologists were people with imagination and ideas, who challenged assumptions, looked behind the curtain to discover what was actually happening. It is the lack of sociologists and sociological thinking, the same scholar asserted, that can explain the post-communist "primitive and repulsive managerial culture and the stupid discourses within the public space" (p. 32).

As with other professionals, the few remaining sociologists had to attend political meetings while working under the vigilant "surveillance" of the Securitate (the communist Secret Service). One of them, Alin Teodorescu (2009), recalls the disappearance of one of his research reports after a house search. His statement is a realistic image of the relationship between sociologists and the state in the later years of Romanian communism:

*"You could write honestly, by doing field research – mainly qualitative research with in-depth interviews and seldom, a sort of focus groups - and library work [...] or simply inventing<sup>7</sup>. Nobody checked up on you. Those who invented were those who used the most ideological quotations, Communist Party documents etc. Usually these were the unprofessional researchers. There was no money for quantitative research but only travel expenses. All in all, there were researchers who didn't even write a page in their entire life." (Teodorescu, 2009)*

While in many socialist states the ideology justified control over the economy or centralized production, control also became the main social mechanism invading private life. The strategy for survival in such a system was "to make yourself brother with the devil until you cross the bridge" or "to agree with your boss and do what you want" – proverbs very often used by Romanians justifying their passive behavior during communism. The intrusion of the political system in private life with the help of Securitate can explain scientists' (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein, 1988: 373) conclusion of decoupling the formal and behavioral systems in socialist countries and differentiates actions between organizational space and private life.

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<sup>7</sup> The author's original expression in Romanian language is "a pune din burtă" literally translated "to add from the belly" and has the same meaning: to lie by manufacturing something that was never researched

In 2010<sup>8</sup> Herta Muller, the Romanian origin Noble Prize winner for Literature, used the German word “mitlaufer” to describe the same survival strategy adopted by intellectuals who wrote to please or not to offend the political authorities. The strategy of producing counterfeit research reports with ideological content was also revealed by other Romanian authors (Gavrilescu, 2006: 183).

Toward the end of the regime the small community of sociologists learned the “wooden language” as a survival strategy just as society in general had done (Betea, 2005). This offers a clue for understanding the origin of words like “burtologie”<sup>9</sup> and expressions like “bla-bla-bla science” used in Romanian society in the early 1990s to portray sociology. Another survival strategy adopted by Romanian sociologists was the orientation of their research toward topics which served communist interests. While research reports regarding youth problems, media penetration and preferences, values transformation and matters related to urbanization were published in the late 1980s (Nelson, 1988: 61), nothing could be said about population’s dissatisfaction with food rationing , “scientific” diet and energy reduction (Mak, 2008: 769).

The years following the fall of the communist regime did not really clarify the past and its legacy to the development of Romanian sociology. Only in 2005, the most important journal at the national level, the Romanian Review of Sociology, generated a debate on the issue of communism and sociology. Prof. dr. Maria Larionescu, a singular voice in post-communist sociology dispelled the idea of resistance. She acknowledged the lack of “an active and open sociology to generate an official and effective break with Marxist ideology” (Gavrilescu, 2006: 184-185).

In 2010, the same review published another article that tried to promote the image of “a sociological community not very numerous, but professionally very strong, whose members were marginally (or not at all) involved in the propaganda of the ‘50s to ‘80s” (Zamfir, 2010: 10). This statement is surprising as different sources<sup>10</sup> revealed that important names in post-communist Romanian sociology were used as a source of information, explicitly cooperated with the Securitate or were party activists and teachers at the communist party’s highest educational institution, the “Ștefan Gheorghiu” Academy. This last stance is consistent with communist party expectations and with the directions given by Nicolae Ceaușescu that: “[...] social scientists must in fact be Party activists” (Nelson, 1988: 61). In

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<sup>8</sup> The interview can be seen on <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dC2xXcY-z3w> in Romanian language, accessed in September 2010

<sup>9</sup> Literally translated “bellyology” (“logos”= science in Greek language and “belly”). Recently in Romanian media I found the expression “claxonism” (claxon means in English car horn) to refer the social sciences content and status during communist times (see <http://www.ziaristionline.ro/2013/02/03/mandria-de-a-fi-brucan-sau-liichelele-de-la-kgb-la-gds-un-eseu-fabulos-de-magda-ursache/> accessed on February 2013)

<sup>10</sup> Romanian media (Civic Media Association) in the article “GDS începe sa dea raportul la CNSAS” (The Group for Social Dialog reporting to the National Council for the Study of Securitate’s Archives) retrieved at [http://civicmedia.ro/acm/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=515&Itemid=78](http://civicmedia.ro/acm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=515&Itemid=78) accessed in April 2008; Gavrilescu (2006)



the context of these differing views, there is still a gap to be filled in the history of sociology in communist Romania.

To describe the evolution of post-communist sociology in Romania, two main directions were defined by Gavrilesco (2006: 189), Zamfir (2009) and Pasti (2009). Although not without difficulties, sociological sections and specific training were re-established in Romanian universities. While the first generations of post-communist sociology graduates experienced a lack of basic and up-to-date bibliography and computers with modern and specific social science software, things changed over time, not only in the quality of education, but also in the number of graduates. From three sections in the most important public university centers of Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca and Iași with a total of about 100 graduates in 1995, the situation changed, sociology being taught in 16 public and private universities with 650 graduates in 2007 (Onuț, 2008: 47-48). The other direction was the re-launching of sociological research under the auspices of The Romanian Academy and the beginning of private sociological research institutes, especially for public opinion surveys. The use of public opinion survey in political life has been the dominant orientation within Romanian sociology in the last 20 years, which became a handicap for a science that was called to give consistent answers for a society facing a deep crisis (Pasti, 2009).

### ***Sociology and the Romanian military***

There are even fewer studies published on the use of sociology within the Romanian military before 1989. In order to make observations some of the landmark books for this period were chosen. These show that some specific topics regarding military sociology were known in communist Romania, but they were less empirically addressed.

In the early 1970s two volumes entitled “Directions and tendencies in contemporary military sociology” (Niculescu, 1974) were published. While the first volume presented the Marxist approach to military sociology with Soviet, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Polish examples, the second one offered selective translations of important western scholars like Kurt Lang, Jacques van Doorn and Morris Janowitz. In another book published later (namely Arădăvoaice et al., 1977), Bădina (pp. 3-12) synthesized the two main topics of Romanian military sociology before 1989: conscripts (recruitment, educational level, motivation and interpersonal relations within military groups) and professional soldiers’ career (leadership, military discipline and time management). Similar topics were covered also in chapters of the book “Elements of military sociology and psychology” (Deaconu et al., 1988). However, despite focusing on similar topics and using similar concepts to western military sociology, the contents of these books were conceived in such manner as not to deviate from the communist political line. Furthermore, a closer look reveals a lack of consistent scientific references (Niculescu, 1974), while

each chapter has quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well from national Communist documents, or from “the magnificent thinking” of the dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu. Empirical data is missing from the analysis in a text abundant with imperatives (“must”) or conditional (“could have”) (Arădăvoaice et al., 1977: 186-225). The reading is very difficult due to long sentences and a lack of visual aids to enhance understanding of the theoretical models.

Sociometric exploration of the military group seems to have been quite important for communist military sociology, since two out of eight chapters focus on this topic in the book with Romanian contributions to military sociology (Arădăvoaice et al., 1977: 226-263). Considering that the main official goal of the military was the socialization of youth to communist values (Nelson, 1988: 176), it seems highly plausible that the identification of the informal leader(s) and structures of the group could be used as a tool to manipulate people and recruit informants. This interpretation looks even more credible for a communist leadership accustomed to *exploiting personal information* from every source (Stan & Turcescu, 2005), just to ensure social control.

It appears that realizing the importance of sociology for the restructuring of the military, as of 1990 the MoD granted active officers a four year-postponement of their service in order to attend fulltime classes and become sociology graduates. These were then employed in different positions within the MoD and higher headquarters of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, this situation was short lived, until 1992, due to a change in legislation which allowed military personnel to attend civilian universities, either at evening or part-time classes, only with the unit commander’s approval. Later, several years after graduation, some of these officers left the military only to have a successful career elsewhere<sup>11</sup>. At the same time, a small number of sociologists became civilian employees in the military, occupying positions such as teachers and Human Resources consultants. Overall, the number of uniformed and civilian sociologists working in the military has remained low and has lacked the strength to form a nucleus with a real impact on the organization’s reform (Poponete, 2006).

With the exception of military technology and psychology, Moștofleu (2002) identified a lack of clarity and consistency in the scientific research policy of the Romanian military after 1989, which negatively impacted sociological research, despite organizational changes generated by the reform process. In this unfavorable context, Romanian military sociology made a few positive steps. The only interwar social-science review “Spirit Militar Modern” [Modern Military Spirit], which also addresses

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<sup>11</sup> Three cases: Ionel Nicu Sava (graduated as sociologist at Bucharest University) in 2008 was assigned as the Romanian Ambassador to Switzerland, Dan Jurcan (graduated at Cluj-Napoca) became assistant to the Minister of Communication in 2003 and in 2008 the Director for the National Governmental Strategies and Marian Zulean (graduated at Bucharest) military sociologist with national and international experience teaching in 2009 at the University of Bucharest after a career advising the presidency on Defense issues.

sociological issues, was re-launched in 1993<sup>12</sup>, after publication had been interrupted since 1942. The other important direction, the focus on classical and contemporary military sociological literature and its translation into Romanian (Sava, Zulean & Tibil, 1998; Zulean, 2010) reached the climax with Charles Moskos' conferences in 2005 in the Romanian Military Academies at Braşov, Constanţa and Bucharest and the publishing of the Romanian version of his inspirational work: "The Military - more than just a job?" ("Armata mai mult decat o ocupaţie?"). The few military sociologists' contributions (articles, chapter articles or books) have addressed macro-topics like national security policy, civil-military relations in communist and post-communist Romania (Sava, 2000, 2001, 2002; Zulean, 2002, 2004, 2008) and focused less on internal organizational life diagnosis with its limits and malfunctions (Poponete, 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2005, 2006; Poponete & Poponete, 2002; Sava, 2006). This reality was critically addressed by the former chairman of the Committee for Defense, Public Order and National Security, George Maior (2005: 9) in the introduction to Charles Moskos' book:

*"[...] Lots of PhD theses in military science or sociology from The National Defense University are interpretative studies, with a rather journalistic and essayistic value but of less practical value."*

Overall, at least two important directions of action can be identified for Romanian military sociology. First, it is the need to clarify the legacies of the past and their influence on the way of carrying out sociological research in the current military organization. The elimination of sociology from the Romanian educational curricula and of the profession of sociologist during communist times, both left traces on what it means to be a sociologist in post-communist Romania. Second, it becomes important to overcome the distance from the European theoretical-conceptual and empirical traditions in the study of uniformed organizations, and thus to bring its contribution to the decision making processes at main management levels.

### ***Changes within the Romanian Armed Forces***

With almost half a century of inaction until the collapse of the country's communist regime in 1989, Romania decided to modify its defense policy, especially after the official closing in of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in 1991. As for all the Eastern-European countries, this required a reorientation toward NATO, the only main player able to offer a credible security umbrella, with the hope of an alternative to 50 years of Soviet Union domination and control. In 1990 the Romanian Government initiated a regular program of visits, information exchanges and consultations to prepare the national armed forces for joining NATO (Ciocoiu, 2004: 1-3; CSSS, 2002). After being the first to join the Partnership for Peace

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<sup>12</sup> Since Modern Military Spirit was re-edited under the leadership of col. (ret) Dumitru Roman and col. (ret) Vasile Stan. The Romanian version of the review can be found at <http://www.presamil.ro/SMM.htm>

program in 1994, the ROAF followed a reform process in order to accomplish the interoperability with NATO forces. The strategic objectives were to change the pattern of civil-military relations from a communist-authoritarian toward a democratic one and to professionalize the entire military organization by changing its missions, roles, structure, and educational system. Although assisted by other NATO members the reform process proved to be difficult and not without barriers not only because each country had its own way of organizing and understanding defense issues, but because the communist heritage left deep wounds in Romanian individual and collective psychology. As later shall be depicted, fear of retaliation from a despotic leadership, harassment on the job and loss of one's home, life incarceration or even the death penalty for "inconvenient" and critical people, and total control and censoring of expression in all possible forms, enslaved an oversized military, unable to perform its basic mission.

The uncertain democratic orientation of the country's leadership, due to a second wave of Communist Party members, prevented a good pace of economic reforms, resulting in Romania losing the nomination for NATO membership in 1996 (Moses, 1998). Lacking serious economic programs to improve people's lives, integration within NATO and European Union structures was the most popular theme in most politicians' public communication<sup>13</sup>. To be accepted, Romania had to demonstrate that it could be a credible partner on the international military arena. To address this issue, Romanian officials decided that:

(a) troops had to be trained in a wide range of national and international exercises. Starting with the first multinational exercise, COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION - SIBIU '95, Romanian territory was the host of bi- and/or multinational exercises as part of NATO-PfP and NATO programs or the country's regional agreements<sup>14</sup> every year. These exercises focused on humanitarian aid in cases of natural disasters, including disaster management, search and rescue, medical evacuation actions, civil protection and peace operations;

(b) troops had to be deployed in multinational operations in order to gain field experience. Romania constantly deployed troops as part of different multinational humanitarian and peacekeeping missions like Desert Storm in Iraq, Restore Hope-UNOSOM II in Somalia, UNAVEM III / MONUA in Angola, UNOSOM in Somalia, ALBA-97 in Albania, IFOR/ SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and KFOR in Kosovo. After 2001, Romania joined the international coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,

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<sup>13</sup> This is one of the factors that explains the emotional attitude of Romanians toward NATO and EU integration

<sup>14</sup> COOPERATIVE PARTNER - CONSTANTA '96; COOPERATIVE KEY - BUCURESTI '96; COOPERATIVE DETERMINATION - SIBIU '97, CARPATHIAN EXPRESS 2000, 2001 with RO-UK troops, SMIRDAN 2002 RO-IT troops, CORNERSTONE 2003 under SEEBRIG umbrella, 2004 BLONDE AVALANCHE, ATLAS and COOPERATIVE PARTNER, 2005 DEMEX, SEESIM 2006 and IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 2006 with troops from the USA and Bulgaria

deploying more infantry, logistics, and intelligence troops comparing to those deployed in previous missions (hospitals, military police); and

(c) troops had to join bi-multinational permanent or temporary structures (SEEBRIG<sup>15</sup>, SHIRBRIG<sup>16</sup>, BLACKSEAFOR<sup>17</sup>, TISA RO-HUN Battalion<sup>18</sup>) to become a credible partner and have a visible activity in the area.

Romania was invited to join NATO in 2002, based on its efforts to change its armed forces and to tailor them according to NATO's interests in the area. Starting with the first deployments in 1990, immediately after the dictatorship fall, ROAF participation in various operations sustained NATO's efforts. In 2004, Romania became a full member of the organization, a membership saluted by some (Bugajski, 2003) and doubted by others (Millen, 2002) inside and outside the country.

THEATRES OF OPERATIONS	MISSIONS UNDER THE AEGIS OF:					TOTAL
	NATO	EU OBSERVATION AND MONITORING MISSIONS	EU LIAISON OFFICER	UN	COALITION TYPE MISSIONS	
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA		EUFOR: 59 <a href="http://www.euforbih">www.euforbih</a>				59
KOSOVO	KFOR: 61 <a href="http://www.nato.int/kfor">www.nato.int/kfor</a>					61
AFGHANISTAN	ISAF: 1842 <a href="http://www.nato.int">www.nato.int</a>					1842
Others		EUMM+ EUSSEC 7+2	1	MILITARY OBSERVERS AND MONITORS: 34	LIAISON OFFICERS: 4	48
<b>TOTAL</b>	1903	69		34	4	<b>2010</b>

**Table 3** The Romanian contribution to international military efforts in 2012  
(Source: [www.mapn.ro](http://www.mapn.ro)<sup>19</sup>)

<sup>15</sup> In 1996, the Multinational Peace Force from South-East Europe (MPFSEE or SEEBRIG) was created with troops from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and (later) Ukraine, as a decision of the South-Eastern European Defense Ministers Reunion (SEDM). SEEBRIG maintained headquarters in Romania with Bulgarian command between 2003 and 2007, and, in 2007, Romania took over the leadership of the brigade's headquarters in Istanbul. The structure was deployed in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2006 in order to support the NATO troops

<sup>16</sup> In 1999 Romania became part of the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), an organization composed of troops from Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Italy, and Sweden. This structure was deployed as part of the UN mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) in 2002, and was involved in the African Capacity Building Program

<sup>17</sup> Bulgaria, Russian Federation, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine set-up together the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) in order to protect their interests in the Black Sea, to be involved in search-rescue, humanitarian assistance and engineering missions

<sup>18</sup> Under the supervision of Germany and France, the Romanian-Hungarian Battalion was established in 1998, as a permanent bi-national structure with alternative command with the designated task to be deployed in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The soldiers were deployed only under their own national flag until now, although they trained together every year. 1999 was a prolific year for Romania regarding the regional cooperation with agreements regarding three new multinational structures. The "TISA" Engineer Multinational Battalion, comprising troops from Hungary, Romania, (later) Slovakia and Ukraine, was created to intervene in natural disaster situations in the Tisa River area and in specific de-mining missions

<sup>19</sup> According to information provided at <http://www.defense.ro/misiuni-internationale/index.php> accessed in December 2012

At the same time Romania's membership in the European Union (EU), beginning in 2007, and the need to contribute to the building of the European Defense Force generated new challenges for the national military. As a consequence of NATO membership, Romania became more willing to share responsibilities by sending troops on various international operations. Romanian troops were involved in operations in Iraq, have been part of various observation and monitoring missions, have supported the counter-terrorist efforts of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan and still contribute to the counter-insurgency operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (see **Table 3** previous page).

Moreover, the Romanian contribution to the NATO Reaction Force with stand-by forces was estimated for 2014 with more than 900 troops. As part of European HELBROC Battle group (with lead-nation Greece, together with Bulgaria and Cyprus) Romanian soldiers have been training since 2007 and have taken up duty in the outer perimeter of Kabul Airport after July 2012. The second European Battle Group, in which Romania cooperates with Italy (lead nation) and Turkey, has been ready with stand-by forces since 2010. In order to contribute to all these international efforts, Romanian troops had to re-learn the repertoire of a real mission which required a mandatory infusion of militarization within a post-communist, de-professionalized force. In this respect, the exercise PROOF OF PRINCIPLE at the Military Airport Kogalniceanu, is an example of Romanian and American troops annually training together using violent scenarios and preparing for specific counter-terrorist actions.

<i>Exercise: name and year</i>	<i>Participants alongside Romania</i>	<i>Place/ Romanian contribution with forces</i>
"White Cloud 08"	Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, USA, Poland	Poland/ Land forces: DEFENCE CBRN
„Cooperative Longbow-Lancer-2008"	16 NATO and PfP members. Among them: Canada, Ukraine, Greece, Hungary, FYROM, Georgia and Poland.	Armenia/ Land forces
"CROSS LANDING 2008"	Hungary	Romania/ Air Force: MEDEVAC
"VIPER LANCE 08"	USA	Romania/ Air Force
"Balkan Guard 09"	Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bulgaria/ Land forces / JOINT HQ
"DACIAN THUNDER 2009"	USA	Romania/ Air Forces
"Airborne Commando 2009"	Turkey	Romania and Turkey/ Land forces and Airborne
ROMANIAN EXPRESS 09	UK	Romania/ Land forces
"Friendship Action 2009"	China	Romania/ Land forces : Mountain troops
"JACKAL STONE 09"	Croatia, United States, Albania, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Sweden and Ukraine	Croatia/ Land forces: Special Forces
"JTF East Rotation 2009"	USA	Romania/ Land Forces
"STRIKE LANCE 2009"	USA	Romania/ Air Forces
"Cooperative Lion 09"	Netherlands and Albania	Romania/ Naval forces: ships, helicopters and infantry
CROSS LANDING 2010	Hungary	Romania/MEDEVAC
Golden Lance	USA	Romania/ Air Forces
SABER DAWN 10	Serbia and USA	Romania/ Land Forces
Friendship Action 2010	China	China/ Mountain troops

**Table 4** Romanian participation in international exercises in 2008, 2009 and 2010 on national and international territory (Source: [www.mapn.ro](http://www.mapn.ro))

Romanian territory became the place for intensified training for national and international troops. In a full European economic crisis, Romania organized the first national joint exercise in September and October of 2009, "ROUEX 09". This exercise was based on a "Chapter 5" scenario – i.e. the collective defense of the NATO members, brought together military units up to battalion level. All participating units planned this joint war-game during the national exercise "GETICA 2008". In 2010 the strategic level exercise DACIA united 2.700 joint troops and VECTOR 2010 more than 4.000 troops in a joint exercise in order to simulate a scenario of national defense. In 2011 Romania became one of the nations hosting the Black Sea Rotational Force, with impressive troops from more than 12 nations involved in training activities in the Black Sea, Balkans and Caucasus areas.

About 20 years of effort to professionalize the ROAF have recently attained some important positive ends. In March 2010 NATO opened its first Human Intelligence Centre of Excellence in Oradea, with responsibilities to test, validate, and implement new intelligence concepts, techniques, tactics, and procedures while supporting Alliance forces with Mobile Teams in order to improve information collection. After more than 70 years, Romanian Air Forces were, between April 2011 and 2012, assigned for the first time by NATO for an entire year as the lead nation at the military airport in Kabul (Afghanistan), after demonstrating their professionalism for shorter periods in previous years. These premieres are acknowledgements of both professionalisms: the national Intelligence Service and Romanian Air Force, as important assets to the North-Atlantic Alliance operational success.

All these impressive national and international military developments described above, could (most certainly) not be foreseen 25 years ago, during the communist era. They are coming inseparably with high demands from and responsibilities toward the various military partners as well as the national armed forces.

### ***Aim of the thesis and the research questions***

The ROAF downsizing started after 1989 as a normal process for an overweight organization. After a few years of contact with NATO prior to 2000, an intensive structural reform was planned and launched in 2003. Later, in 2007, Romanian military leaders began to talk about a transformation process.

At this time, it is accepted that techno-structural interventions have to be accompanied by changes in daily methods of operating in organizations, and those changes have to be learned, sustained and practiced by all members. Structural interventions or the replacement of old organizations with new ones are processes that will fail if a cultural perspective is not considered (Hirschorn, 1999; Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Organizational theory defines transformational change as a process of reshaping the organizational culture, the way people perceive, think about and behave within their

organization. According to Cummings & Worley (2001: 499) this is possible by altering people's assumptions about the functioning of the organization and its relationship with its environment, and, ultimately, by redefining values and corporate philosophy. Because "military transformation involves the revision of collective practices at a number of decisive points in the armed force by commanders, staff officers and soldiers" (King 2011: 14), leaders have to define this new orientation, to create the environment for change and to guide this process. As long as leaders are willing to commit to personal change, the culture can change in the desired direction (Schein, 1990; Cameron & Quinn, 1999).

These theoretical insights became part of current international military thinking (Capstick, 2001; King, 2008; 2011) that recognizes the connection between change, transformation and culture as Siegl (2008) clearly describes:

*"The ability to harness and integrate technological advances with complementary developments in doctrine, organization, and tactics is dependent on the propensity of military culture to accept and experiment with new ideas. Therefore, focusing on developing and shaping a military culture amiable to innovation and continuous change will help create the conditions for current transformation efforts to be effective and successful."*(p. 103)

In this context, the Romanian military official statements and documents systematically disregarded the cultural dimension of the change, with few exceptions. One of the state secretaries of the Romanian Ministry of Defense, S. Encuțescu<sup>20</sup>, defined in 2004 the military culture as a managerial practice needed in order to attain the goal of structural reform. The Romanian Military Strategy of Transformation from 2007 acknowledged the military culture as a pillar of NATO's transformation process (p. 7), but it was not defined as important for the transformation of the ROAF. Together with the other Military Strategy of Transformation published in 2005 the necessity "to change mentality of decision-makers" is rather mentioned toward the end of the document (STAR, 2005: 34, STAR, 2007: 33). Nothing else regarding military culture or its connections with the new projected defense organization can be found in the official documents and public statements of these years. This is consistent with Jung's observation (2004: 170) that specialists and military experts in many countries are focusing on operational and tactical issues and thus neglecting the very basics of human resources.

Moreover, in wide contrast with international practice since 1990 and despite its relatively large participation in military missions, the Romanian military lacks in-depth sociological research on the cultural aspects of troops' interactions and adjustment in multinational cooperation situations. There are a very small number of scholarly publications available, mainly focusing on the psychological processes (adaptation, post-traumatic disorders, troops' morale), logistical differences and the limits faced by

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<sup>20</sup> Everything found in this document was only a simple statement about organizational culture. See Encuțescu, S. (2004) Armonizarea legislației noastre cu cea a statelor membre ale NATO și UE. *Observatorul Militar* [Military Observer], nr.3, retrieved at <http://www.presamil.ro/OM/2004/03/pag%207.htm>, accessed in February 2006



Romanian soldiers in the fulfillment of their mission (Dobre, 2002; Alexe, 2004; Dracinski, 2005; Manea, 2005; Cracsner et. al, 2005; Dinu, 2008; Sasu, 2009, Dica et al., 2010; Țîrlea, Bania & Grăjdan, 2011). The international *Lessons Learned seminar 2004-2005*<sup>21</sup>, organized in Romania, focused on the technological, logistics, public affairs and legal issues, neglecting the impact of the cultural factor on international military cooperation.

As a consequence of the realities described above, Romania had no diagnosis of its current military culture, neither in peace time nor in military operations to help and enhance the chances for a real internal reform. Because of the magnitude of the changes initiated, the main question of the thesis is “*What is the cultural profile of the Romanian military and its impact on intercultural interactions?*” To answer this question means to identify “[...] those elements of culture that must be retained for operational effectiveness and those traditions that can be eliminated, in the light of contemporary values” (Dandeker, 2000: 38). In this respect, the ROAF needs consistent assessments of its cultural configuration and instruments to assist its transformation.

In chapter one, a general assessment of the post-Cold-War developments outlined the changes in the world-wide military and highlighted the international military cooperation process with its challenges (technological and human related issues). These developments were summarized in the ROAF case and became the ground to address the main questions of the thesis regarding the study of Romanian military culture at a time when culture is the biggest missing topic in the Romanian decision-makers’ security and reformers’ agenda. Some observations about Romanian sociology under communism and insights in post-communist military sociology completed the general picture in order to help clarify the state of the art.

In order to pursue this, in Chapter 2, the thesis reviews the theories and models of culture and the way these are applied in the assessment of military organizations. As such, a three-level approach using quantitative and qualitative assessments is the solution to understand the complexity of military culture. Scientific literature indicated the need to study both Janusian faces of military organizations in peacetime as well as during operations, as these are interconnected. National armed forces are socially and culturally representative for the societies they belong. Cultures do not arise overnight, and accordingly history is a factor with great explanatory power for current military culture: it helps to explain and understand the configuration of the present culture and the premises for organizational learning processes in order to enhance its performance. All these became guidelines for the sociological research about the cultural influences on international military cooperation.

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<sup>21</sup> According to G1. Mj dr. Frunzeti T., the Rector of The National Defense University at <http://www.presamil.ro/OM/2005/20/06.htm> accessed in June 2005

To understand and clarify what happened historically after the Second World War, particularly for Romania, requires regaining a lost memory. People learned a biased military history produced during the almost 50-year reign of a totalitarian regime. In this context, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide responses to the main questions of recent Romanian history: *“What happened with Romania and its Armed Forces after 1944? How were changes from royal to communist armed forces possible? What is the evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces after the fall of communism?”* With few analyses available to clarify the recent past, this synthesis builds the trajectory of the Romanian military organization and identifies the ways in which the communist dictatorship imprinted specific cultural features. The second part of this chapter focuses on the changes initiated after 1989 toward integration within NATO and on the various aspects of civil military-relations in post-communist society.

As a diagnosis of the current Romanian military culture, Chapter 4 offers answers to the questions: *“What is the current cultural profile of Romania in the international cluster of the military? When comparing the military academies, are there cultural differences in values and practices?”* Expectations were defined using the conclusions of previous chapters and the synthesis of the few available cultural diagnoses of Romanian social and military culture. In 2002 a representative sample for the entire population of the military academies, 257 cadet-respondents, defined the national culture profile of the Romanian military using Hofstede’s national culture framework and Value Survey Module (VSM82) (Hofstede 1980, 1991; Hofstede & Peterson, 2000; Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Organizational practices and values were mapped using the FOCUS Questionnaire 93 (Van Muijen et al, 1999). Military discipline (Soeters, 1997) and military orientation were addressed to complete the diagnosis of the Romanian military in peace time.

Chapter 5 explores the hypothesis of intergenerational change formulated by the question *“Did the Air Force change its cultural orientation over time?”* The major change in training requirements for career officers opened a new door for integrating an additional study in the thesis. 84 Air Force career officers were added in 2005, together with 64 cadets from the Romanian Air Forces Academy, who became the respondents from the two groups in which was tested the hypothesis of intergenerational changes in post-communist Romania on their main values in national culture and organizational profiles, combined with discipline and military orientations.

The next question: *“How does the Romanian military culture manifest itself in intercultural/multinational interactions?”* is answered in Chapter 6. Economic and organizational barriers forced the adjustment of the initially projected three-phase design. Highlighting these changes has the single purpose of offering an understanding of what it means to conduct social research in the post-communist Romanian military organization. The post-mission, semi-structured 35 interviews and the

quantitative findings are analyzed to describe the cooperation between Romanian and Dutch soldiers in their joint mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. An unexpected evolution associated with the social culture and connected to the recent past abruptly ended my participatory observation of the pre-deployment training of the EUFOR 3 Dutch-Romanian detachment in 2005 in the Netherlands.

<i>Feature analyzed</i>	<i>Place in the thesis</i>	<i>Research issues</i>	<i>Type of research involved</i>	<i>Details about the research</i>
Past: History	Chapter 3	The changes imposed to ROAF from 1944 until today	Study of social documents	History books, military and civilian reviews, newspapers, fiction and non-fiction civil and military literature, political and military official documents and statements published before and after 1989
Present: Peace time Military academies and Air Force career officers	Chapter 4	Cultural profile of the ROAF in the international cluster of the military	Quantitative research	Compute the indices for the national dimensions and interpret the value orientations of the Romanian sample in the international cluster of the military. Item analysis in order to describe cultural orientation. Diagnose and compare different organizational subcultures specific to each military academy (Air Force, Navy, Land Forces and Military Technique) Romania 2002; 257 respondents
	Chapter 5	Intergenerational changes in values and practices within ROAF	Quantitative research	Comparing national, organizational and occupational cultural levels for two generations of Air Force graduates trained before and after 1989; Romania 2002 and 2004 148 respondents
Present: International mission: Dutch-Romanian cooperation in Bosnia	Chapter 6	Romanian cultural profile in interactions. Perceived cultural differences between the military actors and the assessment of the mission with all implications	Combined design: quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interviews and participant observation)	a. Romanian and Dutch soldiers: feedback of the mission and the cooperation, cultural differences perceived and possible lessons learned; Romania, 2004 and 2005, and Netherlands, 2005 35 respondents  b. Dutch and Romanian soldiers pre-deployment stage for common EUFOR mission in Bosnia, Netherlands 2005

**Table 5** Final design to analyze the Romanian military culture

The conclusions from the final chapter unify the past and the present in an attempt to project the future of the ROAF. The answers to all questions addressed in the thesis allow predictions and recommendations for further development of the Romanian Armed Forces for more successful internal change and international cooperation.

## CHAPTER 2

# CULTURE AND THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION

### Culture

#### *Preamble*

Studies focusing on cultural issues are not a recent concern for social sciences (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985; Parker, 2000). However, since 1980, with the publication of W. Ouchi's *Z Theory*, Deal T. E. & A. Kennedy's *Corporate culture: the rites and the rituals of corporate life* and T. Peters and B. Waterman's *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's best-run companies*, we witness a vigorous development of theoretical explorations and empirical research of culture and its connections to organizational performance. The assumption within these books, that culture could be a critical factor for business success, generated a growth from 192 papers published up to 1986 (Barley, 1988) to more than two billion results on [www.google.com](http://www.google.com) in 2013, for the concepts of "national culture" and "organizational culture" altogether. The research papers, articles, books and academic syllabuses include definitions of different levels of culture and their meanings for organizational life and international cooperation, strategies for analysis, change and improvement. Although the focus on culture is seen today as crucial for organizational success (Alvesson, 2002), the use of the cultural framework is an approach conditioned in various ways.

First, historically, a certain level of development within the social sciences connected to a specific, dynamic relationship with social needs had to be attained. The chronological analysis of the organizational theory field (Scott, 1998) indicates the long dominance of rational approaches. These stress the understanding of organizational life through structural and mechanical processes and portray human beings and their interactions in social life on the basis of a rational, logical and calculative intelligence. Thus, by applying this model to the study of social life, scholars were unable to explain human behavior within organizations and society in its complexity, particularly those aspects connected to informal life (Alvesson & Berg, 1992). From the first writings about organizations in which cultural orientation is diffuse to those portraying it in a clear and explicit manner, the 20th century can be seen as an intellectual effort to clarify the natural systems perspective with a clear focus on the forces in human groups other than the rational ones (Parker, 2000). The new directions in the academic research agenda (Peterson & Søndergaard, 2011: 1541) needed to be nurtured by a fertile socio-cultural context: the American industry of 1970s, with low quality products, managers eager to re-launch a tired industry, and employees with acute needs to give meaning to their organizational life (Alvesson & Berg, 1992). In this

respect, the new approach shifted the focus of the analysis from structure to content of the culture and the socialization processes in the best companies at the time, whose internal dynamic became similar with social movements (Soeters, 1986: 302). As Peters & Waterman observed in 1982 (p. 5), as well Martin & Frost (2003: 347) restated later in their synthesis work on organizational culture, all came together with good timing to prepare the avenue for what became today a main domain in organization studies: the societal culture research (Peterson & Søndergaard, 2011).

Secondly, an anthropological explanation for the limited study, until recently, of the culture within organizations is associated with the assumed nature of the cultural background (Martin, 2002: 3). People are deeply embedded in their culture as a consequence of the socialization process, in which they learn the defined and accepted ways of coping with everyday situations. This generates cultural opaqueness or blindness (Adler, 2002). Due to its invisible ideological and symbolic features “cultural malaise” (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997: 9) may go unrecognized. As insiders, people could experience difficulties in identifying not only the features but also the limits of their own culture. By contrast, only the interactions with new cultural contexts enable people to challenge their way of thinking and acting or to question the knowledge about what is good, right, or best in specific circumstances (Cameron & Quinn, 1999).

Indeed, the increasing number of economic fusions and mergers, combined with the rise and the expansion of the multinational and transnational companies in the 20th century, nurtured the call for acknowledgement and understanding of the differences in undertaking the same business. Geert Hofstede (1980, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2004) found in his seminal work that in multinational companies people differ in respect to the value orientations imprinted by their national cultures. They display national cultural differences in social bases of cognition (Altman-Klein, 2004), in teamwork (Altman-Klein & McHugh, 2005), in the way they consider others’ perspectives during social interactions (Wu & Keysar, 2007) or achieve agreement concerning important decisions, and in the interpretation of “consensus” as a concept (Noorderhaven, Benders & Keizer, 2007). In short, the civilian experience of multinational companies demonstrates that, in order to cooperate and achieve the expected benefits from strategic alliances, managers from different countries, industries and companies have to pay attention to the internal cultural heterogeneity of their employees, with reference to their national and organizational cultures (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997; Adler, 2002).

As with multinational companies, the military is currently experiencing the same evolution: there is an ongoing process of cooperation between many national armies in various situations in peace and war time. The success of multinational cooperation depends on the way troops coming from different cultures work together in the highly stressful and complex environment of new missions. Culture is a subtle factor, less “muscular” (Winslow & Everts, 2001) and less visible compared to military technology, therefore

this chapter aims to clarify what the study of the culture implies and how the military culture approach can integrate the study of national and multinational developments.

### ***What is culture?***

In the attempt to capture its essence, scholars offered different definitions, identified contents and levels of measurement which make culture a rich, complex and difficult area to synthesize. Parker (2002) suggests a brief look at the meaning transformation of both terms “culture” and “organization” that could help the understanding of organizational culture as a multifaceted concept. “Culture” brings its meanings from biology of “growing”, combined with the social-evaluative nuance of “educate”, together with the anthropological sense of the totality of practices and beliefs within a society, while “organization” shares a double face of a noun and a verb (Parker, 2002: 81-82). In fact, the differences in the basic assumptions about “organization” and “culture” were the source for major intellectual disputes which infused the field of organizational culture<sup>22</sup> (Smircich, 1983: 339). Moreover, nowadays Vinken, Soeters and Peter (2004: 6) emphasize a disconcerting definitional evolution of culture as concept by observing its ambiguity, lack of coherence and complexity. Features alike manifested strong enough for Martin, Frost and O’Neil to conclude in 2006 that a real war was going on for conceptual hegemony; the semantic changes generated a body of knowledge about organizations that has mainly coalesced in a few perspectives (pp. 345-347).

The *Integration* perspective (Martin, 1992) offers a cluster of definitions which emphasize the collective sharing feature of culture within organizations in an attempt to understand the culture of a whole group or subgroup (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985: 471). Following this paradigm of “the unitary and orderly nature of organizations” (Clegg & Hardy, 2006: 1), authors like Hofstede (1984), Schein (1990), Triandis (1995) and Schwartz (2004) describe the culture as something (values and basic assumptions) shared by all members of a group in a wide consensus and coherence. Reviewing the cross-cultural studies in their synthesis Vinken, Soeters and Ester (2004: 8) observe that these “dimensionalist” studies aim to find “the ultimate, most frugal and yet most meaningful basic set of axes with which to explain the broad range of attitudes, beliefs, life styles and the diversity of practices among large populations across societies”. Two major directions could emerge within this perspective: the functionalist “organizations have culture” and the symbolic-interpretive “organizations are culture” perspective (Smircich, 1983; Morgan, 1986). Firstly, the propriety of organizations “to have a culture”, reflected by Hofstede’s definition is based on the assumption that the researcher can discover and perceive with high precision the true nature of the world. Consequently, it means that the culture can be objectively described, perceived

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<sup>22</sup> And this lack of debate infused later, also, the literature on cross-cultural management where the concept of culture is not made explicit and reflexive, as observed Soderberg & Holden (2002: 107)

and measured by focusing on external aspects and facts of life. Research highlights the limits of explaining the organizational life using approaches that exclude the organizational culture as variable (Hofstede, 1984: 217).

Author	Definitions of culture
Hofstede	“...the collective programming of the mind [...]. The collective level of mental programming which is shared with some but not with all other people [...]” (1984: 14-18)
Schein	“A pattern of shared basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems” (1990: 9)
Triandis	“Culture is superorganic (does not depend on the presence of particular individual), and at some point in its history, it probably adopted the specific elements of subjective culture.[...]. Frequently the elements of subjective culture become organized around central theme” (1995: 6)
Schwartz	“I view culture as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms, and values prevalent among people in a society” (2004: 43)

**Table 6** Integration type definitions of culture

Accordingly, it was essential to capture the influences of different levels or “spheres” of culture: universal, regional, national, and occupational (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997: 47) and, in order to make generalizations, to study the way these influence a specific configuration of each organizational/corporate culture. In this respect culture combined with other organizational features (structure, strategy, technology, and business concept) could explain organizational performance (profit and commitment).

Secondly, the assumption “organizations are culture” of the symbolic paradigm builds from people’s subjective significances and meanings, and thus directs attention toward a more symbolist and ideational faces of culture. Art forms and language, gossip and stories, rituals and ceremonies, beliefs and world-views are the means used by the people in order to learn behaviors that enable them to solve the problems in specific social contexts (Swidler, 1986: 273). This subjectivity is explained at the individual level through the filter of people’s memories, perceptions and interpretations and by the influences and constraints in a specific social context. Because all the people, including the researcher, interpret reality, cultural research focuses on their subjective meanings and frameworks, rites and rituals rather than on the material conditions. These meanings can also generate a metaphor, a way of seeing and thinking (Morgan, 1986), a dimension which infuses all the organizational subsystems (Alvesson, 2002). The significance of these metaphors is connected to what people need, are and do: they accept and build significance within a larger socio-cultural context. “Culture promotes a view of organizations as expressive forms, manifestations of human consciousness” (Smircich, 1983: 348) and focuses on context-specific knowledge. The *raison d'être* behind this symbolic view is the emphasis on the dynamic of organizational life, as described by Schein’s definition (see table above).

If in the first stance taken by the integration perspective, culture is a part of other sub-systems

within organization, as a metaphor, culture becomes a fundamental dimension permeating the other sub-systems and “points at the shared meanings involved” (Alvesson, 2002: 26). Together, these perspectives generate a so-called “macro-perspective” (Winslow, 2007), used specifically to offer a framework for management. However, the initial promise of the culture is to offer a tool for better management toward success (Peters & Waterman, 1982; Deal & Kennedy, 1982).

Other researchers (Sackmann, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993; Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Soderberg & Holden, 2002) contest more or less explicitly the supremacy of Integration perspective to define a single manifestation as representative for a whole culture and the unitary view which derivate from it. The main limit of this perspective is portrayed by Soderberg and Holden (2002: 108):

*“By virtue of the strong emphasis of sharedness – the assumption that all inhabitants in a nation and all managers and employees in an organization carry the same cultural value orientations- this view of culture also tend to entail blindness as regards social variation, diversity and power relations within a nation or an organization or between nations and organizations.”*

By using a *Differentiation* framework (Martin, 1992) the exploration of organizations is encouraged as places for various subcultures nurtured by people and various identities generated by occupation (accountants, officers or teachers), gender (male, female, sexual minorities), race (white, black or others), status (civilian/military), hierarchy (manager/employee) or department/subunit (as management, human resources, marketing, assembly line workers), branches (as air forces, land forces, marines) and their combinations.

Authors	Definitions of culture
Trice & Beyer	<p>“Cultures are collective phenomena that embody people’s responses to the uncertainties and chaos that are inevitable in human experience. These responses fall into two categories. The first is the substance of a culture – shared emotionally charged beliefs systems that we call ideologies. The second is cultural forms – observable entities, including actions, through which members of a culture express, affirm and communicate the substance of their culture to another” (1993: 2)</p> <p>“Most organizations have multiple cultures. Organizational subcultures consist of distinctive clusters of ideologies, cultural forms, and other practices that identifiable group of people in an organization exhibit” (1993: 174)</p>
Hofstede	<p>“Organizations have cultures, but parts of organizations may have distinct subcultures. [...]” (1998)</p> <p>“The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one organization from another” (2001: 9)</p>
Cameron & Quinn	<p>“...each subunit in an organization also contains common elements typical of the organization. Similar to a hologram in which each unique element in the image contains the characteristics of the entire image in addition to its own identifying characteristics, subunit cultures also contain core elements of the entire organization’s culture in addition to their own unique elements” (1999: 15)</p>

**Table 7** Differentiation type definitions of culture

Nevertheless, what makes a critical difference between them is the depiction of a wide palette of perceptions and opinions including of those less powerful or marginalized, different kinds of minorities within organizations (Martin, 2002: 11). The very existence of these social groups rather does not



subscribe to the idea of culture as a unifying pattern (Vinke, Soeters & Ester, 2004: 8). Subcultures develop as consequence of people's need to face and deal with uncertainties generated by their roles in different situations and in performing different tasks (Trice & Beyer, 1991: 150).

For this reason when it is about culture, the Differentiation perspective states there is no such thing as one, big, united family. Some studies focus on the inconsistencies between official, espoused theories and current, every-day practices, forms, beliefs systems and ideologies (Rollins & Roberts, 1998: 4) or identify the significant differences between various subgroups within organizations. Although the Differentiation perspective about culture stresses the existence of specific features for various groups of people within organizations, the organizational subcultures can contain imprints of broader organizational culture as in the above observations of Cameron and Quinn. In this respect, Sackmann (1992) suggests a particular approach when she describes the co-existence of a homogeneous cultural grouping with different kinds of independent and overlapping sub-cultural groupings in an organization (p. 154). Such an approach joins the macro-view offered by Integration of broader cultural unity with the differences in subcultural identities<sup>23</sup>.

Martin (1992) redefines effectiveness by accepting the fruitfulness of different views and by conceiving the conflict as a normal state within an organizational setting, and by orienting attention to the marginalized groups with completely different, sometimes opposite views about culture. In order to describe organizational culture, authors like Meyerson (1991), Feldman (1991) and Martin (1992) were stimulated by another perspective: people join organizations and are exposed to the current cultural elements (stories, jokes, dress norms and such). The ways people interpret all the elements and give meaning to their organizational life coalesce into patterns, which represent the culture (Martin, 1992: 3).

However, all three authors noticed the low level or, sometimes, lack of consensus among various ways of decoding and interpreting the same organizational reality. These observations generate important questions, such as: What is intended and what is appropriate action? What did the organization do in the past? Why and who takes responsibility for what the organization does? Focused on individuals and their understanding of organizational life, the *Fragmentation* perspective exposes the micro-level of organizational culture (Martin, 2002). This aspect is not lacking of importance. “[...] The awareness that individuals play with culture and stretch cultural concepts, and hence create hybrid and ambivalent instead of one-dimensional entities [...] prevents oversimplifications”, observe Vinken, Soeters and Ester (2004: 7). Such a contribution has to be acknowledged and accepted when doing research.

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<sup>23</sup> This perspective was also acknowledged by Hofstede's work; see Hofstede (1998), Identifying Organizational Subcultures: An Empirical Approach. *Journal of Management Studies*, 35, pp. 1–12

Authors	Definitions of culture
Feldman	“Organizational culture doesn’t necessarily imply a uniformity of values. Indeed quite different values may be displayed by people of the same culture. In such an instance, what is it that holds together the members of the organization? I suggest that we look to the existence of a common frame of reference or a shared recognition of the relevant issues” (1991: 154)
Meyerson	“In some cultures, members do not agree on clear boundaries, cannot identify shared solutions, and do not reconcile contradictory beliefs and multiple identities. Yet, these members contend that they belong to a culture” (1991: 131)
Martin	“As individuals come into contact with organizations, they come into contact with dress norms, stories people tell about what goes on, the organization’s formal rules and procedures, its formal codes of behavior, rituals, tasks, pay systems, jargon, and jokes only understood by insiders, and so son. These elements are some manifestations of organizational culture. When cultural members interpret the meaning of these manifestations, their perceptions, memories, beliefs, experiences, and values will vary, so interpretations will differ – even of the same phenomenon. The patterns or configurations of these interpretations, and the way they are enacted, constitute culture” (1992: 3)

**Table 8** Fragmentation type definitions of culture

The common element in the definitions above captures the meaning of organizational culture, connected to the practice of business, of what people think and value, how they act and what they do within a particular organization. The differences among perspectives are reflected mainly in the various approaches to identify and describe the content of culture. The culture of an organization can be found in stories members tell about people of significance for organizational life (positive or negative heroes), in rituals and ceremonies, in unique elements of jargon, in sayings and proverbs, humor and jokes, exterior/interior design (space and artifacts) and in informal practices which color the formal (structure, task, and technology, rules, procedures and financial control) life of organizations (Peters & Waterman, 1982; Deal & Kennedy, 1999; Schein, 1990). The definition can be completed with the complementary analysis of organizational members’ shared norms, values and basic assumptions, definitions and beliefs and their understanding in a social and organizational context (Hofstede, 1998; Denison, 1984; Schein, 1990; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). The organizational culture, found in visible and invisible, material and ideological forms, guides us through the patterns of meaning regarding what people are, and what they do or should be doing within organizations (Schein, 1990; Martin, 1998; 2002). At the same time, it is possible within the same organization, to find perceptions, values, beliefs or meanings that differentiate and solidify within subcultures (Cameron & Quinn, 1999) or even have a high degree of heterogeneity (Meyerson, 1991; Feldman, 1991). The last two perspectives are sustained by Parker’s (2000) observation about the competition among diverse meanings and patterns of meanings for organizational supremacy in order to define the so called “right” way of doing things. Martin’s typology is at the same time one of the best examples to reinforce Boëne’s (2008) conclusion while studying the methods in the military field: the meta-theoretical assumptions of different approaches that once applied to the study of the same reality generates this variety (p. 367).

### ***How can culture be studied?***

The various definitions and contents of the culture described above provide different recommendations on how it should be studied while subjectivity and objectivity, as epistemological positions, generate different solutions when addressing the essential issues for the study of organizational culture.

- The emic-etic dispute

Basically, the dispute focuses on the most appropriate way to describe the culture. It is the cultural insider (an emic view) or the outsider (an etic view) point of view that can generate such a depiction. In etic research, the researcher uses the theory translated into a conceptual apparatus of categories in order to build the instruments which assess the phenomena under study. “The key for an etic study is to cogently explain why these particular concepts and operations were chosen, usually with reference to both reliability and validity” (Martin, 2002: 36). The emic research brings the insider(s) point(s) of view and uses the researcher’s ability to identify the concepts suggested by the members of the culture under study. This perspective appears highly reliant on people’s ability to describe their own cultural features and draw the relevant sub-cultural boundaries (Martin, 2002: 106). Due to these features, the usual emic analysis focuses on a single culture and employs descriptive methods by emphasizing the uniqueness of each unit, contrasting with etic analysis that is rather comparative, using standardized methods in order to identify valid explanation and relations across different cultures (Den Hartog et al., 1999: 18).

Edgar Schein (1990, 2000) distinguishes between the ethnographic (insider) and the clinical (outsider) perspectives and their implications for the cultural diagnosis. In his opinion, the researcher playing the clinician role (an outside person requested by insiders) helps the organization best. This way, the clients (the managers) could be better motivated to reveal hidden organizational issues or the real meaning of organizational life to an outsider. Otherwise, organizational members have no particular interest in cooperating (Schein, 1990: 21-22). In this case, the researchers’ preconceptions are challenges to achieving axiological neutrality, to avoiding ethnocentrism and lead to failure in understanding a cultural context. In regard to defending the emic stance, Martin (1992: 191) notes that the inside researcher can better achieve the goal of a cultural diagnosis by understanding people’s actions and beliefs. She highlights the emotional and intellectual difficulties a clinical researcher faces as a newcomer. These are time-consuming and can affect the ability to gain deeper understanding of the culture. Cummings & Worley (2001) adopt a balanced approach by recognizing that each position has its own positive and negative consequences for the researcher’s actions in the field. It is difficult to keep the

etic-emic balance, but what we can do is to admit and be aware of the limits of our position while doing cultural analysis and, at least, try to enhance the positive aspects.

- Focus and breadth

The variety of studies illustrates the focus on either one cultural manifestation, such as values, as in Hofstede (1984), Quinn & Cameron (1999) approaches, or more elements, such as values, artifacts and practices, as can be seen in the works of Schein (1999) or Martin (1992, 2002). A researcher has to be aware that by focusing on one or a small number of manifestations, one has to use the implicit assumption of consistency between all the other manifestations and to accept its effect: to narrow the area of the study. A broad study of culture intends to examine a variety of manifestations and their consistency within each other. To do this extended type of study, a researcher needs to invest a significant amount of time to get an accurate picture and to keep the balance with the need to make generalizations. It is difficult to answer how much time would be sufficient and where the limit is in studying cultural elements, because each study can be seen as a narrow, focused attempt (Martin, 2002: 45). While a good theory needs to be validated through empirical analysis, it is important to focus the study on as many elements as possible.

Another point of focus is suggested by Hofstede's work on culture and is connected to the sources of information gathered. While defining an organization's culture as a property of its members, he concludes that: "information about an organization's culture should therefore be collected from samples of all these", not just from managers or executives. This stance has applicability as well in the study of values comprising the national culture model, especially in assessing the power distance dimension (Hofstede 1984: 73).

- Level of depth

Schein (1990) differentiates between three levels of culture. The *artifacts* (stories, rituals, clothing, and technology) are depicted as the most superficial and easy level to decipher. The *values* imply a greater awareness, while the cultural *assumptions* are basic, taken for granted, invisible and thus difficult to highlight. The elements of culture in Hofstede's model: "values", "rituals", "symbols" and "heroes" are also described on a continuum from a profound to a superficial level. Some researchers (Martin, 2002: 47) contest these hierarchies of cultural manifestations mainly because they use a global approach to culture and are interested in testing the congruence of people's interpretations. Moreover, they do not share the same point of view about "the superficial" character of artefacts because the search,

discovery and analysis of patterns in each level and the congruence between levels require time, effort, and most importantly, trust and acceptance from the people being studied.

Although honesty of responses is essential for cultural assessments, the in-depth, qualitative studies call for supplementary attention to the researcher-subjects interaction. This contact is less intense in quantitative inquiry because findings are limited to the subjects' self-assessment. The questionnaires are applied to random sample populations and do not consider the complexity of daily organizational life offered by the field research. For in-depth studies it is crucial that the researcher is accepted as an insider in order to achieve an emic stance. Social desirability in daily interactions compromises the quality of a study, because "only when facades are penetrated can a researcher hope to gain depth understanding" (Martin, 2002: 45). The acceptance from people being studied is imperative for the quality and quantity of the information they reveal. In fact, for a researcher, all of the tensions mentioned above become problems difficult to manage, especially when the organization in study is familiar to him but "might not be ready to receive feed-back about its culture" (Schein 1990: 137).

#### - Methodology

Prior to the increased interest in cultural studies, the social sciences were field of fierce debate regarding the supremacy of the various research methods. When compared to quantitative inquiry, the qualitative one was considered to be a less scientific approach, and was, as a consequence, differently conceptualized in academic syllabi. The field of organizational culture was criticized for observer participation in the research method for cultural analysis (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985: 458) and, thus, its capability of generating knowledge. Later, researchers who applied qualitative methodologies (Martin & Frost, 2006) noticed the connection between each perspective and a specific methodology in the cultural field. "Quantitative studies usually assume the integration perspective and adopt a managerial orientation. In contrast, qualitative studies are more likely to assume differentiation or fragmentation perspectives and to adopt a more critical orientation" observes Martin (2002: 234). Ethnographic cultural research is timeconsuming, and more difficult to be employed in studying and comparing a significant number of cultures. On the other side quantitative methods are better used to empirically test theories to make generalizations. Considering this remark, if one observes the strengths and vulnerabilities of each method the debate about methodological supremacy seems obsolete.

The increased use of mixed methods, quantitative and qualitative, is a sign that change in the methodological field is an ongoing process (Creswell, 2003: 208). Both types of research have features that recommend them as useful for organizational culture research. To generate knowledge, the quantitative methods, in which research dimensions are already conceived, can be combined with the

qualitative (clinical or ethnographical) inquiry (Schein, 1990; Martin, 1992; 2002). The growth in knowledge comes from the researcher's awareness of methodological limits, especially from those using complementary or hybrid approaches in their research design. In doing so, it would appear easy to rephrase an old Turkish proverb: "One method cannot do too much; two (or more) methods can do more than you imagine" (Soeters et. al., 2004: 354). This could become a direction of reflection, not only because the field of quantitative societal culture research continues to stimulate the field of analyses dedicated to social culture influences over organizations (p.1539), but because the link between the quantitative societal culture tradition and qualitative research is very strong, as Peterson and Søndergaard point out (2011: 1551-1552).

It is obvious, that in any kind of scientific area, if there are no questions, problems, challenges or even differences of opinion, research and knowledge do not evolve. The review of these debates aids researchers and their audience in deciphering and comprehending the limits and constraints of doing cultural research and accepting that there is no ultimate truth in a cultural assessment.

## **The military**

### ***Culture within the military: peacetime***

Parallel to the evolution in the field of civilian research, the study of military culture was firstly connected with the internal development of national armed forces and the relation to their society. The national military bodies had to adapt to post-modern warfare demands and newly defined missions and, at the same time, had to answer the question about the civil-military gap (Breslin, 2000: 2). The main questions that generated debate around the cultural issues within the military were: "If you change the principal task for which the military prepares, are you bound to change the culture?" and "How does a military organization reflect the culture of the society it serves?" (Hillen, 1998). Projects of cultural diagnoses were launched especially in western armed forces,<sup>24</sup> to initiate cultural changes, the most common form of organizational transformation (Cummings & Worley, 2001: 501). The start of any kind of change process requires having a clear picture, assessment and understanding of the present culture with inherent limits and strengths. For the military, the main purpose of these diagnoses is to identify

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<sup>24</sup> The USA, the Netherlands, Canada, UK were ahead with these projects. Later, the reform processes launched in order to reshape the obsolete ex-communist European armies copied the western model as a valid answer to their challenges of the moment

which practices are useful and which became obsolete in the light of changes over time (Dandeker, 2000: 38).

### **National history, ecology and technology**

Cultures have historical roots; they do not arise over night (Rowlinson & Procter, 1999). “To develop a culture, people need to spend time together to interact and share with each other’s common uncertainties and some ways coping with them” as Trice & Beyer stress (1993: 6). People find specific cultural answers to cope with current realities generated by the needs of adaptation and evolution. If these answers proved to be functional for society, the organization or the group, people accept and internalize these solutions that become references in future decisions about important matters. This process made them valuable and therefore worthy to be transmitted in time from one generation to another as correct ways of doing, acting, perceiving as part of cultural heritage (Schein, 1990). Perhaps the most relevant way in which history is connected to the present is suggested in Miyoshi Jager’s (2007: 7) definition: it serves as agent and process that actually determines specific, tangible and intangible cultural forms. In the open system perspective of population ecology theory (Scott, 1998: 114) the existence, the evolution and the functioning of an organization is influenced by the social environment, which is the result of interaction of social forces in time. All of this means that the seeds of how people function or behave within a nation/society/organization are planted long before, which makes the change process difficult to manage.

To study the culture of the military organizations, a part of the social system and as a public organization it means to pay attention to its specific social sources of growth that nurtured its appearance and evolution. Murray (1999) mentions the history, recent military experiences, and the geography as factors with long-term influence on military culture while Triandis (1995) acknowledges that:

*“Major changes in climate and ecology (e.g. methods of making a living, subsistence patterns), historical events (e.g. wars, conquests by another cultural group), and cultural diffusion (from migration or exposure to the products of other cultures) may drastically affect culture.”* (p. 6)

Ecology (terrain, climate, flora and fauna, natural resources) is linked to military culture because this predetermined reality requires adapted and specific military strategies and tactics during wartime. Any military action is based on a thorough analysis of the way these types of resources can be best used to gain supremacy over a defined enemy. Going one step further, Triandis (2004: 32-34) together with Suh (Triandis & Suh, 2002: 137-139) connects ecology with maintenance system (subsistence and settlement patterns, social structures, means of production) and subjective culture (norms, roles, rules, beliefs and stereotypes) in the similar way in which Max Weber demonstrated the cultural connection between protestant ethic and flourishing capitalism at the beginning of the 20-th century.

Technology and major technological revolutions in particular, generate changes in military culture because of their impact on conducting military operations (Farrell & Terriff, 2002: 2). However, developing or adopting new technologies is also a matter of current culture, since it is connected to open minded receptivity of new thinking (Hofstede, 2005: 35). As Schein indicated (1990: 36), technology is becoming a functional part of any organization when it becomes aligned with the others elements of the culture, and it implies - as well within the military organization - an imperative redefinition of cultural assumptions, job definitions, organizational structure and relations, and leadership styles (Crane et al., 2009). However, the bureaucratic character of the military generates tensions in the change required by modern information and communication technology (Givens, 2011).

Referring to the ‘weight of history’ on the shoulders of the military, Dandeker (2002) states:

*“This is the inheritance of the past in terms of the experience of war - for example whether a society has an imperial history or one of neutrality; a history of invasion or fear of invasion or one of relative security; whether the military has a long-standing position of power and prestige in state and society; or whether a society has a long tradition of conscription. In each of these three settings, decision-makers responsible for the armed forces and their relations with their parent societies face not only constraints but also opportunities in their selection and mix of the physical (equipment and technologies), the intellectual (doctrinal), and moral (ethos and personnel policies) elements of fighting power.”*

Military culture is shaped within a specific configuration of the national environment of civil-military relations as a consequence of the historical past, evident today when analyzing the struggles for democracy in the former communist countries (Forster, Edmunds & Cottey, 2003). Moreover, Dandeker and Gow (2000: 64), Coker (2006) and Soeters and Manigart (2008) assert that the national history experience, transferred into a national military ethos, can even recommend certain nations for classical peacekeeping or humanitarian missions instead of more muscular involvement in war-fighting operations. In this respect, the argument for deploying troops with a warfighting military ethos unsuited to peacekeeping can explain the failures in several peacekeeping missions. While acknowledging the failure of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Major General McChrystal (2009: 9) stated that: “[...] the conventional warfare culture is part of the problem” and a new population-centered approach is required for success. In addition, Murray (1990) observes that the configuration of a specific geographical landscape can orient each military towards specific types of thinking and approaches of war, transferred in the strategic culture of a nation. To emphasize even more the relation of dependence between military and society Janowitz (1975a: 110+) acknowledged the influence of the national economic power over the warfare, reflected in the acquisitions and the technology available at a certain time.

At the same time, the past is a source for socialization within society and organizations. Heroes, legends and stories about important people are used to set standards, values and norms and to reinforce



present expected behavior from members. Within the military, the heroes of a nation and the legends about epic behavior inspire further heroism, unify individual imagination and lead soldiers through difficult circumstances.

An organization is connected to its leaders and founders (Schein, 1990). In this respect, Rowling and Procter (1999) observe that most of the (organizational) culture studies seem to underline the vital influence of (organizational) leadership and founders. They set and manage, maintain or change the cultural configuration of culture within organizations. The changes in leadership are seen to influence directly and on long term evolution the culture of military institutions: the professional military education, the doctrinal preference, and the technology (Murray, 1990). In the same time, the analysis of the commanders' behavior explains why certain practices and values are found as valid within the military organization. These are so because, as Trice and Beyer note (1991: 153), leaders' understanding influences their use of cultural forms and other behaviors regardless of whether it is a time of innovation/change or a time for maintenance in an organization. Based on the culture they nurture with their decisions and behavior it is possible to create the next generation of leaders (Schein, 1990).

### **National culture**

The idea of national culture and its dimensions with roots in Hofstede's work (1984; 1992; 2005) assumes that "each person carries a certain amount of mental programming that is stable over time and leads to the same person showing more or less the same behavior in similar situations" (2005: 2). National cultures emerge from a particular setting, so the shared experiences within that setting shape a common vision of the world taught by all members in order to survive (Altman-Klein, 2004: 5; Triandis, 2004: 30). In the construction of these mental programs, each culture operates with its own fundamentals: values, assumptions, beliefs, practices. The values, "broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affair over others" (Hofstede, 1984: 18) or "desirable transsituational goals varying in importance, that serve as guiding principle in the life of the people or other social entity" (Schwartz, 1994: 21) are invisible and hard to decipher. The most visible elements of culture are the practices - rituals, heroes and symbols, elements that have specific meanings only in the way insiders interpret them (Hofstede, 1991: 8). Learning the values help people to discern good from evil, right from wrong and seem to be difficult to change (Hofstede, 1994: 274) since these are transmitted and learned within society starting at the earliest stages of life, through socialization processes. For this reason their study can help us decipher and understand the configuration of a culture and the magnitude of the differences between cultures studied (Hofstede, 1984). Since the first publication of Hofstede's work in 1984, many approaches to culture stress the importance and centrality of values, and this relative consensus made them worthy of study, as

Stoker (2004: 1-32; 3-16) concluded in her synthesis about the models of culture. More specifically, compared to personality or demographics, cultural values showed better predictive validity for emotions, attitudes/perceptions and were marginally stronger for behaviors (Taras, Kirkman & Steel, 2010: 415).

In Hofstede's theory (1984; 2001; 2005) five cultural dimensions are defined and conceptualized:

- 1) *power distance*, describes the way people perceive and accept inequality between individuals in society captured as the answer to the central question: what is the relationship with authority and what are the management styles ?
- 2) *uncertainty avoidance*, expressing ways of dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity within society or the extent to which members of a society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events. Cultures can value conformity, maintain a rigid code of behavior and not tolerate deviation, or they can enhance an atmosphere more permissive of variation;
- 3) *individualism/collectivism*, which concentrates on the relations between individuals and the group – some cultures stress the achievement, initiative and goals of individuals, while other cultures subordinate these to group membership and goals;
- 4) *masculinity/femininity*, deals with gender orientation, as some cultures tend to value power, heroism, motivation in achievement, performance, recognition and admiration for the strong, whereas others stress modesty, quality of life, solidarity and sympathy for the weak;
- 5) *temporal orientation*: long-term orientation, or the deferment of gratification, is defined as the encouragement of virtues oriented toward future, postponed rewards, including perseverance and thrift. Short-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues related to present and past, including respect for traditions, saving of “face” and the fulfillment of social obligations and behaviors.

The significant predictive power that cultural values described by Hofstede's model seem to have on certain organizational outcomes (e.g. organizational commitment, identification, team-related attitudes, feedback-seeking) compared to other variables (personality traits, general mental ability or demographics) offers a good premise for the study of these values (and cultural values, in general), as Taras, Kirkman and Steel (2010) concluded in their meta-analysis.

However, these dimensions are acknowledged to be an incomplete basis, as they do not exclude in-depth studies of country cultures, (Hofstede & Peterson, 2000: 404). In time, alternative approaches, with a central focus on values, developed, and these are, today, sound macro-models of cultural variation analysis at different levels, having similarities to Hofstede's model (Peterson & Søndergaard, 2011:

1543). In this respect, Triandis (1995; 2004a; 2004b) proposes a theory of cultural variation with relevance for psychological processes by developing three of the concepts used by Hofstede (power distance, uncertainty avoidance and the relation of individuals to the group). Chhokar, Brodbeck and House (2007), the authors of GLOBE Project, acknowledged their study to be an extended version of the HOFSTEDE/IRIC project, by developing and refining the national culture model proposed by Hofstede:

*“Six of the culture dimensions had their origins in the dimensions of culture identified by Hofstede (1980). Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance reflect the same constructs as Hofstede’s dimensions labeled Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. Collectivism has been broken into two dimensions: the Institutional Collectivism (Collectivism I) dimension measures societal emphasis on collectivism, with low scores reflecting individualistic emphasis and high scores reflecting collectivistic emphasis; and the In-Group Collectivism (Collectivism II) scale measures pride in and loyalty to smaller groups such as family, organization, circle of close friends, and organizational cohesiveness. In lieu of Hofstede’s Masculinity dimension, it was decided to develop two dimensions labeled Gender Egalitarianism and Assertiveness, because these attributes are stressed in Hofstede’s discussion of his Masculinity dimension.” (p. 4)*

The work of other authors like Schwartz (1992; 1994; 1999; Smith, Peterson & Schwartz, 2002) or Inglehart (1971; 2000; 2008) independently developed from Hofstede’s work became other famous alternative taxonomies. Despite their theoretical framework differences (e.g. the order and the structure of dimensions presented, the nature of the values used) similarities exist in many ways, as the analysis made by Vinken, Soeters and Ester (2004) demonstrates. Moreover, when re-editing in an extensive version of his first study from the 1980s, Hofstede compared, in 2005, his results with Inglehart’s findings, which proved to be significantly correlated with two of his main dimensions: power distance and individualism/collectivism (pp. 33, 93, 264-266). Peterson and Søndergaard (2011) admitted a clear dominance of Hofstede’s work in the category of quantitative research on societal culture, alongside previously mentioned projects. These authors acknowledge the importance of other cultural studies, less sound but important in the field of cultural research: quantitative alternatives which focus on social axioms, social structures and role conditioning in organizations, quantitative individual cultural research with focus on personal value and cognition or qualitative research (Peterson and Søndergaard (2011: 1544-1548).

Despite the more or less justified criticisms (Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2001; McSweeney, 2002), Hofstede’s theory and model have proved to be fertile in studying national cultural variation in NATO and PfP countries’ military (Soeters, 1997; Soeters & Recht, 1998, Soeters, 2000; Page, 2003; Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006). From this theoretical framework arose the military approaches to culture, aiming to improve team members’ performance in international military encounters. Altman-Klein (Altman-Klein, 2004; Altman-Klein & McHugh, 2005; Altman-Klein, Pogonis & Klein, 2000) used the time horizon, the social perception of inequality, the relationship between the individual and the group

and the tolerance of uncertainty to build their cultural lens. The perception of social inequality and uncertainty approaches were combined in Sutton's work with activity orientation (Sutton et al., 2006) and applied to crucial issues for the military cooperation: coordination, support behavior, situation assessment, roles and responsibilities.

Similarly, national-level cultural diagnoses within the military were nurtured by the "armed forces and society gap"-issue. The question addressed in this context concerned the acceptable distance between the values of the armed forces and those of society to maintain effectiveness and legitimacy of the military and civil-military relations (Feaver & Kohn, 2001). Moskos (2004: 6) suggested the military should reflect the national social composition in order to be legitimate and accepted as representative of a nation. In this respect, he recommended conscription as a social mechanism to assure military legitimacy within society for a simple reason: if political leaders don't have experience they cannot make appropriate decisions for the military organization (Moskos, 2004: 7). Dunivin (1997: 30) also considers that the armed forces should reflect the changing social norms and values: "If America expects its' military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military adopts a paradigm of culture that includes women and sexual minorities". Within the military, the nature of values held by soldiers and the ideologies from social, ethnic, national groups of origin mediates the linkage between military structure and cohesion.

### **Military culture**

Military organizations are a creation of nations, embedded within national settings and representative of the state. They reflect the social structure and the political and cultural values, so their study is culturally significant for the study of a nation (Janowitz, 1975: 110). It is this representation which influenced De Tocqueville to write in 1835: "The remedy of the vices of the military is not to be found in the military itself, but in the country" (Heffner, 2001: 278).

The military, one of the oldest and most traditional, public (non-corporate) organizations has similarities with other social organizations in terms of structure, downsizing, teamwork, management or leadership, loyalty to organization and lessons learned (Druckman, Singer & Van Cott, 1997; Dandeker & Gow, 2000). The sharp difference is made by the unique function (although in various degree) of what Janowitz (1960) called "the management of legitimized violence", in order to protect the national and, more recently, the international security (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000). In addition, the function of the military is legally authorized at central and local levels, in the same way as other "uniformed organizations" such as police and fire squadrons. Soeters (2000: 465-466) considers the following important distinctive factors for such uniformed organizations: (1) distinctive uniforms with clear meaning for inside members and outside world, (2) impartiality requirements in the interaction with

social groups, (3) greedy demands in terms of active duty and (4) assignments of its personnel in potentially life threatening tasks.

Moreover, the meaning of “uniformity” is connected to internal socialization processes. The basic education and training military units (as military barracks) become “total institutions” (Goffman, 1986: 16). The newcomers are exposed (through socialization) to an extreme type of life, by renouncing to their civilian status and learning new ways of thinking and acting to adapt to the distinctive marks of military organizations<sup>25</sup>: communal character of military life, military hierarchy and the chain of command (Lang, 1965). All of these features transform the military in a specific occupational culture (Soeters, Winslow & Weibull, 2003).

The communal character of military life is concerned with the high degree of control over personal life “far beyond their work activities” (Lang, 1986: 849). Subordination of the self to the group and the willingness to sacrifice personal life for the team in peace or war time (Dandeker & Gow, 2000: 60) combined with a 24/7 commitment and short-notice deployments, transform military organization into a “greedy” institution, in a permanent competition and/or conflict with the family (Segal, 1986). According to this feature, Moskos and Wood (1988) observed that military organizations display different orientations. The institutionally oriented military organizations tend to overlap personal and work life by inserting military families into military life. Their employees are close to the military institution, to its normative values and they are not interested in career prospects on the external labor market because their reference groups are internal. Female presence is limited to a restricted pattern which excludes combat roles. An occupational orientation, on the other hand, is diagnosed when troops consider the military “just another job”, are interested in high wages and the acquired expertise to use it in external environment. Family and professional life are clearly separated and female career patterns within the military are gradually extended. In general, compared to the military, civilian businesses look more occupationally oriented because these “tend to emphasize leisure time, private life and performance-based material gains” (Soeters, 2000: 468). Military organizations in different nations display different degrees of institutionalism and occupationalism within their culture.

Military organizations socialize their members to respect military hierarchy and display, especially in peace time, all the bureaucratic features in the deepest Weberian meaning: specialization, rational decision making processes and formal rules systems, within a strong hierarchy. “The hierarchical structure exemplified by the military chain of command postulates a downward flow of directive” and its correspondent “upward flow of information” (Lang, 1965: 852). Adler & Borys (1996) differentiated the

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<sup>25</sup> For the same purpose of socialization during the training period, recruits in the military academies have to suspend contact with the outside world for a specific period of time

features of coercive and enabling bureaucracies. Coercive logic stresses the importance of rules and regulations, while the enabling logic “provides frames of reference designed to help employees do their jobs more effectively and to reinforce their commitment” (Soeters, 2000: 469). This last type of bureaucracy seems to facilitate the mission oriented command philosophy, according to Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), which is more important in some national military than others.

Connected to hierarchy, discipline is a state of order generated by the compliance with rules, obedience toward authority and the way organization deals with disobedience. Soeters (2000: 47) opposed the formal to functional discipline. In the formal version of discipline, the soldier “salutes the bars not the man” (Janowitz, 1960: 44) and places a higher importance on ceremonial discipline with emphasis on the appropriate behavior according to rules (saluting superiors correctly; polished outward appearance - uniform, boots, and helmets). The functional discipline offers a broad orientation view that enables soldiers to act properly in specific situations. Analyzing the challenges within modern military organizations, Janowitz observed the need to change the system of authority based on domination and rigid discipline (with punishment methods) toward other forms, more of indirect control with emphasis on positive reinforcement (1960: 40-42). Self-discipline of the individual soldier is a standard that can be instilled by paying attention to core values teaching in initial training periods and sustaining these during its service (Capstick, 2003: 51).

The work within military organizations is exposed to the permanent dualism between peace, the “cold” side of preparation, and war, the “hot” side of the audit. These features confer a two-sided, Janusian imprint (Soeters, 2000: 446). In peacetime, in the absence of a violent challenge, organizational life runs in an administrative manner, with a “train, exercise, maintaining the force and simply be there daily routine” (Soeters, 2000: 473). This has possible negative consequences: the “irrationality of rationality” effects within bureaucracies (Ritzer, 2000), the trap of super-activity and autocratic ideologies (Parkinson 1955; Odiorne, 1978), strong inertia (Janowitz, 1960: 46-47) and the possible recurrence of boredom (Soeters, 2000: 473). Hot conditions look critical, dangerous, violent, ambiguous and intensely stressful (Vogelaar & Kramer; 2004). These require, as Soeters (2000: 476) observes, flexible groups in mission with a “can-do” mentality, often a critical attitude toward outsiders, with a high level of trust among soldiers from different ranks inspired by emotionally and culturally intelligent leadership. These enable the adaptation of military organizations to the realities of battlefield instead of imposing its leaders’ pre-war conceptions (Murray, 1999: 141). The bureaucratic features of military organization can alienate the need for flexibility and adaptability to new challenges. In this respect, to overcome the daily tasks of cold time administration, to adapt to the concrete realities of the field and to transform the lessons

of warfare into knowledge in order to save lives, provides the classical definition of “victory” for contemporaneous military organizations.

While describing military organizations, Dandeker and Gow (2000: 59) observe the formal and informal sides of culture. The formal culture is organized on four levels: (1) the vision, expressed in the mission statement, (2) the policies and guidelines for action, (3) the procedures and rules and (4) the prohibitions. People also share their values and beliefs, and “the major difficulties in implementing change within is how to translate the formal culture into the informal culture and practice of personnel”. Schein (1990) made a fine distinction between the displayed values, theories of the people/company and the theories in action to explain what really guides people’s behavior.

Military culture comprises “an amalgam of values, customs, traditions and their philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has created a shared institutional ethos. From military culture springs a common framework for those in uniform and common expectations regarding standards of behavior, discipline, teamwork, loyalty, selfless duty, and the customs that support those elements” (Winslow, 2001). Because it is shaping organizational life “military culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, but also in the processes involved in military innovation, which is essential to preparing military organizations for the next war” (Murray, 1999: 27).

### **Military subcultures**

Within the military organizations, each of the services or branches has their own unique, separate and distinct culture as a reflection of different history, missions and the environment in which they operate. “There is no such a thing as one single occupational culture of uniformed organizations” concluded Soeters (2000: 466). Military subcultures are a matter of organizational pride through commitment to that part of the organization that is considered essential to one’s performance (Murray, 1999; Soeters, Winslow and Weibull, 2003; Fischer, 2006).

*“In the Army there is a requirement to close with and kill the enemy in comparison to the greater <action at a distance> characteristic of the other services. Especially in the Army frontline, people are asked to do a variety of tasks in changing and hostile terrain. In the Royal Navy, by contrast, the ship and demands of the sea whether in peace or war tie the individual into the web of obligations comprising a cohesive unit.”* (Dandeker& Gow, 2000: 60-61)

The subcultures of Air Force and Navy are seen as more technologically driven; the wide-spread belief in the Air Force subculture is that technology could make possible a new and better way to fight and win the war (Murray, 1999: 144-145). Mastroianni (2005: 78) adds another internal feature which differentiates Army from Air Force subcultures: the relationship between enlisted men and officers. In the

Air Force there is no need for pilot officers to be taught the flight by their NCOs. The need for a strong bond is more obvious within the Army where the officers' success depends upon their ability to learn from their NCOs and use their help to successfully lead.

Since culture reflects an organization's roles, missions, structure, history, and doctrine (Fischer 2006: 3), this view enables the researcher to see military culture as a pattern of subcultures, rather than as a monolithic structure (Murray, 1999). When military subcultures come in contact, in a successful way, the key elements are the relationship between commanders, the willingness of the units to learn from and understand the culture of the other and the amount of time available before combat in order to reduce cultural barriers (Tucker, 1994). Differences in conceiving and prosecuting war specific to military subcultures appear to be the other edge of the sword for the concept of "joint forces". Subcultural diversity may then become a source for separation and conflict rather than a successful emergence of a joint military culture (Fautua, 2000; Fischer, 2006).

Other sources for subcultural diversity are the organizational status: civilian or military; the rank: officer, NCO or soldier; as well as gender, race and ethnicity. All of these coalesce in identities and build the self-definition of a person.

### ***Culture and multinational military cooperation***

The second need for a cultural audit of the military was generated by the internationalization of military life. It is worth mentioning that Cold War tensions postponed for 20 years the scientific study of multinational structures and missions. In 1993, Rubinstein indicated the need for an anthropological perspective to study the "multilateral peacekeeping" with a focus on culture and symbolism (p. 550). In 1995, Palin defined culture as one of the problems in multinational military contingents/ structures (p. 1). Elron, Shamir & Ben-Ari mentioned, in 1999, the general lack of "previous attempt to offer explicit, systematically developed formulation of the cross-cultural problems encountered in multinational forces and of the means used to solve them" (p.73). Similar observations were made by Duffey (2000) and Dandeker & Gow (2000), while Vom Hagen et al. (2003: 35) underlined the need of a more "concept or theory driven", rather than "descriptive" approach, for assessing military multinationality.

The marginal position of culture in military approaches of efficiency should not surprise, observed Murray in 1999, as long as the military concept of "interoperability" that describes the ability of forces to work together was only used in its narrow technical systems engineering sense. This refers to an association with the visible aspects of hardware and software systems, the compatibility of military weapons or the ability to exchange data and telecommunications. Jelusič (2007: 37) completed the explanation of the under-development in this field by the strong reluctance of some military authorities to



allow any field research among peacekeeping troops. Researchers such as Abenheim (2008) provide evidence of this reality:

*“In my own experience as a promoter of intercultural expertise [...], I have found a general institutionalized resistance to conceive of matters in the sense of the whole, in favor of an overemphasis on tactics and technology, all at the expense of inter-cultural expertise.” (p. 8)*

However, the failures in multinational military operations (Strader, 2006) were steps toward a steady acknowledgement within general military theory of the need to study multinational forces and their impetus in contemporaneous operations from a cultural perspective (Coops & Szvircsev, 2007; Soeters & Manigart, 2008). Constructs such as “cultural interoperability” (Winslow & Everts, 2001), “co-operability” (Delanche, 2001) or simply “non-technical interoperability” (Stewart et al., 2004) were conceived in order to focus attention to a new variable. Culture is the “less muscular” pillar (Winslow & Everts, 2001) of the multinational forces and a “soft factor with hard consequences” for international military life (Soeters, 2000).

The diagnoses using Hofstede’s model (Hofstede, 1984; Hofstede, 2001) on peace times showed a consistent cultural heterogeneity of national military cultures, similar to civilian business or public administration, whatever the character of the sample: cadets from national military academies (Soeters, 1997), officers-students from NATO Defense College (Soeters & Recht, 2001) or from NATO and PfP countries at the NATO School in Oberammergau-Germany (Page, 2003). According to Soeters (2000) when compared to the culture of civilian organizations, military culture seems to display a supra-national pattern: more bureaucratic, hierarchic and institutional. This similarity across national armed forces is a fertile ground for international cooperation. However there are quite some differences too. There is still a high need for a better understanding and overcoming of the cultural differences because none of the military cooperative efforts has yet succeeded in transcending the individual national strategic culture (Coker, 2006) or national “logics” (Uiterwijk, Soeters & Van Fenema, 2013). The cultural settings shape differences among nations in respect to teamwork (Altman-Klein & McHugh, 2005), leadership styles (Soeters, 1997; 2002; Soeters et. al., 2004; Sutton et al., 2006), communication and coordination mechanisms (Elron, Shamir & Ben-Ari, 1999; Altman-Klein, 2004; Van Dijk, 2008; Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008; Uiterwijk, Soeters & Van Fenema, 2013), representations about “respect” and “discipline” (Soeters, 1997), and organizational practices like patrolling, fighting and control of an occupied foreign area (Soeters et al., 2004). Differences in hierarchy matters could create tensions within the multinational force (Soeters et al., 2004) and cause collisions among military cultures, thus endangering cooperation (Soeters, Op den Buijs & Vogelaar, 2001; Soeters & Bos Bakx, 2003). Also, multinational cooperation showed cases of different interpretations of the same rules and procedures as a consequence of national and organizational settings (Fitz-Gerald, 2003), a reality of even more concern.

NATO countries used the national military experiences acquired from multinational missions (Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq or Afghanistan) and tried to learn from their failures (Strader, 2006), which gave impetus for more focus on cultural research in the field of international military cooperation. Cultural perspectives were applied to analyze and explain the failures of several missions (Winslow & Everts, 2001; Fitz-Gerald, 2003; Winslow, 1999; Coker, 2006). Military cooperation was studied during peacetime, training and simulations situation (Soeters & Recht, 2001; Page, 2003), during missions (Soeters et al., 2007) and, in multinational temporary research efforts or permanent structures during peace and mission (Vom Hagen et al., 2003; Soeters et al., 2004; Tomforde, 2005; Coker, 2006; Vom Hagen, Moelker & Soeters, 2006; Coops & Szvircev, 2007, Leonhard et.al, 2008; Uiterwijk, Soeters & Van Fenema, 2013). The studies used a broad range of quantitative, qualitative or mixed methodologies (focus group, questionnaire, semi-structured interview, participant observation, distinct or in combined design). For this reason the research of the military field offers a more balanced and diverse palette of methodological approaches and avoids futile tensions in the methodological area, although during missions the speed and the high risk more often relied on the use of qualitative methods (Coops & Szvircev, 2007; Soeters & Manigart, 2008).

To study “multinational (combined) forces” (comprising diverse national forces from the same branch, e.g. Air Force), the researcher has to pay particular attention to the national and organizational level of culture and the evolution of intercultural relations. In “joint multinational forces” (forces from different nations and military branches) sub-cultural influences add more pressures to the military command and control system. Thus, it is no surprise that the main question raised by the international military cooperation was how this “collision of cultures” can be managed to accomplish the mission (Cooker, 2006). The cultural differences generated a *multinationality paradox*: armed forces are dependent to cooperate and “the dependence of states on these coalitions vitiates the very military effectiveness of the deployed forces” (King, 2007: 251).

It becomes clear that soldiers’ professional training has to include, simultaneously, specific military skills and those facilitating work in a multicultural environment. Inter-cultural competence can improve soldiers’ awareness of their colleagues’ way of being, performing the job, comprehending or reacting to the same reality. In this way, inter-cultural competence can enhance the ability to advance creative solutions to shared problems (Soeters, 1997).

### ***Intercultural training***

The intercultural training evolution is the consequence of the acknowledgement and study of the cultural challenges within international military operations and the result of permanent updating of

various national military experiences with lessons learned. Although different terminologies were used to define this effort, to understand interactions with others (military and civilian partners, local population, the adversary), a social science background was essential. Intercultural competence was viewed as a capability, ability or a framework to facilitate this understanding. These two categories describe in fact two types of realities: the need for a scientific background in order to explain the differences (lens) and a personal effort in order to learn, understand and apply this knowledge in multinational encounters (competence, adaptability).

Authors	Terminology / explanation
Sutton, Pierce, Burke & Salas, 2006	Cultural competence is a key enabler of decision making in these complex command and control (C2) configurations and form the basis of team adaptability and performance. Cultural adaptability - the ability to understand one's own and others' cognitive biases and to adapt as necessary to ensure successful team performance.
Altman Klein, 2004	Cultural lens – a framework to understand the cultural differences between people
Wunderle, 2006	Cultural awareness – the ability to recognize and understand the effects of culture on people's values and behaviors
Berry, 2004; Hofstede, 2005 Soeters et. al., 2007	Intercultural competence
Ang & Van Dyne, 2008	Cultural intelligence – capability of an individual to function and manage effectively in situation characterized by cultural diversity; a complementary form of human intelligence

**Table 9** Terminology describing efforts connected with cultural learning

In this respect, the participants in international military cooperation could be better helped by applying the guiding principle established by the Lessons Learned Bureau of the Netherlands Armed Forces: “to know one’s own culture first, then the other culture and subsequently attempt to find solutions to cultural differences together” (Soeters, Op den Buijs & Vogelaar, 2001: 60). This assertion has three precious practical implications.

Firstly, it invites people to be aware of the limits of their own ideas and to be cautious with their own cultural assumptions while working in a multinational context. Secondly, it defines an increasing need to depict the cultural backgrounds of partner organizations through valid scientific models and to create a common cultural data base to facilitate the process of learning and to create instruments used for learning processes. Thirdly, it clearly states that the burden of finding solutions requires a collective effort. Above all, the most important observation related to afore mentioned recommendation is the positive perspective about intercultural training. Professional intercultural training, observes Soderberg and Holden (2002) was too much oriented to prevent the “culture shock” instead to be conceptualized as a resource for competitive advantage and learning.

Berry’s work (2004: 179-181) suggests that training for intercultural competence should emphasize the existence of both cultural differences (surface, visible) and cultural similarities (deep level) because, if only one level is recognized, there will be errors in mutual understanding. He focuses on the need to increase the participants’ awareness of human errors in perception, stereotypical thinking and

attitudinal evaluation of both groups. In this context, the third recommendation is to strive for integration strategy, the least stressful attitude based on the idea that the knowledge of one's own cultural roots provides a secure basis for establishing intercultural relations. This could be a solution, similar to the one suggested by Soederberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg in their work (2007: 196). Due to the military culture settings, the leadership has higher importance in comparison with civilian business, especially in international military cooperation. To strive for a common in-group identity and to emphasize the commonness and commonalities are useful strategies in building the cohesion (Elron & Beni Ari, 1999; Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006; Elron, 2008).

Pre-deployment situational awareness training responds to soldiers' need for accuracy, so they can fulfill their mission, and offers a picture close to the mission environment. This is achieved by informing the participants to a multinational military mission about the political and economic situation in the host country, as well about customs, traditions and religion of the local population. For example, in 2004, the US Marines introduced sensitivity lessons about the social culture of places where soldiers deployed, with "do's and don'ts", taboos and etiquette as part of their training. The complexity of battlefield realities and the situations encountered by soldiers during their missions made authors like Salmoni (2006) consider this kind of approach obsolete while requiring more in-depth cultural knowledge. In this respect an important step was to build valid scientific models to assess and understand the cultural differences and include them as a specific part of the training of the military forces (Sutton<sup>26</sup>, 2006; Wunderle, 2006). Moreover, since 2005-2006 the cultural awareness syllabi added cultural tactics, techniques, procedures, the use of translators, continuing with the development of the skills needed to succeed in cultural diverse environments. Yet, these improvements needed time to be fully integrated in the organizational life and proved, as yet, not to be enough for the success of the mission.

Despite these developments, the impact of intercultural training is still limited, as Winslow, Kammhuber and Soeters (2004: 403+) observed. The practice of pre-deployment cultural training was and is still not integrated in the "train as you fight" national doctrine of all nations, and sometimes it is not part of the pre-deployment training that is expected to be rather a national responsibility. Not all the countries seemed to be interested in doing cultural analyses and having databases of cultural lessons learned. Consequently, the soldiers' performance varies during missions.

Yet, if troops have the possibility to train together before common missions, situational awareness can be achieved as the first step toward facilitating (cultural) contact. Going further, as a consequence of changes in military mission types, the scientific arena mirrors the debate about the possibilities of

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<sup>26</sup> As GlobeSmart Commander or GlobeSmart Soldier, interactive software designed for cultural training

teaching soldiers to play different roles, from war-fighter to police and peacekeeper. This is doubled by a discussion about the feasibility to change the training of the military for the new missions that require a complex repertoire of skills (from physical to social) as described in Chapter 1 (pp. 1-5).

### ***Learning issues***

In *Organizational learning: a theory of action perspective*, Argyris and Schön (1978) describe organizations in a -then new- perspective: as systems capable of learning in order to attain the best possible performance. As such, if a match or mismatch occurs in the planned actions, organizations can create those conditions for people to become learners from mistakes as well as from successes. Two forms, single- and double-loop learning were identified to occur in the workplace. Single-loop implies a focus on learning that occurs when matches are created or when mismatches are corrected by changing actions. Instead, if people are first examining and altering the governing variables and, just after this, the actions, double-loop learning takes place (Argyris, 2003: 68). However, identifying organizational malfunctioning is considered just a step toward any learning attempt. Argyris (2003: 231-233) shows that this process doesn't occur spontaneously, and focuses on two important barriers which have to be overcome in order to make learning possible within organizations. First, this effort is individual because people within organizations become the agents responsible for the behavior that lead to organizational learning. During socialization, as part of the education received in various settings (family, peer groups, school) they learn how to deal with difficult situations. If they learn to perceive a situation as a potential threat or embarrassment they become inclined to act defensively and rather not to acknowledge publicly the error to be corrected. For this reason there is a cultural variability in the way situations are defined (Argyris, 2003: 232). The second impediment seems to stream from the internal organizational space: policies, routines, practices and actions that protect people to experience embarrassment or threat. These are having a boomerang effect in turn by preventing people to question the nature in military organizations of the perceived situations as such and become a source of unlearning.

The individual and the organization share the responsibility of organizational learning, while from all members, leaders and managers have the key-responsibility. Their actions can foster the climate for building learning organizations. "Learning is avoided when leaders do not attribute failure to internal causes" states DiBella in a more recent analysis about the impact of leadership actions in military organizations (2010: 119).

Like other organizations, the ability of the military to learn from its past and more recent experiences (during peace and war times) is a process socially conditioned (Argyris, 2003). The update of organizational knowledge in lessons learned is transferred to military doctrine, the most important formal

document to prepare the military organization for its missions. Historians, Murray (1999) considers, have often suggested the need to pay attention to the study of the last wars and the lessons derived from these experiences as a prerequisite to win next military confrontations. In this respect he states clearly that any failure to consider the last military experience explains why military organizations fail in the next mission (p. 28). Applying such theorem to the analysis of national and international military operations requires commanders' entire attention and rigor. The common saying among soldiers of different nations "*Train as you fight*" emphasizes in fact the call for a joint vision of war and peace, in which the linkages are the lessons learned from past experience(s) projected to accomplish future missions.

As the oldest bureaucracies, military organizations were acknowledged for their imperviousness to innovation and change which was a consequence of the unintended effects inherent in their organization structure, procedures and culture. At the same time, the difficulty of assessing the efficiency of public organizations in peacetime brings another contribution to this state of matters. In private-market oriented organizations efficiency is measured financially and the time between changes and results can be easily quantified in results; for the military however, the exam of its capabilities is during operations. Sometimes there is a long period of time between training and operations and militaries need time to see if the pace to run the business set by leaders during peacetime is the same when confronted with the tough operational reality. The functioning of the military in a bureaucratic administrative manner during peacetime (Soeters, 2000) always becomes a challenge, especially when excessive formalism changes the active military spirit with an administrative tempo (Alevra, 1916).

In his book about the influence of organizational culture within the military, Nagl (2005: 10) discusses internal and external sources for innovation by addressing five basic questions to describe how each branch becomes a learning institution. If generalized to the level of the entire military these articulate the main topics:

- a. Does the military promote suggestions from the field?
- b. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
- c. Does the organization regularly question its basic assumptions?
- d. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?
- e. Are standard operating procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally, or imposed from the center?

The images these questions portray are those of permanent and functional communication flows in both directions, upward and downward, as prerequisite for a possible organizational learning within the military. DiBella (2010: 121) identifies similar barriers in the military like those described by Argyris

above, generated by the relation between subordinates and superiors in command. These realities become rather constraining on the military since its specific inertial processes rather inhibit ideas coming from individual actions or from internal impulses. For these reasons Davidson (2010) concluded that catalysts of learning in the military are originating either in critical/dangerous situations (failure or survival opportunity) or in the external environment (civil-military relations challenged by political agenda or changes in technology). While acknowledging different ways of sub-cultural learning within the military (DiBella, 2010: 119), to have “strategic corporals and flexible leaders” are two recommendations derived from recent military operations to be implemented by those armed forces aspiring to become learning organizations (Petraeus, 2006: 46). At the same time, the internationalization of military life seems to facilitate the processes of learning and making learning easier than ever in the history of the military. In contact, soldiers of different nations have the chance to disseminate different way of solving situations that can enhance military international cooperation, once that soldiers are cultural aware and able to surpass cultural barriers previously discussed. At returning in their home-countries commanders in key-positions are becoming again the main organizational actors facilitating the update of organization with new lessons from the field.

### ***Final theoretical considerations***

Even if separately presented and sometimes incompatible (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985; Winslow, 2001), the various approaches of culture are not disconnected realities. The stances emphasize the organizational culture as subject and object at the same time. As newcomers, we find within organizations, beliefs, assumptions, values, rules and norms and other cultural elements that are expected to be learned, understood and practiced in daily interactions. Next we learn how to interpret the organizational reality and also we are building new meanings and give new dimensions to the organizational life. Organizations share a common part of regularities and features, which make comparative studies and generalizations possible. Yet, variability creates specific cases that require symbolic approaches (Druckman, Singer & Van Cott, 1997; Berry, 2004). It reveals the need to consider an inseparable, dual nature of the concept of organizational culture. It is a way to acknowledge that the social reality is more complex than a single perspective can explain.

In every organization recurrent, different, fluctuating or unclear themes occur. A “one perspective approach” will limit the researchers’ chances of a more accurate comprehension of the culture. In this context, Martin’s (1992; 2002) conclusions about the need for a broader theoretical framework for study appears normal. It helps to avoid the blind spots inherent to a single perspective on the culture, by using a

pluralistic approach, at any single point in time, from all three perspectives<sup>27</sup>. The result it offers is a more complex and inclusive portrait:

*“When any single organization is viewed from all three perspectives, a greater understanding emerges than if it were viewed from any single perspective. If any cultural context is studied in enough dept, some things will be consistent, clear and generate organization wide-consensus. Simultaneously, other aspects of the culture will coalesce within subcultural boundaries and still other elements of the culture will be fragmented, in a state of constant flux, and infused with confusion, doubt and paradox.”* (Martin, 1992: 6)

This approach means considering military subcultures’ (formation, evolution and content), and the way these interact within the military. It also requires paying attention to those people who have alternatives, different points of view and ambiguities, with the purpose of gaining a complete and broad understanding of organizational life. In this respect organization studies, as well as the military sciences have space enough to integrate the study of this diversity. Winslow’s analysis (2007) demonstrates the benefits of this pluralistic approach, from macro- to micro- level, while describing the influence of each level upon army sub-culture formation and understanding. Finally, it depicts various cultural elements analyzing them with of a variety of methods. The ideal study of a culture combines idiographic and nomotetic, emic and etic, qualitative and quantitative approaches, both equally necessary and complementary ways to depict the same reality (Hofstede, 2001: 26).

In addition, the military literature suggested that the cultural audit of the current military culture needs more than a three perspective framework. It requires the integration of at least two other dimensions:


- internal, with a combined effort intended to study the historical past, with a diagnosis of current culture. The reason for such a complex study is to understand and explain the present culture. The national culture values and various patterns are stabilized over long periods in history, observes Hofstede (2001: 1). Schein (1990) explains that these patterns are the valid answer that helped to solve two major issues of the group and society: survival and functionality, and were transmitted from one generation to another. For this reason, the history is the key in beginning to understand the cultural settings crystallized in the minds and hearts of present generations (Hofstede, 2001: 11), and a rich source of learning. It can be completed with the study of geography and technology, which impacts on the way national armed forces are doing their military business (Murray, 1999). More specifically, it helps the understanding of certain doctrine orientations and combat choices. Nonetheless, the pluralistic approaches of culture in civilian organizations (Martin,

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<sup>27</sup> Similarly, Sackmann (1992) concludes about the possible triangulation of the results studying behaviors, artifacts or other manifestations with the information gathered about cognitive elements in order to assess the congruence between theories and practices, especially within organizational space (p.140)



1992; 2002) with key ideas from psychology, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, systems theory and psychotherapy (Schein, 1990:314) permeate the current approaches of military culture;



**Figure 2** Integrating national and multinational contexts in the study of military culture

- international, during the fulfillment of missions in a multinational environment. This approach is imperative since the settings of a military culture on peacetime shall be transferred to the way of operating during mission. The intercultural encounters in current military cooperation redirect attention toward human interpersonal and group processes and dynamics (Coops & Tresh, 2007; Soeters & Manigart, 2008; Soeters & Tresch, 2010). People transmit to future colleagues their experiences, auto- and hetero- stereotypes and perceptions about others during multinational exercises (Soeters & Recht, 2001) or missions (vom Hagen et al. 2003; Moelker, Soeters et al. 2004; vom Hagen & Soeters, 2007; Leonhard et al, 2008), enhancing or hampering any cooperation and affecting the mission success. Today, the understanding of international military cooperation through the eyes of the participants is an essential step toward tomorrow's improved action. The purpose of the study of international military cooperation is to highlight the multinational level of

military cooperation through the depths and interdisciplinary nuances, a guideline connected to Caforio's (2007: 1) observation:

*"[...] the increased complexity, diversification and importance of the military function imperiously call us back to interdisciplinary, cross-national studies of the military. [...] because both the problems and the dimensions of the deployment of national armed forces now amply exceed the confines of individual countries and can no longer be studied and solved in a narrow national perspective."*

However, the internal and international levels of the cultural studies are intertwined. In this regard, Abenheim (2007) considers the study of history through the lens of intercultural expertise, so important in the study of multinational military encounters:

*"...if one embraces the best that historical scholarship has to offer as regards the link between war in the past to society, culture, economy, and politics then one has made a step in the direction of education for intercultural expertise" (p. 9)*

The closing loop of the cultural studies regards the emergent lessons learned. Modern warfare asserts that the learning process is the key to integrating the experiences in current training and formal documents to lead the entire organization (Petraeus, 2009; DiBella, 2010) and, accordingly, enhances the chances of success in future military challenges. However, all the above mentioned aspects amplify the complexity and difficulty of any attempt at military culture research, and consequently a cultural diagnosis should be seen as a collective rather than an individual research effort.

## CHAPTER 3

# ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES - YESTERDAY AND TODAY

### *Culture and history in Romania*

About 2000 years ago Cicero<sup>28</sup> emphasized the importance of history by stating that

*“Not to know what happened before you were born means that you will always remain a child. For what is the life-experience of a man, unless it is interwoven with the memory of the past, together with the experience of our ancestors?” (XXXIV/121)<sup>29</sup>*

This reflection has particular relevance to Romania and its armed forces. After the Second World War, with the installation of communism in Romania, a newly created historical context was endorsed to support and legitimize the existence and actions of an all-powerful Soviet “friend and savior” as well as the Communist Party (Ciurea, 1956: 215-217; Diener, 2001: 150-151; Deletant, 2006: 262). As Watts (2010) observed recently, Romanian historiography was deformed more than any other, “not only recasting the pantheon of national heroes and enemies of the people, but attacking the very ethnogenesis of the Romanian people; a unique phenomenon in the region” (p. 186). The fall, in 1989, of the “illegal and criminal regime”, as communism was called later, in 2006, by the Romanian President<sup>30</sup>, brought hope of a true history being returned to Romanians, who had, for more than forty years, been given a falsified image of their past. In this vein, the flourishing of historical writings and research nowadays is more than legitimate: it is mandatory.

It was expected that historical topics would be openly debated, studied and published, through the collection of oral and written memories, the study of communist secret service archives in Romania and Russia, the healthy functioning of the National Council for Research on the Communist Secret Service Archive (CNSAS), as well as through projects initiated by the Romanian Academy (The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism), the Romanian Institute for Recent History and the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania. Created in 2000, the CNSAS was the custodian of the Romanian Communist Secret Service Archives and had the mission to reveal the truth about the communist period.

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<sup>28</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC); writer, politician and great Roman orator

<sup>29</sup> “Nescire autem quid ante quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse perierum. Quid enim stultas hominis, nisi eamemoriarum veterum cum superiorum aetate contexitur?” according to Sandys, J. E. (1885). *M. Tulli Ciceronis Ad. M. Brutum Orator*, Cambridge: University Press, p. 125

<sup>30</sup> According to the Speech of the President of Romania, Traian Bănescu, on the occasion of the Presentation of the Report of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania CPACDR, The Parliament of Romania, 18 December 2006 at [http://www.presidency.ro/pdf/date/8288\\_en.pdf](http://www.presidency.ro/pdf/date/8288_en.pdf) accessed in August 2008. However this report was fiercely condemned by the The Association of the Romanian Political Ex-Detainees and by the Romanian Orthodox Church for its unscientific and internationalist character with lots of omissions and errors. See [http://civicmedia.ro/acm/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=343&Itemid=49](http://civicmedia.ro/acm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=343&Itemid=49) accessed in May 2011

This institution provided evidence on political police activity and collaboration of some major actors in current political life (Negruțiu, 2006). National media (Tănase, 2006; Comoroni, 2008) identified problems in the proper functioning of CNSAS and advanced the theory of subversive political influences to explain its observable vulnerabilities. The decision to restructure all CNSAS activities in 2008 sustains these views<sup>31</sup>. In 2010, new media scrutiny publicised evidence on the incompatibility of a CNSAS member, due to conflicts of interest, while the organization addressed the issue very late, in 2012, after the accused lost its membership (Roncea, 2012). Moreover, the Reports of the Senatorial Commission created in 1991 with the purpose to investigate what happened in 1989 in Romania were not officially published to date. This is an indication of the existence of forces that still obstruct truth finding in Romania.

The purpose of this chapter is to create a coherent image, from a social science perspective, of the important organizational changes in the Romanian military, using 1989 as an historical landmark. “The history of the Romanian Armed Forces during communist times is not completely clarified”, wrote Hlihor (2004), one of the most important contemporary military historians. In 2003, through Florin Șperlea’s voice, the younger generation of military historians highlighted the lack of “*sine ira et studio*” approaches to the study of the national Armed Forces after the WWII. Above all, two military historians, Opreș (2003: 391) and Șperlea (2003: 3), acknowledged the difficulties in accessing archives and, thus, the impossibility of analyzing this still forbidden part of modern Romanian history. The general picture of recent attempts to rediscover the true history of Romania and its armed forces seems built on memories of the communist era published abroad before 1989 and publications after the fall of communism, mostly in Romanian, while papers published in international languages (English and French) are quite scarce. Fortunately, the recent opening of CIA and Warsaw Pact archives, together with initiatives such as the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, or the Cold War International History Project, became valuable sources of information for research (Watts, 2010).

In this respect, in order to describe the period before 1989, books and articles from various fields were used as references. History books, newspapers, fiction and non-fiction civil and military literature, Communist Party and military official documents and statements published in Romania and abroad helped to reveal the harsh reality of communist Romania. The publication and reading of many books used in this chapter were forbidden in communist Romania. There was a law which punished anyone caught reading these sources or accessing those considered by the communists as against the party line, or

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<sup>31</sup> The Romanian Government passes an Emergency Executive Order governing the access to political police (Securitate) files after Romanian Constitutional Court declares CNSAS unconstitutional

labeled as dangerous, with hostile content (Troncotă, 1996: 267; Cordoș, 2010: 70+). In fact, these sources were describing a different history, inconvenient for the purposes of communist officials and hidden by blatant censorship from the people entitled to know it (Giurescu, 1996: 177-189; Deletant, 2006: 5, 262-263). At the same time, people who knew the real history and publicly or privately spoke of it, were severely harassed, imprisoned, tortured or eliminated from social life by the members of the political police, while their families faced lifetime ostracism (Bacu, 1971; Diener, 2001).

Parallel, it has to be acknowledged that for the period after 1989, bibliographical resources addressing civil-military relations in Romania are scarce, especially any published in English or French, and those that do so analyse these relations rather in terms of formal changes within the Romanian military. This can be seen as an under-development in national military sociology, while the public forum is dominated by the national press, which offered mainly useful information in order to understand the complexity of the topic and to help connect with the content of civil-military relations in Romania.

After the Second World War, important changes were imposed on Romanian armed forces, by the Yalta Agreement. Focusing on the communization process, the first part describes social life within the military which lasted more than 40 years. Romanians did not accept or want communism, so a lesser known aspect of Romania, introduced here, concerns the armed resistance movement in the mountains. After 1989, the fall of communism brought the expected project to reform the Romanian armed forces in order to become compatible in international security structures, such as NATO. The main topics of organizational life are critically addressed: civil-military relations, leadership and corruption, structure and composition, and public opinion issues. As mentioned in previous chapters, delving into recent Romanian history is the key to explaining and understanding current culture. Today, especially, when an official military history is not yet published, there is a need to gather and archive data in order to describe with accuracy this part of Romanian reality. Analyzing the past in order to understand the present can also offer the key to a better future.

## **The aftermath of the Second World War**

### ***The dramatic year 1944***

Nine months before the end of the Second World War, on 23 August 1944, King Michael I of Romania and some political figures decided to take leadership of the state in a *coup d'état*<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Including General Sănătescu, the leader of the new formed government after 23 august 1944, used this term in his published memoirs; see Jurnalul Generalului Sănătescu [General Sănătescu's Memories], (2006), Humanitas: București, p. 166

This meant breaking relations with the Nazi Germany and joining the Allies (Deletant, 2006: 238-244)<sup>33</sup>. Such action continued the way opened by extreme political solutions spread in Europe (as in Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) at the end of the 1930s (Țiu, 2009: 16) within a continent facing a Great Depression. It is in this complex conjuncture that in Romania flourished the royal dictatorship of Carol II (between 1938 and 1940), whose mistakes determined its replacement with a nationalist-legionary<sup>34</sup> regime (1940-1941) and later with the military dictatorship of Marshall I. Antonescu (1941-1944) (Mann, 2004: 264).

In his radio proclamation, the King specifically ordered Romanian troops to cease hostilities against the Soviets and to turn the fight against Germany. This implied opening Romanian territory to Soviet troops, suddenly transformed from foes to friends, and letting them advance freely through Romania. By doing so, the war was clearly shortened with an earlier capitulation of Nazi Germany<sup>35</sup>. All international political actors were assured that this was a good decision, especially based on Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov's declaration in the name of the Soviet Government on 3 April 1944, which pledged non-interference in Romanian affairs<sup>36</sup> (Rieber, 2004: 62).

However, from 1944 until their late formal withdrawal in 1958, the Soviet forces behaved like an occupying force in Romania. "The Russians robbed everyone, because of the war [...] they scared to death people in the cities; people are running in all directions. At the Presidency, we are receiving reclamations from all the places where Soviets arrive" noted General Sănătescu in his Journal of 1944 (2006: 168). Having granted open gates to Romania, with no written documents (Chirnoagă, 1986; Constantinescu, 2006) "the Red army responded by robbery, murder, rape, and wanton destruction" as fugitive Romanians testified before the US Congress<sup>37</sup> in 1954. This behavior was the subject of numerous reports, like the one of the police inspector from Constanța informing the local authorities about the Romanian mariners' refusal to serve together with Soviets, due to the bad treatment which they

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<sup>33</sup> The Romanian leader, Marshal I. Antonescu was arrested and condemned to death later, in 1946 as happened with all those fought against Soviets; this step appears at strange, to say the least, seeing that in 1943 Marshal Antonescu started negotiations with the Allies in order to change the Romanian position in the war, according to Baci (1990) and Deletant (2006: 230-233). Regarding Antonescu's seizure of power Deletant (2006) analyses the complex conjuncture that lead Carol II to compromise monarchy and abdicate; he mentions as decisive the popular uprising in Bucharest after signing Vienna's Award (pp. 47-50, 54-56). The successor, his 18 years son, Mihai, invested General Antonescu to be the leaders of the state. Deletant (2006) examines in a balanced manner the Romania's decision to join Germany in WWII (pp. 45-52).

<sup>34</sup> For a more balanced approaches of the Legionary Movement's origin see Deletant (2006: 30-31) and for it's role in the legionary state see Țiu (2009: 177-178) and Deletant (2006: 55-68)

<sup>35</sup> American Admiral Leahy and General Marshall testified about the prime importance of this change, according to Baci, N. (1990). *Agonia României 1944-1948. Dosarele secrete acuză*. [The agony of Romania 1944-1948. The secret files accuse]. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, pp. 29-30

<sup>36</sup> According to the United States Congress Special Report n.11 on The Communist takeover and occupation in Rumania (from now on USSpRp11CTOR) (1955), p. 5

<sup>37</sup> "This aspect of the Soviet Army's behavior in Romania was emphasized in the committee's hearings in Washington, D. C., on December 2, 1954. The witnesses, among them Mr. Fărcașanu and Mr. Romanos, described the behavior of the Soviet soldiers as that of: <savage bandits, ravaging the countryside, shooting livestock, even cows, setting fire to farmhouses, stealing cars by stopping them on the roads and throwing their drivers into the ditches> " in USSpRp11CTOR (1955), pp. 7-8

had to endure (Moşneagu, 2004). Further, on the front line, Romanian troops joined the fight with the Soviets, under their leadership. Their attitude of taking by force and menace remained unchanged. Mariana Drăgescu, the single survivor of the famous White Squadron<sup>38</sup>, recalls in her memories of the front lines in Slovakia that force was the only element in the Soviet soldiers' behavioral repertoire (Focşa, 2007). In one instance, as Drăgescu evoked, the Romanian commander of her unit was threatened with gunfire by Soviet regular soldiers. This sort of humiliation, which Romanians, regardless of rank, had to endure from Soviet troops, was just the beginning. After 23 August 1944, despite the verbal promise, Romanian soldiers were treated by Soviets on the battlefield as enemies, and consequently captured and deported to the Soviet Union as prisoners of war<sup>39</sup>. The great majority never returned. Some of those who did were specially selected and indoctrinated as part of the so called "communist divisions". Once attached to the existing armed forces structure in 1944 and 1945, these divisions became major factors in the political indoctrination of the Romanian military (de Sola Pool et al., 1955: 82). The other part, military personnel with low organizational status, who could not be used for work, returned in Romania to 1945<sup>40</sup> after their harsh Siberian experience. These abuses were known but, because of the sympathy Soviet Union enjoyed in British and American eyes for their military contribution to war, "unfavorable comment in some British newspapers about Soviet behavior in the countries it occupied at the close of the war was discouraged until the advent of the Cold War [...]" (Deletant, 2006: 3).

In October 1944, in Moscow the leaders of the Great Powers, I. Stalin and W. Churchill decided on influence within the region according to the percentage agreement (Churchill, 2002: 273). Although there are contradictions about this agreement's time-span<sup>41</sup>, this small document, approved by US president T. Roosevelt<sup>42</sup>, decided the destiny of the Romanians for the next 45 years: 90% Soviet influence and 10% the others allies' influence (United States and Great Britain). Nowadays it is quite clear that the following year's declaration of Yalta about a promise to support democracy in all European countries did not refer to Romanians for one simple reason: their destiny had already been decided.

The documents regarding the formal armistice with the Allies were negotiated on September 12 and were signed on October 25 in Moscow under great pressure. Romanians were advised by Western

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<sup>38</sup> The White Squadron was a unique unit in WWII comprising exclusively women military pilots with a medical first-aid mission. Their accomplishments are described in a unique book *Escadrila Albă* [The White Squadron] written by the Romanian historian Daniel Focşa

<sup>39</sup> The number varied between 230.000 up to 300.000; see de Sola Pool et al., 1955; USSpRp11CTOR,1955; Constantinescu, G. (2006)

<sup>40</sup> Sănătescu, op. cit., p. 212

<sup>41</sup> The dispute is whether the percentage agreement was initially proposed (USSpRp11CTOR,1955: 6; Smith, 1985; Churchill, 2002: 273) or not (Baciu, 1990: 66+) for three months

<sup>42</sup> "We were disturbed that your people took this matter up with us only after it had been put to the Russians", declared offended the President Roosevelt, contesting the lack of American participation in this matter, in a telegram to W. Churchill in 1944 (Churchill, 2002: 101)

representative to negotiate directly with Soviets (Rieber, 2004: 63). Throughout this time, the Soviets watched that Romania did not get recognized as an ally and this made the imposition of harsh peace conditions possible (Midan, 2006). According to Dobre, Nanu and Toader (2005), the Romanian representatives were threatened with the total extinction of military forces that were still within the national borders by the Allied Commission of Control, which was dominated and totally controlled by Soviets. It is no wonder that under these conditions, the Romanian officials agreed with the Romanian-Soviet military protocol on the closing of units larger than battalions, before the 1st of December 1944 (p. 26).

Disregarding its own official edicts, statements or plans made within Allied Control Commission about respecting the sovereignty and unchanging social structure in Romania, the Soviet Union played a parallel game in order to rule according to the percentage established (Șperlea, 2003: 31; Rieber, 2004: 63-64). This condemned Romania to be subject to the Sovietization process, which changed the way of organizing and running society, including the military. The life style and mentality imported from the Soviet Union were imposed by terror throughout society, as subsequent pages describe. Under the slogan “democratization of society”, the Sovietization process in Romania focused on changing the main institutions of social structure, such as public administration, police, armed forces and secret services. They created three main forms of control: military, political and economic (Chirot, 1978: 460-462; Miroiu, 2004a). This happened with the West’s tacit approval, as acknowledged later by the US President, G.W. Bush at Riga in May 2005<sup>43</sup>.

### ***Green light for purges: 1945 and after***

Since the first communist contacts with the Royal Palace in May 1944 (Sănătescu, 2006: 152, 163) and the nomination of the communist representative L. Pătrășcanu in the government formed by King Michael I on 23 August, the involvement of communists in country’s internal affairs had become systematic and not without dubious intentions (Giurescu, 1996: 177-189). The decisive step came on 6th March 1945, when the small Communist Party<sup>44</sup> with less than a thousand members (Staar, 1971: 155) helped by the Soviet Red Army and NKVD agents succeeded in imposing by force a communist government led by Petru Groza, profiting from the political crisis. Staar concluded about the communist party: “in 1944 its reduced leadership consisted mostly of Russian-trained Jews, Ukrainians, and

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<sup>43</sup> “President Bush said Saturday the United States played a role in Europe’s painful division after World War II — a decision that helped cause <one of the greatest wrongs of history> when the Soviet Union imposed its harsh rule across Central and Eastern Europe”, see <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1399973/posts>

<sup>44</sup> Due to Soviet intervention in the current political life, its members were part of the government after 23 august 1944 according to Constantinescu. G.(2006); Baciu, op cit, point of view confirmed also by Sănătescu, op.cit in his memoirs; Staar (1971) describes the leaders of the communist party in 1944 as “[...]consisted mostly of Russian-trained Jews, Ukrainians, and Hungarians” (p. 162)



Hungarians” (1971: 162). The same opinion is shared by Zamfirescu (2008: 71-74), whose analysis goes further, indicating the content of NKVD action directions for the countries under Soviet influence together with the real name of those vested with important state and government functions. Chirot (1978: 460) describes even in more details: “the Romanian C.P. in the 1940s was weak, filled with opportunists, directed almost entirely from Moscow and advised by resident Soviet officials, unpopular, inexperienced, and [...] frightened of itself”. Accordingly, there is no other way to understand this dynamic in such short time<sup>45</sup> just if considering the imposition and the terror period that followed after the communists came to power in Romania.

During its first meeting next day, the new government raised the problem of “the re-organization of armed forces” (Zainea, 2004: 51). More specifically, the main goal was “the abolition of the army in its present form and the establishment of a new army” made out of the communist divisions, “as well as of all the officers activating now on the Soviet territory” (Chiper & Constantiniu, 1996: 153). This meant to put Romania in a defenseless position. According to Carp (1956) and Bukovski (2002) there are three factors to explain the takeover, control and destruction of RRAF, and its transformation into “People’s Armed Forces”.

Firstly, after 1944, the complete operative national armed forces were dislocated to fight outside the country, under Soviet command. By doing so, the General Staff of the ROAF lost the command of its troops and the Soviets could install undisturbed their commanders in all important Romanian units. Secondly, the War Ministry<sup>46</sup> was in Soviet hands and was enabled to systematically intervene in Romanian political life. And least, to prevent any resistance, large bodies of Soviet troops were deployed in key-positions in the country, able to intervene at any moment. According to the authors aforementioned Bucharest, the capital, was also surrounded. In this manner, the Soviets could center their attention on the changes inside the military.

According to Șperlea (2003), the reorganization of the military followed three main lines of action:

1. the elimination by any means of the military elite from the RRAF,
2. the creation of a new wave of soldiers, obedient to the Communist Party, indoctrinated with the new “democratic” mentality by the propaganda structures,

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<sup>45</sup> In order to understand the dynamics of Romanian postwar period authors like Bottoni, (2010) suggest the need for a reevaluation of other two variables: the popular support and party rivalries on the political scene. However this statement and his analysis are not combined with archives information that proves the decisive contribution held by Stalin through his secret service agents’ (NKVD) and Red Army’s actions in Romanian post war governments and their contribution in paralyzing any resistance activity that explains this dynamic (USCCCA, 1954; USSpRp11CTOR, 1955; Chirot, 1978; Nelson, 1988; Chiper & Constantiniu, 1996; Rieber, 2004; Zamfirescu, 2008; Watts, 2010)

<sup>46</sup> This structure is equivalent to the current Ministry of Defense

3. the politicization of armed forces using a political instrument: the Higher Directorate for Education, Culture and Propaganda (DSECP) transformed later after 1950 in the Higher Political Directorate of Armed Forces (SPDAF).

In a short time, the number of Romanian divisions was reduced from 50 in 1944, 17 in May 1945 and to seven in 1947, while its troops were reduced from 1,100,000 to 138,000 soldiers according to the Peace Treaty (Duțu & Dobre, 1997: 9). Although a normal process after a war, the downsizing of the RRAF was controlled and imposed by Soviets, without relating it to Romanian society's needs (Sănătescu, 2006). Some assessments (Bachman, 1991) estimate the purges as up to 30% of total forces. After August 1944, the communist government decided to change the military law system in order to clean the “bourgeois elements with a retrograde mentality from the armed forces” and “to punish those guilty for the actual disaster of the country and for war crimes”. These quotes are from the Law number 312 of 1945, adopted for punishing those members of the military who prepared and supported (in all ways, including politically) the entry of German troops into Romanian territory, those who declared war against the Soviet Union and Allies, and those who left the national territory to serve the “cause of Hitlerism” (Zainea, 2004: 51). For the first time in the modern history of Romania, soldiers' imprisonment was possible on the basis of their past activity.

The Soviets prepared lists with names and ranks of the military personnel they wanted to purge (Sănătescu, 2006: 175). Pages of official documents, with the names of 69 generals, 1137 officers, especially superior ranks and 2223 NCOs purged between 1945 and 1946 were recently revealed by Zainea (2004). Using the expression “the mandatory retiring” from the Law number 768 from 19 March 1945<sup>47</sup>, the new communist power arbitrarily eliminated those “active duty military personnel that overflows the armed forces requirements [...] according to the decision of the Minister of War”.

Also Zainea (2004) completes the view about this “cleansing” process by adding documents that confirm the cancellation of all medals and war awards received by 110 Romanian soldiers (officers, NCOs and privates) between 1942 and 1943 based on the accusation of fighting against Soviets troops and interests. Using the new laws<sup>48</sup>, the Soviets could decapitate the leadership of the RRAF. Duțu and Dobre (1997) present the case of 33 generals imprisoned, some of them without even knowing the accusations and spending many years without getting any answers to their letters sent to authorities to find the official accusations. Many “were put out of the armed forces, some for good reason, but many because they were disliked by Soviets”, as General Sănătescu (2006: 197) confirmed in his memoirs.

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<sup>47</sup> This information was published in Monitorul Oficial nr. 65 from 20 March 1945 (Zainea, 2004)

<sup>48</sup> Especially the Law 186 (768) of 19 March 1945, published in Monitorul Oficial nr.65 from 20 March and art. 48 of law 196 of 27 January 1944 published in Monitorul Oficial nr.23 from 28 January 1944

According to Carp<sup>49</sup> (1956: 357), in 1946, 9000 officers and 5000 NCOs were dismissed en masse, an action that no doubt entertained the fear installed after 1944. Their replacements were loyal Soviet communists and counselors (Miroiu, 2004a), some with names changed into Romanian to be more convincing to others, secret agents and highly reliable Romanian communists (Zamfirescu, 2008: 71-72). The last, publicly presented as people with a “rich revolutionary activity steeled in the fight with the class enemy in the cruel years of underground activity”<sup>50</sup>, were often personnel deserted from the RRAF in the Soviet Union or returned prisoners of war, all indoctrinated with communist ideology (Bachman, 1991; Cătălan & Stănescu, 2004: 38-50; Zainea, 2004: 53).

In 1945, the law punishing the interference of soldiers’ political orientation with their military activity was abolished and replaced by a new one to generate the politicization of the military. “One of the main duties of every soldier” is to eulogize the communist political leaders (Șperlea, 2003: 44-45). Those officers and NCOs doing otherwise were easily labeled as “dangerous”, “reactionaries”, “anticommunist” or “anti-democrat” and carefully noted for liquidation (Carp, 1956: 357). They lost their military career and were subjected to trial and imprisonment or extermination after harsh physical and/or psychological torture, being accused of incompatibility with or lack of adaptability to these “new and democratic type of armed forces”. These were people who lived in Romania before the war, had strong hopes for a healthy pluralistic political life after the war, and rejected the Sovietization of Romania. Due to the fierce unwillingness to accept communist ideology, another part of high ranking military personnel, accused of “hostile activity against the workers’ movement” and “the people’s democratic regime”, was eliminated by massive downsizing or imprisonment (de Sola Pool et al., 1955: 85-86).

The national elections in 1946 were a moment for new abuses. A few days before the elections, all generals were ordered to gather in Bucharest to listen to the political program of the communist government. The War Minister explained why it was mandatory for the armed forces to vote with the communist government and he nominated the communist general Lascăr<sup>51</sup> to organize the voting system for the armed forces, with elections centers in every unit. For the first time in its history, the Romanian military was ordered to organize a public demonstration and show support for the communist government. After this unique order General Sănătescu in 1946 (2006: 233) realized with sadness that there is “[...] no question of freedom in these elections, as the government preaches” – and as Soviets had promised in the Yalta Peace Treaty. After the fraud of the elections, the destiny of the Romanian military,

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<sup>49</sup> Mircea Carp (b.1923) - officer dismissed from the Armed Forces in 1951 for his anticommunist activity. He was a journalist, assistant-director of the Romanian Department of Radio Free Europe and chief of the Romanian Department of The Voice of America

<sup>50</sup> In history books this was the official portrait of the first communists in Romania

<sup>51</sup> Leader of the second communist division formed in Soviet Russia named, in a manipulative way, “Horia, Cloșcași Crișan” after the leaders of the folk movement for liberation from imperial domination in the Middle Ages

as of the whole country, was delivered into Soviets hands (Chirot, 1978: 460). From that moment on they decided which officers and NCOs were to be accepted or dismissed. King Michael quit Romania at Soviet request after two years of ruling without authority. In the Popular Republic of Romania proclaimed on 30 December 1947, nothing was done without Soviet supervision and approval.

There is no doubt that the new armed forces built between 1947 and 1948 were not designed to become operational but rather a structure filled with people loyal to communists, to assure the stability of the regime in case of a social uprisal or even to control the people in case of general conflict (Midan, 2005: 172).

### ***Imposed change of the social structure of the armed forces: 1948-1955***

With the spring of 1948 came the onset of the Cold War and the progressive creation of “the people’s military” (Midan, 2006). The structure of armed forces, military laws, rules, regulations and instructions, ranks and uniforms were copied from the Soviet military model to ensure ROAF subordination to the Communist Party. There were even failed attempts to conceive a military doctrine that supposed to combine national with Soviets elements (Duțu, 2007: 64). The term “Sir” used in addressing each other in the military was deemed to be “bourgeois” and declared unsuitable to the new conditions of the new “democracy”. Accordingly it was replaced with the communist “Comrade”.

Carp (1956: 370), officer in the Royal Armed Forces during the war at that time, remembered:

*“By the spring of 1948, units of the Romanian army began to be equipped with Soviet and Czechoslovak war materiel (later with East-German equipment), military training was being carried out according to Soviet manuals, and Soviet army officers were assigned to units down to independent battalion level as <counselors>.”*

This conformity went so far, mentioned Giurescu (2003: xv), that when Nikita Khrushchev officially visited Bucharest in 1951, he declared himself totally surprised by the identical Soviet uniforms worn by the guard of honour.

Parallel with a structural reorganization, encompassing mergers, disbandment and attachments of new units<sup>52</sup>, the political control of the Communist Party over the military was also accomplished. Șperlea (2003: 87+) analysed the complex intricacies of this process. A political apparatus within every unit down to company level was built. The new Higher Directorate for Education, Culture and Propaganda (DSECP) had the main role to select soldiers and to take care of their indoctrination with Marxist-Leninist education. This structure worked hand in hand with the counter-intelligence section that

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<sup>52</sup> This is the case of the communist divisions “Tudor Vladimirescu - Debrețin” an armed division brought in Romania in 1944 and “Horia, Cloșcași Crișan” later in 1945, according to Rieber (2004: 71) and Sănătescu, (2006). A late analysis of Miroiu (2004a) shows that all Chiefs of Staff of Romanian Armed Forces named until 1989 and even after had stages of command or activated within these communist divisions

had to supervise and to check the orthodoxy of soldiers in accordance with the communist ideology. In order to do so, lists of communist and non-communist members were ordered from the beginning of Higher Political Directorate of Armed Forces (SPDAF) activity, and, once identified, the extermination of personae non-grata was much easier.

Opriş (2001: 592-602) mentions the General Order number 24 of 30 July 1949 that defined political advisors' shared responsibility together with the military command for the operative, political and administrative settings of a military unit. From that moment on, he observes, the principle of the unity of command had been undermined by the political control of the Party of military decisions. Until the abolition of communism, the double military and political command undermined the functioning of the military, a reality well-disguised by the communists between 1950 and 1954, concludes the same author. During these years the SPDAF was led by Nicolae Ceauşescu, a supporter of the centralization of power in the Communist party leaders' hand.

A new military oath was adopted in 1949, soldiers swearing to serve the country with loyalty and devotion. Additionally, they had to swear "to hate from the depths of my being the enemies of the fatherland and of the working people"<sup>53</sup>. If doing otherwise, soldiers asked to be subject of "the hatred and contempt of the working people of Romania". While, for instance, the Polish Oath of 1943 directed hate toward a clearly identified enemy, the Germans, in the Romanian case the enemy was vaguely defined; this was a convenient strategy to attach the label of "traitor" to any person who could not accept communist ideology. The removal of the hate element from the military oath after 1972 shows that the communists considered their mission of eradicating any opposition accomplished, and they could start building the "bright future of communism".

Later, in 1956, in the book coordinated by Cretzianu and published in United States about captive Romania in Soviet hands, Carp (p. 372) depicted his experience within the armed forces of those times:

*"There can be no true esprit de corps where reciprocal "revolutionary vigilance" is prescribed. Fear there can be and there is, but what loyalty can flourish in such a climate? Isolated and indoctrinated though they are from morning till night, the men and officers cannot help but be poignantly aware that things are going from bad to worse in the cities and villages, that their own kith and kin suffer increasing hardships both on the land and in the factories. They are only too well aware that they themselves as individuals are powerless to change things, that they have no chance to band together with their fellows to force a change. Can this make for high morale?"*

A low educational background of military personnel was one of the most important selection criteria that served the regime to control and manipulate the people by making them dependent and

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<sup>53</sup> According to „Preluarea modelului sovietic privind stabilirea gradelor ofițerilor inferiori și a formulei jurământului militar” [Taking Soviet model of establishing lower grades officers and military oath formula] retrieved at [http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/arhiva\\_biblioteca](http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro/ro/arhiva_biblioteca) accessed in March 2008

obedient, and by annihilating the fighting capability of the new military. In the new communist vision, only the sons of workers and peasants, and the so called “progressive-minded” and “democratic intellectuality” could satisfy the needs of the communist armed forces (Carp, 1956: 371; Duțu, 2007: 60). Accordingly, for the communist Ministry of Defense E. Bodnăraș, the 29% of the recruited officers having modest social origins in 1947 was an unsatisfactory reality. The strengthening of the “cleansing” measures had the expected results: in 1950 about 42% of the soldiers were sons of peasants and workers, while in 1955 more than 84% were of “proper” social origin (Bacon, 1978; Giurescu, 2003: XIV; Șperlea, 2003: 126). The educational level of the troops experienced the same downward trend, and in 1955, from the total officers recruited for the Romanian People’s Armed Forces (RPAM), a percentage of 61 had graduated from elementary school, 10% followed but did not finish high school, 22% graduated from high school and only close to 7% had academic education (Giurescu, 2003: XIV, XVI). One year or even several months of education were sufficient for the soldiers to advance within the military even to a superior officer rank. A significant example is the case of general I. Hortopan<sup>54</sup>, who was promoted to colonel in 1962 with only a high school diploma (Șperlea, 2003: 133). These data combined with other official communist party documents enabled Giurescu (2003) to conclude that, in 1955, the change of the social composition of RRAF was broadly accomplished. This supports Nelson’s earlier evaluation (1988: 179).

According to Laws number 67 and 69 of 1948, the main requirement for promotion, i.e. the proficiency in Marxism-Leninism (Carp, 1956: 360), was in practice surpassed in importance only by the political dossier of an officer or NCO and by the political “educators” references<sup>55</sup>. Political education was defined and treated as one of the pillars “that could enhance the value” of the communist military” (Opriș, 2001: 594). For many years from now on professional evaluation within the military emphasized the communist orientation and was conditioned by the political membership and activity of all soldiers, “in function of their democratic commitment” (Șperlea, 2003: 129-130). In the same manner, the political officer’s references and not those of his commanding officer represented the supreme business card of a soldier in all situations. “The only significant change is the total control of the party over the choices”, no matter the rank: inferior or superior; if for the first the decision rests within the military, for the later, it is mandatory the acceptance of the political line from outside the military (Midan, 2005: 96).

In 1949, after lowering the educational and recruitment standards within the military, students from military schools (officers and NCOs) were hardly able to locate the Danube and the Carpathians on

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<sup>54</sup> He became the Chief of Staff of Armed Forces in 1976 and later, in 1989 he was one of the leaders of the repression in Romanian social uprising of December

<sup>55</sup> According to Carp (1956: 358) these were DSCEP members and part of the “Tudor Vladimirescu” first unit within the communist Romanian Armed Forces, affirmation confirmed by Sănătescu (2006) in his journal

the map, and were incapable of understanding anything in communist political lessons (Șperlea, 2003: 136). This nurtured a saying in Romanian social and military culture that ridiculed the degradation of the educational level of the officers, well known by older generations: “What is the difference between a train and an officer? An officer has (graduated) just two more classes than a train”.

According to the new law adopted in 1951 by the ministry of defense, military personnel could be fired or demoted to the rank of soldier only because “political reasons made impossible their use as officers” (Șperlea, 2003: 153). In this way the communists had a legal basis for new arrests because “The Ministry of Defense (...) is the specialized organ designated to achieve the military policy of the Romanian Communist Party” (Miroiu, 2004a). After 1953, the military and communist leadership seemed to accept the failure of the selection and education system and reconsidered the old appraisal, criticized as “bourgeois”, with respect to the importance of serious knowledge in soldiers training and military business. Unfortunately, the political mandatory requirements (to be member of communist party and have a communist orientation) did not lose their relevance. The new policy stated their equal status: “the political qualities have to be doubled by the professional ones” (Șperlea, 2003: 130).

However in the spirit of this political guidance, the conscripts labeled with “unhealthy social origins”<sup>56</sup> formed the so called “work detachments” and were sent in places that had nothing in common with military training (Bumbeș, 2006). They could receive assignments either from the General Direction of Military Constructions, a new structure of the MoD that institutionalized forced labor, or from other ministries like Transport or Constructions. After 1949, the Danube-Black Sea Channel became such a destination for them. Surnamed “The Channel of Death”, because it was a place where all political detainees were exterminated, The Danube-Black Sea Channel was a project started at Stalin’s orders (Sfetcu, 1997). It represented an impossible venture after a huge economic war effort, especially because of the lack of appropriate technology. Troncotă (1996) quotes from official documents signed in 1954, about the inhuman practices applied to detainees once arrived in the “gulag of terror”: beaten with iron rods, spades, shovels, whipped; sick prisoners denied medical attention and forced to work outside, imprisonment in cells open to the sky in winter (detainees inadequately clothed or even naked), forcing them waist deep in cold seasons to cut reeds and rushes; warders on horseback pursuing and trampling prisoners, prisoners kept naked in winter, punished by being kept in freezing water until noon; tying and keeping tied prisoners’ hands, prisoners tied and kept (...) naked during the summer, day and night, to be bitten by mosquitoes, prisoners buried alive (p. 268). The intention of the system was that they die slowly and painfully (Chiper & Constantiniu, 1996: 134). Combined with working with bare hands and

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<sup>56</sup> Which means their parents didn’t accept communism and/or fought against it in various ways

rudimentary tools this treatment resulted in high rates of mortality, sufficient to eliminate “unhealthy elements in society”. From 1944 to 1953 after Stalin’s death, when these practices stopped temporarily, Romania became a huge forced labor camp with prisoners of all social categories, including the Romanian military. In 1954 people of different nationalities testified for the United States Congress on Communist Aggression about

*“[...] the same story: the inhuman nature of real life under communism [...]. A dreadful world of mass murder and anonymous graves, of concentration camps, torture prisons, slave labor camps, the ever present secret police, and hatred; hatred, beyond comprehension [...].” (p. 5)*

### ***Intermezzo: No to Communism in Romania! The Armed Resistance Movement***

In 1947, according to the Peace Treaty of Paris and under the pretext of ensuring communication connections with the western front, Soviet troops gained international acceptance to remain on Romanian territory (Opriș, 2003). However, militarily occupied by Soviet forces until late 1958<sup>57</sup>, Romanians did not accept communism. An important survivor of ten years of communist incarcerations, Corneliu Coposu, testified in one of his last public interviews after 1989<sup>58</sup>, just before he died, that Romanians did not want to accept Sovietization and did not give up hope of a free country.

Although in the western world the view of a submissive attitude of Romanians toward Sovietization is widespread this is definitely not historically correct (Rostaing, 1997: 278; Deletant, 1999: 225). A taboo subject for over 45 years of communist history the Romanian Armed Resistance Movement (RARM) was organized in Romania between 1944 and 1962, which is not well known within the international historians’ community (Brișcă, 2002: 75). The hatred toward the Russians, who invaded Romanian territory several times in history, was much too prevalent among Romanians simply to give up (Baciu, 1990: 23; Sănătescu, 2006: 187). The United States Congress Committee on Communist Aggression (USCCoCA, 1954: 23) described the situation in Romania at that time in a more balanced way but with accuracy. After his emigration, King Michael’s deposition, in front of the same committee endorsed the same version (p.15) of the next statement:

*“The persecution and moral sufferings of the people have not been able to thwart their opposition and resistance to Soviet occupation and communism. Groups of patriots hiding in the mountains are keeping alive the spirit of resistance and sabotage under appalling conditions, as they lack arms, food, clothing, and medical supplies. The whole of the Rumanian population is opposing the regime through its passive resistance. It is of course a fact that any resistance entails the most horrible reprisals. At the*

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<sup>57</sup> The formal status of “occupation force” of Red Armed Forces in Romania changed overnight in 1955 into “friendly forces” when the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) birth certificate was signed. Although they left Romanian territory in 1958 Romanian historians do not speak about a total retreat of Soviet forces as happened in Austria. The official diplomatic discourses after 1989 are hardly using “occupation force” to describe Soviet troops presence; rather is preferred the more neutral “retreat of Russian troops” (e.g. Pașcu, 2007)

<sup>58</sup> Coposu, C. (1914 -1995) retrieved at [http://www.memoria.ro/?location=view\\_article&id=1647](http://www.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=1647) accessed in May 2008



*committee hearings, in Washington, D. C. on December 2, 1954, an illustrative incident on the occasion of a national demonstration on November 8, 1945, in Bucharest, was mentioned:*

*Mr. BOTOSANI. I know that after the demonstration many young people, boys and young girls, were arrested by the Communists. The girls were abused, raped by the Communists and sent back to their parents.”*

Yalta’s promises to protect the democratic world nurtured Romanians’ hopes for a possible allies’ intervention to liberate the country. According to Baciu (1990: 55-66), it seems that Romanian strategy for the aftermath of the Second World War was built on the false anticipation of a possible arrival of allied troops in Central Europe. This illusion, transformed into a strong belief, played the main role in the organization of the Resistance movement in Romania<sup>59</sup> (Eremia, 2006b: 75). At that time there was little awareness of what the former British Prime Minister Churchill (2002: 96-106, 272-275) mentioned later: Romania and the other East-European countries were traded in order to keep Greece within the British and United States sphere of influence, and, as a consequence, the allies were not interested in intervening and helping these countries escape from the Soviets. Based on this agreement, the Soviets occupied Romanian cities and villages until 1958, aware that no other ally would intervene in its business. The atrocities committed are still alive in people’s memories (Budeanca, 2007).

In this respect the RARM started internally in the autumn of 1944, as a spontaneous form of popular opposition to the Soviets in northern Romania, where the Soviets entered first, and spread throughout the country (Diener, 2001: 146; Brișcă, 2002) and externally, being prepared by the Romanian exiled legionnaires<sup>60</sup> in Germany and later Austria (Biddiscombe, 1993; Beldiman & Honciuc, 2007; Țiu, 2009; 2011). According to Romanian historians Beldiman and Honciuc (2007), the legionnaires were parachuted in Romania and organized the resistance movement as part of a scenario: a large scale military action in South-East Europe to surprise the Soviets (125-127). The plan didn’t function and the legionnaires joined in guerrilla fighting alongside others: officers, administrative personnel of the previous government and historical political party members, students and many peasants, the last being outlawed because their refusal of collectivization imposed by the communist system (Biddiscombe, 1993: 147; Deletant, 1999: 228; Brișcă, 2002; Beldiman & Honciuc, 2007: 130; Țiu, 2009: 147).

Brișcă (2002: 75) identified 20 zones of armed resistance all over Romania. The Carpathian Mountains were the main hiding place of these groups (Ionițoiu, 1993), so the knowledge and practice of

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<sup>59</sup> The saying “Long live the partisans until the Americans come!” is the title of a book appeared in 2008 printed by Fundația Academia Civică and signed by Aristina Pop-Săileanu, one of the few survivors members of the Anti-communist Resistance from North part of Romania; see also Viorel Opreanu in Budeanca (coord, 2007). *Experiențe carcerale în România comunistă* [Prison Experiences in Communist Romania], IICCR, p. 145

<sup>60</sup> According to Țiu (2009; 2011) before the coup on 23 August 1944, the Legionary Movement was somewhat paralyzed and its leaders were refugees in Germany. Nazi Germany decided to cooperate with I. Antonescu, the leader of the country, while hosting Legionary refugees on its territory and keeping them relatively inactive. Under the wing of Nazi Germany, shortly after the coup on 23 August 1944, a “general headquarters” was established in Vienna by Legionary refugees to initiate an internal anti-Soviet movement in Romania. Only from that moment on was there collaboration between the Legion and the Nazis in order to initiate an anti-Soviet movement in the country

survival skills in harsh conditions, familiar to the former officers of the Royal Forces, were critical. For this reason they were leaders or part of the groups in various places in Romania. One of the most famous cases is General Aldea Aurel, the minister of Interior after 23 August 1944, who was later accused by the communists of being the leader of the National Resistance Movement (Duțu & Dobre, 1997). He died in Aiud prison after a short trial in 1949. The group named the “Black Coats”<sup>61</sup> was formed of dismissed officers lead by Gavrilă Olteanu, and was the subject of the first major trial in 1946 (Țiu, 2008). General Ciuperca<sup>62</sup> was the commander of the “The Voice of Blood” group. The small groups organized in south and the south–western Romania were led by major C. Latea, general G. Mosteoru and colonel Uță (Bărbulescu & Țăranu, 2005). Major Dabija organized another group in the south of Transylvania<sup>63</sup>, and colonel Arsenescu and lieutenant Arnăuțoiu led the group from the Făgăraș Mountains, to just mention a few.

The map of the armed resistance movement (Photo 1, see below) shows many anti-communist nuclei across the country<sup>64</sup>.



**Photo 1** 19 nucleus of zonal resistance in the Romanian mountains (Source Cotidianul<sup>65</sup>)

Because of their defensive nature (few offensive actions such as sabotage or occupation of localities have been recorded), the groups, varying between 20 and 120 persons, spread around the country did not pose a major threat to Communist power because they didn’t succeed in unifying and

<sup>61</sup> In Romanian language the name is “Sumanele Negre”  
<sup>62</sup> Ex-commander of the Romanian Fourth Army between 1940-1941  
<sup>63</sup> Ionițoiu, C. *Tombes Sans Croix. Contributions à une chronique de la résistance roumaine contre la dictature communiste* retrieved at <http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/morminte1/default.asp.htm> accessed in August 2008  
<sup>64</sup> The map of the armed resistance is one of the symbols published on the first page of the Review Memoria, retrieved at <http://www.revista.memoria.ro> accessed in August 2008  
<sup>65</sup> Reprinted by permission granted by the author of the article, Mr. Târziu Claudiu

coordinating their actions. Yet these groups undermined the Soviets and their regime of total control of society for a long time. Recent oral history research projects in post-communist Romania reveal that people still remember those days when for a glass of water or a loaf of bread given to any Resistance member they faced penalties of 25 years or even life imprisonment with harsh physical and psychological torture (Brișcă, 2002; Budeanca, 2007). Despite this reality, people sustained these groups and risked their life (IICCR, 2006) and for this reason RARM “activity appears all the more valiant and poignant” (Deletant, 1999: 234).

The troops of the new secret service - Securitate - succeeded in capturing the “bandits” or “terrorists”, which is how the Communist regime labeled Resistance members. Several strategies were applied: by promising a better life to anyone helping to find them, by torturing people from villages to get information, or by infiltrating resistance groups. In an internal report from 1959, the Securitate mentioned about 1196 “counter-revolutionary or subversive organizations and groups”<sup>66</sup> captured alive. When arrested after mock secret or public trials, members faced life imprisonment with forced labor. Others died during fights or were executed when captured. Their family members were socially stigmatized, persecuted and deported to Dobrogea, the poorest geographical area of the country at that time (Deletant, 1999; Brișcă, 2002).

The authors of “Commanders without troops”, Dobre, Nanu and Toader (2005), revealed the Romanian military exile’s (RME) attempts to organize in a coherent structure. Between 1944 and 1950, a part of the military personnel of the Royal Armed Forces decided to emigrate to non-communist countries like France, Germany, the USA and Spain. They were dissatisfied with the massive dismissals due to the political “misfit” with the “new, democratic” post-war orientation of the national military organization. Former diplomats who refused to return, active and reserve officers who left Romania after 23 August 1944, gathered in “The Association of ex-combatants” from France, and “The Union of Romanian Combatants” from Germany. The RME, a permanent potential threat for Romanian communist society, was mostly active between 1949 and 1954 when its members still believed in a miraculous international intervention to save Romania from Soviets hands. Due to their activity, they were in the focus of the Romanian Secret Service, under permanent scrutiny, and reports, as Dobre (2008) discovered through his research on the lives of 17 RME generals.

However, time passed and no Western power intervened after the devastating Second World War (Baciu, 1990). Facing this reality, the military exile’s activity confined to organizing commemorative conferences, publishing articles in the Romanian press in exile – such as “The Military Journal of active

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<sup>66</sup> According to CPADCR, 2006: 331

and reserve officers and NCOs from Romanian exile”- and writing letters to make international leaders more sensitive to the Romanian cause. The last available documents of the RME appear from 1972 when it seems that the military exiles ceased activity (Dobre, 2008).

### **1955-1965**

Although the Communist Party controlled the input, output and the feedback mechanism throughout society, it seems that during the 1950s, national armed forces were allowed to play an increased input role, especially due to the expertise required by more sophisticated technology imported from “fellow” communist countries (Volgyes, 1981: 185; Midan, 2005: 173). With a huge number of “Soviet specialists” in the country still the atmosphere within the armed forces is the one described by U.S. Congress Committee on Communist Aggression (USCCoCA, 1954: 22):

*“[...] the Communists maintain their control over the Red Army and the other military elements under Communist domination, by an elaborate police system which permeates their ranks to spy upon them. The armed forces are kept isolated and under inordinate discipline and are subjected to continuous false propaganda and indoctrination.”*

It is this context in which the general (ret.) Ion Eremia (1913-2004), an educated superior officer speaking five languages, with high technical skills and former commander of the Political Military School became, in 1955, the adjunct of the Minister of the Communist military. Having access to all Stalinist and post-Stalinist realities from the top of the communist military hierarchy, he was fired after harsh open criticism of the communist regime in the Romanian Parliament and private discussions. In 1958 he wrote “Gulliver in the Country of Lies”, a satirical novel which transformed him into one of the most subtle but fierce critics of the communist system<sup>67</sup>. He realized long before that in communist philosophy: “...the army must protect Granit<sup>68</sup>’s fame at home and to spread it in the entire world using the force of swords” (Eremia, 2006: 280). Sent to be published in France, using a friend’s help, the book was delivered directly to the Romanian Secret Service and General Eremia finished his military carrier in 1959 by receiving 25 years of hard prison for the sentence of “plotting against the social order”. As if these measures were not enough, the punishment and blame extended to family members as well<sup>69</sup>. The

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<sup>67</sup> Eremia, I.S. (2006a). Gulliver în Țara Minciunilor. [Gulliver in The Country of Lies]. București: Andromeda Company. Regarding this book Boariu observes in 2007 that “the author imagines with sarcasm detailed scenes of life from Kukunia, which became reality in the 1970s and 80s in the Romania of the <glorious years> of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s leadership. See Boariu, A. (2007). Generalul Ion Eremia - un Soljenițin al României[General Ion Eremia – a Romanian Soljenitzn]. *Jurnalul Național*, 26 October, retrieved at [http://www.jurnalul.ro/index.php?section=rubrici&article\\_id=110079](http://www.jurnalul.ro/index.php?section=rubrici&article_id=110079) accessed in September 2008

<sup>68</sup> The political leader of the state

<sup>69</sup> His wife and family members were persecuted and discriminated during their lifetime, a practice applied to all political prisoners during the communist regime in Romania. Gen. Eremia’s brother was punished with 15 years forced labor, accused with complicity, and his sister 7 years prison for not denouncing her brother to the authorities (Eremia, 2006b: 15). The “bad origin” stigma could be applied even to second generations and to all family relatives with social repercussions (impossibility of finding a work place, rejection from the educational system and a general harassment and permanent monitoring by the secret services)

destruction of freedom of thought and expression in all their cultural forms, and the destruction of family relations were strategies of enslavement on the Sovietization menu (USCCoCA, 1954: 23-24).

After perverting the promotion system (loyalties to party coupled with military ability) the KGB and Soviet power successfully succeeded in gaining external control over the major and important decisions regarding the armed forces in Romania and satellite countries. In order to ensure total Soviet dominance over communist countries and to balance NATO influence in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was created in 1955 (Volgyes, 1981: 186). With a structure similar to NATO, the representatives of the nations in the WTO were in fact strategically placed Soviet marshals and generals who sustained Soviet interests in all decisions (Miroiu, 2004a). Internally and externally dominated, the communist national military was not involved in civilian-military debates or confrontations over main topics of military related policy formulation, so vital for a professional officer corps to develop into a cohesive interest group.

The United States Congress Committee on Communist Aggression (USCCoCA, 1954: 24) concluded about the nature of the value of the Communist way of diplomacy:

*“As far as the Communists are concerned, treaties, mutual assistance pacts, nonaggression pacts, or solemn covenants are mere scraps of paper. Agreements or pledges made at the conference table are broken any time such action serves the Communist table for world conquest.”*

Just two years later, Red Army troops stationed in Romania invaded Hungary to stop the anti-communist uprising. Due to similar potential internal actions, the Romanian military and political leadership of the time was reluctant to have national troops involved in this intervention, although they declared it “necessary and correct”, as Deletant<sup>70</sup> mentioned in his work. In Soviet eyes, Romanian communist authorities seemed to manage this episode quite well. Internally, in order to prevent similar developments, new waves of arrests (especially of students) occurred in the main academic cities: Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca and Timișoara. Externally, since Red Army troops were still stationed on its territory, Romania responded to the Soviet call by sending undercover communists into Hungary to help the fight and stop the Hungarian Revolution. This event was also “a good moment” for new solidarity actions organized by Romanian communists in order “to pay respect to the fraternal help” offered by the “liberating Soviet forces from Hitlerism”<sup>71</sup> during these years.

According to Midan (2005: 129-130) during these years, a new downsizing of the forces and important changes took place in order to redefine the structure, composition and technological support for

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<sup>70</sup> Deletant, D. Romania, 1948-1989: A Historical Overview. Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, Collection Romania and the Warsaw Pact, retrieved at [http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll\\_romania/introduction.cfm?navinfo=15342](http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_romania/introduction.cfm?navinfo=15342) accessed in November 2008

<sup>71</sup> As a child I would be taught these lessons in history classes, in the late 1980s. This is one example of how history was rewritten by the communists to suit their purpose: to manipulate people to accept communism and the Soviet power as “friend”

the proletarian armed forces<sup>72</sup>. This came after an illegal augmentation between 1948 and 1950 of the military personnel over the level established by the peace treaty, signed at the end of the WWII (Midan, 2005: 111). If in the first phase from 1955, the political criterion was prevalent (60%), it seems that in the purges from 1956 and 1958 more credit was given to professional competencies (Midan, 2005: 129-131). However, once all changes decided in Moscow were implemented in Romania by Soviet counselors, they became the basis for negotiation and signing in 1958 of the retreat of the Soviet occupational forces stationed in Romania since the end of WWII (Midan, 2005: 109, 125).

Opriş (2003) compared the Soviet and Romanian official documents of the time and concluded that Soviet officials always understated the number of troops stationed on Romanian territory. In fact, the complete withdrawal never took place, as happened in Austria, and a good number of Soviet air and naval bases, combined with an impressive quantity of supplies<sup>73</sup>, remained on Romanian territory. Soviet divisions strategically placed in southern Ukraine and across the Prut River, in the Moldavian Republic could descend at once, if Moscow's interests would be undermined (Opriş, 2001: 529).

After this episode the Romanian security and intelligence services became the first agencies of a Warsaw Pact country to remove its Soviet counselors. If prior to 1960 military cadres were sent to the Soviet Union for advanced training, after this year Romania not only nationalized the military training but ceased its participation with troops in Warsaw Pact exercises (Bacon Jr., 1999: 179). Communist allies were allowed on Romanian territory only for strategic meetings with high ranking officers while sending their observers (D'Encausse & Holoch, 1987: 280). This line of independence in internal affairs opened by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej culminated with the famous "theses from April" in 1964. Several principles were established by the Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party as guidelines of the Romanian foreign policy: the respect of national sovereignty and independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, the mutual support and the reciprocal advantage of countries.

Internally, the armed forces were in quite bad operational shape. Using the reports of French military attachés in Romania, Midan (2006) concluded about the distance between propaganda and reality in what concerns the military technology of those days:

*"...while officials claimed in 1965 the total and modern re-equipment of troops, at the funerals of Gheorghiu-Dej<sup>74</sup> [...] is nothing more than the <old ZIL, ZIS and SR 101> in the standard equipment of the units. Similarly [...] the establishment of the motorized rifles divisions advertised in 1958 is far from reality in the 60s and even later, in 1970-1974..."*

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<sup>72</sup> For a detailed analysis of changes within ROAF passed after signing its entrance in Warsaw Treaty Organisation, see Midan, 2005: 125- 146

<sup>73</sup> There is no information available on the possible return in Russia of these quantities after 1991 when the WTO was officially dissolved, according to military historian Opriş (2003: 396-397)

<sup>74</sup> Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was the communist leader of Romania from 1948 to 1965

Aware that this new context of desire for independence would not be accepted by Moscow, Romania continued its politics with the reorganization of the conscription service for different categories of youth. The law adopted in March 1961 defined the conditions for exemption from military service according to social class. “Clemence” was given to “worthy” people, whereas “unworthy” people who opposed the existing social order were sent to “labor camp” (Midan, 2005: 132). It is a sign that within society the repression continued. Starting with the 1960s, people who resisted communist indoctrination, did not want to submit, or tried to discuss social problems openly, were labeled as “mentally ill” and put in psychiatric mental hospitals under severe treatment<sup>75</sup>. Under national Decree no. 12 of March 1965, the repression continued to cultivate fear and keep people under total obedience for a total uniformity of thinking.

### ***The slaves of the “Golden Epoch”: the armed forces during Ceaușescu’s Regime. 1965- 1989***

After 1965, with Nicolae Ceaușescu as head of the Communist Party, Romania continued to claim a more national and Soviet-independent policy within WTO. Soon after his investment, a new purge started in order to clean armed forces from the graduates of Soviet schools (Midan, 2005: 150). A major reorganization of the military followed with the 1966 Constitution, and the Decree no. 1017 that clearly stipulated the total national control over the Romanian military forces to battle (Watts, 2010: 261). Another important moment represented the Romanian proposals to reform the WTO in the spirit of the Declaration of 1964. Based on the study of original documents Oșca (2001: 16) mentions the Romanian delegation’s main proposals:

1. The Supreme Command to be given to each country in rotation;
2. The Supreme Commander to be elected with the agreement of all national governments for a period of 4-5 years;
3. The Control of national Armed Forces to be in the hands of national authorities, and the responsibility for the training of the soldiers to be in the national hand.

Soviets’ refusal to accept these ideas generated an atmosphere of animosity between the countries and blocked the establishment of a Unified Armed Forces of the WP with Soviet control over it (Watts, 2010: 254-255). If implemented, the proposals would result in more self-centered national policies for each member state and a more democratic organization and functioning of the Pact because this could interfere with the Soviets’ desire to keep their control over the satellite countries. Several years later, with

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<sup>75</sup> Medication was mandatory; usually narcotics combined with optional electric shocks were prescribed. Paul Goma (writer) and VasileParaschiv (worker) are just two of many Romanians dissidents who endured and testified about these practices. Today in Romania the ICAR Foundation tries to rehabilitate the people who suffered abuses, retrieved at [http://www.icarfoundation.ro/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=48](http://www.icarfoundation.ro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=48) accessed in November 2007

the adoption of Law number 14 of 1972, the organization of defense within the Socialist Republic of Romania became a national competence issue, clearly separated from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Ionescu & Rijnoveanu, 2007: 5-6).

A moment of international glory in the democratic world followed by intense tensions with the Soviets is the public declaration of refusal to send military troops to join the Soviets during their invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Romania also continued to reject its' troops participation in common military exercises on territories of other countries<sup>76</sup>, thus preventing Soviet troops to come on its territory ever again (Watts, 2010: 429, 579). Recent hypotheses (Bachman, 1991; Bichir, 2008) discuss the possibility of a planned Soviet invasion of Romania in the same year as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which could be a valid explanation of the intensification of national propaganda toward an independent economic development of Romania. In Larry Watts's book of 2010, reports found in East Germany's secret service, STASI and NATO archives seem to confirm the plausibility of such a scenario (pp. 430-433).

It has to be said that after these actions until later, even after 1989, Romania was labeled as pursuing a maverick policy while suspected of hidden Machiavellianism, according to American assessments (e.g. Szayna & Larabee, 1995) or a planned strategy to seduce the West by playing an independent game (Midan<sup>77</sup>, 2005: 147). In a recent work, based on the study of CIA and WTO declassified documents, Watts (2010) dismantles these misplaced labels by showing that Romania actually risked its independence and was playing a lone card, for which none of the WP countries had the courage or desire.

Aware of the relation between armed forces and the political leadership problems in communist countries and fears of an overthrow (Bumbeș, 2006) Ceaușescu was preoccupied with establishing strict control over the national military. In this respect the action taken focused on the rotation of military staff within the Ministry of Defense and the top management military structures. To secure officers' loyalty, Ceaușescu used the same Stalinist practices, such as promotion of lower ranking officers to higher positions, purges, arrests and executions. Forty officers from the General Staff were arrested in 1971, other five senior commanders in 1974 and 12 generals were executed for accusation of plotting in 1983 (Bachman; 1991). Simultaneously, he imposed structural limitations on military autonomy in such a way that "every chain of command led to him", while, as president of the Defense Council, he had the power to appoint high ranking officers and to declare a state of emergency or war (Nelson, 1988: 182). Later,

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<sup>76</sup> The first military manoeuvre took place in 25 September 1962, with the joint participation of Bulgarian and Soviet Union after the Polish -WTO maneuver „Baltic oder” just finished. See Report by Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces Leontin Sălăjan on the Warsaw Pact's Military Exercise in Romania (October 1962) at Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security at <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=22632&nav1=1&nav2=6&nav3=4> accessed in September 2008

<sup>77</sup> Although the same author acknowledges the ROAF conservation of autonomy, from limited to progressive augmentation within Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Midan, 2005: 119)



to increase control, Ceaușescu appointed his brother, Ilie Ceaușescu as Minister of National Defense and chief of the Higher Political Council of the Military.

During its leadership, Ceaușescu created the concept of “The war/struggle of the entire nation”<sup>78</sup> or total war and vested the military with a new mission: “to defend the revolutionary achievement” (Zulean, 2002: 118). Set after the failure of Czechoslovakia to defend itself from Soviet invasion in 1968, this doctrine tried to reflect the Romanian economic and socio-structural realities translated into a low level of military forces and capabilities after World War II, incorporated into a defensive strategy to protect the country from any kind of possible attack (Bachman, 1991; Miroiu, 2004b). It meant placing defense responsibilities on other social actors, thus dispersing and alienating the military from its basic mission. Midan (2005: 168) underlines the confusion and diffusion of responsibility for the national defense between permanent (armed forces and police) and non-permanent forces (patriotic guards<sup>79</sup>, pre-military detachments<sup>80</sup> and groups for civilian defense<sup>81</sup>) that this new concept creates.

Life continued to be militarized as during the first years of communism. All children from kindergarten to high-school wore uniforms. The kindergarten children were called the “eagles of the country” in special military-type of ceremony.



**Photo 2** Children at kindergarten becoming “eagles of the country”  
(Source: Personal archive, 20 march 1977)

Continuing the Soviet traditions (Ciurea, 1956: 219) the children after the second year of study in primary school were made “pioneers” and later, after eighteen, they became members of The Union of Communist Youth, modelled on the Soviet Komsomol, and future recruits for the communist party (Staar, 1971: 167). Pioneers were organized in military type detachments in groups, classes and units; their

<sup>78</sup> “Lupta întregului popor” in Romanian language

<sup>79</sup> Special paramilitary detachments created with workers in order to defend factories in case of an attack

<sup>80</sup> Are designed to young of 18-20 years with sessions of training that provide basic knowledges regarding defense

<sup>81</sup> Formed by men and women who are not part of other structures for defense, the purpose of this structure is to protect, limit and neutralize the air raids, natural disasters and catastrophies; formed by men and women who are not part of other structures for defense

commanders wore red, yellow and blue insignia and called each-other “comrade” while saluting as soldiers do. However, if at the start of communism pioneers were special, favored children (Ciurea, 1956: 221), later, during the Ceaușescu regime, all children became pioneers in order to show the exceptional character of Romanian youth, perhaps in a manner similar to other spheres of social life. The pioneer oath meant swearing loyalty to the Romanian people and Communist Party, in order to prepare the mind for a politicized reality from a very early age. The unit commander was, almost always, a different person than the school director, in order to reproduce the double, parallel structure of every organization. The schools curricula incorporated classes of Youth Training for the Defense of the Country (PTAP), including weapon training sessions in the final gymnasium year.

Although exempt from compulsory military service, women participated in military training during their university or professional studies, while male students were forced to become conscripts for 6 months after finishing their studies. While women had very low prominence in both the Communist Party and the military in the first years of the Communist regime in Romania (Bucur, 2006: 183), they became more important with Ceaușescu’s rise to power and the nationalistic orientation of the country’s policy. After the approval of Law no.14 of 28th December 1972, on the organization of national defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the first women in uniform started to appear in Romania’s communist armed forces. Although this was part of the war of “the entire people” concept of the communist regime, some authors (Popa, 1999) concluded that the decision to accept women in the armed forces was made because the communist nomenclature wanted to push their protégées into well-paid positions. The female professional military personnel were not able to achieve high ranks, since they were not allowed to pursue higher military education and their main task was to train female students within civilian higher education institutions who had the obligation to fulfill military service<sup>82</sup>. While at the beginning, they specialized in infantry, communications, NBC warfare, railway service, civil defense, topography and engineering construction, after 1980 women officers could also become helicopter pilots, doctors, pharmacists and logisticians.

Ceaușescu’s accession in the public arena meant a certain professionalization of the armed forces, which was highly succeeded because of the high percentage of officers without a basic educational level (Zulean, 2002: 116-117). In this light, we see, in the early 1970s, the requirement that candidates for Romanian general staff should have held line command, starting with independent battalion and regimental level (Watts, 2001a: 20). Unfortunately, during the 1980s, the quality of the military corps altered again under the influence of intense personality cult propaganda. This (personality) cult had to be

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<sup>82</sup> According to National Report for NATO at <http://www.nato.int/ims/2004/win/romania.pdf> accessed in May 2008

propagated by all people appointed by the Party to important positions in the state system, as in the book published in 1981, written by five generals and six colonels, five of them having doctoral degrees in different areas. Intended to make an analysis of the factors enhancing the defense capabilities of the country, the book “Factorii pe care se întemeiază capacitatea de apărare a patriei” [The factors on which the defense capacity of the country is based] (Gomoiu et al., 1981) had only 203 pages in A5-format and used only 49 references, as in **Table 10**.

Categories	References : the distribution of the books	Frequency of quoting within the book
Communist Party documents	3	14
Military science (strategy)	11	11
Social sciences- history, demography, sociology	3	3
Marx, Lenin and Engels – communist basic thinking	7	8
<b>Nicolae Ceaușescu’s published books</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>62</b>
General literature (encyclopedia )	10	17
	49 books	115

**Table 10** References distribution in the book “Factorii pe care se întemeiază capacitatea de apărare a patriei” [The factors on which the defense capacity of the country is based], authors: Gomoiu et al., 1981

The book starts and ends with quotes from Ceaușescu, which was rule number one for having a book published or a public speech delivered (Mak, 2008: 763). “Brilliant thinking”, “creative spirit”, “exceptional power of understanding and capturing reality”, “imprints a new, dynamic vision to reality”, all these bombastic descriptions of his personality was rule two. These were accompanied by frequent quotations from his “magnificent work” which demonstrated rule three. Ceaușescu’s name is quoted on average once every three pages. General non-fiction literature was more often quoted, appearing more valuable than military science or social science argument. Moreover, with scarce references it is easy to conclude about the low scientific and academic value of such writing for those times.

“Permanently focussed with carrying out its basic mission the military is also involved in accomplishing the great objectives established in the Party Program” (Gomoiu et al., 1981: 187). This is just an example of the so called “wooden language” of that time, and expresses a reality institutionalized by Ceaușescu. The “great objectives” carried out in communism with military participation required sending mainly army conscripts, NCOs and officers<sup>83</sup> to harvest crops, build roads, bridges and power plants, and even to work in coal mines with only a day of training (Bumbeș, 2006). According to Decree no. 444 of 1972, the Ministry of Defense could organize and assure the conditions for the accomplishment of the political-educative work of its soldiers, a legal basis sufficient to transform the armed forces into the cheapest and most obedient labor force. This document was the birth certificate of the Directorate for Labor in the National Economy (DLEN), a special structure of the Ministry of Defense

<sup>83</sup> Air force and elite units were exempt from such a tasks, a discrimination which became a real source of intra-organizational tensions

designated to recruit military personnel<sup>84</sup> to be sent to support the national economy in various places around the country. From now on soldiers shared the burden of the construction of the Danube-Black Sea Channel and many other important infrastructure and economic objectives (such as the Transfăgărășan Road in the Carpathian Mountains and the People's House in Bucharest). This explains why the promotion of military leaders in important Party, administrative and diplomatic missions was not ordinarily associated with traditional military skills (Bacon, 1978: 243). The consequence of this practice was the transformation of the military personnel in state bureaucrats (Midan, 2005: 124).

A "leitmotif" can be found in most of the important public statements (books, articles, speeches): "The total and enthusiastic involvement of the armed forces in the people's constructive effort [...] consolidates unity of thought and action between soldiers and labor forces, amplifies the possibilities to know, help and respect each other" (Gomoiu et.al., 1981: 187). In the mirror of the Romanian realities of the late 1980s, this example of wooden language was differently described through the words and feelings of a young lieutenant, as follows:

*"...Around me soldiers died, I saw people mutilated physically and mentally; I walked down on the many steps of humiliation and degradation scale. [...] We were spat on, slapped and, hit over the eyes with our notebooks which were required to be filled out day and night with stupid, useless entries. These killed the judgment, mind and the heart of an officer. As platoon leader, I was insulted so many times, put on ad-hoc military trials so many times for imaginary offences, hit, humiliated, forced to ask apologies from my own subordinates because of <not accomplishing his quota of plastering and bricking>."* (Popa, 1992: 9)

Although propaganda and disinformation prevailed in this period, Romania had the lowest level of military capability of all the Eastern-European Soviet satellites for an internal threat (Volgyes, 1984) and the lowest proportional levels of military budget in the Soviet Bloc (Bacon Jr., 1999: 180). Subordinate to the same aim of independence from Soviet intrusion in its internal affairs, the development of a large domestic defence industry raised the incompatibility with Warsaw Pact countries (Watts, 2003b: 133). This development cannot be separated from the general context of the industrial development of Romania (Midan, 2005: 158). This statement helps to understand why at the end of 1980s "Romania's armament industry was enlisted in the struggle to erase external debt and thus produced even less for the already poorly equipped armed forces", as Bacon Jr. observed in 1999 (p. 180). Official lying was widespread in Romania during those years, since communism had to be presented as the best social organization system of all, and thus to cover the economic austerity of the 1980s.

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<sup>84</sup> Direcția pentru Lucrări în Economia Națională – DLEN; after the military oath the soldiers were recruited to form the "diribau" (work detachments) and sent to forced labor. According to military norms the soldiers should perform military instruction one day each week but this did not happen. Moreover, they had to work in between 12 and 16 hours a day, under appalling conditions (Popa, 1992; Bumbeș, 2006)

The diversion (in a way a goal displacement) of the armed forces to non-military duties, combined with politically determined promotion policies, share the main contribution to the severe erosion of Romanian civil-military relations in communist times, altering operational, fighting capability and generating discontent in the military (Bacon Jr., 1999: 180) although not vocally enough. In 1989 more than 85.000 soldiers and officers, most of them from army units, were sent “to use their skills” in agriculture, mines, construction of roads and bridges (Zulean, 2002: 118). In the summer of the same year, Ceaușescu received information about the low level of military training in infantry and air force units and the lack of military discipline (Miroiu, 2004b). After Charter 77, signed by the Romanian writer Paul Goma, and social upheavals - the miners’ strike in Valea Jiului (1977) and Motru (1981), suppressed with regular troops (Nelson, 1988: 187), and the Steagu Roșu Factory workers’ strike in Brașov<sup>85</sup> (1987) - the popular uprising which started in Timisoara in December 1989 spread throughout the country and brought change to Romanian politics.

## **Romania after dictatorship**

### ***1989 and immediately after***

Compared to other Eastern European countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary which had faced changes of their social projects before 1989, communism in Romania represented internally a despotic, totalitarian regime with Stalinist features of fear, hunger, corruption and deceit, until its very last moments while externally, in the international diplomatic arena, there is a wide reconsideration of beneficial communist inputs (Watts, 2010). In the absence of any negotiations to transfer power to other group(s) and in the struggle to keep their positions after the social protests started, Ceaușescu and his followers gave clear orders to all troops to shoot and kill (Tănase, 2006). The simultaneous presence on the streets of the armed forces, Securitate (political police), militia, and anti-terrorist special troops in December 1989 created, later, difficulties in identifying what really happened. Over the years three hypotheses were generated. The first talks about a revolution, a spontaneous popular uprising. Another hypothesis is built up around the idea of a coup d'état, a conspiracy led by the second wave of communists who used internal forces to change the situation, helped by the KGB, the Soviet Secret Service (Papacostea, 2005; Tudor, 2011). The last hypothesis combines the first two scenarios with the idea of electronic attacks on the Romanian military in order to explain the tragedies such as at Otopeni

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<sup>85</sup> Several of the participants suddenly died, displaying cancer symptoms after exposure to radioactivity, as Vintilescu (2008) observed in a recent article

Airport, where soldiers died in “friendly” fire. The term used for this third scenario is rather “lovituție”, a coined word which combines the beginning of the Romanian translation of coup d’état and the end of the Romanian word for revolution. Today this last scenario looks more plausible, when considering the view expressed by one of the post-communist minister of the Romanian Armed Forces, I.M. Pașcu (2007): the changes were possible under Moscow’s almighty umbrella, which encouraged and accepted the reform of communist societies (p. 11)<sup>86</sup>.

The role of a part of the Romanian military leadership and some military units during the first hours of the riots is considered rather hesitant because of their inability to anticipate the threats of the moment (Mureșan, 2001; Zulean, 2002; Macovei, 2004). In this respect Midan’s (2005) observation is very punctual: the total paralysis of ROAF can be explained by the past diffusion of responsibility between permanent and non-permanent defense forces as defined by the communist doctrine of the war (p.169). There is no document available to explain what really happened with the last Chief of the General Staff of the Communist armed forces, General Vasile Milea, who died at the beginning of the people’s uprising, officially by suicide. The topic of a Soviet offer to send troops to restore the situation, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 came up in civilian media. In an interview, the first post-communist Chief of Armed Forces, General Nicolae Militaru denied that Romania would ask for Soviet help, while acknowledging his incognito visit to the Russian embassy during the first moments of the riots (Anghelescu, 1991). Recently he was portrayed as a KGB member in national media (Badea, 2011; Tudor, 2011), and this requires to reconsider and reanalyze his statements in a time when it was acknowledged “[...] the sudden presence of more than 25.000 of the 37.000 <extra> Soviet tourists that deemed Romania a desirable place to visit or transit in the two weeks prior to its revolution in December 1989” and their choice “not to leave until almost a year later, in October 1990, after the Romanian government formally insisted on their departure” (Watts, 2010: 16).

On 20<sup>th</sup> of December, in his speech, Ceaușescu congratulated the armed forces and Securitate for their intervention on December 17th (Bacon Jr., 1999: 182). Major (ret.) Nicolae Durac (2001) was, in 1991, one of the few insiders, a captain at the time in a unit located where the events started, in Timișoara. Analyzing official documents from then, his conclusion was about the cowardice and repressive attitude of the Romanian military leadership, in the main days of the events, whose orders to shoot people represented a violation of military ethics. On December 21, after the failure of the famous balcony-speech, the protests started in Bucharest and some units fired on people (Bacon Jr., 1999: 182). However, the behavior of some Romanian soldiers in the streets is reflected in the slogan of those days

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<sup>86</sup> Similar to the conclusion of some important Western scholars who studied what happened in those days, as Bacon Jr. states (1999: 183)

“Armata e cu noi!”<sup>87</sup>, when siding with demonstrators. In this vein, the testimony found in Mak’s book (2008) given by a professor at Bucharest University, describes soldiers’ reconciliation with the rebelling population when “the tanks turned their guns away from the crowd” (p.765). At the end, the decisive role of the armed forces in the fall of Ceaușescu’s regime was claimed based on 20% of the casualties (Watts, 2003b: 134) and this became the basis of revolutionary legitimacy for the new military (Bacon Jr., 1999: 184). After few years caught in political crossfire, Romanian Armed Forces were solely blamed for what happened in 1989 and legally compelled to pay compensation to all victims and their families (Watts, 2001a: 22). The opening in 2008 of the military archives concerning the events in December 1989 revealed that the secret service, Securitate<sup>88</sup>, shared at least equal guilt for the national tragedy.

However, lacking an independent Judiciary, Romania and its military prosecutors were summoned in 2009 by the European Court of Human Rights for their procrastination in opening the dossiers of December 1989 in order to clarify and punish those responsible (Savaliuc, 2009). If other issues are still debated (Grigoraș, 2010) or raising question (Bacon Jr., 1999: 183) the paradoxal non-*praetorianism* of the Romanian Armed Forces (Blackwell, 2004: 92) is a positive certainty. Its leaders did not exploit the chance for a military dictatorship, as Nelson otherwise anticipated earlier on p.190 in his 1988 book.

According to Zulean (2002: 115) in February 1990 the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Military<sup>89</sup> (CADA) emerged spontaneously with the aim of clarifying the role of the ROAF during the popular uprisings. The members of CADA, i.e. thousands of young officers and NCOs who had refused to execute the order to fire in December 1989, tried to oppose interim-president Ion Iliescu’s<sup>90</sup> decision to promote those Romanian officers who had been involved in retaliation against the population, and his nomination of a previously exposed Soviet agent, General Nicolae Militaru, to the leadership of the national armed forces (Watts, 2010: 12). CADA asked for the resignation of compromised superior officers in December 1989 and insisted on the need to reform the military, especially the distorted promotion system based on political obedience and the non-use of the military as a police force against its own people (Bacon, Jr. 1999: 190; Zulean, 2002: 115). Shortly, after the first post-communist elections in May 1990, the new political regime mainly formed of second wave communists labeled CADA as an illegal organization and banned it (Dragoman, 2005: 7) while forcing its members to leave the military. Later, in 2005 Major (ret.) Nicolae Durac, one of the founders of CADA mentioned earlier in this chapter,

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<sup>87</sup> “The military is with us!”

<sup>88</sup> The military journals from Timișoara units were opened (unclassified) in order to have a clear answer for the Justice Minister according to Jurnalul Național research, retrieved at [http://www.ziare.com/Jurnalul\\_Revolutiei\\_Armata\\_tap\\_ispasitor\\_al\\_Securitatii-351846.html](http://www.ziare.com/Jurnalul_Revolutiei_Armata_tap_ispasitor_al_Securitatii-351846.html) accessed in June 2008

<sup>89</sup> CADA, Comitetul de Acțiune pentru Democratizarea Armatei, in Romanian language

<sup>90</sup> second-wave communist, the leader of the temporary structure National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naționale, FSN) and ex-president of post-communist Romania

won the court case against this abusive decision of The Minister of Defense (Chișu, 2000; Ardelean, 2002; Jurnalul Național, 2005).

One of the first public actions of the “new interim revolutionary forces” lead by Ion Iliescu was a surprising gesture to declare the adhesion of Romania to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), perhaps with the intention to ensure the external stability of the country and avoid the intervention of Soviet troops. By signing, in 1990, the treaty for Conventional Forces in Europe, Romania slowly started downsizing its armed forces, as a normal process for a large organization and reducing its outdated technology (Zulean, 2002: 120).

After 1991, with the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, Romania was interested in finding another solution to protect its security at a time when potential threats became visibly close to its borders. For the first time, in 1993, Romania declared, in an official statement, through the voice of the elected President, the decision to orient its security policy towards NATO (Watts, 2003: 189). Until 1996, reforms were not imposed, but Romania displayed a high level of functioning of its military, being a leader in the area for reforms, but had poor economic and democratic consolidation performances (Watts, 2001a: 15). Communism “swelled military muscles, but withered its brain; it created a large military with little ability to adapt to rapidly changing environments, internally and internationally” (Sava, 2003: 5). The time for major changes had arrived. After these years the entire political class settled its aim and became committed to the objective of joining NATO, defined as the solution for national security problems, as well as an aim invested with emotional value: to regain the path of long lost freedom (Degeratu, 2001: 157).

### ***Reforming the national armed forces***

Major issues that had been addressed by reform within the ROAF crystallized in time (Mureșan, 2001; Watts: 2001a; Watts, 2003a; Zulean, 2002; Sava, 2003):

(a) the lack of democratic control of armed forces, that were politicized during communism by pervasive and abusive civilian control,

(b) oversized armed forces, unprepared for their mission, after so many years of de-professionalisation,

(c) the lack of civilian expertise in the armed forces, and

(d) obsolete equipment.

According to these problems the revision of Constitutions in 1991, 1994 and 2000 was a mandatory step, with the purpose to create the democratic institutions responsible to reshape internally the military and as well its post-communist relations : the supervision of the armed forces by Parliament,



the establishment of the Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) as the dominant civilian<sup>91</sup> agency to coordinate and make decisions regarding national security and the appointment of civilians as Minister and state Secretary of Defense. A draft National Security Framework and Military Doctrine has been created but has been rejected by Parliament<sup>92</sup>.

National armed forces adapted their missions: the traditional defensive character of the Romanian military (homeland protection) was combined with new responsibilities emerging from membership of various international agreements and the aspirant status to NATO (Zulean, 2002: 120). By 1994 with the adoption of the OSCE's code of Conduct, which included civilian control of the armed forces (Zulean, 2004: 91), Romania was a Partner for Peace (PfP) member. This process was not easy. In a detailed analysis of the normative aspects of building civil-military relations in post-communist Romania, Zulean (2007b: 8) notes the "plethora of laws, regulation and directives" as a feature of the period after 1989. Another conclusion for the period up to 1999, found in Watts's analysis (2001b), is the civilian leaders' lack of competence in military affairs. These two are connected because they explain the need for time to clarify the directions of reform in the 1990s, especially after troops were mobilized to block roads during a miners' protest (Watts, 2006: 27).

Once approved, the first National Security Strategy in 2001 meant the creation of a two-tier force, divided in function by their capability of working with NATO-forces (Zulean, 2002: 210). The tensions generated on the international stage by the September 11th attacks hastened the adoption of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) by the Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) in the very same year, since new threats and vulnerabilities were identified and a new framework had to be defined to clarify these (Degeratu, 2005). The change was conceived as involving "the central structures and also combat forces" to professionalize the military organization by "changing the role, missions and the system of defense planning. It aimed to restructure the military organization and its forces toward a "more flexible and mobile armed forces", and changing the system of education and training (NDS, 2001: 15). However, although there was a major shift in missions' definition for the ROAF, no sociological inquiry focused on the way Romanian military views this, accepting or being committed for such direction. Negative perceptions on this issue within society<sup>93</sup> did not form a strong social or military opposition. A new

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<sup>91</sup> CSAT or Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării in Romanian language; initially, almost half of the members were high rank career officers and key-players in Romanian MoD. Today the only career officer in this structure is the Chief of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces

<sup>92</sup> Interesting point: Romanian analysts explain this matter differently. The military sociologist Zulean (2002: 119) asserts that its lack of clarity made the Romanian Parliament ask the government for revision, while Pașcu (2002: 132), the ex-minister for the ROAF, asserts that the rejection was on political grounds, since the following year, after the elections, the same document, without changes, was adopted

<sup>93</sup> In 2002 the Public Barometer (p. 28) measured 34% of Romanian citizens opposed to sending troops outside national territory, balancing the 53% of those who are in favor, according to <http://www.mmt.ro/Cercetari/bop%202002.pdf>, accessed in September 2012

Military Career Guide was adopted in 2001 and the system of recruiting and training officers in national and international establishments was redefined and consolidated.

After joining the PfP program, due to the slow pace of reforms, the concept of the Membership Action Plan was introduced at the NATO Summit in 1999 and this helped to clarify the changes. The ROAF conceived the *structural reform* while respecting two main directions: the creation of a new structure of forces until 2003 and the modernization of military equipment in a second phase, starting in 2004 (Popescu, 2001). The objective of the structural change combined with downsizing was accomplished and the ROAF adjusted to a size projected by the Member Action Plans (MAP): 112,000 service personnel and 28,000 civilians in 2007.

A new structure copied from the NATO/USA model of organization was settled, since 2001 and the ROAF encompassed air, land and naval forces organized in operational and territorial units lead by the General Chief of Staff. Since then, military units have experienced numerous restructurings, sometimes more than once a year. Also, there is anecdotal evidence that units were disbanded and recreated in the same day, while others were disbanded, to be recreated within a few years. The restructuring was, at times, as evidence revealed, just a mechanism to satisfy the personal interests of those in decision making positions or able to influence the decision makers. There are reports of 400 cases of influential generals and colonels who succeeded in transforming military positions into civilian ones, leaving with pensions or compensatory salaries, only to rejoin the military next day in the same position, but as civilians. This phenomenon forced the Government to adopt legal measures later in 2007<sup>94</sup>.

Using American knowledge, after two years of tests, a new planning, programming, evaluation and budgeting system was adopted in 2002. The conclusion was that the system offered an integrated concept of human, material and financial resources to fulfill the need to set up appropriate goals for each period of time (Lungu, 2002: 51-52). At the same time, the year 2004 meant for the Romanian military a new human resource (HR) policy defined as a top priority of the reform<sup>95</sup>. The ROAF needed such an approach, after the “unproductive and rushed” top-down downsizing process in the early 1990s, which “encouraged the military to be inactive, conservative and complacent” (Sava, 2003: 5) and resulted in high percentages of resignations of young officers who condemned “the lack of moral and material

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<sup>94</sup> According to <http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/Actualitate/32322/Guvernul-gireaza-generalii-de-lux-ai-MApN.html> accessed in June 2007 and <http://www.realitatea.net/ordonanta-de-urgenta-a-guvernului-boc-a-starnit-controverse-aprinse-in-tara-432641comentarii.html> accessed in August 2009.

<sup>95</sup> “Prioritățile reformei Armatei României” [The priorities of reform for Romanian Armed Forces], interview with the Chief of Staff general Eugen Bădălan in *Observatorul Militar*, 2004, n. 47, p.7 at <http://www.presamil.ro/OM/2004/47/pag%2005.htm> accessed in October 2007

standards” in the military at the time (Cândeia, 2001)<sup>96</sup>. Main objectives involved a “modern management system”, a new pyramidal rank distribution, the professionalization of the military according to NATO standards, high standards of English language proficiency for military personnel and professional retraining guidance for downsized troops (Barbu, 2004: 27). Instead, if we look at the pace initially set by the leader of the Romanian military, General Mihail Popescu, the reform was behind schedule. During this period there was a conceptual confusion of professionalization of the forces assimilated with changes in the recruitment system (to the all-volunteer force, AVF). In a book published by The Centre for Strategic Studies, a national research representative institution for military sciences, the analysis and recommendations made by researchers (Duțu, Moștoflei & Sarcinschi, 2003) for the new AVF system are confined to a narrow competence area (skills, internal administration and performance standards), while the soldiers’ commitment toward the ethics of the profession is missing.

Another change was necessary in the *ranks structure of the military* as long as one of the communist heritages was a mass of high ranking officers, especially colonels. Also, due to post-communist political pressures, the rapid promotion of officers to the rank of colonel became a generalized pattern until 2001. To create a 1:3 Officers-NCOs ratio within a pyramidal structure, a legal mechanism was created to ensure voluntary retirement and most of those using this mechanism were colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors (Costea, 2002). In 1999, according to the Chief of Human Resources Branch, the ROAF had 2.300 colonels and needed only 630 (Bălan, 1999). The “colonelisation” of the officer corps produced serious distortions in what should have been a pyramid rank structure and a modern system of command, as Maior and Huluban (2002: 112) assessed. Some authors also noticed that beginning with 2000, the need to eliminate the “exceptional” promotions was recognized, but this dysfunctional practice continued until 2001 due to political considerations. As Macovei (2004: 99) notes “the great number of those officers involved in the reprisals from 1989 and advanced with two or three ranks in a short period of time is surprising”. His research showed that in the MoD, Internal Affairs and Secret Services alone, 648 generals were promoted between 1990 and 2002. Although, in 2001, 440 generals were reduced by 90 (Watts, 2006: 21), the President of Romania still criticized, in his public appearances from 2005 until 2008, the high number of generals without troops (Tudor, 2005; Bâta, 2008; Oprea & Matieș, 2008). Overall, the extent of downsizing of the ROAF was from 320,000 military and civilian personnel in 1989 to 90,000 employees in 2008, of which 75,000 were military personnel.

Although the first *volunteer enlisted personnel* started to be recruited in 1993, the ROAF became an all-volunteer force (AVF) only in 2007, when conscription was ended. A change was necessary

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<sup>96</sup> “One could say that to a certain extent, the military organization dismissed some of its most valuable people a few years before being admitted into NATO” added the military sociologist Sava in 2003 (p. 19)

because the troops' training and motivation were less than appropriate (Poponete, 2002). Some military sociologists (Zulean, 2002; Poponete & Poponete, 2002; Sava, 2006) warned of the unfeasibility of the AVF project especially due to a lack of finances to pay a professional force in an underperforming Romanian economy. They advised the need for medium and long-term recruiting policies as long as the European workforce market offered better prospects to Romanian youth. The unattractive status of the Romanian AVF, especially low salaries, low standard of living conditions, and the lack of possibilities of finding a proper job after finishing the contract (volunteer soldiers were forced to leave the system at the age limit of 40 with no benefits) generated resignations among troops: about 2,000 in 2007 and about 3,500 in 2008 (Diac, 2008; Marin, 2009).

In 2005, 80 sailors on the frigate "Regina Maria" went on hunger strike because of the diminishing daily allowance on a sea mission<sup>97</sup>. The Military Council of Navy Staff decided the sanctioning of crew members who publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the legislation and three enlisted sailors had their contracts terminated<sup>98</sup>. Later, one of them sued the military and, in 2006, he won<sup>99</sup>. In 2009 volunteer enlisted personnel sued the Ministry of Defense for the low quality of the AVF project after the salaries of military personnel in 2009 were reduced by 20 percent, creating dissatisfaction<sup>100</sup>. After these years, with many tensions between the leadership of the ROAF and the AVF, the unfair military statute adopted in 2006 was changed in 2011, offering more organizational benefits for the volunteer forces of the ROAF and their families.

While analyzing the reform of *acquisitions and property management system*, Watts (2006: 24-25) mentions the limitations of the Romanian system until 2000: the politicization and the lack of motivated general staff to implement the changes and the lack of transparency which, together, resulted in economically and ethically questionable and uncoordinated acquisitions. Romanian media presented many cases of billions in Romanian currency spent on disadvantageous investments: communications equipment paid through a chain of "phantom" intermediaries, instead of by direct payment to the producer; investment in used equipment, in dysfunctional electronic systems and in low quality fabric for military uniforms; repair licenses given to private organizations with no prior experience or background in military technology, acquisitions from different suppliers of parts that cannot function together in final products (vehicles or weapons) and other similar examples (Macovei, 2004; Watts, 2006: 24; Diac, 2007;

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<sup>97</sup> According to <http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2005-06-15/greva-foamei-la-bordul-fregatei-regina-maria.html> accessed in April 2008

<sup>98</sup> According to <http://www.infonews.ro/article9240.html> accessed in April 2008

<sup>99</sup> According to <http://www.gandul.info/news/caporal-dat-afara-fortele-navale-castigat-procesul-mapn-255824> accessed in March 2007

<sup>100</sup> According to [http://www.realitatea.net/militarii-au-primit-cu-20prc--mai-putini-bani-la-salarii-din-cauza-taierii-unor-sporuri\\_518221\\_comentarii.html](http://www.realitatea.net/militarii-au-primit-cu-20prc--mai-putini-bani-la-salarii-din-cauza-taierii-unor-sporuri_518221_comentarii.html) accessed in December 2009

Popa et al., 2008). No-one was found guilty of corruption or ill-judged investments after the investigations of military prosecutors, and the Romanian state was unable to retrieve the money (Diac, 2007a).

In 2006, official ROAF documents<sup>101</sup> stated that 85% of the equipment was, in effect, outdated. During an exercise in 2007 an armored personnel carrier, produced in 1979 in Romania and modernized after 1989, broke down in front of the Minister of Defense. Following this evidence, the official had no alternative in his next speech than to publicly recognize the lack of appropriate military equipment, revealed in civil media (Diac, 2007; 2008a) as he proposed 2015 as a deadline for improvements. Until then, military policy is mainly focused on acquisition of second-hand equipment from other countries (e.g. the USA/Hummers, UK/ships, Germany/air defense systems).

The worst situation is in the Air Force. Between 1989 and 2012, 38 accidents caused 68 casualties and destroyed military aircraft, most of them MiG 21s<sup>102</sup>. 2010 brought the 29th catastrophe in a line of 33 in the history of Romanian aviation<sup>103</sup>. In a crash on 5th July, an Antonov 2 (an aircraft produced in late 70's), 12 out of a total of 14 officers, NCO's and professional soldiers from the Air Force (4) and Navy(8) died after a fatal failure of old equipment. A few months later, in November, another tragedy shook the Romanian Air Force: the loss of two highly trained professional pilots in the crash of another, the eighteenth, MiG 21 Lancer. The chief of the Romanian Air Force until 2009, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Croitoru explained that Romanian military and civilian leaders were systematically informed about these aircrafts not meeting all NATO requirements, especially after 2012 when their deployment was planned to end. After this deadline the aircraft have to be replaced, while Air Force personnel need at least three years of training for the new technology. Political and military leaders explained the delay in multirole aircraft acquisition mainly by budgetary austerity (Rotaru, 2010). However, Tudor (2009) diagnosed a lack of coordination between the low military budget in recent years and the challenges faced by the Romanian military's outdated equipment and the Government's publicly declared will to play a greater role on the Balkans and international military stages. There are two possible explanations for the realities described: first is the dependence in thinking and action of an external, foreign or national actor during communist times and, second, the distance between words and reality in communist countries. In September 2012 the Supreme Council for National Defense, CSAT, urged officials to restore the fighting capabilities of the national armed forces by starting the acquisition of used F16 fighters (Bărăgan, 2012).

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<sup>101</sup> According to „Concepția de înzestrare cu sisteme și echipamente majore a Armatei Române în perioada 2006-2025”, retrieved at <http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?data=2006-10-23&id=209628> accessed in September 2009

<sup>102</sup> ROAF are currently lacking public official data on this issue. The info was retrieved in a private initiative dedicated to Romanian Air Force, the site Silver Wings (Aripi Argintii) <http://www.aripi-argintii.ro/pagina.php?p=26> and <http://www.aripi-argintii.ro/pagina.php?p=24> accessed in September 2013

<sup>103</sup> According to <http://www.aripi-argintii.ro/pagina.php?p=27> accessed in September 2013

The reform of *the military educational system* started with the establishment of the National Defense University (UNAp) in 1992 to prepare civilian experts and continue the education of high ranking officers. The ROAF kept and improved its own educational system: high schools, schools for NCOs and warrant officers, military academies, preparing officers for each military branch and application schools for young officers. In time were founded the Regional Center for Defense Resources Management, the PfP Regional Training Center and the centers for the study of foreign languages, to better train forces for the new type of mission and a new multinational environment. Due to the adoption of a short-term contract of 8 years for professional officers, the western model of a manager/leader was formally adopted in the officers' training and education as a solution compatible with civilian life. Still not understood, and disputed at the lower levels of military command, this model creates a lot of pressure and tensions between old and new generations of officers. For a time there was no agreement between civilian and military educational systems to accept the military academies graduates' diplomas in civilian life. Starting with 2000 Government decision HGR nr. 645 of 04.08.2000 changed this situation. However, it seems that for a while, at least, the top military educational system was also politicized. Watts (2001a: 19-20) analyzed the development of the National Defense College (created in 1992) between 1997 and 2000 and observed the politicization of the institution in favor of the leading of that moment, while none of the graduates were assigned to a defense position in the government. Another aspect of the educational system to be considered is the number and the quality of the civilian and military personal trained abroad. There is little to no research available at this moment on the way these graduates are integrated in the domestic military system, except one reference from 2001 (Mureşan, p.10), which offers information about 60 graduates of the Monterrey (USA) Centre, specialised in management of military resources, none of whom working in the fields for which had been trained.

The overthrow of the communist regime also brought changes in the situation of *women in the military*. The new post-communist constitution stipulated that only men were subject to the draft. Thus, the training of female students was no longer necessary and their instructors became redundant. Many female professional military personnel left the military during the 1990s, before reaching legal retirement age, because they were assigned only to administrative and secretarial positions, with limited access to senior decision-making levels<sup>104</sup>. Law number 202 of 2002 concerning equal opportunities between women and men offered the legal basis for gender equality in Romania. Subsequently, Parliament promoted the Law concerning the Status of Military Personnel, which had provisions on gender equality. Moreover, the Defense Minister delivered an Order for the implementation of the National Action Plan

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<sup>104</sup> According to <http://www.nato.int/ims/2004/win/romania.pdf> accessed in February 2005

concerning gender mainstreaming in the activities of the Ministry of National Defense. As a consequence, since 2003 women could become generals and starting with 2008, because of the recruitment crisis, women were allowed to enroll as professional soldiers. In 2012 Romania has one female general active<sup>105</sup> while the other retired in 2011.

For a couple of years, high school and military academy candidates, young boys and girls were competing together for common places. The ROAF report of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWNATOF, 2007: 5) specifies that before the academic year 2005-2006 there was no gender differentiation in the number of places in military educational institutions. In the academic year 2004-2005, the female candidates in military high schools represented over 50% of the total number of candidates and this context generated the need for change. Since 2006 some military educational institutions have established a specific number of places for female candidates (CWNATOF, 2007: 5) while starting with 2010, all the military high schools and academies (except The Medical and Legal Institute) have gender-specific places<sup>106</sup>. The prospects for 2011 were identical since not even at music school could women perform the same music as men, in the Romanian MoD vision<sup>107</sup>. The Committee on Women in NATO Forces provides the data regarding the women presence within the Romanian military, following the country’s membership of the alliance, until 2006<sup>108</sup>. Combining this picture with National Reports from 2008 and 2009, the evolution of the percentage of women soldiers in the ROAF is shown next:

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
3,99	5,00	5,00	3,16	3,16

**Table 11** Evolution of percentages of women in the Romanian Military  
(sources: Committee on Women in the NATO Forces, National Reports Romania: 2007, 2008 and 2009<sup>109</sup>)

The table shows a sinusoidal tendency regarding female presence in the ROAF and indicates a declining trend, as 2007 and 2008 show the lowest percentages. Moreover, when comparing with other countries from the available international database of 2009, Romania alongside Poland (1,79 %), had one of the lowest percentages of female soldiers, which reflects the more “masculine” cultural orientation of their environment.

<sup>105</sup> According to [http://www.nato.int/issues/women\\_nato/rfi\\_female\\_generals\\_2006.pdf](http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/rfi_female_generals_2006.pdf) accessed in March 2007

<sup>106</sup> The list with available seats in military high schools and academies for 2010, in Romanian, retrieved at <http://www.citynews.ro/maramures/pentru-studenti-14/lista-locuri-disponibil-in-colegiile-si-academiile-militare-78148/> accessed in March 2011

<sup>107</sup> According to the Romanian MoD site release [http://www.mapn.ro/recrutare/informatii\\_utile/plan\\_scolarizare\\_2011-2012.pdf](http://www.mapn.ro/recrutare/informatii_utile/plan_scolarizare_2011-2012.pdf) accessed in March 2011

<sup>108</sup> According to [http://www.nato.int/issues/women\\_nato/perc\\_fem\\_soldiers\\_2001\\_2006.pdf](http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/perc_fem_soldiers_2001_2006.pdf); accessed in March 2007

<sup>109</sup> The database with national report stops on 2009. No other national reports on Romania were available for 2011 or 2012 in September 2012 at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50327.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm)

Romanian military sociology (Sava, 2002, Sava, 2003; Zulean, 2004; Zulean, 2007; Zulean, 2008) acknowledged the role and importance of Western input to Romanian and Eastern Europe reforms. NATO contributed to the craft state building using mechanisms of teaching and persuasion (Gheciu, 2005), which acclimatised Romania and Central and Eastern European countries with adopting western norms. Sava (2003: 13) concluded significantly in this connection:

*“[...] the integration into NATO and the NATO PfP assistance offers a better framework [...], although not the solution itself. The solution is to be found on the domestic scene.”*

### ***Following what kind of military leaders?***

Although new democratic laws were adopted and institutions were created for supervision of the military, civil-military relations in post-communist Romania were characterized by numerous crises of different magnitude and consequences (Watts, 2001b). One after the other, virtually all ROAF leaders were involved in public scandals. While several acknowledged during their leadership the lack of political neutrality of the military organization, they seemed eager to get involved in political life, starting immediately on retirement. Between 1997 and 2000 there was a great danger of the ROAF being politicized rather than professionalized, observed Watts (2001a: 14). The crisis of 1999, generated by the mobilization of the military during a social protest, opened the debate about the proper use of the military in internal affairs. Such matters, reminiscent of recent events of 1989, when the military received order to act against the people they should protect, deteriorated civil-military relations until the new elections of 2000 (Watts, 2001a: 19). Senior officers from ROAF leadership were determined to “not honor any order to act during a purely domestic crisis unless received in writing, and [...] not fire on the population during a purely domestic crisis, no matter what form such an order took”, as Watts recalled from his advisorship experience in Romania (2006: 34). Such testimony portrays a military leadership better prepared for its role in a democratic environment than the civilian complement.

Unfortunately such optimism cannot be applied when analysing other organizational issues. As an insider, Macovei (2004: 98) observed that the plan for change in the Romanian Armed Forces was internally compromised by organizational corruption. In an internal assessment from 2003, 63% of military personnel of the ROAF rated the Human Resources department in the top position of corrupt organizational structures. According to the author of the unique monograph on ROAF corruption over time, the explanation is simple: applying for various military training courses for all ranks (in Romania or abroad) requires bribing those working in Human Resources, because they have the information available and they are the first decision-makers in the recruitment process. International assignments were better paid compared with national salary and assured an organizational advantage in a period of restructuring. Much later, in 2011, the new law adopted in Romania made mandatory the participation of military



personal in international missions. This measure could eliminate any suspicion of bribery in national media (Tache, 2011).

After 1990, the housing of military personnel became another issue tainted with corruption in the post-communist Romanian military, as no apartments were built after the 1980s. The illegalities, from influence within the ministry to false declarations, were at the heart of the case of the public scandal of “Houses for Generals” (Belciuganu, 2008a). In 2011 the Court sentenced each of the accused leaders in the ROAF to four years of prison, while most of them had meanwhile become members of political parties. The involvement of military personnel in diverse materials (especially fuel) theft highlights another painful reality: lower ranks executed verbal orders from their commanders to supply gas without formal written documents (Macovei, 2004: 131).

General Dumitru Cioflină, Chief of the General Staff from 1991 to 1997, along with the former Defense Minister Victor Babiuc, were accused, in 2006, by the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, of abuse of office for their involvement in the exchange of land between the Ministry of National Defense and the landowner Gigi Becali.<sup>110</sup> General Constantin Degeratu, the chief of the ROAF between 1997 and 2000, with no prior line-command experience (Watts, 2001a: 16), was accused of abuses concerning a luxury apartment in 1999 (Belciuganu, 2008a). Recently in 2011, US Embassy discovered Degeratu’s involvement in illegal trading with technology<sup>111</sup>.

A few days before the end of his military leadership of the ROAF in 2004, General Mihail Popescu expressed his availability to enter political life as member of the Social-Democrats, the governing party, even when he was Chief of Staff of the ROAF. His successor, General Bădălan Eugen was assigned to lead the armed forces despite his involvement in the reprisals for the civilian uprising in 1989 (Surcel, 2004a; 2004b; Macovei, 2004:172). Moreover, together with his predecessor, Bădălan was involved, in 2006, in a corruption scandal at national level (Purcăruș, 2006). He was the first leader of the ROAF who, very close to the moment of his replacement, acknowledged political interference in the military<sup>112</sup>. The last in this series, the current Chief of General Staff, Admiral Gheorghe Marin, was also the subject of press exposure and he was accused of signing disadvantageous contracts for the Romanian Navy.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Ziarul de Iași, from September 20, 2007 retrieved at <http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/dna-cere-aviz-si-pentru-victor-babiuc~ni4g6p> accessed in January 2008

<sup>111</sup> Nine o'clock Journal from 6 April, 2011 at <http://www.nineoclock.ro/wikileaks-ex-army-chief-of-staff-involved-in-us-military-technique-deals/> accessed in August 2012.

<sup>112</sup> The Romanian transcription of the last press conference of Gen. (ret) Bădălan as Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, retrieved at <http://www.mapn.ro/briefing/2006/200609/20060911/index.php> accessed in June 2008

<sup>113</sup> According to Curentul, 08.11.2005 at <http://www.infonews.ro/article19260.html> accessed in May 2009

In April 1998, the Romanian Armed Forces' name was involved in a scandal over cigarette trafficking through an Air Force base, using military planes. Very soon, in 1999, public dissatisfaction on defense matters was registered after a national survey raised the question of using Romanian air-space to facilitate NATO planes bombing former Yugoslavia. So close to Easter, the main Orthodox celebration, the peoples' answers clearly suggested a gap between the political class and the will of the people, who, with a majority of 83%, were clearly against this facilitation for NATO, even when no other country was available (Pruteanu, 1999b). The political and military decision ran against people's will, while few politicians stood up in Parliament to protest (Pruteanu, 1999a).

Starting in 2000, the anonymous web-posted Armageddon Reports<sup>114</sup> revealed and indicted the corruption, injustice and problems of Romanian society, including the armed forces. All these reports criticized the lack of interest of the political and military elite in improving organizational and social life, as a result of the communist cultural heritage. The first report focused in-depth on the situation of the military and identified problems mainly related to conscripts' life: (1) despotic leadership by officers and their corruption, a real industry of bribery reproduced by regular soldiers and conscripts in order to obtain their normal rights, (2) low quality uniforms and gear, food supplies, and medical services, and (3) lack of psychological assessment of new recruits. These problems, combined with the low quality of training and NATO requirements for a professionally trained force created the conditions for the elimination of mandatory military service in 2007. At the time of its release, the attitude of the military leadership was rather one of rejection and a will to punish those who launched the report on the Internet. Instead a fact proving that the report information was close to reality is that from 2006, two generals and 13 superior ROAF officers, active or retired, were brought to justice for the dubious acquisition of low-quality fabric for military uniforms, which cost the Romanian state over 3 million euros (Vintilescu & Stoica, 2006).

After 1999 when General Degeratu, the former Chief of Staff, engaged in partisan political activities while in uniform (Watts, 2001a: 23), military uniforms were mis-used during the political campaign in 2008, without legal consequences. Mihai Ozunu, ex-director of the National Defense University, appeared in the election campaign for Parliament in military uniform for the Democrat-Liberal party (Belciuganu, 2008b), while the reserve general Mircea Mureșan, together with Gabriel Oprea, advertised on the banners of the Social Democrat Party (Biro & Tapalagă, 2008). The Romanian Association of Retired Officers<sup>115</sup> took action against the retired general Mircea Mureșan and removed his right to wear the uniform for life (Oprea, 2008), but no punitive actions were taken against the

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<sup>114</sup> The integral version can be found at [http://www.bursa.ro/on-line/s=dosare&dosar=1&id\\_articol=1.html](http://www.bursa.ro/on-line/s=dosare&dosar=1&id_articol=1.html) with quoting permission granted from the editor received via e-mail in 2008

<sup>115</sup> AOR, Asociația Ofițerilor în Rezervă, in Romanian language

others<sup>116</sup>. Like nothing happened, Gabriel Oprea (see **Photo 3**, next page, in the middle of the banner) became Minister of Defense until 2012, when a political scandal cost his position. The fact that these type of violations of democratic standards in civil-military relations were generated by reserve officers, shows that the politicization of the military did not stop even after more than 20 years since December 1989.



**Photo 3** 2008 – Major “progress” in the democratization process: military uniforms involved in political elections (source Hotnews.ro<sup>117</sup>)

However, a similar incident in 2012 this time involving an active officer did not have the same end. Lt. Alexandru Gheorghe (27) arrived at a large popular demonstration in Bucharest against the austerity measures imposed by the president of Romania and the Prime Minister. His discontent with the politicized promotion system within the military, the demotivation of those who earned their ranks with honest work, hard training and great sacrifices, was publicly stated after the leadership of ROAF failed to give him an answer within the legal period (Toader-Williams, 2012). He became a national hero, while in the end he was accused and judged for wearing his uniform in a civil demonstration, leaving his unit without permission from his commander to travel and giving interviews without his commander’s approval. In February 2012, after a short trial, he was dismissed from the officer corps.

The theft of 50 weapons from an Air Force warehouse was subject of a new public scandal involving top leadership of the ROAF at the beginning of 2009. The Minister of Defense, Stănișoară, dismissed the Chief of the Air Force and another 17 high ranking officers, among them four generals. At that time, the media (Dragomir, 2009; Ivanciuc, 2009) launched the suggestion that the sacking of the

<sup>116</sup> After the elections, Ozunu was nominated in December 2008 for the position of chief of the National Registry Office for Classified Information (ORNISS), according to Gardianul review, see <http://www.gardianul.ro/Ozunu-si-Talpes-se-bat-pentru-sefia-ORNISS-s126930.html> accessed in December 2008. Since 2010 Ozunu M. is State Secretary in the Romanian MoD

<sup>117</sup> Republished with the written agreement of the author, A. Biro

Chief of the Air Force was a possible political revenge, due to his differences of opinion with the Minister of Defense over the acquisition of aircraft for the ROAF. The impressive deployment of police and protection forces to find the weapons had no immediate results and the weapons were only found towards the end of the year. All this attracted a high level of media interest in the military.

In 2009, accusations of corruption at the National Defense University (NDU) put the military once again on the front pages. Generals and superior officers were investigated by the National Anti-Corruption Directorate for the irregular way they had obtained doctorates between 2002 and 2008 when the commander and rector of the university General Mircea Mureșan had been the president of all the commissions entitled to grant degrees. In the period investigated, numerous theses display similarities, while lacking originality (Gherguț, 2009). With no mandatory “Academic skills” classes in its curricula and no means to detect plagiarism at The Romanian Defense University, the first measure of the new appointed leader, Lieutenant General Teodor Frunzeti, was to limit the number of places available for doctorate candidates hoping to reduce the number of these <doctors in ...“stars”<sup>118</sup>> (Dragomir, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c).

The European Parliamentary elections in May 2009 were the scene of another episode with negative impact on civil-military relations in Romania. The daughter of the President of Romania, Elena Băsescu, was dressed in a military uniform during her campaign to influence voters to support her independent candidature. Although she was denounced to the Police for this irregular behavior, the charges were dropped because the Ministry of Defense considered that it was not a complete uniform, although she wore the desert Army uniform used by Romanian soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan with a clear Romanian Army emblem. The implication of such events when military regulations clearly forbid any civilian to dress in military uniform shows inconsistency in accountability influenced by the current political status and the lack of a legal attitude coming from the military, accustomed to the servile, communist attitude toward politics.

In this general atmosphere there were only two gestures of public protest to condemn the military current situation coming from top military echelon. First, the Chief of the ROAF in 2000, General Mircea Chelaru resigned from his position after publicly declaring that the Superior Council for Defense protected some “Mafia” and interest groups in southern Romania in 2000. A year later, in his letter to the president asking for his retirement, the general condemned the decline of the ROAF since 1996 and the lack of political and organizational will for consistent actions in order to improve its’ internal

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<sup>118</sup> “Generali in ...stele” is an allusion in Romanian language to the cosmic phenomena, since generals wore stars as distinctive marks of their rank

conditions<sup>119</sup>. Later, in September 2009, during the presidential elections campaign, the General Major (ret.) Iordache Olaru<sup>120</sup> condemned, in a public letter to the future president of Romania, the “humiliation of the national armed forces”. He underlined the lack of a political project regarding the military and denounced the failure of the military to fulfill its internal and external missions, while harshly criticizing the systemic neglect of the military esprit de corps and military values (honor, dignity, respect for the flag, and supreme sacrifice) by an incompetent civilian leadership. While holding one of the most important positions in the General Staff as the Chief of the Strategic Planning Directorate, Major General (ret.) Olaru reported the situation during the annual analysis of the ROAF and retired six months later when he saw no improvement. In this context his letter, although a positive step in breaking the silence, came after his retirement and could negatively affect the morale of the personnel of the ROAF. “If ROAF generals with their magnitude could not change anything and left what could/should I expect?” could someone say. Similar attitudes endanger everyday efforts for change, even in trivial, minor issues.

The case “Bribe to MoD”, near the end of 2010, was built on accusations of corruption, and an entire leading line was dismissed from command, being organized as a "criminal group" led by Brigadier General Ion Marian, Deputy Head of the Department of Management and Human Resources, together with Major General Mihai Chiriță, head of the MoD’s Doctrine and Training Department. The two generals, together with others 24 officers, 15 military instructor sergeants, and 71 corporals became “specialized” in bribes for jobs in the Ministry and facilitated the falsifying of the August results of the admission exams at the ”Basarab I” Military School in Pitești<sup>121</sup>.

Finally in 2012 the newly appointed minister, G. Dobrițoiu was able to denounce publicly in the civilian and military media what was visible for so long: “Any trial of politicization of the ROAF has to stop” (Dumitrescu, 2012). This imperative statement was in connection with his predecessor action: the promotion, en bloc, of politicians, former ministers, mayors and media representatives, in 2011 and 2012<sup>122</sup>, some of them in spite of never even completing military service. After a mega-scandal in Romanian media and society (Marinaș, 2012) the military commission analysis rejected about 60% (835 out of 1462) of the files for not respecting military regulations. It is the last evidence demonstrating that NATO’s requirement for effective civil-military relations regarding the exclusion of the military from political partisanship (Blackwell, 2004: 92, 94) has not yet become a reality in post-communist Romania.

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<sup>119</sup> România Mare, nr. 570 from June 15, 2001 retrieved at <http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/generalul-mircea-chelaru-si-a-prezentat-demisia-ni1jrv>

<sup>120</sup> Major General (ret.) Olaru was the deputy of the military representative to NATO and European Union in Brussels

<sup>121</sup> According to the English published journal *Nine o'clock* retrieved at <http://www.nineoclock.ro/dna-wants-to-detain-brigadier-general-ion-marian-on-corruption-charges/> accessed in January 2011 and at <http://www.nineoclock.ro/two-reserve-generals-deferred-to-justice-for-rigged-examinations/> accessed in July 2012

<sup>122</sup> These illegalities were happened during Gabriel Oprea leadership at MoD

The stated “commitment to complete de-politicisation, with professional competence being the only criterion for promotion” (Zulean, 2002: 124) perpetuates the same gap existing between theory and practice in current Romanian society as in communist times.

### ***Mutual Trust: The Romanian Armed Forces and the Public***

The military needed the public opinion to legitimize its reforming actions and this, more than others, is the explanation for the available data on this topic. While the Public Opinion Barometer<sup>123</sup>, usually published twice a year, gives the results of a survey which includes a question about *public trust in the military*, consistent and systematic studies of the way the military (from cadets to professional soldiers and officers) views society, and post-communist expectations, are virtually unavailable. Since 2007, there are some results available in respect to the cultural gap between the armed forces and society, which will be addressed later (Zulean, 2007; 2008).


The figure next page shows a generally declining trend of public trust in the military, with four relatively distinct periods. Between 1990 and 1997, more than 80% of the population trusted the military, which, together with the church, represented the traditional institutions of the country and received the highest public trust of all national institutions (Sandu, 1996). Then, from 1998 to 2000, the percentage of those showing trust in the military reduced to about 70% of the population. The decrease from 1997 to 1998 coincides with the exposed corruption case in the media about contraband with cigars and was registered in the aftermath of the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, when Romania was not invited to join the alliance. The 10% increase in public trust in the military between 2001 and 2002 corresponds with the period before the NATO Summit in Prague in Nov. 2002, when Romania was invited to join the alliance and started its participation in military operations in Afghanistan. After this event, public trust in the military decreased by about 12% and remained at about 66% until the end of 2005, when it started to decrease continuously. The decrease in public confidence in the military between October 2002 and May 2003 coincides with Romania’s involvement in the Iraq war. In 2003, the first two Romanians died in Afghanistan. Between 2005 and 2011 Romania has had casualties every year; until now 20 soldiers died and more than 50 were injured.

Public trust in the military was directly correlated with the age, older persons tending to have greater confidence in the military (Sandu, 1996; Poponete, 2004). People in the countryside tended to have more trust in the military than those living in urban areas, while people with a higher educational level seemed to think of military as a less trustworthy institution (Poponete, 2004). Also, those who did

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<sup>123</sup> According to [www.osf.ro](http://www.osf.ro)

not like compulsory military service were less inclined to trust the military. Nowadays, the military remains the second most trusted national institution after the church. Yet the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force in 2007, which can reduce the contact of the military with the people, and the increasing number of casualties, are expected to reduce public confidence in the military or, at least, to maintain it at a relative lower level. At the same time, the economic crisis may orient more people toward a more secure job offered by the military, which, in turn, may have a positive impact on public trust.



**Figure 3** Evolution of the percentages of public trust in the Romanian military between 1990 and 2007  
Sources: [www.osf.ro](http://www.osf.ro) for the period 1997-2007 and Sandu, 1996 for the period 1990-1996

**Figure 3** is not updated to 2012 because the Foundation for an Open Society stopped this research in 2007. Since then, the newly opened National Institute for Evaluation Strategies (IRES) continued the research into trust in the military and its profession. From 64% in 2009, the trust in February 2012 was 78%, a percentage last registered in December 1997. This can be explained by the memorable gesture of a young lieutenant who joined the public demonstration dressed in military uniform in order to express his disappointment with current political decisions affecting the military. Such a gesture clearly had the effect of reinforcing the image mentioned by Macovei<sup>124</sup> in his book (2004: 7): to be representative of the population. Nonetheless, despite the declining trend until 2009, the military still remains relatively high in public trust, together with the church, as traditional institutions with a long history: a positive fact for the

<sup>124</sup> Other images mentioned by the author are: (1) the military is the guarantee of defense of national sovereignty; (2) the military is the continuation of the glorious tradition of centuries of free peasants; (3) the main qualities of military personnel are: honesty, honor, dignity in peacetime and a spirit of heroism and sacrifice during wartime. There is no serious research within current military sociology on the strength of such social representations nowadays, or about the past, when these images were exploited by communist leaders in their intensive nationalistic propaganda

ROAF, mostly because this popularity was the basis for the support the military needed to initiate post-communist changes (Watts, 2003).

The relatively large participation of Romanian troops in military operations abroad since 1990, before NATO membership, moved the military from the role of guarantor of national sovereignty towards a constant contributor in the regional and global security arena. In this vein, the Romanian population appears eager to agree most of all with humanitarian roles rather than with intervention requiring traditional military use of force (Voinescu & Dobre, 2005). The pre and post-communist roles of disaster relief assistance during various natural calamities (floods, fires or storms) contribute to this perception (Watts, 2003b: 133).

***Summary: vestiges of the past for the understanding of today's military culture in Romania***

This chapter delved into Romania's recent history and underlined the changes after the Second World War, when the country was dependent and submissive to Soviet interests. It is too superficial to claim today that Sovietization was possible in Romania because of the fertile terrain cultivated by previous authoritarian regimes in Romania. At the end of the war the main Western political international actors decided that Romania would be transformed into a Soviet satellite; Romania was not given an alternative. After 1944, the systematic elimination of the military elite, the appointment of opportunist, incompetent but obedient people to positions of command, indoctrination through communist propaganda and the creation of political structures parallel to the military chain of command were lines of action of the communists in the Romanian military. Using terror and espionage, the political chain had strict control over the internal activities of the military. Indeed, espionage instruments were used during the authoritarian royal regime until 1940 to control the political elites (Deletant, 2006: 106). However, during the communist regime these instruments were developed to "perfection": the elite of that time penetrated and controlled an entire society by changing its total social psychology. Freedom of speech and thinking, developed in the more liberal Romanian inter-war society, were replaced by the only "correct" way of thinking, as promoted by the omnipresent Communist Party. After the Soviets' partial withdrawal, from 1958 the Romanian communists reproduced internally the same patterns in order to keep their positions of power, with even more damage to the individual and collective psyche. Recently some authors acknowledged the merits Romanian communists' had on international stage in mediating major international conflicts (Watts, 2010). Until the early 1960s, the efficiency and performance of the military, as well as of the entire society, were defined by Soviet key-players at the top of all Romanian social and political structures. Soviets have irreversibly changed the Royal Armed Forces' structure, composition and culture through various mechanisms specific to occupation regimes.



In 1989, at the start of the anti-communist uprising, the ROAF - as a tool in communists' hands - received order to intervene and stop it. As events evolved toward change of the dictatorial regime, in the end, the military decision was to sustain the new political structures. This fact enabled the military, later, to build its legitimacy on these principal actions. However, the promotion of a long list of high ranking officers who executed the orders to stop the population from its protest, together with the nomination of ex-communist retired generals in ROAF's leadership were actions that generated discontent in the military led by the Committee for Democratic Action of the Armed Forces (CADA). Its program to clarify ROAF's role during the popular uprising was blocked. After the elections in 1990, instead of the compromised officers leaving the military, CADA was disbanded and thus the ROAF missed the opportunity for moral reform.

Parallel to these developments, political efforts were channeled toward the creation of a new legal framework and instruments to build democratic institutions. Being not such an easy process, and requiring time, it postponed the release of the National Security Strategy and the start of a more visible structural reform until later. A three-phase downsizing process for an overweight military was conceived and implemented. This was doubled by frequent short term disbanding and re-establishment of units, with harsh consequences for troops' morale and wellbeing (Mureşan, 2001: 10).

The conclusion of the chapter sustains previous observations made on the study of civil-military relations, that many of the problems are generated by the legacy of the past (Nelson, 2002: 427; Zulean, 2007a: 206-207), contrary to some tendencies in Romanian military sociology suggesting otherwise (Sava, 2003: 19). This legacy in the Romanian military case can be summarized building on Clemmensen's framework (1999):

(1) *De-professionalization of the military and deviation from its main purpose.* Involved in domestic activities to support the national economy, the Romanian military became a de-professionalized instrument in its main area of expertise, the management of violence, while acquiring expertise rather in civilian tasks, some of them with no connection to military life. Under the (dis)guise of "helping society" soldiers, especially of lower ranks, became "slaves" within their own military. Promotion was influenced by seniority, nepotism and corruption, while top candidates had to be members of the Communist Party and had to have knowledge of the content of political documents; these becoming a substitute for engaging in real social science. The structure of the Romanian communist military became an inverted pyramid, with many high rank officers (generals and colonels). This de-professionalization explains (a) the lack of understanding of the situation at the first moments of the riots in 1989, when Armed Forces were against the people, (b) the intense politicization of the

military, (c) the organizational corruption and (d) the lack of expertise in creating new models or in advancing solutions derived from national realities not those which succeed in other societies with a different cultural setting.

(2) *Politicization of the military.* Before 1989 this process was possible by using a system of parallel structure that conditioned the decision-making process in each organizational matter. Political supervision affected the promotion system (mandatory party membership coupled later with privileges and family loyalties). After 1989, politicization became manifest through high ranking generals and former leaders of the ROAF, who expressed personal political options or misused military uniforms during elections campaigns. Another facet of the problem was generated by the acceptance of the misuse by civilians of military uniform without legal consequences. The permanent politicization of the ROAF, exposed publicly by the Romanian MoD leadership in 2012, shows an under-developed content in civil-military relations.

(3) *Complete dependence on the commander and authoritarianism in superior-subordinate relations.* Although in public official documents and statements people were acknowledged as the main concern of leadership at all levels, communists showed no room for human resources approaches or care for people's needs as defined by Western understanding in the military. The result was the creation of an authoritarian culture with dictatorial emphasis. Before 1989, subordinates necessarily learned not to develop open criticism, not to express new ideas, to hide the real status of organizational problems and not to express points of view other than those stated by communist documents and officials. Moreover, they learned that to challenge these views meant to be close to losing their job, to risk their lives and their families' future or years of prison and forced labor. The main tool for controlling people was fear. After 1989, the Romanian military system was confronted with a moral and material crisis, reflected in young officers' resignation motives. Sava (2003: 3, 29) discusses the transitional features of the ROAF until 2003, only mentioning that "changing the attitudes of the officer corps is underway" while consistent studies about the current leadership and its implications for organizational performance are missing in the debate about transformation and in national military sociology.

(4) *Low academic standards.* The purpose of literature on defense, published during these years, was mainly to praise the communist political leadership. An anti-intellectual attitude developed and books were published without having serious national or international reference to defense matters. These books usually had to eulogize the "great vision" of the "supreme commander", to sustain the Communist Party vision and not initiate a scientific or serious debate about the main issues for the military. In this "perfect" world, there was no place to address critically the structural and procedural

weaknesses of an organization preoccupied with reporting each year the accomplishment of the plan in all “entrusted” activities. After 1989, information about low academic standards and integrity within the military educational system, combined with corruption and political involvement, continued to be in the media.

(5) *Nonpraetorianism*. There is an important positive feature within ROAF that transcends the political regimes. Romania has no tradition in military interventions and this attitude was found after 1989 as well, when military leaders were confronted with prospects of intervention in internal affairs. Romanian military leaders neither exploited the chance to lead the state in the uncertain moment of political change from 1989, nor accepted to be involved in later domestic repression situations. This maturity is a positive input in civil-military relations that shows a clear understanding of the place of the military in society before and after 1989.

(6) *Lack of credible leadership*. Except for the lack of skilled civilians in defense matters, there is another problem revealed in the current analysis: corruption in top military structures. The reform showed the lack of moral integrity in top military leadership, who accepted being involved in numerous corruption scandals, including in 2012. At this time, these two major barriers for effective civil-military relations (Blackwell, 2004: 94) are far from being “successfully reformed” (Watts, 2006). It is difficult to build trust and a healthy *esprit de corps* while following a corrupted leadership preoccupied with other than people’s needs or organizational aims accomplished by ethical standards.

This does not imply denying the efforts made to change the Romanian Armed Forces’ structure and size, improve their performance and make them interoperable with foreign armed forces, and to share responsibilities, even before being a *de facto* NATO member. However, the historical analysis presented in this chapter projects a new light. It unveils an organization involved in a mechanical change of its structures, but trapped in an old, unhealthy system of values and practices. In this respect, the contribution of this historical analysis is twofold. It reinforces the need for a current analysis of Romanian military culture and it provides motivation for the integration of the cultural perspective into organizational change approaches.

## CHAPTER 4

# DIAGNOSING ROMANIAN MILITARY CULTURE IN PEACETIME

### Theoretical framework

#### *Theoretical grounds*

According to the conclusions derived from the Chapter 2, the Romanian military culture diagnosis should offer an understanding of current organizational values and practices. This can be achieved by using a combined design research, applied at multiple levels and by respecting the two faces of the military organizations: peace and war time. Following the objectives to diagnose the Romanian military culture and to use results for internal and external needs, the literature on cross-cultural studies directed the attention to two major projects of multinational research on values: the GLOBE and HOFSTEDE projects.

Hofstede built his model on two pillars. The first assertion is that “each person carries a certain amount of mental programming that is stable over time” (1984: 15; 2001: 2). The second pillar focuses the attention toward the main concepts to describe mental programs: values and culture. As collective programming of the mind, culture patterns are rooted in the values and beliefs systems of major groups in society and they are stable over time and history (2001: 1). Hofstede asserts that nearly all behaviors, attitudes and beliefs carry a value component as human beings prefer certain states of affairs over others and they decide to chose (1984: 18; 2001: 6). In this respect measuring work and private life goals can give answers about the values “as desired” rather than “as the desirable”, which actually is considered closer to actual behavior (Hofstede, 1984: 20; 2001: 6). Part of these values coalesced into five national culture dimensions: (a) power distance, PDI (b) uncertainty avoidance, UAI (c) masculinity / femininity, MAS (d) individualism/collectivism, IDV and (e) long term/short term orientation, LTO. The PDI and UAI were found through an eclectic analysis of data, based on theoretical reasoning and correlation analysis. IDV and MAS were derived from a country-level factor analysis of scores on work goal importance, standardized for eliminating acquiescence (p. 41). Specific questions are combined using a mathematical formula in order to calculate each specific index. The information gathered from indices needs to be triangulated for each country and extensively analyzed in combination with historical evidence.

*PDI* is an ecological factor that deals with the unequal distribution of power within society and measures the norm of authoritarianism (1984: 87; 2001: 93). In order to compute its value Hofstede considers the answer to three questions: the actual and the desired style of management (ranging from

authoritarian to democratic) and the frequency of the fear of expressing disagreement with superiors. Hofstede's decision to build the sample on the less powerful members in an organization was statistically proved correct when comparing the PDI scores for managers and non-managers (2001: 86-88). Where superiors maintained a large power distance, subordinates tend to polarize into dependence or counter-dependence. In countries with high PDI, subordinates are dependent on their superiors and there is "a strong ideological push toward models of formal participation" (Hofstede, 1984: 82). PDI is influenced by education and occupation: the lower-education/ lower-status occupation tended to produce high PDI values. According to Hofstede it seems that every additional year of school needed for an occupation reduced the occupation PDI score by 18 points (2001: 89). In respect to possible gender influence on PDI there is relevance just for occupations that have sizable shares of men and women doing the same work (1984: 80).

*UAI* describes the (in)tolerance of ambiguity within society or more specifically the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations (Hofstede, 2001: 161). It was derived from country mean scores or percentages on three questions regarding rule orientation, employment stability and stress at work. The three questions are correlated across countries because they represent alternative reactions to a same challenge: a norm for ambiguity avoidance (Hofstede, 2001: 159). People in high *UAI* societies feel more alienated; they feel themselves less able to influence their lives, their superiors and authorities and the world at large (2001: 161). Rules try to reduce human behavior's unpredictability, so the stronger a culture's tendency to avoid uncertainty the greater its need for rules. Technology, law and religion and their combinations are central features to handle high uncertainty societies and organizational life and they should be considered in analyses too (Hofstede & Peterson, 2000: 409). Hofstede acknowledges the need for rules and notes that "these can destroy people's autonomous judgment and lead them to do things that they would have considered bad without rules" (1984: 115). While employment stability and rule orientation are two ways of avoiding uncertainty, stress is a subjective experience. Under high stress conditions, people seek strategies to search for security and this is visible in these two strategies mentioned above. An occupation's mean level of rule orientation depends mainly on its' average formal education level (more educated occupation, less rules oriented) but also on the hierarchical level. Hofstede notes that gender differences were negligible while "there is a clear relationship between *UAI* and the average of respondents in the subsidiary" (1984: 110).

The *IDV*, individualism as opposed to collectivism, describes the relation between the individual and collectivity as intimately linked to social norms (Hofstede, 1984: 149; 2001: 210). In individualist cultures the distinction is between self and other; the individual self is more distinct from the collective, while in collectivist cultures the distinction is between in-group and out-group and the different rules and


principles that apply to the self in relation with each of these two. Out-groups may be treated with compassion, competition or hostility (Hofstede & Peterson, 2000: 408-409). Collective societies call for greater emotional dependence of its members in organizational life. The degree of individualism within organizations depends from employee's educational level, organizational history and organizational culture (2001: 213). The IDV index used to compare countries was calculated using the importance given to work goals: sufficient personal time, physical conditions at work, cooperation and the life in a desirable area (Hofstede, 1984: 156; 2001: 492). By computing the mean of the answers countries scores were compared. However, through the ecological factor analysis across occupations a *social* (relationships with manager, cooperation, friendly atmosphere) and an *-ego* (earnings and advancement) *factor* similar to social/ego factor across countries were found (2001: 285). These were used for other theoretical developments (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

The *MAS*culinity dimension -as opposed to femininity- describes two ways of coping with gender differentiation and their consequences for emotional and social roles in society (Hofstede, 2001: 279). These ways are entirely a matter of the socialization process, because each society recognizes certain behaviors suitable to males rather than females and vice versa, and the choice for each gender is mediated by social norms and traditions (Hofstede, 2001: 298). High social masculinity tends to differentiate clearly the gender roles: men tend to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, challenge and recognition of the good work; women are supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life. On the other hand, femininity means an overlapping of the gender roles: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned about the relations with managers and job security. The interpretation of this dimension is given by Hofstede by underlining: "These words should not be taken to imply that men always actually behave in a more masculine manner than do women, or that women behave in more feminine ways than do men; rather statistically men as a rule will show more <masculine > and women more <feminine> behavior" (2001: 284). In the same time, this dimension can describe occupations as more masculine (ego) oriented or feminine oriented (social) (Hofstede, 2001: 285). More specifically, in high masculine cultures the difference in values of men and women for same occupations tends to be larger than in the low-MAS countries (Hofstede, 1984: 194). This index used the means on next work goals: cooperation, earnings, security of employment and opportunity to advance on high levels. There are differences' by age category: employment security, physical conditions, desirable area, a good relation with the manager and cooperation are more important with an increasing age, while advancement, training, earnings, challenge, use of the skills, personal time become less important with age (Hofstede, 2001: 289). Technological developments enable changes in work itself and participation of women in society which also enables a more feminine orientation in values (Hofstede, 2001: 334).

Long Term Orientation (LTO) was identified next to the other four dimensions and it is inspired by Chinese Confucian thinking about honorable behavior. The LTO dimension expresses to what extent the virtuous living is a goal, independent of any religious justification. Long Term Orientation stands for the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, such as education, frugality and persistence (Hofstede, 2001: 359-363). It stresses personal adaptability and adaptation of the traditions to new circumstances (Hofstede, 2001: 360). At the opposite pole Hofstede defines Short Term Orientation which “stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present, in particular, to respect for tradition, preservation of < face> and fulfilling social obligations” (2001: 359). This means a culture in which quick results are expected and the emphasis is on personal steadiness and stability (Hofstede, 2001: 360).

In order to explore the cultural profile of the national armed forces, studies using the Hofstede methodology focused on describing the culture of military academies (Soeters, 1997; Soeters & Recht, 1998). This was done during peacetime in military academies as these are the places where cadets are socialized to become future officers in the spirit of the culture to be transmitted through socialization (Soeters, 1997: 8). Officership standards are taught during the cadets’ years in military academies; hence, the importance of the cultural study of military academies.

As defined in Chapter 2, the military organization is a public organization with the goal of preparing its members for fulfilling their unique task: the management of legitimized violence. This generic term covers different content in time. The primary, traditional focus of the military was exclusively on combat operations. Instead, today’s challenges as depicted in Chapter 1 made soldiers learn new roles: the statesman-diplomat, i.e. the negotiator in non-combat and peacekeeping actions (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000). This shift requires soldiers’ competence to be redefined in function of their ability to switch between the various roles (Williams, 2000: 269; Williams, 2007). Under these conditions, military ethos has to be re-defined. Future officers should be educated to avoid conflict, or to find less violent solutions to it, and to adapt to complex situations. At the same time they have to be ready and prepared for the task of defending homeland security, with violence, if necessary. And it is in this respect that the cultural diagnose should decipher the military orientation when it is to choose between strategies for solving an international conflict that have different intensities on the violence scale.



**Figure 4** Strategies for solving an international conflict

As part of the class of uniformed organizations, the military socialization emphasizes hierarchy, military discipline and the communal character of military life (Lang, 1966). When comparing with civilian organizations, the military discipline describes the repertoire of basic military socialization and a fundamental occupational value (Capstick, 2000). In fact values relating to discipline and obedience raised the debate on the theory about the gap between armed forces and society (Feaver & Kohnm 2001; Caforio, 2007). Soeters (1997, 2000) and Soeters and Recht (1998) differentiated between ceremonial (e.g. salute, outward appearance, or uniform) and functional discipline (e.g. acting in accordance with commander's intention or existing rules). Comparing cadets' discipline orientation from 19 military academies these scholars observed a national variation in the weight for the two features of military discipline.

From national and occupational culture level addressing the organizational culture is the next step in the diagnosis. There is a great variety in models for assessing organizational culture and no instrument covers with precision and exhaustiveness these conceptual domains, as Dellobe, Haccoun and Van den Berg (2002) observed. Van Muijen et.al (1998) divided organizational culture into practices and values describing four basic orientations: "support", "innovation", "rules" and "goal". Central to "*support orientation*" are concepts such as participation, cooperation, people-based, mutual trust, team spirit, and individual growth. Informal and verbal communicational patterns help employees to make decisions and to express their ideas about their work and about each other (emphasis here is on employees' commitment). In order for an organizational culture to be oriented toward "*innovation*" it needs to give freedom to its members to experiment and experience and as such, exercise less top down control. An innovative culture is thus characterized by concepts as: searching for new information, creativity and openness to change, anticipation and experimentation. These require employees' commitment and involvement in organizational life. The "*rules orientation*" emphasizes respect for authority, rationality of procedures and strict division of work. Hierarchical structure and written top-down communication are combined with a power based formal authority. Therefore, rationality, performance indicators, accomplishments, accountability and contingent reward are concepts describing the "*goal orientation*".

Developing the FOCUS study, Van Muijen (1994) built his theory on a competing value model with two main axes: external/internal and flexibility/control (p.235). Innovation and goal orientation are externally focused, while innovation and support share an emphasis on flexibility and cooperation between colleagues. He defined a tension between values of the diametrical orientations (Van Muijen et al., 1999: 557): stability and control are opposed to creativity and change. For this reason, the questionnaire was built including a descriptive part that measures the perception of organizational practices and another part which measures the evaluative aspects of organizational culture. It comprises



descriptions of behavioral patterns and artifacts. The assumption that the descriptive aspects of culture are influenced by their corresponding evaluative aspects was confirmed for the support, innovation and goal orientation, while the rule scale was considered to need some improvements. Overall, all the scales were considered one-dimensional and reliable (Van Muijen, 1994).

Going further, the research in the area of military culture should address the differences between military branches, as we should not forget that within military organizations considerable cultural differences exist (Soeters, Winslow & Weibull, 2003: 238). As the warfare has a dual nature (forces and capabilities) the sociological exploration of cultural differences is of key importance for the armed forces (Fisher, 2006). Each subculture has its own environment to operate and receives specific missions which generate its features that ideally should converge to the mission accomplishment. Fisher (2006:3) notes in this respect:

*“An ideal end-state culture for joint military forces would be one in which diverse-integrated service subcultures form a force characterized by unique and highly trained services melded efficiently into a single organization with no seams or gaps between services.”*

Unfortunately the different identities developed in time and reinforced through socialization processes separated subcultural identities as in examples from military operations in Somalia and Ex-Yugoslavia (Winslow, 1999), Iraq (Taguba Report, 2004) or Afghanistan (Boal, 2011). The authors aforementioned described the abuses of the soldiers belonging to different subcultures that failed to respect the standards of general military discipline and professionalism.

### ***Expectations and hypotheses***

#### **National culture dimensions**

Hofstede's national culture model using the quantitative assessment offered by the Value Survey Module offers an impressive database on civilian and military cultures, and thus a useful instrument to compare and conclude about military cultures world-wide. This instrument offers the chance to diagnose Romanian military culture and to add to the international military database (Soeters, 1997; Page, 2002) especially now that Romanian forces are involved in multinational cooperation and no research is available on this topic. Moreover, under the communism of the 1980s, Romania was not present in the original civilian IBM study or in the international military research that was conducted in the late 1990s.

As portrayed in Chapter 3, the 50 years of harsh communist suppression shaped specific features within the military: centralization of power in leaders' hands, expectation of total submission from subordinates, persecution intense enough to cultivate fear of expressing opposite/different ideas from the official ones. The evolution in career conditioned by political affiliation combined with nepotism and

favoritism (Ionescu & Toma, 2001: 229) developed into an environment of dominance, submission and control. *These arguments point towards the assumption that RO military culture is expected to be characterized by a high value on Power Distance.*

The fear to express ideas different from Communist Party documents encouraged formal participation of people in organizational life. Cătană and Cătană (1999) emphasize Romanians' disliking of risks and uncertainty: the deep need for control and security; and numerous meetings, sometimes without a clear decision, in organizations. Moreover, Romanians are characterized as liking stability and being good at those actions which require continuity rather than change. If we add to these the fact that the Romanian Orthodox Church is always in the top position of the national trust barometer, *all these observations lead to assume a high value of the UAI for RO military culture.*

In 1994 the National Centre for Youth Studies concludes, in a significant sample for Bucharest, on the values profiles of youths (18-34 years): "The youths show a low interest in social, communitarian values, in compassion, empathy, and tolerance. Results indicate the high value placed on individual success; also the display of obvious tendencies toward individualism and egocentrism" (Preda, 1994: 182). This is a surprising result when comparing it with collectivism, a core feature of communist societies. In 1996, Hofstede led a group of scholars in eight East-European countries in order to assess the characteristic of the ideal job among students. The most important absolute values rated by Romanian civilian students were: cooperation, contribution to company success, freedom, use of skills, and earnings (p. 206), a mixture between individual and collective values. *Accordingly a moderate individualism is likely to describe RO military culture.*

Compared to civilian organizations, the military seems to display more masculine cultural features (Soeters, 2000). The low percentage of women in the Romanian military, most of them working in non-combat roles (see pg. 96), the gender differentiated seats to enter some of the military academies or schools, and the low number of high rank (general) women, would suggest rather a masculine cultural orientation. Nowadays, in post-communist Romania a chance to have a secure job is a strong argument. After 1989 this message is reflected within the military media, in articles and interviews with young cadets and students in military colleges especially after changing to the All-Volunteer-Force system of recruitment. It exploits the need for steadiness, indicating rather a feminine orientation within ROAF. *Accordingly, we would expect these opposite tendencies to be reflected in a moderate value of masculinity.*

A look back into recent history shows that specific to communist management was the 5-year planning system (Ionescu & Toma, 2001: 234), in fact a sign for a short term vision. This applied to entire societies, including the military. Since 1989 the reform of the ROAF was divided in short periods of time

(2001-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2010) with detailed objectives and accomplished requirements for all five Member Action Plans (Popescu, 2001; STAR, 2007). *Accordingly, short term thinking is more likely to be the cultural feature specific to ROAF.*

### **Organizational culture**

Similar to national culture dimensions, the theory of organizational culture and subcultural differences are up until now not sociologically addressed in ROAF nor explored by current Romanian military sociologists. This could be done using an analysis of the general configuration of organizational culture of the military academies and to test the existence of cultural differences in organizational values and practices between land, naval and air force, the three major components of ROAF. In the Romanian case different locations of military academies supplementary called the need for the investigation of their organizational culture (values and practices) differences.

With respect to work motivation, historical and religious causes generated a special perception of money and goods: all the invasions and wars had harsh consequences for Romanians, who couldn't see in time the results of their work, and cultivated a feeling of acceptance similar to resignation and apathy (Cătană & Cătană, 1999: 256+). The communist realities created the very well-known, ironical sayings: "Time is passing /we get paid anyway / so we are working with 'love'..." or "The long and frequent breaks are the key towards 'big successes' "125. During communist times a double, underground meaning was developed in the Romanian language. In this spirit, the first saying means "If time is passing anyway and we are to be paid, why bother to work?" Their effect on people's morale was simple: it sustained and amplified the Romanians' indifference toward work results. The study of history showed the low interpersonal trust between Romanians resulting from communist oppression. In fact after 1989 annual national surveys pointed out the same low level of trust between Romanians as a "constant social result" (Dâncu, 2000). The lack of human resources approaches or support orientation in communist military life was combined with imitations rather than innovations, as long as people with new ideas were considered a threat to communist thinking. Combining the bureaucratic character of the military and Romanian realities described in Chapter 3 *we expect in all academies relatively high scores for rule orientation, values (evaluative scale) and practices (descriptive scale) with differences between military academies.* However in 2002, the ROAF were involved in full structural reform and changes toward more compatibility with forces from NATO and EU (change of roles, missions and planning system; educational and training system). Therefore, this diagnosis should reflect the described reality by *showing relatively high scores on the innovation scale in each military subculture.*

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<sup>125</sup> Romanian version "Timpul trece leafa merge noi cu drag muncim" and "Pauzele lungi și dese, cheia marilor succese"

In the original model of the FOCUS study the values are country specific and the practices are organizationally different (Van Muijen et al., 1999). Except the Technical Military Academy (ATM) which recruits cadets training in the technical field, the other three are organized according to each of three subcultural needs within the ROAF: air, land and naval. Accordingly, within different military academies, we expect significant *differences in organizational practices (descriptive scale) on innovation, goal, support and rule orientations, but not in values.*

### **Occupational culture**

As no previous studies are available on military academies the final section will be devoted to exploring the similarities and differences across these institutions on military discipline and military orientation. In the international study (Soeters, 1997) the military academies in countries with high values on PD index tend to score generally above average in all aspects of military discipline. In the Romanian military academies case, *the tough past-communist experience is a reason to presume a coercive military culture oriented toward formal discipline.*

Peace with their neighbors is a value cherished by Romanians, who had a rather turbulent history. After the long successions of invasions, culminating with the imposed communization of the country after the Yalta “trade”, the Romanians have in their collective memory the social representation and the awareness of a destiny dependent on the will of great powers. From another standpoint the Romanian military remained involved in domestic activities in the communist past and after 1989 each year, due to natural disasters. Moreover, Romanian culture generally, and particularly in the last 50 years of communism, lacks an offensive military ethos. *Accordingly, we expect the current military culture to have (a) a more peaceful orientation in its work, that (b) peaceful strategies (negotiation, diplomatic appeal) prevail in the options of its members, while (c) aggression (bombing and ground combat) serve only as a last resort in general conflict.*

### **Design**

The Romanian Armed Forces have four military academies in different cities: Sibiu – Land Force Academy; Braşov – Air Force Academy; Bucharest – Technical Military Academy and Constanţa – Naval Force Academy. Three of them are specific to each of ROAF branches and the fourth was designed to prepare future engineers for all the forces. This organization was useful to analyze the national, occupational, organizational and subcultural differences by applying a questionnaire that combined different instruments.

## Questionnaire

The questionnaire was organized around three modules: national, organizational and occupational culture (discipline and military orientation). It is based on the Romanian version, independently translated from English by the English teachers at the Air Force Academy. The final form was improved after discussing each suggestion.

Following the purposes of the thesis, only those questions about value orientations useful in computing the value of each of five indices were included. At the same time, a change was made in the Romanian version of the VSM82<sup>126</sup> with respect to the answers to the question about the intention to work for the military organization. Since quitting the military after graduation means paying the fees for education received in the military academy, the purpose was to gain an impression of the desire to leave the system after the expiry of the first specific term of the contract. The purpose was to offer a more nuanced division of the third option from the original version, however, without affecting the computation of the index. Only the first two response options were used (Hofstede, 2001: 149).

Hofstede VSM82	Present research
• 2 years the most	• 2 years the most
• between 2 and 5	• between 2 and 5
• more than 5 years (but I will probably leave before I retire)	• more than 5 years
	• <i>until the contract expires (between 5 and 8 years)</i>
• retirement	• retirement

**Table 12** Comparing the structure of the answers to the question regarding the intention to work for the military in original version and the present research

The FOCUS 93 questionnaire, based on a competing values framework (Van Muijen, 1994; Van Muijen et. al, 1998) was used as the second module. Unfortunately, due to a wrong print in the original article (Van Muijen et. al, 1998) the item „task orientation” was printed accidentally as „ask orientation” and was translated in Romanian language alike.

The third module included discipline and military orientation issues. Following Soeters (2000) formal discipline was measured using the answers to the importance given to outward appearance: the correct wearing of uniform, boots and headwear, the correct salute of superiors and to punctuality. The informal discipline was operationalised in terms of behavior, in accordance with the commander’s intentions and the adjustment to group informal norms. To measure the military orientation cadets were asked to assess the frequency of given solutions to an international conflict (from diplomatic to total aggression). The completion of the entire self-administered questionnaire took, on average, 25 minutes per respondent.

<sup>126</sup> VSM82 is the acronym for Value Survey Module, Version 1982

## The sample

Hofstede's methodological recommendation<sup>127</sup> was to investigate more than 50 people in each unit. The criterion used to build this sample of each military academy was the ratio of each class within the general structure of the academy. This meant investigating every second cadet in each military academy. Accordingly, a sample of 257 cadets out of approximately 560<sup>128</sup> from all four military academies (Air Force Academy–AFA, Land Force Academy–ATM, Naval Force Academy–AFN, and Military Technique Academy–ATM) filled out the questionnaire in December 2002.

Groups/ year of collecting the data	N
AFA / 2002 cadets	64
AFT / 2002 cadets	76
AFN / 2002 cadets	64
ATM / 2002 cadets	53
<b>Total</b>	<b>257</b>

**Table 13** Sample composition in order to analyze the Romanian military culture on peacetime

## Data management

In the international study using Hofstede's Value Survey Module 82 (e.g. Soeters, 1997) the data were analyzed within groups as any sets of respondents considered homogeneous for the purpose of the analysis. Usually a group analysis represented one occupation (or set of similar occupations) in one country; sometimes it represented one or more occupations across a set of countries (Hofstede, 2001: 50). A country score was computed as the arithmetic mean of the scores for seven occupational categories ranging from managers at all levels to clerks and administrative personnel (Hofstede, 2001: 51). All of these categories carried equal weight in the computation of country score, regardless of the actual numbers of respondents. Hofstede requires the application only of ecological correlations (between societies/cultures correlations); in the construction of indices for the national level we ought to make sure that the country means scores correlate across countries, not individuals (Hofstede, 2001: 16). The reliability of the country scores cannot be tested across individuals, the calculation of means and computations are relative to the other countries, so validation means correlating the country scores with data from other surveys and with indices measured at country level (2001: 41). In these conditions, the reliability of the instrument can be tested only if the data collected come from two or more societies/nations. *Therefore, in the present study the statistical analysis of Hofstede's instrument reliability cannot be tested since this was not the original purpose of the study. Instead, the indices were computed according to original methodology and an item-analysis was performed for an in-depth exploration of the results.*

<sup>127</sup> Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation (1982). *Scoring Guide for Value Survey Module, Version 1982*. Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, June, p.1

<sup>128</sup> At the time of the research, the number of the cadets was considered secret in some military academies, so the total sample measure is an approximation

The reliability of the Focus 93 Questionnaire was explored and the cultural diagram was plotted for each dimension describing military academies' values and practices. Discipline and military orientation were issues addressed in each military academy in order to test the internal consistency scale.

**Table 13** (see above) shows the distribution of the sample according to military academy while **Table 14** describes the sample composition according to year of study. The lack of similarity of compatible data in the sample led to the decision to eliminate cadets of the fifth year from The Naval Forces Academy (AFN) from comparative analysis only when the independent variable is the year of study. To the eight respondents excluded, another one was added because this respondent did not mention the year of study. Accordingly, when the year of study is the independent variable the sample has N= 248 respondents.

Groups/ years of study		Frequency	% from total sample
Valid	cadet year 1	56	21.8
	cadet year 2	48	18.7
	cadet year 3	71	27.6
	cadet year 4	73	28.4
	cadet year 5	8	3.1
	Total	256	99.6
Missing		1	.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>257</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 14** Sample distribution according to year independent variable used for statistical analyses, N=256

Considering that 3 out of 5 methodological requirements<sup>129</sup> are satisfied (Sava, 2004: 115) it is possible to compute a one-way between-groups ANOVA with post-hoc tests analysis to compare the sub-cultures of all four academies Air Force, Army, Navy and Military Technology (AFA, AFT, AFN and ATM).

## Value orientations in military academies

Data were computed for each dimension using the standard defined procedure by Hofstede (1984) and the item analysis will additionally help to describe the cultural features of the military.


### *PDI*

With the computed value of **74** for PD Index, Romanian military culture is a relatively high power distance culture with a centralization of power in leadership hands, with subordinates being afraid to

<sup>129</sup> (1) A significant sample  $\pm 4,5$  for a  $s = 95\%$ ; (2) The dependent variable shows a normal distribution; (3) Each person was tested only once; (4) It is applied to nominal(independent) / ordinal(dependent) variables; (5) Equal homogeneity of variances for each group – as obligatory and this means Levene's test to be not significant, with  $p > .05$  and data treatment with Scheffe post-hoc test; if differences in variances different post-hoc methods shall be used (Dunett's C)


express a different opinion and with a preference for more participation in organizational decision making processes.

The comparative item analysis of the current management style of commanders reveals significant differences between military academies.  $\chi^2(12) = 24.81, p = .02$ . The Air Forces Academy (AFA) displays the higher percentage of consultative styles (6.2%). The fact that this organization is positively different from the others can be observed in **Figure 5**. Beyond this difference, overall, Romanian cadets perceived their commanders' management style as predominantly authoritarian (54.50%) with some paternalistic nuances (22.20%). The predominant pattern is that commanders make the decisions and expect subordinates just to execute them without question ( $M=1.84, SD=1.15$ ). This relation creates a subordinate usually being told “what” and “how” with no place for self-development, but for dependence.



**Figure 5** Item level analysis: the distribution of the answers about current command style within Romanian military academies (N=257)

Instead, this dependence is not desired by Romanian cadets: almost 77% ask for styles that require more participation of subordinates in the decision making process. Actually, this **contra-dependence** becomes a source of tensions and conflicts between commanders and subordinates in each military academy although cadets learned never to express this openly during their socialization.



**Figure 6** Item level analysis: differences in percentages between current and preferred management styles in Romanian military academies (N=257)



The same contra-dependence was identified when organizational status was the independent variable. Excepting the first year of study, the cadets' request for a more consultative command style has similar patterns as in the figure below. The fifth year of study in the Naval Forces Academy was excluded from analysis due to a lack of similar groups from other academies.




Figure 7 Desired command styles according to year of study (N=248; cadets year 5 excluded from analysis, 1 respondent missing)

Year of study	Command style	Command style				Total
		Authoritarian	Paternalist	Consultative	Democratic	
Cadet year 1		.4%	3.6%	<b>8.9%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>	22.6%
Cadet year 2		.4%	4.0%	10.5%	4.4%	19.4%
Cadet year 3		.8%	5.2%	15.3%	7.3%	28.6%
Cadet year 4		2.0%	6.5%	<b>16.9%</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	29.4%
Total		3.6%	19.4%	51.6%	25.4%	100.0%

Table 15 The distribution of percentages for the question regarding desired command style according to year of study (N=248; cadets year 5 excluded from analysis, 1 respondent missing)

According to Table 15, the similar percentages for consultative (8.9%) and democratic (9.7%) styles in first year cadets' options change after the first year of socialization toward the fourth year with a more balanced view about the appropriate command style within the military (16.9% and 4%). Most probably, cadets understood that military organizations cannot be ruled by applying a democratic style of command too often. Rather, as it can be seen above, senior cadets (from years 2, 3 and 4) desire a consultative management style. By adopting this style, commanders take decisions by involving their subordinates in decision making processes.


The analysis of the next item used to compute PDI is the fear of expressing opposing or different ideas (M=2.58, SD=1.15). The answers: very frequent (3%), frequent (23%) and sometimes (25%) is a sign of the lack of participation of Romanian low organizational levels in their own organizational life

and a still closed military system. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate if there are significant differences between military academies or years of study in fear of expressing disagreements with superiors.

<i>ITEM Fear of expressing disagreements</i>				
	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Group /Academy	1.651	3	253	.178
Status /Year of study	3.801	3	244	.011

**Table 16** Test of Homogeneity of Variances – academy and year influence

Although the F-value shows significant differences in comparing military academies [ $F(3, 253)=2.83, p=.04$ ], when treating the data with a post-hoc Scheffe test, the differences were not strong enough to generate different groups. Accordingly, the military academies were homogeneously grouped AFA (M=2.84, SD=1.25); AFT (M=2.68, SD=1.02), AFN (M=2.34, SD=1.16) and ATM (M=2.38, SD=1.13). The Levene test value showed a violation of the assumption of homogeneous variance when the year of study is the independent variable. Still after treating data with Dunnett’s C no significant differences were found between the years of study [ $F(3, 244)=1.41, p=.23$ ]. CY1 (M=2.59, SD=1.04), CY2 (M=2.58, SD=1.33), CY3 (M=2.82, SD=1.20) and CY4 (M=2.42, SD=1.04) were grouped in the same cluster showing a constant level of the fear of expressing different/opposing ideas within the military.



**Figure 8** Means for the item “Fear of expressing disagreements” according to military academy and organizational status

When analyzing the results of the international study on military academies (Soeters, 1997) with respect to the PDI index including Romania (see **Table 17** below), an interesting observation emerges.

Norway	Hungary	Germany	<b>Romania</b>	Canada	USA	Denmark	Spain	Belgium	The Netherlands	Italy	France	Great Britain
26	58	63	74	75	84	92	92	95	96	114	116	131

**Table 17** The PDI for the international military cluster (for the foreign academies source: Soeters, 1997)

Contrary to expectations, East-European countries with many years of harsh communist experience like Hungary and Romania register relatively low PD index values, when compared with Western countries such as The Netherlands, Great Britain or Denmark. In East-European societies, due to their communist past, the distance between military and civilian life is possibly perceived as rather small since the societies in general were totalitarian. In this vein, because the high power distance is similar with the rest of society, people are likely to perceive small differences when becoming members of the military. However, the result sustains Soeters' (1997, 2000) conclusion while studying military organizations: most military academies display high power distance cultures as a consequence of the strong hierarchy: a specific military feature (Lang, 1967). It is just the perceived distance between military and civilian life that has different intensities among societies.

In conclusion, based on historical analysis and current data we deem the hypothesis about the relative high power distance in Romanian culture using Hofstede's measurement partially confirmed.

### ***UAI***

The score computed for UAI (**80**) explains the level of centralization but especially formalization and anxiety when confronted with new situations, a finding consistent with other studies (Cătană & Cătană, 1999). Romanians dislike risks and uncertainty, being good at those actions which require continuity, rather than change. After 1944 as Chapter 2 portrayed, Romanians learned not to express opposition not even to organizational rules. This social environment explains these results.


Cadets' data analysis showed divided opinions on the item "Organizational rules should not be broken, not even when the employees believe that is the company best interest": 43.6% agree and 39% opposite (M=2.86; SD=1.17). A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the academies' responses to this question and no significant differences were found [ $F(3, 253)=.15, p=.93$ ] and academies are grouped in a homogeneous group: AFA (M=2.86, SD=1.14), AFT (M= 2.87, SD=1.17), AFN (M=2.78, SD=1.20), and ATM (M=2.92, SD=1.91).

<i>ITEM Rules should not be broken even it is in the company's best interest</i>				
	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Group /Academy	.592	3	253	.621
Status /Year of study	.630	3	244	.596

**Table 18** Test of Homogeneity of Variances – academy and year influence

No significant differences were found between groups when tested for the influence of year of study over this item (CY1 – M=2.66, SD= 1.13; CY2 – M=2.79, SD=1.11; CY3 – M=3.08, SD=1.24; CY4 – M=2.86, SD=1.16). Chapter 2 presented in details how after 1944 Romanians learned in time not to oppose or criticize bad rules, imposed by a higher rank/authority, otherwise enduring severe punishments. In these conditions, the means of survival were the acceptance of ambivalence and the

separation of what people thought and what they are expected to say, while learning how to slip between available legislation in order to get what they want. Hofstede asserts that in similar conditions the need for rules for coping with uncertainty became rather emotional because rules could not be used as a reference guide.



**Figure 9** Item analysis: means for the item “Rules should not be broken even if is the company best interest” according to military academy (group) and organizational status

The military can become a stressful environment, especially when undergoing change but this stress is not very intensely experienced by cadets ( $M=2.90$ ;  $SD=.71$ ). Almost 61% of respondents felt this pressure within Romanian military academies sometimes.


<i>How often do you fell tense or nervous at work?</i>	%
1. Never	1.9
2. Seldom	22.6
3. Sometimes	60.7
4. Usually	12.8
5. Always	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 19** Item-level analysis: percentage of answers to the stress in organizational life in military academies (N=257)

<i>ITEM Feeling tense or nervous at work</i>	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Group /Academy	4.26	3	253	.006
Status /Year of study	1.20	3	244	.309

**Table 20** Test of Homogeneity of Variances – academy and year influence

To the question about stress at work, academies were grouped together with no significant differences after, treated with Dunett’C, because of low value of Levene’s test: AFA –  $M=3.02$ ,  $SD=.75$ ; AFT –  $M=2.93$ ,  $SD=0.55$ ; AFN –  $M=2.83$ ,  $SD=.77$ ; ATM –  $M=2.81$ ,  $SD=.79$ . When the independent variable is the year of study the statistical data analysis separated the cadets of the last year of study (CY4 –  $M=2.74$ ,  $SD=.73$ ) from the other years (CY1 –  $M=2.80$ ,  $SD= .59$ ; CY2 –  $M=3.06$ ,  $SD= .63$ ; CY3 –  $M=3.10$ ,  $SD=.78$ ). This means that toward the end of their cadet life, the intensity of stress decreases to the lowest level.




**Figure 10** Item analysis: means for the item “Feeling tense or nervous at work” according to military academy (group) and organizational status

The distribution of answers to the question about the intention to work in the military shows that almost 70% are thinking of a short stay, somewhere between 2 years and until the first contract expires (after 8 years graduating from the military academy). The prospect of working with the military until retirement is an option for 30.5 % of cadets. The Technical Military Academy scores the lowest from all four military academies for cadets’ desire to stay until retirement. Apparently the engineering students see more options for jobs on the external labor market than the other officers-to-be.

	Groups/ academies				Total
	AFA	AFT	AFN	ATM	
2 years the most	1	1	1	2	5
between 2 and 5	2	4	4	12	22
more than 5 years	13	12	13	11	49
until first contract expires	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>102</b>
Retirement	16	30	27	5	78
Total count	64	76	63	53	<b>256</b>

**Table 21** Distribution of the answers to the question regarding the time to work for current organization according to military academy (N=256, one respondent missing)




**Figure 11** Time to work for current organization according to military academy

A closer look was given with respect to the analysis of answers when the independent variable is the year of study. After excluding the cadets from year five of the Naval Forces Academy, the analysis showed the same descending trend with respect to the desire to stay in the military for a long time.

	Groups/Organizational status				Total
	Cadet year 1	Cadet year 2	Cadet year 3	Cadet year 4	
2 years maximum			1	4	5
between 2 and 5	4	2	7	9	22
more than 5 years	5	9	20	11	45
until first contract expires (8 years)	<b>22</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>101</b>
retirement	25	11	19	19	74
Total count	56	48	70	73	<b>247</b>

**Table 22** Distribution of the answer to the question regarding the time to work for current organization according to year of study



**Figure 12** Time to work for current organization according to organizational status

Moreover, **Figure 12** shows a break in the cadets’ desire to stay within the military after the first year of study. Since, from all intentions expressed to stay until retirement (29.95%), the desire drops by almost half between the first year (45%) and the last year (26%) something affects cadets’ motivation to perform longer during their contact with the culture found in academies. This result strongly suggests the need to explore this issue further in future studies.

According to findings in the international research on the military academies, the computed UAI places Romania within the Latin Cluster with Italy, France, Spain and Belgium as shown below:

Canada	Hungary	Norway	Denmark	The Netherlands	Great Britain	France	USA	Belgium	Germany	<b>Romania</b>	Italy	Spain
3	22	22	44	44	49	71	72	74	75	<b>80</b>	86	89

**Table 23** The UAI for the international military cluster (for the foreign academies source: Soeters, 1997)

The initially defined expectation regarding a high value on Avoiding Uncertainty dimension in Romanian military case was confirmed.

**IDV**

This index was built on the questions about the importance given to: time for personal life (M=2.01; SD=.76), having good physical work conditions (M=2.05; SD=.86), working with people who cooperate well (M=1.77; SD=.68) and to the life in an area desirable to the entire family (M=1.64; SD=.79).

Italy	Germany	Hungary	Belgium	Great Britain	<b>Romania</b>	The Netherlands	Canada	Denmark	USA	Spain	France	Norway
25	37	40	41	44	<b>50</b>	52	53	54	74	65	66	75

**Table 24** The IDV for the international military cluster (for the foreign academies source: Soeters, 1997)

With this result we cannot infer a clear orientation within the Romanian sample, since middle value of the index combines the individualist tendencies with the collective ones. This is not a surprising result after 50 years of communism, where dominance by fear made people mistrust and not rely on others, as found in systematic surveys (Dâncu, 1999). Comparing results from a more recent study (IDV=69 according to Kunzler, 2007: 32), the civilian students displayed more individualist orientation than cadets in the present study, as expected according to the theoretical framework.

A one-way ANOVA was performed in order to compare the military academies for each item of the IDV index and the statistical treatment grouped all academies in the same cluster. Although the item about the importance regarding the physical conditions at work indicated some significant differences between groups [ $F(3, 253)=3.053, p=.029$ ], a closer inspection with the Scheffe test found military academies grouped in the same cluster.

Item / Significance values	Group	Mean	Std. Deviation
Sufficient time for private life $F(3, 253)=.622, p=.601$	AFA	1.84	.67
	AFT	2.01	.92
	AFN	1.89	.62
	ATM	1.92	.78
Physical conditions $F(3, 253)=3.053, p=.029$	AFA	2.16	.86
	AFT	1.99	.82
	AFN	2.16	.91
	ATM	1.74	.84
Work with people who cooperate well $F(3, 252)=1.271, p=.285$	AFA	1.64	.57
	AFT	1.83	.69
	AFN	1.78	.74
	ATM	1.64	.74
Live in a desirable area $F(3, 253)=.326, p=.807$	AFA	1.56	.61
	AFT	1.67	.74
	AFN	1.58	.69
	ATM	1.58	.86

**Table 25** Significance values, means and standard deviations for items from IDV index

To conclude, the result indicates a military that is moderately individualistically oriented, which confirms the hypothesis.

### MAS

The Netherlands	Belgium	Spain	Italy	Germany	France	Norway	Great Britain	Denmark	USA	<b>Romania</b>	Canada	Hungary
- 42	- 35	- 32	- 28	- 11	- 10	- 7	3	9	18	<b>24</b>	29	46

**Table 26** The MAS in the international military cluster (for the foreign academies source: Soeters, 1997)

The masculinity index was computed using the means on the answer to next items: cooperation (M=1.77, SD=0.68), earnings (M=2.17, SD=0.82), promotion opportunities (M=1.94, SD=0.72) and job security (M=2.02, SD=0.83). The closeness to feminine features of the culture in the Romanian military is reflected in the low value of **24** found in this sample. The current result can be explained by cadets' preference for the secure job that military offers during changing times. It is important to observe the relatively low value of MAS index which leaves no place for balancing the other tendency observed in Romanian military case. It is interesting that, if we look at hierarchy features (PDI and UAI), military Romania can be included in the Latin cluster, but when analyzing the other dimensions (MAS and IDV) it does not reflect the same features.

The one-way ANOVA was performed and the military academies on the four value orientations were compared. The Levene test inspection showed the non-violation of assumption of homogeneous variance, and the post-hoc treatment with Scheffe test flagged significant differences between groups just for the importance to high earnings [ $F(3, 253)=3.050, p=.02$ ]. Cadets from the Technical Military Academy (M=1.85, SD=.74) exhibit the highest interest in financial issues, while Air Forces Academy cadets show the lowest (M=2.27, SD=.75).

Items/ Significance values	Group	Mean	St. Deviation
Work with people who cooperate well $F(3, 252)=1.271, p=.285$	AFA	1.64	.57
	AFT	1.83	.69
	AFN	1.78	.74
	ATM	1.64	.74
High earnings $F(3, 253)=3.050, p=.029$	AFA	<b>2.27</b>	.72
	AFT	2.22	.95
	AFN	2.19	.81
	ATM	<b>1.85</b>	.74
Advancement opportunities $F(3, 253)=.514, p=.673$	AFA	1.89	.80
	AFT	1.80	.69
	AFN	1.81	.61
	ATM	1.74	.56
Security of employment $F(3, 252)=2.068, p=.105$	AFA	2.17	.94
	AFT	2.03	.82
	AFN	1.86	.73
	ATM	1.85	.86

**Table 27** Significance values, means and standard deviation for the items from IDV index



In the case of masculinity-femininity dimension, the hypothesis was not confirmed, Romanian military being found as having rather a feminine orientation.

### **LTO**

In the Romanian study, this dimension was formed by the importance in people’s private life of: personal steadiness and stability (M=1.86, SD=0.69), thrift (M=2.30, SD=0.73), respect for tradition (M=2.87, SD=0.85), persistence and perseverance (M=1.95, SD=0.70). The answers were computed according to Hofstede’s methodology and lead to **53** for LTO index signifying a relatively uncertain orientation between present and future. The one-way ANOVA performed did not show significant differences between military academies in any of the four items investigated. Accordingly, all academies were grouped homogeneously in the case of each item.

Item		Mean	Std. Deviation
Personal steadiness and stability <i>F</i> (3, 253)=1.119, <i>p</i> =.342	AFA	1.98	.75
	AFT	1.79	.66
	AFN	1.81	.59
	ATM	1.85	.69
Thrift <i>F</i> (3, 253)=1.079, <i>p</i> =.359	AFA	2.33	.82
	AFT	2.32	.68
	AFN	2.13	.68
	ATM	2.30	.80
Persistence, perseverance <i>F</i> (3, 253)=1.155, <i>p</i> =.328	AFA	1.97	.80
	AFT	2.05	.67
	AFN	1.91	.64
	ATM	1.83	.70
Respect for tradition <i>F</i> (3, 253)=.369, <i>p</i> =.776	AFA	2.97	.91
	AFT	2.95	.75
	AFN	2.83	.81
	ATM	2.96	1.04

**Table 28** Significance values, means and standard deviation for the items from LTO index

### **Top 5 work values**

Romania became the subject of a number of recent studies testing the hypothesis of the cultural gap between the armed force and society (Zulean, 2005; 2007). Significant differences were found with respect to: the role of patriotism and discipline in education, foreign and security goals, the image of the military profession and conscription/national service. Specifically, military students are considered materialists (in Inglehart’s terms) favoring domestic issues and national orientation; being stronger supporters of helping less-developed countries, they have a better image of the military than the civilians and they are more in favor of military service (Zulean, 2007: 277). These significant differences reflect the cultural orientation of the military organizations and their history. Moreover, in the comparative research regarding the characteristics of the ideal job among students in Eastern-Europe (Hofstede et al.,

1996) the Romanian sample included only civilian students, and in these conditions it is even more useful to compare the top five results between civilian and military students.

In the present study the top five work values lead to a similar conclusion about significant differences between civilian and military students. For cadets it is not a surprise that living in a desirable area is the most important value, since during the last 40 years serious investments in building apartments for the military were stopped, although the law guarantees a house for military personnel according to their needs. A new law was adopted and military personnel were permitted to rent apartments in the civilian zone, outside their military units. Another comment to be made regards the importance to advancement opportunities given by cadets. Within the military system a higher hierarchical position brings better payment so it can be assimilated with the civilian desire for earnings. Despite all the differences, there is a common value between civilian students and cadets regarding the high importance given to work with people who cooperate well. This item is part of the individualism/collectivism index and it is in accordance with motivational theories about the importance of the work environment (e.g. Herzberg motivational theory).

Top 5 military academies 2002 / DIMENSION INVOLVED	Top 5 civilian students Hofstede et al.,1996 / DIMENSIONS INVOLVED
Live in a desirable area / IDV	<i>Work with people who cooperate well</i> / IDV
<i>Work with people who cooperate well</i> / IDV	Contribution to company's success
Advancement opportunities / MAS	Freedom to adopt own approach
Personal steadiness and stability / LTO	Use of skills
Sufficient time for private time / IDV	Opportunity for high earnings / MAS

**Table 29** Top of 5 work values for Romanian cadets and civilian students

Before continuing with the organizational culture analysis, the table below offers a summary of hypotheses for the Hofstede's national culture:

<b>Hypothesis Dimension</b>	<b>Expected</b>	<b>Findings</b>
PDI	High	Partially confirmed
UAI	High	Confirmed
IDV	Moderate	Confirmed
MAS	Moderate	Not Confirmed
LTO	Low	Confirmed

**Table 30** Hypotheses and their status in the research on military academies in Romania (N= 257) using the VSM 82 instrument

## Differences in organizational culture between military academies

### *Organizational culture*

For the descriptive scale (see Table 31 next page) the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was 0.91 and Bartlett test was significant (p=0.000); hence, the factor analysis was

proceeded. The PCA revealed four factors with an eigenvalue higher than 1, explaining 52.75% of the variance in the scores. The evaluative scale (see Table 32, below) KMO was 0.94 significant (p=0.000), and the PCA revealed three factors with eigenvalues higher than 1, explaining 54.8 % of the variance in scores.

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</i>		.911
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2214.968
	df	253
	Sig.	.000

**Table 31** KMO and Bartlett's Test for descriptive scale

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</i>		.942
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	2744.673
	df	253
	Sig.	.000

**Table 32** KMO and Bartlett's Test for the evaluative scale

The work problem with factor analytical solution in Van Muijen (1994) was the high intercorrelations between scales (pp. 180-182). Additionally, the Mokken scale was used to further explore the reliability of the scales but with low values on rule orientation. The analysis on Romanian sample reveals similar problems, namely several items with cross-loadings in the four factors model. However, based on the original analysis (van Muijen et. al, 1999) and the reasonable percentage of variance explained by these factors in our sample we consider each of the scales as one-dimensional. Accordingly, partial item-scores were averaged into unitary scale scores.

ITEMS	COMPONENT			
	1	2	3	4
(S) People with personal problems are helped	.14	.75	.24	-.0002
(S) People who wish to advance are supported	.09	.74	.18	.11
(R) People are treated in impersonal manner	-.40	-.31	-.072	.46
(G) Performance is measured in the organization	.31	.29	.34	.25
(S) Is constructive criticism accepted?	.41	.52	.002	.23
(G) Is competitiveness in relation to other organizations measured?	.53	.11	.20	.27
(R) Is there emphasis on stability?	.21	.12	.58	.25
(G) Is individual appraisal directly related to the attainment of goals?	.08	.39	.23	.53
(S) Do managers/commanders express concern about employees' personal problems?	.31	.63	.13	.22
(G) Does management specify the targets to be attained?	.30	.17	.57	.25
(G) Is it clear how performance will be evaluated?	.44	.31	.32	.25
(R) Are instructions written down?	.09	.10	.27	.55
(I) Does the organization search for new recruitment markets?	.22	.22	-.01	.64
(G) Are there hard criteria against which job performance is measured?	.45	-.004	.32	.44
(S) Do people try to solve their interpersonal conflicts?	.34	.36	.32	.07
(G) Are people's skills are used in order to improve organizational performance?	.60	.37	.31	.07
(R) Are jobs performed according to defined procedures?	.33	.35	.57	.07
(S) Are new ideas about work organization are encouraged?	.67	.29	.05	.01
(R) Employees have to perform according to specific norms	-.18	.06	.80	-.005
(I) Does your organization look for new challenges?	.81	.10	-.01	.06
(R) Do management follow the rules themselves?	.34	.46	.24	.35
(S) Do management practices allow freedom in work?	.48	.48	-.24	.19
(I) Does the organization make the best use of employee skills to develop a better product/service?	.68	.22	.25	.19

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 8 iterations

**Table 33** Factor Analysis for descriptive scales

The internal reliabilities of scales for the descriptive orientations are: support=.79, rule=.60, goal=.80 and innovation=.71. For the evaluative scale the reliabilities results are: support=.86, rule=.74,

goal=.84, innovation=.79. If one of the new items, specifically “people are treated in an impersonal manner” from the descriptive scale for rule orientation is excluded, alpha increases to .70. In the innovation descriptive scale the item “new ideas about work organization are encouraged”, initially belonging to the support orientation, was understood as an innovation orientation item, due to its translation. When this item was included in the reliability analysis, the alpha Chronbach increased from .60 to .71. The evaluative item “task oriented” was printed “ask oriented” and accordingly was translated in the meaning of asking orientation help, and included to goal orientation; the reliability was above the accepted limit, namely Alpha= .84.

ITEMS	COMPONENT		
	1	2	3
(S1) Mutual understanding	.22	.55	.40
(G1) Clear objectives	.69	.29	.19
(R1) Compliance with standards	.77	.17	.05
(G1) Ask orientation	.55	.07	.31
(G1) Responsibility	.57	.40	-.11
(S1) Build a team spirit	.48	.60	.03
(I1) Openness to criticism	.06	-.11	.65
(G1) Focus on performance	.54	.41	.32
(R1) Compliance with rules	.71	.12	-.02
(I1) Flexibility (others disposition to change)	.15	.28	.71
(S1) Risk taking	.21	.55	.11
(S1) Mutual support for personal problems	.22	.59	.42
(S1) Failure acceptance	-.001	.42	.49
(I1) Searching for new challenges	.22	.32	.64
(G1) Efficiency	.61	.26	.33
(G1) Performance measurement	.65	.23	.30
(S1) Mutual support in solving work problems	.40	.49	.36
(S1) Interpersonal harmony (agree each other)	.27	.74	.22
(S1) Provide group-safety	.33	.72	.18
(I1) Courage in proposing and discussing new ideas	.24	.39	.64
(R1) Job clarity	.64	.18	.29
(I1) Rethink old ways of doing thinks	.21	.17	.60
(S1) Have a good work environment	.08	.50	.54

**Table 34** Factor Analysis for evaluative scales

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was performed in order to explore the impact of specializations on organizational practices (descriptive) and values (evaluative) for each dimension: support, goal, rule and innovation as measured by the FOCUS questionnaire.

	<i>Levene Statistic</i>	<i>df1</i>	<i>df2</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<b>DESCRIPTIVE SCALE</b>				
SUPPORT	3.91	3	253	.009
RULE	.47	3	253	.704
GOAL	1.75	3	253	.157
INNOVATION	.64	3	253	.587
<b>EVALUATIVE SCALE</b>				
SUPPORT	3.12	3	253	.026
RULE	.18	3	253	.906
GOAL	1.43	3	253	.233
INNOVATION	.72	3	253	.538

**Table 35** Test of Homogeneity of Variances for evaluative scale

For the rule, goal and innovation dimensions of both scales (descriptive and evaluative) the homogeneity of variances assumption was not violated. The post-hoc test Scheffe was used, as the most

cautious method for reducing the risk of a Type 1 error (Palant, 2003: 74). Only the support orientation in both, descriptive and evaluative scales was treated with post-hoc Dunnett's C tests not assuming equal variance.

A statistically significant difference is found at the  $p < 0.05$  level for the descriptive scale (practices) in rule [ $F(3, 253) = 3.5, p = .016$ ], goal [ $F(3, 253) = 5.7, p = .001$ ] and innovation [ $F(3, 253) = 5.7, p = .001$ ] scores in all four military academies. Despite reaching the statistical difference when treated with a post-hoc test, the actual difference in mean size was quite small for rule orientation; the calculated effect size eta squared value was .03, so all groups are more or less homogeneous for this orientation. Based on this result we can conclude that the rule orientation ( $M = 3.39, SD = .58$ ) is predominant within all Romanian Military Academies. Land and Naval Forces Academies, AFT ( $M = 3.53, SD = .55$ ) and AFN ( $M = 3.44, SD = .58$ ), are the most rule oriented of all.

For the goal and innovation descriptive orientations, the military academy as a variable showed a medium size effect with a value of eta squared 0.6. The post-hoc comparisons for goal orientation divided in one group the Air Forces Academy - AFA ( $M = 2.91, SD = .63$ ) and in the second one Land Forces Academy - AFT ( $M = 3.38, SD = .64$ ), the Naval Academy - AFN ( $M = 3.26, SD = .75$ ) and Technical Academy - ATM ( $M = 3.26, SD = .76$ ) together. The post-hoc comparison for innovation orientation isolated again AFA ( $M = 2.49, SD = .75$ ) from the group of the other military academies AFT ( $SD = 2.93, M = .84$ ), AFN ( $SD = 2.95, M = .74$ ) and ATM ( $SD = 3.02, M = .84$ ). Significant differences between military academies were also found for the support descriptive orientation [ $F(3, 253) = 4.9, p = .002$ ], with a moderate effect size eta squared .05 and after post-hoc treatment with Dunnett's C for a  $p < .05$  level. The result opposed again AFA ( $M = 2.58, SD = .54$ ) to the other group of three academies: AFN ( $M = 2.99, SD = .61$ ) AFT ( $M = 2.86, SD = .73$ ) and ATM ( $M = 2.93, SD = .78$ ).

As seen on the previous page, in **Table 33**, no significant differences were found at the  $p < .05$  for the evaluative scale in rule [ $F(3, 253) = 1.7, p = .16$ ] and goal orientations [ $F(3, 253) = 1.9, p = .12$ ]. For the evaluative scale, the same strong rule orientation for all ( $M = 3.75, SD = 0.80$ ) is observed. On goal value, the post-hoc treatment with Scheffe grouped all military academies in the same cluster AFA ( $M = 3.39, SD = .68$ ), AFT ( $M = 3.66, SD = .67$ ), AFN ( $M = 3.58, SD = .77$ ) and ATM ( $M = 3.45, SD = .79$ ). The innovation orientation analysis gave significant differences between groups [ $F(3, 253) = 5.3, p = .001$ ]. The effect size calculated for this last significant difference using the eta square indicated a medium effect (value .06). The post-hoc comparison grouped one side AFA ( $M = 2.38, SD = .80$ ) and on the other other group formed by AFT ( $M = 2.80, SD = .68$ ) and ATM ( $M = 2.89, SD = .76$ ). AFN ( $M = 2.70, SD = .77$ ). For the support orientation [ $F(3, 253) = .73, p = .53$ ] the differences are not strong enough to be significant between

military academies AFA (M=3.01 , SD=.78), AFT (M=3.15, SD=.63), AFN (M=3.97, SD=.86) and ATM (M=2.97, SD=.72). In Figure 13 to Figure 16 all results are displayed graphically.







Figure 13 Descriptive culture profiles for the sample of military academies




[F(3, 253)= 4.9, p=.002]



[F(3, 253)=3.5, p=.016]




[F(3, 253)=5.7, p=.001]




[F(3, 253)=5.7, p=.001]


Figure 14 Means for support, rule, goal and innovation orientations from descriptive scale of the organizational culture for the Romanian military academies




**Figure 15** Evaluative culture profiles for the sample of military academies




[ $F(3, 253)=.73, p=. 53$ ]



[ $F(3, 253)=1.7, p=.16$ ]



[ $F(3, 253)=1.9, p=.12$ ]



$F(3, 253)= 5.3, p=.001$

**Figure 16** Means for support, rule, goal and innovation orientations from evaluative scale for the Romanian military academies

## Occupational culture

### Discipline

Because the sample size is acceptable, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was 0.83 and Bartlett test was significant ( $p=.000$ ), a factor analysis could be conducted (Pallant, 2003: 152-153). The principal component analysis revealed two components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 39.6 % and respectively 21.9 % from total variance. The plot shows a clear break after the second component. The rotated factors displayed a similar composition to the original model, with one exception. The item “always obey superiors” - initially part of formal discipline - was loaded in the informal discipline factor; accordingly the further analysis will reflect this loading. The factors were grouped in formal/ceremonial discipline and in informal/functional items according to the original model. The ceremonial discipline displayed a good reliability, with an alpha cronbach of .82, while the functional scale showed the need for improvements in order to attain the validity criterion.

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.</i>		.821
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	729.443
	df	28
	Sig.	.000

**Table 36** KMO and Bartlett's Test for discipline

Items	Component	
	Formal discipline	Informal discipline
Wearing the uniform correctly(F)	.82	
Wear their headwear according to the rules (F)	.79	
Military boots are polished (F)	.87	
To be on time in classes (F)	.73	
Salute correctly (F)	.72	
Always to obey superiors (F)		.82*
Behave according to informal group norms (I)		.50
Act according to the wishes of their commanders (I)		.83
<b>% of variance explained</b>	<b>39.9%</b>	<b>21.8%</b>

Note: only loadings above 0.3 are displayed

\* This formal discipline item grouped in the informal cluster

**Table 37** Rotated Component Matrix with Varimax for discipline scale

When compared the formal features rated by Romanian cadets, the most important are the correct wearing of the uniform ( $M=2.11$ ,  $SD=0.77$ ), the correct salute ( $M=2.12$ ,  $SD=0.82$ ), punctuality to classes ( $M=2.13$ ,  $SD=0.86$ ), obedience to superiors ( $M=2.15$ ,  $SD=.85$ ), clean boots ( $M=2.22$ ,  $SD=0.82$ ), and headwear according to rules ( $M=2.62$ ,  $SD=.99$ ). Less important is the functional discipline: behavior according to commander's intention ( $M=2.31$ ,  $SD=0.87$ ), and behaving according to informal groups norms ( $M=2.51$ ,  $SD=0.74$ ). Soeters (2000) observed in his research that in those academies displaying high values on functional discipline the formal discipline values were low and vice versa. This distinction is also observed in the Romanian academies' case when comparing means.


A one-way ANOVA with post-hoc tests was conducted in order to explore differences between means of the four military academies on formal and informal discipline. No significant difference at the



$p < .05$  level for the formal discipline [ $F(3, 253) = 1.26, p = .29$ ] was found nor for informal discipline within military academies [ $F(3, 253) = 2.29, p = .08$ ].

	<i>Levene Statistic</i>	<i>df1</i>	<i>df2</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Formal discipline	1.712	3	253	.165
Informal discipline	1.186	3	253	.078

**Table 38** Test of Homogeneity of Variances for the formal and informal discipline between military academies



**Figure 17** Formal and informal discipline means according to military academies

Discipline items	Mean	Std. Deviation
(F)Wearing the uniform correctly	2.11	.77
(F)Wearing headwear according to the rules	2.62	.99
(F)Military boots are polished	2.22	.81
(F)To be on time in classes	2.13	.86
(F)Salute correctly	2.12	.82
(F)Always to obey the superiors	2.15	.85
(I)Behave according to informal group norms	2.57	.87
(I)Act according to the wishes of their commanders	2.31	.87

**Table 39** Descriptive statistics for formal and informal discipline items in the military academies (sample N=257)

Also, a one-way ANOVA was conducted in order to explore the impact of year of study on military discipline. Both discipline dimensions were statistically different for all years: formal discipline [ $F(3, 244) = 7.44, p = .000$ ] and informal discipline [ $F(3, 244) = 4.18, p = .007$ ], without violating the assumption of normality for  $p < .05$ .

	<i>Levene Statistic</i>	<i>df1</i>	<i>df2</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Formal Discipline	.458	3	244	.712
Informal Discipline	.443	3	244	.723

**Table 40** Test of Homogeneity of Variances for the formal and the informal discipline according to year of study

The significant differences in formal discipline separated the cadets of first CY1 (M=1.96 SD=.61) and second years CY2 (M=2.11 SD=.64) from the others CY3 (M= 2.48, SD=.71) and CY4 (M= 2.30, SD=.65). Interestingly, the informal discipline divides the first CY1 (M=2.13 SD=.61) from the

second CY2 (M=2.56 SD=.56), the third CY3 (M= 2.39, SD=.65) and the last year CY4 (M= 2.33, SD=.66) in another. Since two out of three items are about commanders' intentions and orders this is an unexpected result that requires further examinations to offer a consistent explanation.

As can be seen in the figures below, formal discipline and informal discipline have different patterns of evolution, according to the year of study. Both decrease in importance with time for cadets.




Figure 18 Formal and informal discipline means according to year of study

### Military orientation

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was 0.56, to the limit and Bartlett test was significant (p=.000), the factor analysis was proceeded (Pallant, 2003:152:153). The PCA revealed two factors with an eigenvalue higher than 1, explaining 52.01% of the variance in the scores.

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</i>		.56
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	129.52
	df	15
	Sig.	.000

Table 41 KMO and Bartlett's Test for military orientation scale

	Component	
	Soft	Hard
The international community should send an international peacemaking force as soon as possible	.663	.240
The international community should impose economic embargoes on the conflict area in order to isolate it	.473	.392
Engaged an international force in battle/ military operation on the ground	.063	.754
The international community should try to get the warring parties to the negotiation (mediation) table	.770	-.210
Military units of the warring factions involved should be subdued by means of an international air campaign (and cause less collateral damage)	-.122	.732
The UN and the international community should make a diplomatic appeal to the warring parties to settle their differences	.585	-.379

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization - Rotation converged in 3 iterations

Table 42 Rotated Component Matrix for military orientation items

Two clusters of strategies to solve international conflict came out at extremes: one soft, with emphasis on the diplomatic, negotiation solutions and another more, with military force engaged in battle

on the ground or in the air. In between, the economic embargo loaded (almost) similarly in both clusters suggesting the initial grouping of the items on a continuum differing in intensities of violence.

In the cadets' opinion, the predominant solutions to an international conflict are negotiation (M=4.69, SD=.64) and diplomatic appeal to settle differences (M= 4.58, SD=.78). Violent strategies with an international air campaign (M=2.12, SD=1.05) and the engagement of a battle force on the ground (M=2.60, SD=.97) are seen as the last solutions to an international dispute. No significant differences between academies at p<05 were found, so it is fair to conclude that military academies equally socialize cadets' in respect to their military orientation. A survey among a national representative sample (IPP, 2005: 66) showed that Romanians agree in high percentages (81%) with sending troops to provide medical assistance and food to victims after a devastating war or (69%) in situations requiring to keep peace after war hostilities are over. To conclude: cadets' orientation can be labeled as convergent with society's expectations.

The table below organizes all the hypotheses and the findings of this part of the thesis:

Hypotheses	Findings
Rule orientation – main orientation of Romanian military academies	Confirmed
High score on innovation in each military academy	Not confirmed
Academies are not significantly different on evaluative dimension	Rule orientation – Confirmed Goal Orientation – Confirmed Support orientation – Confirmed Innovation orientation – Not Confirmed
Academies differ significantly on descriptive dimension	Rule orientation – Confirmed Goal Orientation – Confirmed Support orientation – Confirmed Innovation orientation – Confirmed
Coercive military discipline formally oriented	Confirmed
Peaceful ethos	Confirmed

**Table 43** Hypotheses and their status in the research on military academies in Romania (N= 257) using organizational culture instrument

### Summary

The results show that the Romanian military can be described as a bureaucracy with a moderately high power distance and uncertainty avoidance, low masculinity combined with a moderate individualist orientation and a short-term temporal culture.

INDEX	PDI	UAI	IDV	MAS	LTO
	74	80	50	24	53

**Table 44** Values computed using VSM 82 for the Romanian military cluster

With the high scores on PDI and UAI Romania is part of the “Latin cluster” of countries with traditional bureaucracies such as Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Brazil. The relations between commanders and subordinates are rather strict and narrowly defined, and subordinates are made

dependent on their bosses. The high asymmetry of power, between commanders and subordinates translates (in organizational life) into obedience to rules and regulations through coercive means with accent on disciplinary actions and punishments. Romanian cadets describe their commanders' management style as predominantly authoritarian (54.5%) with paternalist accents (22.20%). This implies that subordinates are expected most of the times just to execute orders without questions in an atmosphere marked by fear of expressing different ideas from those of their bosses. Meanwhile, as results showed, independent of their location and status, 76.6% of cadets reject the current command style by calling for an increased participation in decision processes. This result is consistent with Zulean's conclusion (2005; 2007: 276) with respect to the continuation of the rupture between political and military leaders and the rest of society, as perceived by cadets and civilian students. The present results reflect this rupture between commanders and subordinates with possible negative consequences for organizational cohesion.

The high uncertainty avoidance score portrays a high formalization and anxiety in new situations, and a need for control and security; a result aligned with the observations of the historical study. Special attention needs to be paid to the clear polarization between the agreement (43.6%) and the rejection (39%) of breaking organizational rules. It depicts a reality that should be addressed in a military organization whose members' socialization process is supposed to focus toward respect for rules. Paraphrasing de Tocqueville, the roots of this reality should be searched for in society. This situation has deep roots in the communist history of Romania when rules were only imposed top down without acceptance of upward feedback. Surprising for the organizational culture of the military academies is the evolution of perceived stress at work. The first year of study is perceived quite low in stress, intensifies toward second and third year, to descend to the lowest value, in the last year of study. Despite the intense intellectual activity required by graduation exams and thesis writing, the level of stress is even lower than the first year. Probably, cadets of the fourth year are self-confident and in general no longer think they will fail.

In Europe, a strong correlation between UAI and PDI was observed (Hofstede, 2001: 150). The Latin /Mediterranean cluster inherited from the centralized, structured Roman Empire both large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance. As part of the Latin-countries group, Romania combines a large power distance with moderate level of individualism, lower than the value computed by other studies for the entire society (Kunzler, 2007). The rather feminine orientation of Romanian military culture indicates that differences between men and women in performing the same jobs are quite small, while all organizational members are less competitive and less preoccupied with performance. The historical analysis showed that for Romanians, the social aspects of the work were more important than accomplishments. This was also the case in a static military with no involvement in operations and no real

measures of effectiveness, which mirrored the high importance of relationship with their superiors. The feminine orientation of Romanian military culture is connected with the Romanian cadets' inclination to find rather diplomatic ways to solve conflicts. At the same time, women's presence tends to be accepted within the military but not without residual attitudes.

The computed score of the LTO Index reflects a somewhat balanced option between perseverance and personal steadiness and stability. The study took place during full structural reform for the ROAF. Perhaps here is a clue to explain the co-existence of contradictory values. The slightly above middle value of the long term orientation indicated a certain tendency toward perseverance, the base for more entrepreneurial spirit to build a business.

Important for the current organizational development is the cadets' desire to stay within organizations and have a career within the military. Fewer cadets are inclined to decide for a long term career, especially those from AFA and ATM. This indicates an occupational orientation of cadets in these institutions; a result otherwise congruent with other observations about Air Force subculture and the technical orientation (Mastroianni, 2005). Final-year cadets are significantly less interested in a long-term career than their first-year colleagues and this should be a reality further investigated.

When analyzing the five most important work values, cadets are more interested in the stability and steadiness of the organization than that they prefer the challenge of using skills, the freedom to adopt a personal approach in the job and contribute to organizational success – values specific to civilian students. The results are similar to Zulean's findings (2005) about different materialist and post-materialist orientations of cadets and civilian students in post-communist Romania. Under these conditions, the short-term desire to stay in the military raises the question of cadets' readiness for and adaptability to a civilian society that displays different value orientations. Meanwhile, the common desire to cooperate at work can be a fertile ground for managers able to create such conditions.

The results above also impact on international military cooperation. Potential collisions are expected on hierarchy issues while people coming from high power distance are co-operating with those coming from low power distance cultures. The Romanian military organization tends to work in a rigid manner during peacetime, a fact that must draw attention in multinational operations, when organizations must exhibit flexibility, cohesiveness and the ability to create an environment that promotes creative solutions.

After finding Romania's place within the international cluster of the military national cultures, the next step was to identify the organizational culture differences. The FOCUS Questionnaire (Van Muijen et al., 1998) was applied to the sample of 257 respondents from the four Romanian military academies. The Romanian military organizational culture is predominantly rule oriented in both values and practices.

The commanders require a high degree of respect for formal authority, combined with a strict division of work, rationality in procedures and written communication. These results should come as no surprise. First, the military is an organization with emphasis on behavior based on rules, regulations and specific norms, with instructions written down. This was also reflected in the results of the first question of the research on national culture and is underlined by the results on organizational practices. Second, in the communist history of the Romanian military, when the emphasis was rather on formal participation, it was much easier for commanders to focus on the form of military life (rules, regulations, parades) than on military content (leadership, cohesion, trust and performance).

The statistical analysis confirmed significant differences between military academies regarding support, innovation and goal organizational practices. The organizational culture of the Air Forces Academy was isolated from the others. Compared to the other military academies, the Air Forces can be portrayed as having the least permissive culture for practices that encourage cooperation, trust and individual growth, creativity and search for new and goal setting and its efficient accomplishment. On the evaluative scale, military academies revealed no significant differences with regards to goal and support orientations. Military academies promote as values: participation, cooperation, human, group and mutual trust and a certain focus on setting and attaining goals. Only in the case of innovation the moderate value of size effect on this scale again separated the Air Forces Academy from the other group of military academies. This finding shows a lack of openness to promote innovation as an organizational value in the Air Forces Academy.

Analysing the findings we can observe the fragile position of the Air Force Academy, which scored the lowest in goal, innovation and support practices of all military academies. This shows a cleavage between the exposed values and practices in organizational life. A key in understanding this reality could be the analysis of the leadership history and its impact on the organizational life (Schein, 1999), although no studies are available on this topic. Until 2006 at least, the author could observe that most of middle and top management positions were filled with officers from the Air Force other than pilots, and perhaps much closer to the bureaucratic type of officer promoted by communist training and expectancies that emphasizes routine, stability, and dominance of rules.

Another conclusion of this section is that from all values and practices, the least encouraged in current organizational culture of academies are support and innovation. This is a contradictory result in times of changes and reforms and a painful reality, since every university should be an environment open to knowledge and experimentation. Flexibility and others' disposition to change or to having a good work environment are the less promoted values in the current organizational culture. People's skills are seldom used in order to improve organizational performance. The current military organizational culture can be

depicted as one where the commanders are expressing little concern for subordinates' personal problems. Sayings like "personal problems should be left at the unit gate" portray the commanders' expectations of having employees acting as robots able to plug in the work issues when entered the unit, and to change it with the other for home and family issues after the program is over. At the same time, the autocratic management style transmitted by socialization from past times does not allow too much freedom in work and accordingly the climate cannot be open to constructive criticism.

In the international study of military academies (Soeters, 1997; Soeters & Recht, 1998) the West-European cadets from Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Norway gave average importance to most features of military discipline. More specifically, the Dutch cadets rated the correct wearing of uniform, the correct saluting of superiors, and having clean boots as features with the lowest importance (Soeters, 1995). The "Latin cluster" (excepting Belgium) with France, Italy, Spain, Argentina and Brazil have scored as classical bureaucracies and institutional academies, the main themes on discipline having above average importance. It is also the case with Romanian formal military discipline that cadets rate outward appearance as the most important feature of military orientation. Although Romanian military academies are in different locations, they succeed in socializing homogeneously their cadets regarding formal military discipline and orientation. Cadets' options are to find more diplomatic solutions to an international conflict that confirms the peace orientation, a finding congruent with the historical analysis.

Overall, despite their different locations across the country, the similar results in organizational values, formal discipline and military orientation indicate that the organizational culture of the military academies is quite homogeneous. The statistical data reveals a homogeneous rule oriented organizational culture of the military academies. Significant differences were found for support, innovation and goal dimensions, which isolated the Air Forces Academy as a distinct organizational culture (both practices and values) with moderate negative accents. This is the youngest military academy whose activity started in 1995 after the closure of the Air Force Military School. It cannot be compared with the others whose activity is far older with traditions and consistent educational activity and research over decades. Accordingly, the findings have to be interpreted in this perspective, as well. The positive finding about the management style perceived as most consultative in the Romanian Air Forces Academy is a finding consistent with Mastroianni's observations about the more open leadership required by the air force subculture when comparing with other subcultures (2005: 80).

However, the relative homogeneity of the current organizational culture of the military academies could be explained by the recent history of Romania. Within a society whose leadership focused mainly on uniformity of thinking and reacting according to political edicts signed by the Communist Party,

perhaps the de-professionalized armed forces could not develop their distinct sub-cultural ethos and identities in academic life. Deflected from their main mission and focused mainly on domestic affairs, perhaps subcultural differences could not develop so visibly and in the same magnitude as in other armed forces. There was no place in a uniform society for strong differences to develop, not enough, at least to be reflected in the questionnaires. The statistical treatment of the data indicated some limits of the models used in this research in diagnosing these differences.



## **CHAPTER 5**

# **DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OFFICERS AND CADETS IN THE AIR FORCE**

### **Theoretical framework**

#### *Preamble*

The year 1989 represents a crucial historical moment for all central and eastern European countries, namely the liberation from direct Soviet communist influence. As described earlier, after 1944 the development of this part of the world was determined by the final political decision at Yalta, followed by interventions and domination by the Soviet Union for more than 50 years. Soviet standards were imposed on the military, society and education, starting with the formal uniform and ending with attitudes (Șperlea, 2003). The fall of imposed communism in Central and Eastern Europe was followed by macro-reform processes initiated in each of its component societies.

The subsequent period of transition brought challenges in finding new and valid security alliances (with NATO), to rebuild society according to new economic principles (development of the free market) and to combine these with the process of the reconfiguration of society according to democratic principles. Parallel to these developments, the accession to the European Union became another process with a symbolic dimension: to regain the pattern of socio-economic development and realignment with the rest of Europe. For these reasons the year 1989 is referential in social research, as is also argued in Turkina and Surzhko-Harned's (2010) study of intergenerational differences in Central and Eastern Europe. These two scholars noted that the macro socio-economic changes have important implications for social life and especially for the micro-level system of values, norms, beliefs and perceptions of individuals (Turkina & Surzhko-Harned, 2010: 1).

To date, Romanian military sociology lacked either open scientific debate about values between the generations trained before and after 1989, or published research reports on this topic, although there are important differences between the generations and their qualitative social experiences and conditions before and after 1989. The "children of the Golden Époque" born before 1989 (around 1970-1980) grew up in a strictly militarily-organized society, with school uniforms<sup>130</sup> to be worn perfectly and teachers forced to emphasise the society's importance. Sometimes, children were tasked with patriotic duties to

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<sup>130</sup> The pioneer tie, with its mandatory transparent plastic ring, until finishing gymnasium, the allocated serial number, together with the name of the school, embroidered on a badge; the girls' mandatory white hair band, the skirt of a certain length with the blue shirt, until high school graduation

clean certain areas of the city and help with the autumn harvest; there was no (free) media exposure, except the regular evenings two-hours propaganda about communism and its bright future; there were restrictions on foreign visits and contact with foreign relatives; there were clear limits to discussion topics or criticism of current political decisions and programs, and the competition to enter a public high-school (and later a university) was harsh. Each student had to pass exams at various stages: at the end of secondary school to enter a chosen high school, after the second year in high school, at the end of high school the baccalaureate and, after the last session, (normally) three written exams for admission to a state university<sup>131</sup>. These exams were highly competitive and as a consequence, while a spirit of competition was encouraged, the other force driving society (Adler, 1991), the spirit of cooperation, lacked a similar evolution. Important social changes occurred after 1989. The generations born and raised after this year benefited in Eastern and Central Europe from another environment more open to individual freedom and rights than previous generations (Melich, 2005) and as a consequence had different social experiences. Particularly, in Romania the post-1989 generations were raised in a veritable explosion of free media combined with a real evolving torrent of IT, in particular computers and free access to information via the World Wide Web. In a recent interview, Romanian sociologist Sandu (Bercea & Sofronie, 2008) observes these new generations' propensity for information, media consumption, travel, migration for work. Therefore, following 1989, numerous changes occurred in the structure and the curriculum of the pre-academic educational stages (primary, secondary and higher education) (Frangopol, 2002; Vlăsceanu et al., 2002). These changes in academic life and curricula (new faculties and specializations) were doubled by a certain relaxation of admission process to some universities (from exclusive written exams to combined forms written and interview, or later interviews combined with the high school grades, in different percentages) (Onuț, 2008).

With respect to the Armed Forces Education, Chapter 3 described some of the main changes initiated after 1989 in order to increase professionalism. Until 1989 the career officer pattern implied graduation from four years military high school followed by another three years of military school<sup>132</sup> (today the military academy equivalent) and the final stage of two years military school of practice (one year today). Upon completion, the studies of a young lieutenant were considered (in academic terms) to be of a lower level than any civilian university. Instead, the post-communist reform brought the mandatory requirement for holding at least a bachelor degree in order to perform management duties. In order to accomplish this objective, the curriculum was changed and the studies in the new military

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<sup>131</sup> Each university was organizing separate admissions exams and candidates were admitted to limited number of places based on the results to these exams (predominantly in written form)

<sup>132</sup> With the exception of Air Forces pilots according to Law 233 of 1978 retrieved at <http://www.mta.ro/documente/01> accessed in March 2011

academies – the ex-military schools<sup>133</sup> became equivalent to any civilian bachelor in management. Under these conditions, career officers' training was considered incomplete and not suitable for the new Romanian defense realities and demands. Accordingly, the top military leadership decision was to create a special training program of two years, comprising part-time sessions in each military academy for those career officers who decided to update their knowledge and further develop their skills. In order to continue their jobs in the new designed structure, career officers were forced to complete their studies at the branch-academy from which they had graduated as lieutenants. Because of limited work places a short examination was required after each academic year, in order to select the potential applicants. Usually, after one month of intensive training at the military academies, career officers returned to their units, continuing their military duties and two months later returning to the academy for exam sessions during following two years. This generational change inspired another way of continuing the diagnosis of military culture, by exploring the values and practices of Air Forces career officers and to investigate if it is possible to distinguish with those displayed by cadets.

### ***Theoretical grounds***

Cultures are not static and have no (pre)definite configurations. Today it is accepted that cultural changes need time and this generates the first feature of culture: its stability over time, as Hofstede (2005: 34-36) concluded about national cultures. A similar statement about national culture as shaping political and economic behavior for a long period is made by Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 80). The moments of change are decisive for a society especially the change in values, the core of any organizational or national culture (Hofstede, 2005: 9-11). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that there are two types of changes in values: temporary, generated by social ephemeral events and others with a more deep and long term impact. These long-term impact changes can be generated by important moments in the history of a nation which affect its entire socio-economic dynamics. Included here are the liberation from outside forces of long time conquest or domination and its reverse (the moment of conquest followed by long economic and political dominance) and technological breakthroughs (Hofstede, 2005: 36). Particularly within military organizations, Soeters (2002) observed two important sources of changes: one coming with the change of generations and the other induced through leaders influence. The meaning of the “generation” as concept in this context encompasses the definition outlined by Wong (2000: 6) stating that:

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<sup>133</sup> The only training institution with an academic background was the Technical Military Academy while the others had an somehow inferior status defined as military institutes with specializations in each military branch

*“Generational differences emerge as cohorts experience defining moments in history which shape their attitudes and perspectives.”*

Triscari (2000: 3) suggests that there are many distinct areas to differentiate one generation from another: by values, economic trends, changing enemy threats, milestone events, gender and race relationships, career stage and development, and technological advances. According to Hofstede (2001: 35) when data are collected at one moment in time, a researcher needs to pay attention to three different but combined effects: age, generation and Zeitgeist effects. These can only be separated in a longitudinal design. Age effect means that values held by respondents are changing as they grow older; generation effect means that young people absorb the values which accompany the cohort over their life, while Zeitgeist effect occurs with drastic changes generating a shift regardless of age.

These changes affecting the generations become challenges for a military organization preoccupied with filling its ranks with qualified employees. In his research from 2001, Wilcox defines a contemporary paradox of recruitment: while the forces are downsizing and youth numbers are growing within society, there is less and less willingness to serve<sup>134</sup>. Since the demands of today’s armed forces involve more complex skills than ever, the study of the sociological differences between generations appear hingly needed because of the all-volunteer-force policy. In this respect, comparing the values and the practices of senior career officers with those of cadets who prepare to become officers<sup>135</sup> is a more recent approach found in the work of Wong (2000) and Duane (2010). Since leadership’s main mission is to integrate the generational differences, such research gives leaders the information to conceive motivational packages to meet the recruitment standards and retention in the national military. This assertion also highlights the importance of leadership within the military - at least the same weight as that of the opinion leaders in civilian life. Triscari (2000: 24-25) focuses the attention on the base of power between leaders and their subordinates belonging to different generations as:

*“[...] a key factor in understanding how one generation communicates with the other. If the leadership style reflects a negative approach, as viewed by the receiving generation, the response will be different than what was expected by the senior generation.”*

For this reason, power based on coercion generates reactions of opposition, while the power of expertise and reference generates commitment to organizational aims and objectives (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1999: 387). A negative approach can be reflected in the distance between the actual management style and that desired and expected by receiving generations, as measured by Hofstede with

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<sup>134</sup> The author’s conclusion is only in the US case, although after the end of the Cold War more countries copied the model inspired by this country. For this reason, in accepting the conditions mentioned by the author, this statement can also apply elsewhere

<sup>135</sup> In this respect Triscari’s (2002: 8) recent findings suggest that, in the US Army, job satisfaction, time for personal family life, integrity-professionalism, overall quality of life and spouse’s overall satisfaction are important in career decisions for Captains

his power distance (PD) index (1984, 2001 and 2005). In current Romanian Sociology, Niculae (2004) tested the main tenets of Theory X/Y and explored the dominant management style, in a representative sample of respondents from the Romanian Armed Forces. Based on his findings he hypothesized that participative and consultative management styles occur especially at the last stage of the military career (unit and big unit command or staff activities). He explained this using the observation that this level implies more experience within armed forces to a high level of command (thinking more in the joint perspective of military actions) that require more participative leadership styles<sup>136</sup> (Niculae, 2004: 150). At the same time, the cultural approaches within the military seem to suggest, a subcultural variability between military branches in leadership styles, which was not addressed by Niculae's analysis for the different levels (military academies, military units of different level and top structures). However, with respect to the variability of leadership styles Mastroianni's (2005) argues:

*„It is possible that the particular nature of the occupation in which military members are engaged may directly affect the way they go about the business of leadership, and that the nature of this effect may be different in the different services.” (p. 78)*

*“While relationships between officers and NCOs in other Air Force career fields may be more parallel to those in the Army, it is pilots who broadly dominate the leadership and mythology of the Air Force. Consequently there may be very different leadership styles among senior officers in the different services, conditioned by their different formative experiences as young officers.” (p. 80)*

To conclude: a systematic endeavor to search for value-based differences between generations could help us to better understand and manage organizational human resources in the Armed Forces.

### ***Explorations and hypotheses***

Hofstede's research on national values indicates that one should expect age and managerial level-based differences (2005: 85-89). In this respect, his study points towards the fact that the power distance dimension is status-conditioned and is expected to be higher for respondents in non-managerial position as compared to those having managerial roles. The present research tests if there “is the tendency for managers to produce lower PDI values” (Hofstede, 1984: 77) by comparing Air Force career officers' and cadets' answers to the items used to compute the PD index. At the same time using the question about current command style to compute PDI it is possible to address statistically Niculae's hypothesis (2004) and see if are differences between the two samples of cadets and career officers.

In what concerns the UA index, Hofstede (2005: 152) asserts that rule orientation is dependent on an occupation's average formal educational training, while employment stability depends rather on average age (the older the more stable). The stress level increases proportionately in intensity, according

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<sup>136</sup> A perspective otherwise consistent with Chester Barnard's observations in his classic book about *The functions of the executive*, but somehow contradictory when analyzing the features of military as organization (see Chapter 1)

to managerial level. However, between cadets and officers, we could argue that the restructuring process tried the officers more, since the cadets still had some years to arrive in those units whose future was uncertain, while officers' positions were directly affected by the restructuring process, as mentioned in Chapter 3. This process can generate a higher desire to leave the organization in order to provide material security for the family. *Based on these arguments, we would expect to find a lower level of uncertainty avoidance in the officers' sample.*

Other value based differences are also suggested, since Hofstede (1984: 246) defines individualism rather "composed of a different mix of goals for different age groups than a single group". His research led to the conclusion that, with age, there was an increasing emphasis on employment security, and positive relations with managers and cooperation. Advancement opportunities, earnings, personal time for the family and having challenging tasks are less important with age. Living in a desirable area, are particularly important for the 40-49 age group (Hofstede, 1984: 244-245). In this research the statistical analysis will be oriented to give an answer to the hypothesis that suggests *an inverse relation between age and individualist orientation.*

At the same time, masculinity decreases after the ages of 20-29, which is considered the peak for this particular dimension (Hofstede, 2001: 333). There is a demographic distribution effect identified on masculinity: societies with aging population seem to shift toward more feminine values (less achievement orientation), although the general differences between countries seems to remain constant in time on this scale (Hofstede, 2001: 334). Accordingly, *we would expect to find a more feminine orientation in the career officers' sample as compared to cadets.*

In their work, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have a skeptical view of a possible change of value orientations in the European post-communist area. However, after a while, the extended analysis within Central and Eastern Europe made by Turkina and Surzhko-Harned (2010) seems to indicate a change trend in value orientations. Romania is one of the three countries in the World Values Survey (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 113) found with intergenerational differences in the survival/self-expression values dimension, although not with the same magnitude as other Western democracies. However, there are not many efforts to further explore intergenerational changes in post-communist Romania for the period analyzed in the present thesis. Cultural research about value orientation is relatively new in post-communist Romanian sociology and the Romanian team of World Value Survey just recently published their book on this topic (Voicu & Voicu, 2007). The finding of the WVS team coordinated by Voicu and Voicu (2007) was that Romania is one of the European societies with a high level of materialism and with equal percentages of materialists and those with mixed orientation (p. 293).

Nonetheless, Hofstede observes the low temporal horizons that respondents display in periods of macro-scale changes, as mentioned previously in Chapter 4. People are focused on short term solutions to survival. Thus, the reform that was started in 2004 within the entire Romanian Armed Forces organization enabled us *to expect a rather short-term orientation to be found in the Air Force career officers' case, with no significant differences when compared with cadets' results.*

Because the sample of officers is not extracted from the same organizational population (one military unit), the results on organizational culture can only be interpreted in the light of differences between managerial levels within the air force subculture. Accordingly, it would be unappropriate to expect the same variation in evaluative but not descriptive dimensions. For this reason the analysis has an exploratory character. However *we expect the officers to have higher scores on innovation orientation on the descriptive and evaluative dimensions* in this period of change.

Military academies are places for socialization and for such reason *we expect more emphasis on formal discipline matters* than later in the military life, while considering informality the subcultural label attached to the worldwide Air Forces (Mastroianni, 2005). In what concerns the military orientation, we would not expect significant differences in conflict resolution solutions. As mentioned before in Chapter 3, the historical past of Romania that combines Christianity with homeland-oriented and de-professionalised communist armed forces *should be reflected in the same peaceful ethos transalted in priority given to non-violent means to a conflict situation for both, officers and cadets.*

## **Design**

### **Sample**

From the total of 150 career officers, who enrolled in 2005 as senior-cadets in the first and second year to complete their studies at Air Forces Academy, 87 returned the same questionnaire as the one applied in 2002 for the research within military academies. Trebici (1994) calculated the accepted average distance between generations, particularly in the Romanian case, at 25 years. The average distance of 16 years between respondents' samples became the premise for investigating whether changes had occurred in the values and practices of Air Forces members.

### **Data management**

Both of the samples were found to be representative of the cadet population in the Air Forces Academy and, accordingly, a parametric statistic was used to perform data analysis. Because of incomplete data in some cases (questions about desired and current management style), three respondents from career officers' sample were eliminated from further analyses.

As Hofstede (2001: 34-35) observes, data collected at one point in time do not differentiate age and generation effects, and for this reason the results have to be considered for both effects as an explanation of possible differences. Thus, it was possible to compare the sample of the 64 respondents from the Air Forces Academy with those of 84 Air Force career officers. Moreover, we did not consider the gap of 3 years between samples (2002 versus 2005) significant, since the major changes started after 2004 in the Romanian Air Force. The models, used in Chapter 4, to diagnose the culture in the military academies<sup>137</sup> are built on items describing the importance of specific values in personal and private life, and the perceived realities of organizations. These are: organizational values and practices, current and desired management style, expression of disagreement with superiors in organizational matters, perceived stress at work, respect for rules and career prospect with current organization, emphasis on military discipline, and military orientation.

## Findings

### *Value orientations*

Answers were recorded on Likert scale items evaluating the importance of values in work or private life and work-related issues (Hofstede, 1984). For these variables an independent t-test was conducted to compare each value for cadets and career officers. The categorical variables used in the questionnaire – the current and desired management style, the time working for the current organization, were statistically treated with Pearson Chi-Square to test their association with the independent variable “group” and will be addressed in detail in the next two sections. From all continuous variables, five comparisons revealed significant differences between the two groups, with important implications for Hofstede’s national culture model:

1. The importance to have sufficient time for private life [ $t(146) = -3.97, p = .000$ ] AFA ( $M = 1.84, SD = .67$ ) and AFCO ( $M = 2.29, SD = .67$ ). This means that cadets found the time for private life more important than career officers;

2. The importance to have advancement opportunities [ $t(146) = -3.45, p = .001$ ] AFA ( $M = 1.89, SD = .80$ ) and AFCO ( $M = 2.32, SD = .71$ ). According to this result, when compared, Romanian cadets evaluated their career opportunities more important than officers;

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<sup>137</sup> Hofstede’s national culture model, Van Muijen’s organizational culture model (1994), Soeters’s discipline module and military orientation



3. The importance of variety and adventure in the job [t (146) = -4.16, p=000] AFA (M=2.13, SD=.79) and AFCO (M=2.71, SD=.90). This means that cadets consider variety and adventure in the job more important than career officers;

4. The importance of working with people who cooperate well [t (146) = -2.34, p=.02] AFA (M=1.64, SD=.57) and AFCO (M=1.88, SD=.65). Cadets rated cooperation at work a value much more important than officers did;

5. Fear of expressing disagreement [t (146) = 3.06, p=.002] AFA (M= 2.84, SD=1.25) and AFCO (M= 2.29, SD=.96). In their organizational life cadets experienced more often than officers situations in which subordinates feared to express disagreement with their commanders.

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VALUES	LEVENE'S TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCES F	SIG.	T-TEST FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS T	SIG. (2-TAILED)
<b>Sufficient time for private life</b>	.09	.75	-3.97	<b>.000</b>
Challenging tasks	.53	.46	-1.25	.213
Little tension/stress at job	.12	.72	1.11	.267
Physical conditions			.181	.856
Good relation with superior	2.12	.14	-1.57	.118
Security of employment	2.85	.09	.374	.709
Own job approach	2.87	.09	-.882	.379
<b>Work with people who cooperate well</b>	.41	.52	-2.34	<b>.020</b>
Consulted by superior in his decision	3.40	.06	-1.43	.154
Real contribution to company successes	.81	.36	-.66	.510
High earnings	.15	.69	.12	.900
Serving the country	1.43	.23	1.39	.167
Living in a desirable area	.45	.50	-1.89	.061
<b>Advancement opportunities</b>	.07	.78	-3.45	<b>.001</b>
<b>Variety and adventure in the job</b>	3.37	.06	-4.16	<b>.000</b>
Work in prestigious company	1.46	.22	.279	.781
Well-defined job requirements			-.539	.590
Personal steadiness and stability	.20	.65	.843	.401
Thrift	1.53	.21	-.520	.604
Persistence, perseverance			-1.96	.052
Respect for tradition	.30	.58	1.82	.070
Feel nervous /tense at work	1.48	.22	-.54	.590
<b>Fear to express disagreements</b>	<b>9.04</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>.003</b>
Rules should not be broken	1.17	.28	.32	.751

**Table 45** Test of homogeneity of variance for the items of the questionnaire Hofstede/VSM 82

The others values, for which our comparisons did not reveal significant differences between cadets and career officers, are listed in **Table 46** (see next page). The differences that were found seem to indicate that these significant changes occurred in individualism and masculinity between the analyzed generations; it is not yet possible to explain this by a clear cultural change in patterns. The cadets are younger at the start of their military career. The closed environment of the military academies – with a strict schedule, few opportunities for free time, requiring leave permissions until 7 or 8 p.m. creates some frustrations for young cadets since they compare their life with the life of civilian students and accordingly they expect much more time for private life. At the beginning of their career, ready to learn

and succeed, the cadets are most interested in organizational promotion opportunities and in having more varied work than their seniors. The fact that in an academic institution there is less openness in expressing disagreements, reflects again a negative climate for personal development and the need to postpone change, just for those who one day may be privileged to be assigned such important command positions, as the officers from the present sample.

WORK AND PERSONAL VALUES	GROUPS	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
Challenging tasks	AFA	2.22	.70
	AFCO	2.37	.74
Little tension/stress at job	AFA	2.94	1.14
	AFCO	2.74	1.03
Physical conditions	AFA	2.16	.86
	AFCO	2.13	.82
Good relation with superior	AFA	1.91	.75
	AFCO	2.10	.70
Security of employment	AFA	2.17	.94
	AFCO	2.12	.78
Own job approach	AFA	2.14	.85
	AFCO	2.25	.66
Consulted by superior in his decision	AFA	2.36	.95
	AFCO	2.56	.75
Real contribution to company successes	AFA	1.91	.66
	AFCO	1.98	.62
High earnings	AFA	2.27	.72
	AFCO	2.25	.77
Serving the country	AFA	2.31	.94
	AFCO	2.11	.85
Living in a desirable area	AFA	1.56	.61
	AFCO	1.76	.65
Work in prestigious company	AFA	2.50	.84
	AFCO	2.46	.72
Well-defined job requirements	AFA	1.95	.76
	AFCO	2.02	.82
Personal steadiness and stability	AFA	1.98	.75
	AFCO	1.88	.73
Thrift	AFA	2.33	.82
	AFCO	2.39	.69
Persistence, perseverance	AFA	1.97	.80
	AFCO	2.21	.70
Respect for tradition	AFA	2.97	.91
	AFCO	2.71	.78
Feel nervous or tense at work	AFA	3.02	.75
	AFCO	3.08	.76
Rules should not be broken not even in the company's interest	AFA	2.86	1.14
	AFCO	2.80	1.19

**Table 46** Mean and standard deviation for 20 work related and personal values from questionnaire, Hofstede/VSM 82  
 N<sub>AFA</sub>=64 N<sub>AFCO</sub>=84

The military, in its basic functioning, requires the internalization of collective values. Everyone has to learn team spirit and mutual dependence for mission accomplishment. As top-managers, career officers are responsible for mastering all organizational efforts and leading their subordinates toward success. For this reason the finding that in the Romanian Air Force sample the senior respondents give significantly less importance to cooperation as a value than their young colleagues does not confirm Hofstede's expectations and findings. While we are not sure if this is a generational difference, a look at the Chapter 3 explains that in the recent past, due to the climate created by controlling police-type forces

of private and work life, combined with the lack of real military training and action can be a reasonable explanation.

Overall, if we consider career officers and all cadets (from 2002 research) as two distinct samples and we apply the same methodology to computing the indices as in Chapter 4, we observe a few differences and similarities. The connections with the results will be addressed extensively in the next two sections.

<i>INDEX</i>	<b>PDI</b>	<b>UAI</b>	<b>IDV</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>LTO</b>
<i>RESPONDENTS – YEAR RESEARCH (SAMPLE SIZE)</i>					
Cadets - 2002 (N=257)	74	80	50	24	53
Air Force Senior officers - 2005 (N=87)	53	53	44	15	50

**Table 47** The computed values for national dimensions indices in two samples

### **On management styles**


A look at previous Q1 findings using Hofstede’s Questionnaire showed that for all cadets the authoritarian leadership style prevails in military command issues and that they desire more participation in decision processes and in their own organizational life. To the question design “to which one of the above four types of managers/commanders would you say your superior correspond the most?” cadets described their commanders as displaying an authoritarian style with paternalistic traits. It is a result that confirmed the historical analysis and was confirmed also by foreign cultural analysts such as Lewis (2006) who visited and understood the culture of modern Romania. Besides, in certain limits, it is quite understandable that cadets face more authoritarian leadership that seniors do. This is probably an overall pattern in military institutions all over the world.

With regard to the last part of Niculae’s *Y-X-Y hypothesis*, one would expect that at least the career officers, drawn from all Romanian units evaluate the current style of their superiors in a predominantly consultative way, in contrast to cadets. Possible significant differences were investigated between groups. For both variables studied (the current and the desired superior manager style) 95% of cells had the accepted frequency, so the assumption of chi-square was not violated (Pallant, 2003). The Asym. Sig. (2 sided) value was above the limit for both variables,  $\chi^2 = .28$  for the first and for the preferred style  $\chi^2 = .73$ . This leads to the conclusion that in both cases the proportion of assessed styles of command - current and desired - are not significantly different between the two groups: cadets and career officers. Both rated, in similar ways, the current command style as authoritarian with paternalistic traits, and both groups ask with the same intensity for a more consultative style in their organizational life. This enables us to conclude that there are no statistical grounds for proving significant changes between generations and organizational levels in perceived command styles in the Romanian Air Force.

	<i>AFA</i>	<i>AFCO</i>	Total
Authoritarian	26	39	65
Paternalist	17	21	38
Consultative	16	21	37
Democratic	2	2	4
Other styles	3	1	4
Total	64	84	148

**Table 48** Distribution of answers to the question about superior's current command style within the Air Force (N=148)

Moreover, according to data from **Figure 19** another observation emerges. When compared to the others, the ratio of consultative management style seems the highest within the Air Force subculture, a result that seems to be consistent with Mastroianni's theory about subcultural differences, particularly within the Air Force. The Air Force is depicted by its members as one of the most liberal subcultures within the ROAF, requiring more relaxed interpersonal relations and its informal attitude between its members. However, in the absence of the other equivalent samples equivalent for the Army and Navy Academies, this conclusion needs to be reinforced with supplementary research. Having this limitation, still the findings entitle us to reflect on the authoritarian command style in the entire ROAF at both levels that were studied.



**Figure 19** The highest rated (percentages) current superior's command styles for all groups: academies and career officers (N=341)

However, there are significant differences between cadets and career officers with regard to fear of expressing open disagreements with their superiors. Cadets experience this fear more often. The consequence of this reality is a lower computed value of PDI (53) confirming Hofstede's hypothesis, from Chapter 4, which states that, at higher levels of management, power distance decreases. As we can observe in the Romanian Air Force case, the lower value generated by the middle-top managers is not explainable by more consultative management styles. It is the fear of expressing disagreements with superiors, in organizational matters that accounts for the difference. To conclude, these results support Hofstede's recommendation that any investigation of the power distance dimension should be focused on the lowest managerial levels.

**Other national culture dimensions**

In the previous section, PDI and its connection with management style was discussed, therefore this section will be devoted to the other dimensions of Hofstede’s theory.

Comparisons between cadets and career officers, reveal significant differences only for one item (the time working for the current organization) of the three (nervousness /stress at work and orientation toward respecting the rules) comprising the uncertainty avoidance index UAI. The Asym. Sig. (2 sided) value is under 0.5 so the value of  $\chi^2= 41.047$  shows an association between the desire to work for the military and the group of respondents. More specifically, results reflect a higher desire of career officers to leave the organization as soon as they can (up to five years 36.5% comparing to 8.4% of cadets), although the percentage of those who decide to stay until retirement is quite similar (10.8% cadets and 13.5 % career officers). These observations mean that Hofstedian findings regarding the dependence of employment stability on age and the variance of the stress level according to managerial level are not replicated by our results. It has to be reminded that in 2005 the military organization was involved more in changes of organizational design. However, the general computed value is lower for the air forces officers, thus confirming the macro age-dependency defined by Hofstede.

Next, if we consider the items used to compute individualism and masculinity, we can observe that in the present research some of them confirm the trends defined by Hofstede in his original work (1984), while others do not. The explanations for such realities are embedded within a society experiencing a period of change (thus making employment stability, earnings, living in a desirable area or having challenging task equally important for respondents) or dealing with cultural inheritages (cooperation was less important in a period of communist repression, while positive relations with superiors are capital for advancement especially when dealing with a predominant authoritarian type of management).

Trends		Findings
More important with age	Employment security	Not confirmed
	Positive relations with managers	Not confirmed
	Cooperation	Not confirmed
Less important with age	Advancement opportunities	Confirmed
	Earnings	Not confirmed
	Time for private life	Confirmed
	Challenging tasks	Not confirmed
Important for 40-49 age bracket	Living in a desirable area	Not confirmed

**Table 49** Hofstede’s (1984: 244-245) trends for work goal importance according to age brackets and findings in present study

At the same time according to computed values, both individualism and masculinity are lower for officers than cadets. These confirm the general theoretical expectations defined by Hofstede in his theory, while the specific variable variation reflects cultural specificity of Romanian realities. Another look at the items in the long-term orientation index shows that there are some differences in the means of

perseverance (more important for cadets) and respect for tradition (for career officers), but these differences did not coalesce sufficiently in each group to reach statistical significance. Since the other two items (importance of thrift and stability) revealed no significant changes, career officers' time orientation appeared quite unchanged.

### ***Organizational culture***

Results show the Air Force subculture as clearly rule oriented in its practices ( $M= 3.24$ ,  $SD=.56$ ) and values ( $M=3.62$ ,  $SD=.77$ ), a result consistent with the theory presented in Chapter 2 and expectations. In general, the emphasis on jobs performed according to defined procedures (the so familiar SOPs or Standard Operating Procedures), behavior according to standards and norms, and the written culture, is specific to military organization and came as no surprise, as other scholars have already reported similar trends (Lang, 1956; Soeters, 2000). These also apply to the Air Force, which is the most technical and generally operating the most riskfull activities of all armed forces branches (Murray, 1999), hence requiring carefully following the rules and procedures.

There are also a few other aspects to note here. The compliance with rules is significantly (Sig.2 tailed is .012) less typical for career officers ( $M=3.76$ ,  $SD=.92$ ) than for cadets ( $M=4.14$ ,  $SD=.87$ ) and for this reason in current organizational life cadets observed that people are treated in an impersonal manner in current organizational life significantly much more often than their senior colleagues (AFA –  $M=3.28$ ,  $SD=.92$  and AFCO –  $M=2.75$ ,  $SD=.79$ ). At the same time, cadets declare that management does not follow the rules ( $M=2.69$ ,  $SD=.92$ ), an answer that significantly differentiates (Sig. 2 tailed is .001) them from career officers ( $M=3.24$ ,  $SD=1.00$ ).

An independent- sample t-test was conducted to compare the scale results for Air Force cadets and career officers for the eight organizational culture dimensions. Two out of eight dimensions were found with significant differences between the two groups of respondents. As the table below shows, in the case of the support orientation from descriptive scale AFA ( $M=2.58$ ,  $SD=.54$ ) and AFCO ( $M=2.95$ ,  $SD=.68$ ) and the innovation orientation from the evaluative scale AFA ( $M=2.38$ ,  $SD=.80$ ) and AFCO ( $M=2.85$ ,  $SD=.71$ ) the differences between groups were significant at  $p=.000$ . The magnitude of these differences between means is marginally significant (.08 for support practices and for innovation .09 values). This result suggests a subcultural difference between respondents, with cadets identifying less support practices for personal problems. In the culture of Air Force Academy fewer concerns are expressed by a management that allows very little freedom in work, a reality doubled by significantly lower propensity for encouraging critical remarks ( $M= 2.42$ ,  $SD=1.10$ ), disposition to change ( $M=2.22$ ,  $SD=1.05$ ), to rethinking old way of doing things ( $M=2.28$ ,  $SD=1.12$ ), or even to the courage to propose and discuss

new ideas (M=2.59, SD=1.08). In fact, these are the lowest scores of all items in the Air Force combined sample (with cadets and career officers).




Figure 20 Air Force cadets (AFA) and career officers (AFCO) descriptive cultural profiles





Figure 21 Air Force cadets (AFA) and career officers (AFCO) evaluative cultural profiles

	Equal variances	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances F	Sig.	t-test for Equality of Means	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
<b>DESCRIPTIVE SCALE</b>						
Support	not assumed			-3.694	145.69	.000
Rule	assumed	.013	.908	.433	146	.665
Goal	assumed	1.232	.269	-1.469	146	.144
Innovation	assumed	1.176	.280	-1.768	146	.079
<b>EVALUATIVE SCALE</b>						
Support	assumed	1.240	.267	-.189	146	.850
Rule	assumed	.008	.928	1.047	146	.297
Goal	assumed	.823	.366	.444	146	.657
Innovation	not assumed			-3.725	126.688	.000

Table 50 Independent Samples Test to compare the organizational culture scales Air Force cadets and career officers

Another conclusion found in this sample (N= 148) is that the Air Force can be described as subculturally fairly uniform on goal (M=3.00, SD=.68) and innovation orientations (M=2.61, SD=.71) on

the descriptive scale and to goal (M= 3.36, SD=.71) and support (M=3.02, SD=.73) orientations on the evaluative scale, however not without some internal differences on a few items on both scales.



**Figure 22** Significant differences on descriptive and evaluative scales between cadets and officers in Romanian Air Force (N=148)

There is a quite small place for promoting values such as a good work environment (M=2.57, SD=1.10), failure acceptance (M=2.61, SD=.94), mutual support in solving work problems (M=3.03, SD=.94) or for personal problems (M=2.85, SD=1.01) and understanding (M=2.93, SD=1.03). Surprisingly, Air Force career officers declare that building a team spirit in their organization is significantly (Sig.2 tailed is .002) less specific in their experience (M=3.27, SD=1.05) compared with the Air Forces Academy (M=3.73, SD=1.16).

As in the 2002 study in the military academies, in this 2005 study among managers from middle and top levels of the Romanian Armed Forces, the lowest results are found on the innovative scale. This means that organizational practices in the Air Force are not receptive to new challenges or to rethinking old ways of solving problems, a finding consistent with the results reported in Chapter 4.

## Discipline

An independent-samples t-test was run to compare the discipline scores in both samples.

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances F	Sig.	t-test for Equality of Means t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Formal discipline	Equal variances assumed	1.924	.168	-2.045	146	.043
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.071	141.460	.040
Informal discipline	Equal variances assumed	.084	.772	.167	146	.868
	Equal variances not assumed			.167	135.080	.868

**Table 51** Independent Samples Test values for formal and informal discipline comparing the Air Force cadets and career officers

Formal discipline differentiates significantly AFA (M=2.32, SD=.56) from AFCO (M=2.52, SD=.61), which means that the formal discipline is reinforced in the Air Forces Academy more than within the culture of Air Force career officers, since this is the place of socialization for future officers.



Very important to cadets are the correct wearing of uniform (M=2.11, SD=.62) and having polished boots (M=2.30, SD=.73) as a consequence of organizational demands.

Concerning the informal culture, in comparing the means of the two groups, no significant differences were observed AFA (M=2.49, SD=.58) and AFCA (M=2.47, SD=.57). Both groups gave similar importance to behavior according to group informal norms and to the intentions of their commanders.

### Military orientation

In the case of military orientation, the Levene test showed just in one item a violation of the assumption of equal variances with significant differences between groups Sig.(2 tailed)=.27. It means that compared with their superiors (M=3.88, SD=1.13), cadets (M=4.22, SD=.70) seem more eager to accept an intervention with a peacemaking force as soon as possible in an international conflict. As described in Chapter 1, since the fall of communism, Romania has been involved in peacekeeping operations and post-construction efforts in various places in the world. Internal (written and visual media) and external communicators (civilian media, politicians) presented and emphasized these participations and adopted the post-modern discourse.

Solution to an international conflict	Equal variances assumption	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances F	Sig.	t-test for Equality of Means t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
International peacemaking force as soon as possible	Equal variances assumed	8.54	<b>.004</b>	2.10	145	.037
	<b>Equal variances not assumed</b>			2.23	139.12	<b>.027</b>
Economic embargo of the conflict area, in order to isolate it	Equal variances assumed	1.88	.17	-.52	145	.604
	Equal variances not assumed			-.529	142.32	.598
International force in battle/ military operations on the ground	Equal variances assumed	.68	.41	-1.051	145	.295
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.070	142.92	.286
To get the warring parties to the negotiation (mediation) table	Equal variances assumed	.02	.87	-.192	145	.848
	Equal variances not assumed			-.191	134.402	.849
Military units of the warring factions involved subdued by means of an international air campaign	Equal variances assumed	.019	.892	1.144	144	.255
	Equal variances not assumed			1.140	134.085	.256
Diplomatic appeal to the warring parties to settle their differences	Equal variances assumed	.030	.864	-.042	145	.967
	Equal variances not assumed			-.042	132.300	.967

**Table 52** Tests of Normality for the items comprising military orientation

To continue, findings show that in the Romanian Air Force sub-culture the most frequent perceived solutions to an international conflict are the ones involving diplomatic means: negotiation (M=4.65, SD=.69) and diplomatic appeals to cease the conflict (M=4.61, SD=.73). Air campaign (M=2.05, SD=1.09) or troops engaged in battle on the ground (M=2.67, SD=.97) are the less accepted options to do their business for both groups: cadets and career officers. This reinforces the profile

assumed and confirmed by cadets in Chapter 4 about the Romanian military's orientation toward conflict and peace.

### ***Summary***

The question addressed in this chapter was “Did the Romanian Air Force change its cultural orientation over time?” To answer this question, we compared answers of two groups of respondents: career officers and cadets. The answers of 87 Air Force senior career officers who were senior-cadets at the Air Forces Academy in 2005 were compared with those of 64 Air force cadets from the previous study in 2002. The results on various models of analysis used (national, organizational and occupational culture) showed that are some similarities and few but notable differences between these two groups.

Significant differences between groups were found at the level of six national culture work and personal values, more specifically those items used to compute power distance, individualism and masculinity indices. In this regard, cadets consider it more important to have time for private life, to have opportunities for advancement, variety and adventure in their job and to work with cooperative people. This means that they display more individualism than their senior officers. This is a finding consistent with original research on age-related differences for this dimension (Hofstede, 2001). The high importance given by cadets to cooperation explains the difference in values for masculinity index. Although the explanatory basis for such reality is uncertain, the lack of real military challenges for those generations under communist authority could have a contribution to a lower value of cooperation found in career officers' sample. Another item on which samples differ significantly is the time span of work for the military: senior officers are less inclined to stay and work for the military until retirement. Such result could have different explanations. It is possible that the period of changes initiated after 1989 created better opportunities in civilian life for these respondents or the answer could be the effect of the downsizing that generated rather a leaving pattern for old generations. Whatever the cause may be, it needs to be addressed in further studies.

In the Romanian military case both groups of respondents, cadets and career officers assessed in the current command style the same way. Authoritarianism is reinforced as the main way to lead to all organizational levels in the Air Force subculture. At the same time, contra-dependence, the preference for a consultative management style in the current organization characterizes both groups with the same intensity. The results enable us to assert that the hypothesis regarding the institutionalization of a dominant consultative style of command within the Romanian military has no sociological confirmation in the present study, neither was it possible to assert such a hypothesis after the study of military history and the evolution of post-communist Romania, detailed in Chapter 3. Romania survived 50 years of

communist dominance by fear. Accordingly, when asked specifically, the result was a low percentage of consultative management styles in military academies and in the Romanian Air Force leadership. Since Air Force subculture respondents (senior officers and cadets) described a predominant authoritarian command style, this finding suggests a revision of Nicolae’s hypothesis (2004: 150) about differences in management styles for different stages of a military career in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Cadets are socialized to be more formally discipline oriented compared to career officers and they displayed greater importance given to outward appearances, as opposed to informal, group oriented issues. This is confirming the expectations as military academies are socialization places for future officers. At the same time, the Romanian Air Force subculture can be defined as having a dominant peaceful military ethos. Cadets and career officers showed no differences in rating diplomatic means as the most appropriate solutions to international conflicts. This result confirms the historical analysis and defined expectations and is consistent with the general picture of the conclusions on military academies in Chapter 4.

To sum up all the findings implying Hofstede’s national culture dimensions (1984), Nicolae’s hypothesis (2004), military discipline (Soeters, 1997) and military orientation in solving a conflict, the next table was built:

Hypothesis	Findings
PDI Hofstede - lower computed values for higher management level	Confirmed
Nicolae hypothesis (2004) - more consultative management style to the organizational executive levels	Not confirmed
UAI lower in officers’ sample	Confirmed
IDV higher with age	Confirmed
MAS lower with age	Confirmed
Formal discipline more important in military academies	Confirmed
Peacefull ethos in both samples	Confirmed

**Table 53** Hofstede’s national culture model (1984), Nicolae’s hypothesis (2004), military discipline (Soeters, 1997) and military orientation findings in Air Force subculture (N= 151)

Regarding organizational values and practices, the Air Force is fairly homogeneous. Its’ rule orientation as reflected by organizational practices and values depicts the highest intensity of all, in both groups. This shows a strong emphasis on stability and on performing jobs according to defined procedures, with employees expected to behave according to the specific norms the military and air force technology ask from its members. However, groups were found to differ significantly in items regarding the rules. In fact, we can observe congruence between answers: the demands to rules compliance and respect are higher for cadets then for the career officers. Although it can be interpreted as normal, since cadets are at the beginning of their military socialization, there is a potential role conflict since

management is perceived as not respecting the rules, becoming a privileged category in cadets' wider perception.

Surprisingly, Air Force subculture does not promote innovation and support; neither in values nor practices. Having a good work environment, where flexibility, openness to rethink old ways or even courage in proposing and debating new ideas do not characterize the current Romanian Air Force subculture. The innovation evaluative scale highlights an Air Forces Academy environment even more closed to new ideas, creativity and modernization. Since in the Armed Forces change does not seem to be generated at these levels, it means that changes are imposed rather from outside the organization. At the same time, goal orientation is promoted as a value but not as practice. One key toward the understanding this last difference can be found in what Schein (1990) described as the difference between declared theories and theories in action or what was explained by Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988: 373) while presenting the decoupling words and actions strategies specific to socialist societies.

In conclusion, the research results indicate some significant changes, useful for a military leadership interested in unifying organizational efforts toward mission accomplishment. The cross sectional nature of our design made it impossible to fully explain the cause of the changes described. Whatever the changes, they left untouched the most important feature of military culture in its consequences for a worthy and profound transformation: that of management style.

## **CHAPTER 6**

# **ROMANIAN MILITARY CULTURE IN INTERACTION**

### **Theoretical framework**

#### ***Preamble***

The main goal of the chapter is to assess how the ROAF perform in complex military encounters and how the current Romanian military organization learns from its soldiers' experiences after 50 years without active service. Answering these questions requires a principal assumption that the military culture learned in peace time is used as a reference guide to performance in mission time. The conclusions of Chapter 4 will be used to define expectations during military cooperation. Further, addressing the organizational learning tempo in the ROAF, as suggested in Chapter 2, means to understand the feedback about the mission in the form of lessons learned, while testing the receptivity of the military organization to suggestions coming from the field in order to adapt to a changing business. Accordingly, the answer to the questions above can be highlighted, comparing the way Romanian soldiers perform in common missions with soldiers from different military cultures, and analyzing their perceptions and representations about themselves and their partners in same professional roles. In this chapter I describe the military cooperation between The Netherlands: a Western and economically developed, democratic and old NATO member, and Romania: an ex-communist, Eastern country with a transitional economy and new membership of NATO. This description can fill a gap in current Romanian military sociology, which lacks a cultural approach to military cooperation.

#### ***Main background of the cooperation between Romanian and Dutch troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina***

In December 1995, NATO was given the mandate to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the failure of the UN mission, establishing a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). One year later, NATO countries' defense ministers reevaluated the situation, and a Stabilization Force (SFOR) was set up with a clear mission to stabilize the peace and to maintain a secure environment. In December 2004, the European Union took over the mission from NATO and launched Operation ALTHEA of the European Force (EUFOR).

On June 27, 2000, the Romanian Government, answering the request by NATO officials, decided to continue the country's participation to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to enhance it through the establishment of a transport platoon acting under Dutch command within the Dutch logistic base of the Multinational Task Force, North-West (MNTF-NW). The platoon was composed of 28

soldiers and was located in Banja Luka and Bugojno. It deployed from November 1, 2000 until December 2, 2004 as part of SFOR and then as part of EUFOR until 2006. According to the Memorandum of Understanding and Technical Agreement between the Romanian and Dutch Ministries of Defense, the Dutch logistically supported the Romanian platoon, including the transportation and different types of equipment needed to accomplish the mission. In this respect, it was agreed that the Romanian platoon needed specific training in the Netherlands. During the six months operational tour, the platoon's mission was to transport personnel, goods, ammunition, automotive parts or broken combat equipment. Under Dutch command, the Romanian Detachment transformed in the field into a bi-national land force structure with a Romanian commander, a Dutch liaison officer and Dutch soldiers under his command.

Volunteer recruiting of the Romanian members of the detachment assumed a series of physical, medical and English language tests. The selected soldiers participated in a two-month training session in Romania followed by another session of one month training with their Dutch colleagues in the Netherlands. Here, beside military sessions, training included cultural awareness classes regarding the area of operations (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and more recent consistent information about the Romanian and Dutch societies was added. The Netherlands training period finished with a real life exercise to get the soldiers accustomed to the challenges of the mission. One month after the combined training period, the soldiers were deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina to work together for a six-month period. After this the new contingent was deployed while troops met together for a week in order to facilitate the newcomers' integration and communication.

### ***Theoretical grounds***

The literature (Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir, 1999; Murray, 1999; Winslow, 1999; Gareis et al., 2003; vom Hagen et. al. 2003; Moelker et. al, 2007; Fischer, Weber & Eliason, 2008; Soeters & Manigart, 2008; Augbry et al., 2008) suggests the focus on several topics with influence on final performance during a multinational mission.

Firstly, in multinational military encounters (during classes, trainings or missions) groups of soldiers from various nations come together to work and interact for a set period. This aspect orients the researcher toward the theories about group interactions in different cultural settings. Soldiers act more or less aware of the cultural differences between them and their partners using different ways to cope with similar situations and practiced every day in their home culture. Since the interactions and processes developing between groups affect the quality of cooperation, they influence the efficiency of mission accomplishment (Gareis et al., 2003: 37). Social psychology provides key theories for studying and understanding such type of military cooperation. Intercultural relations are useful in explaining the

evolution of cooperation between troops from different cultures. According to Berry (Landis, Bennett & Bennett, 2004: 174), the research in this field is mainly channeled in two directions: acculturation and intergroup relations.

*Acculturation* refers to the process of interaction among actors (individuals, groups) with the focus on cultural exchanges between these entities. Hofstede (2005: 325+) defined the stages of acculturation by observing that the experiences in a foreign or international culture start with the excitement of travel, living, staying or seeing new lands and meeting new people. This continues with the stress of a culture shock because of an inability to understand others' behavior, and it reaches a final phase when a person learns to function in the new environment. The last phase implies the filtration of experiences gained to reach a stable state, which could become positive, negative or neutral. Acculturation is rather a group-level phenomenon and it is distinct from the psychological acculturation. This distinction between levels is particularly important, as it shows that not all individuals participate to the same extent in the general acculturation being experienced by their group. Ward (2004: 196) mentions that people who view their stay in a new culture as temporary retain their identity more strongly when compared to those whose intentions are to stay more permanently, although all are willing to acquire new skills. Hofstede also acknowledges this temporal dependence of acculturation, which means that the length of exposure to a new cultural environment defines the outcomes (2001: 424-427). These insights can explain why after a six months course for career officers within a multinational environment, changes in national values are rather unlikely to occur (Soeters & Recht, 2001) whereas changes in attitudes do occur (vom Hagen, Moelker & Soeters, 2003: 46). However, in the broad field of cooperation in international business, situations with different outcomes than previously were noticed. According to Hofstede (2001: 455) there are people on short assignments of up to three months that reported phases of euphoria, culture shock, and acculturation. In the same vein, Ward (2004: 189) asserts that the intensity of culture shock is related to the cultural distance between the home and host country. In this respect the acculturation process proves to be less difficult when the cultural distance between the home and contact culture is small. At the same time people, who successfully complete their acculturation process and return home experience a reverse culture shock in readjusting to their old cultural environment (Hofstede, 2005: 327).

The intergroup relations between Dutch and Romanian military people were addressed through the mirror of several theories. The first process involved regards the social categorization or the "ordering of the social environment in terms of social categories that is of grouping persons in a manner that is meaningful to the subject" (Tajfel, 1974: 69). More explicitly, when two groups coming from different cultures enter in contact, this:

*“[...] does not automatically breed mutual understanding. Rather it confirms the groups involved in their own identities and prejudices. From the view of one group members are not perceived as individuals but in stereotyped fashion” (Hofstede, 2001: 424)*

At this point, it is important to mention that Tajfel (1974: 88-89) underlines two conditions in which people think in terms of the group rather of the self: (1) the dichotomization of the world in distinct and non-overlapping categories and (2) the impossibility/ serious difficulty in passing from one group to another. Behaving in terms of a group means the acquisition of a clear cognitive structure of “us” and “them” unless this can be easily shifted in a variety of social and psychological conditions. Both of the above conditions are satisfied in multinational military encounters and the most salient criteria to differentiate is the nationality. This amplifies the process of identification and differentiation (Leonhard et. al, 2008: 75-79).

Stereotypes, the generalised attitudes as images that apply to other groups/people, are the central element of categorization. They are culturally embedded and their content information helps in coping with new situations when entering in contact with others. By some authors, stereotypes are considered “half-truths” (Hofstede, 2001: 424), others consider them as beliefs (Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1996: 98), but all the authors define the stereotypes as a result of the social categorization process and describe them as unavoidable for the human mind. Stereotypes can be positive or negative, although their oversimplification can lead to prejudice and discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and gender. The study of the stereotypes is justified if considering other sides involving stereotypes as described in this paragraph by the *social identity theory*. There is a tendency toward the maintenance of stereotypes, even in the face of contradictory information, thus making more difficult the process of cooperation for task accomplishment (Tajfel, 1981: 133).

Another consequence of the social categorisation processes regards the in-group favouritism or discrimination against the out-group. Tajfel (1974) acknowledged the existence of several conditions that normally lead people here: “face-to-face interaction, conflict of interest, any possibility of previous hostility, any utilitarian or instrumental link between subjects’ responses and their self-interest” (p. 67). Accordingly, neither in the absence of conflicting group interests or a history of group conflict, can the simple categorization of persons in groups produce discriminative behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

However, to investigate stereotypes Moelker and Soeters (2003) recommend rather a more neutral concept to be used instead: “image”. The images, argue the authors, become stereotypes if they are connected with positive or negative connotations which influence interpersonal interactions (p. 26). In this respect, the study of the mutual images that soldiers held about themselves (auto-images) and the



other(s) (xeno<sup>138</sup>-images) and their analysis become an indicator of the communication and co-operation in multinational encounters (Gareis et al., 2003: 78). People define themselves comparing these images with each other and it would be normal for their own group to be seen in more positive terms than the others. In other words, auto-images are likely to be more positive than xeno-images for each group. While the strong negative attitudes developed against other groups can be changed through organizational policies and interactions in the long term, it seems that xeno-images are resistant to change and appear to be cultural constants (vom Hagen, Moelker & Soeters, 2006: 45). Nonetheless, stereotypes are equal in importance for cooperation success “no less, or even more than real cultural differences” as Shamir and Melnik (2002: 233) underline. “Deeply rooted in the awareness and relationship with the values and socio-cultural attitudes of the individual’s original background” (vom Hagen et al., 2003: 77), stereotypes may help or cause disturbances to interaction for performing common tasks in military operations. Transmitted through the communication process they become relevant by offering beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people, but also these can be over-generalized, inaccurate and resistant to new information (Myers, 2000: 182).

Although the social categorisation theory describes the challenges for the encounters between groups, there are premises for changes: the more people work and live together, the more they will like each other, as states the *intergroup contact hypothesis* (Allport, 1954). The hypothesis also clarifies the conditions that create possible reductions of prejudices:

- (1) groups to have equal status within the situation: this means that no group is more important than another,
- (2) common goal-orientation: this means that each member belonging to the involved groups, define, accept and commit to the same goal (see also Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir, 1999),
- (3) intergroup cooperation in order to achieve the common defined goal: this means personal interactions between people, and
- (4) supportive contact facilitators, more specifically authorities, commanders, laws or customs (see also Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir, 1999).

In today’s military world, former Cold War enemy countries (Western and Eastern) with different economic levels are today’s partners in multicultural encounters to cooperate and achieve common mission goals. This is not a smooth process, since scholars point out that:

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<sup>138</sup> There is available another terminology to describe the same reality as other authors as Smith, Bond & Kağıtçıbaşı (2004) suggest by using “hetero-stereotypes” term to describe the nationality stereotypes (p. 224)

*“It is essential that the soldiers from different nations experience each other as on a par and equal. This does not at all exclude the awareness of and the pride in national peculiarities – which however may not go so far that others feel degraded.” (Aubry, 2008: 218)*

Inspired by later developments, Pettigrew (1998) suggested a fifth condition: “the contact situation must provide the participants with the opportunity to become friends” (p. 76). It is this potential in friendship that facilitates positive intergroup relations because positive emotions stimulated by intergroup friendship became facilitators of intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 1998: 71-73). Studying military collaboration between nations in war time Vom Hagen, Soeters & Moelker (2003) have a similar conclusion: sympathy is the cement of co-operation and thus communication and mutual understanding between troops become more important than organizational concepts or equipment compatibility. “A basic condition for successful military collaboration between two nations is mutual friendliness and open-mindedness” notes Moelker and Soeters (2003: 16). Mutual acceptance appears an important prerequisite for military co-operation (Aubry, 2008). Continuing, Pettigrew (1998: 77) mentions in his synthesis another four processes of change through intergroup contact:

(1) learning about the out-group as a means to improve attitudes: knowledge in various areas is a way to improve mutual understanding of reactions and others specific cultural habits, taboos and conditions of social life.

(2) changing behavior, after repeated inter-group contacts: such a process is conditioned by an open attitude to reviewing the differences between what we learn before, and the new experiences.

(3) generating positive ties, since emotions are critical in intergroup-contact and because each contact involves a cognitive and an affective dimension

(4) in-group reappraisal that leads to less bias toward the out-group; contact situations bring to light new ways of managing the world and reshaping peoples' views.

As described in Chapter 1, some military organizations already incorporated, in the Lessons Learned approaches, part of these processes in the form of cultural lessons, as part of pre-mission preparation. Permanent updating is the key to enhancing cultural understanding of the situation. To this end, cultural packages for the investigation of cultural habits, taboos or conditions of social life are becoming an applied training tool. However, it has to be said that there is no such single training package applying to all military deployed. Each nation has different training practices in respect to specific missions, depending on the knowledge available at the moment, according to previous experiences and the organizational culture permeability to permanent updates in the form of “lessons learned”. Argyris (2003) concluded that organizational learning is a cultural process, dependent on a wide range of mechanisms which can enhance or inhibit it. In this respect, the return from a mission is the main moment

to assess the quality of the training and, at the same time, to test organizational capability to analyze and apply the observations/ proposals coming from various organizational levels.

Another practice found in today's missions involves the contingent of soldiers leaving after their tour. Before leaving, these troops debrief the next contingent for one or two weeks on the mission and their experiences in the field, including stories about the relations developed with other national contingents/soldiers. This short time spent together is the means of transmitting the institutional memory of the mission in the form significant experiences (transmitted by others, or experienced personally). These moments are crucial for shaping the next contingent's attitudes, beliefs and behavior. Consequently, it is easy to understand why, in such encounters, the military personnel deployed on mission for the second time become a pivotal element in any national group and influence people's perceptions.

Entering into contact with new culture(s) is a stressful experience which requires active coping strategies, as Adler explains (2002: 143). Both characteristics – individual and situational – may facilitate or impede adjustment to the new milieu (Ward, 2004: 186). Within the military, the stress of new cultural experiences is doubled by the stress of the high risk of military operations and the double subordination: national and international. Recent studies demonstrated that life-threatening situations influence people's desire for cooperation in a negative way (Seiler, 2007: 226; Dechesne, Van den Berg & Soeters, 2007: 78). The more dangerous the situation, the more influence the personal cultural background of a soldier will have, because precarious situations encourage a return to routine thinking, learned before, to the basic cultural experience, knowledge and pattern (Van den Berg, 2009). In these circumstances, soldiers' minds will most probably obstruct cooperation with soldiers from other cultures as long as this process requires readiness, openness and flexibility.

With regard to these aspects, Vom Hagen, Moelker and Soeters (2003) combine two relevant aspects: *the degree of contact between groups and the involvement of each group*, and *the desire for cultural preservation manifested by each group*. Taking these variables into account, two important forms of multinationality emerged in military cooperation: horizontal and vertical (Klein & Kuemmel, 2003: 316; Klein, 2004: 209). The first, the horizontal multinationality, was best described by the work-related direct interactions within headquarters or the lining up of different national contingents within a battle group. Although parts of an international force, the troops are operating under the command of their national flag, have specific areas of responsibility not interfering with other nationalities and interactions are more frequent in camps where behavior is studied and compared. This is a separation strategy and implies cultural avoidance (Berry, 2004: 177). A separation on geographical areas strategy was recommended and practiced when cultural distance between contingents was large or when the work of a

unit did not have an impact on the work of another. While analyzing cases of military cooperation Soeters & Szvircsev-Tresch (2010) observe that this “federation strategy” (p. 281) enable units to develop their own way of working, avoids the language or cohesion issues, though generating hard consequences on the mission due to lack of uniformity of responses in strategic and operational matters. The separation strategy proved to work out with good results in various situations of military cooperation, but it is an option less attractive for salient interpersonal and intergroup cultural processes.

Recently, vertical multinationality of forces was defined as small units trying to operate together under an integrated command structure, and soldiers of a nation led by an officer of a different nationality. Vertical multinationality offers two solutions for cultural issues: (1) assimilation or domination – the small sizes forces accept and adapt to the lead nation’s cultural settings, and (2) integration or cultural synergy which indicates the efforts toward the emergence of a new culture (Hofstede, 2001: 425-426; Adler, 2002: 125+). When ad-hoc coalitions with short notice are required to be deployed, one or few lead nation(s) are in charge to formulate the mission tactics, doctrine, organizational set-up and official(s) language and the others to adapt. According to Moelker, Soeters and vom Hagen (2003: 15), assimilation as strategy seems less viable, since, “most national armed forces [...] are proud of themselves” and soldiers become less inclined to renounce to their collective identity. Other limits to this strategy are listed by Soeters & Szvircsev-Tresch, (2010: 280) naming the created imbalance in power and status and the consequently hampered decision making process. Integration is the other strategy that can be found mostly in multinational headquarters. Soldiers of different nations live together and work by following the same defined working procedures. Complications arise here due to various problems identified in multinational cooperation, as mentioned in Chapter 1. However, when comparing with horizontal multinationality, vertical multinationality implies a greater degree of work interdependence. The strong influence of various factors, including here the national, organizational and sub-cultural settings explains the lack of advanced vertically integrated forces (Soeters & Manigart, 2008: 3).

The situations encountered in military cooperation are diverse: troops of different nationality in imbalanced proportion, small groups of soldiers (platoon of 25-30 soldiers) integrated in a bigger structure (battalion with more than 500 soldiers of other nations), structures of heterogeneous composition at various level of command. In similar cases, as Berry observed (Landis, Bennet & Bennet, 2000: 175), the contact experiences have much greater impact on the non-dominant group and its members, although as previously mentioned, to various degrees. Multi-culturally diverse teams have the advantage of permitting increased creativity, enhancing the effort to understand the others’ perspective, generating better decisions and a variety of solutions with one condition: only if members of the team are

culturally intelligent, sensitive and competent (Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006). The research of Earley and Mosakowski (2000) into multinational teams revealed the U-shape relation between national composition and performance. When compared, both the high and the low homogeneous teams outperform the teams with moderate heterogeneity. The former displayed the least amount of conflict and the most effective communication patterns, and succeed in achieving a high level of satisfaction, planning and cooperation. Having in their configuration two or three equal sized nations, the homogeneous groups favor “us-them” thinking and the separation and use of the former organizational national identity; almost an organizing principle and a good source of conflict and standard explanation for problems (Soderberg & Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2008).

O’Dea et al. (2006: 6) built a global model around four focus areas that can be identified in each coalition: organizational structure (the formal and informal structures that govern the organization of the force), work-style (the culture and climate with each national force), stance (attitudes toward force protection within a particular force), and level of integration (the level of awareness between coalition partners; how well they understand each other’s roles, functions, capabilities, responsibilities, approach and stance and how willing they are to collaborate to solve problems). According to this model, specific issues at integration level include: understanding the coalition partner(s), understanding the host nation’s culture, understanding “coalition” giving direction, information exchange, resources, rules of engagement, priorities, trust, understanding non-governmental organizations, roles and functions, capabilities, commander’s intent, understanding own and others’ responsibilities, and the willingness to share information and resources. In this model, as in the observations in Chapter 1, the main condition for understanding mission partners is good communications and foreign language proficiency. Trust in other nation’s soldiers’ capability to fight side by side (skills, technology, and desire) is a process that needs time and adjustment, since it is a basic ingredient for achieving cohesion. This is a goal difficult to achieve as acknowledged in soldiers’ narratives or in quantitative approaches of the trust (vom Hagen, 2003; Van Ruiten, 2006; Moelker, Soeters & vom Hagen, 2006).

The other major challenge from a social perspective is addressed to *leaders* in multinational military cooperation in order to build troops’ cohesion and commitment through good management of cultural differences. Multinational missions can bring situations where soldiers have superiors of different nationality and culture and have to cope with the fluctuant environment of a mission. By extending Hofstede’s quantitative work into the military and studying the power distance concept applied within different military cultures, Soeters and Recht (1998) concluded that there is a cultural variation in command styles. In this respect, Hofstede observed that business is developing from the cultures with low PDI in countries with high PDI but not the other way around, since the latter creates so much

dissatisfaction because of the high concentration of authority in one hand (Hofstede, 2005: 442). Vice versa, Hofstede and Peterson (2000) recommend prudence for managers coming from low power distance culture when working with high power culture subordinates because of “the potential tensions under surface of deferential behavior” (p. 406). The development in time of several clashes between cultures in military encounters (Soeters, Op den Bujs & Van Ruiten, 2006; Soeters, Tanerçan, Varoglu & Sigri, 2004) strengthened Hofstede’s conclusion and directed Yanakiev (Coopis & Szvircev Tresch, 2007: 210) to focus on leaders’ skills required in multinational military encounters. Chapter 1 and 2 describe the military leaders’ challenges connected to cultural differences, added to the new context of military missions. In this respect, we recall Elron, Ben-Ari and Shamir (1999) and Dallaire’s (2000) imperative that military leaders should receive cultural training in order to enhance their cross-cultural adaptation and performance when commanding international troops. After a strong awareness of cross-cultural differences, military leaders have to strive to unify different perspectives while keeping in mind the objectives of the mission and its unpredictable environment. In this respect, Soeters & Szvircev-Tresch (2010) speak about an *integrative leadership* capable of generating the conditions for cultural synergy to flourish by helping troops to adjust mutually, and by identifying “the strengths of each contributing nation’s working style, bring them together and rather combined into a (supranational) working style” (p. 282). Emphasis on the super-ordinate goals of the mission bridges differences, creates shared norms and reveals sharing experiences (Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir, 1999). These processes, the authors observe, are the most suitable, yet the most idealistic situation for international military cooperation. Until now, in organizations, management efforts were channeled toward the fostering of cultural unity by pressing a common identity, especially within military organizations as the cultural features recommend it. Some authors, such as Soederberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg (2007: 196), suggest this strategy is falling out of use: the challenge is rather to find an organizational identity solution which permits the coexistence of all identities using cultural synergy. In this vein,

*“When well-managed, diversity becomes an asset and a productive resource for the team. When ignored, diversity causes process problems that diminish the team’s productivity. Because diversity is more frequently ignored than managed, culturally diverse teams often perform below expectations and organizational norms.” (Adler, 2002: 148)*

Considering performance from a mission point of view, military psychology addressed the question of *soldiers’ motivation* in the classic context of the will to fight, the traditional military job. Today’s changed nature of military actions gives rise to the need to address soldiers’ will to keep the peace as a more appropriate motivation in a military organization still focused on performance and commitment (Jelusič, 2004: 58). Military multinational cooperation has a growing body of research on the topic of motivation; meanwhile, the question of soldiers’ motivation seems examined only marginally

as noted Biehl in 2008 (Aubry et al., 2008: 194). Comparing traditional motivations in combat, Batistelli (1997: 467) discovered new attitudes among soldiers joining complex military encounters and these generated a new taxonomy used in various researches: pre-modern (normative emphasis - to be useful to others, to strengthen one's country image at the international level), modern (instrumental or utilitarian commitments - earn some extra money, to learn things that could be useful for career later) and post-modern motivation (centered on the need to satisfy a desire for adventure, to have a meaningful experience). Motivation differs with the mission type and service status and mediates the relation with satisfaction with their mission. Later, Tomforde (2004) notes the dependency between the motivation type and the period of time a survey was conducted, which means soldiers are changing their motivation in order to keep themselves positive and focused on mission accomplishment.

Due to their complex implications, each assessment of the military cooperation designed to take place in integrated structures of actions should consider from a psycho-social perspective the study of cooperation between troops in the lights portrayed above.

### ***Cultural settings and expectations***

From Hofstede's perspective, Dutch culture offers the basis for social participation, because strict obedience is not a widespread virtue and people disagree with something they don't believe is right (Mole, 2001: 88). Soeters (2002) describes a century "Old Dutch approach" characterized by three C: consensus, consultation, and compromise and shows subordinates' involvement in the decision-making process and in organizational life. The Dutch management style is rather democratic-participative with informal accents (Mihuț, 2002: 187). From this point of view, anyone can make suggestions and everybody expects to be respectfully listened to (Mole, 2001: 87). Communication is open and transparent. Preference for direct relationships can be observed rather than written communication. For this reason "A direct approach can be perceived as aggressive to those coming from that kind of cultural environment in which the quality of an idea is linked rather to sender's identity" (Mole, 2001: 88).

"Dutch hierarchical systems are, in general, superficial and the boundaries, flexible" so they "are very often shocked by the hierarchical discrimination in other cultures. Hierarchical superiority is useful and necessary but the exercise of power is rather masked than strongly affirmed. The leader is "one of us", is the most important co-worker. In Dutch organizations relations among all the levels are usually open and full of tolerance." (Mole, 2001: 87). In this respect, the most important difference between Dutch and Romanian soldiers is the way people relate to the authority and hierarchy.

The Romanian communist experience developed at the social level an impossibility of freedom of expression and a centralized way of doing things, which contrasts with the Dutch way of consultation,

participation and decentralization. Hofstede (1991) shows that business that starts from low PDI countries succeed in high PDI countries, but never the other way around. This is because the members of high PDI cultures are not prepared to show a participative style of management. The counter-dependency<sup>139</sup> noticed in the Romanian case implied preferences for more consultative leadership styles and more openness for subordinates' involvement in decisions. From this point of view, horizontal bi-national cooperation is expected to be successful because the creativity and need for participation desired by the Romanians could be unblocked while working under Dutch command. Despite the fact that both military organizations are characterized by a relatively high PDI culture, their social background is different: for Dutch soldiers it is usual to be involved in the decision-making process. This should be kept in mind when Romanian commanders have Dutch subordinates because the Romanian commanders are not very used to involving subordinates in decision-making processes. The appointment of a Dutch liaison officer to Romanian detachment was a very good strategy for tempering the rank differences between the two armed forces. Moreover, considering the adoption of Mission Oriented Command as official philosophy within the Dutch Armed Forces (Vogelaar & Kramer, 2004), based on mutual trust and innovation, it would be possible that the Dutch leadership style would offer a new leadership perspective to the Romanian soldiers. Also, Hofstede and Peterson (2000) advise managers from low power distance cultures working with subordinates from high power distance cultures, to be aware that they can only exert influence on subordinates' attitudes and opinions, not on their values (p. 406).

The moderate value of uncertainty avoidance brings "the promotion of respect for the formal aspects (laws, norms, regulations, and bosses) and everybody knows what can do and what is allowed, but this does not become a barrier to relationships development based on strong principles" (Mihuț, 2002: 178-188). More than that, "the Dutch don't make rules just for their own sake. Respecting the rules becomes a personal credibility issue" (Mole, 2001: 86-87) and a challenge for Romanian soldiers.

In an informal discussion in 2002, one of the former Chiefs Of Staff of the Dutch Contingent at Banja-Luka observed with great accuracy:

*"The Commander of the Romanian Contingent needed a car. He came to me to ask if he could get it. In such cases our procedures solve the problem by using direct communication with the responsible sergeant and he will arrange the car and the drivers. Later, I found that was very difficult to him, as a colonel, to ask a sergeant for a car. In our army it is something natural for a senior officer to ask for a subordinate's help without giving the final order. There are situations in which information is not always entirely available or correct. In our military culture we say "Please wait, we will check and you will get the information". We are not afraid to say "Please, wait". We had situations in which somebody needed some information. It is very hard for Romanian or Bulgarian colleagues to work when they don't have all the answers and have to wait for a decision or correct information to take a decision."*

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<sup>139</sup> Current autocratic leadership style was clearly rejected when cadets were asked specific questions about the desired leadership style



The different way of approaching risk and the need for rules in the Romanian culture can reduce the speed of the decision-making process. While Dutch soldiers adapt themselves more easily to unknown and uncertain situations, Romanian soldiers can have problems in this respect. Relatively high Romanian UAI shows soldiers' propensity for rules and procedures in dealing with uncertain situations. The discrepancy between what people say and what they do which characterizes the Romanian culture can generate in critical moments, information hiding and disrespect for procedures. A great difference is seen with regard to the uncertainty avoidance dimension of the two military cultures. The ways soldiers from Romanian and Dutch militaries cope with risk, unknown and uncertain situations and change are likely to be different, and these differences can have undesired consequences for their cooperation. With respect to this dimension, Hofstede and Petterson (2000) suggest to managers working with high avoiding uncertainty cultures "to consider carefully the specifics of not only nationally shared laws but especially unwritten codes, heroic examples, and religious values shaping behavior" (p. 409).

The military cultures are described by similar values in terms of individualism, and this similarity is expected to reduce the cultural distance and, if used as a common ground, to create a premise for good cooperation. Collectivist cultures are more powerful with regard to the in-group loyalty, and that can create difficulties in cooperating with members of other groups. At the same time, it should be necessary for the leadership to develop a common team spirit within the combined structure. This is no surprise, since the result was connected to what Soeters (2000) concluded: military organizations at peace are bureaucracy par excellence, with strong hierarchies compared to civilian organizations.

The identified differences of the MAS dimension can have a powerful impact, especially when it is about such a profession as the military defined and practiced at the beginning by men. The historical and social influences makes that the Dutch military culture to offer more space for the manifestation of equality and tolerance than within the Romanian military in jobs considered "not suitable for women". However, the values that characterize both organizations could make us think that, in respect of tolerance and mutual acceptance, there won't be any problems in a bi-national cooperation situation.

The two military cultures also differ in the way members define discipline and relate themselves to disciplinary rules. While Dutch soldiers pay less attention to the formal discipline rules and are more oriented toward self-discipline (Soeters, 1997), the Romanian military socializes its soldiers according to a formal discipline which underlies the value accorded to outward appearance, as resulted from diagnosis. The formal discipline shown by the Romanian soldiers, who stand up when a superior enters the room and communicate with a superior only in a formal tone, could surprise their Dutch counterparts. Dutch leaders are expected to reduce tension through a more informal and friendly attitude, a challenge for the Romanians, who must re-define their vertical relations.

The small Romanian group was designed to be part of the mixed platoon, led by a Romanian captain and his second in command, a Dutch lieutenant. This platoon was incorporated in the Dutch battalion structure, so Romanians were outnumbered by their Dutch fellows. In these conditions it is useful to see how the cooperation really worked out since almost everytime, the adaptation in bi-national structures tends to be unidirectional, as noticed by Soeters (2000). For a better understanding of the situation, it is worth mentioning the double subordination of the Romanian soldiers. Although they are under the Dutch operational subordination, from the administrative point of view they are under Romanian command. This element is important because, in this context, the cooperation can create confusion and coordination difficulties (Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir, 1999), especially when combined with the high power concentration specific to Romanian military culture.

### ***Research design***

From these theoretical insights the study of both acculturation and motivation in multinational encounters requires researcher's presence in the field, at least for short stages, and direct contact with the participants. This observation is sustained especially in the recent works of Soeters and Manigart (2008) or Aubry et al. (2008). In their research, authors describe the important topics mainly using qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews and participatory observation) in the ethnographic type of research, or case studies which assess performance during military action. Both time constraints and fuzziness of the environment make quantitative approaches less appealing in the field, while in-headquarters such research design or even combined ones are easier to develop (Moelker et al., 2007).

Since in the Romanian Armed Forces, the presence of sociologists in the field was neither legally permitted by military regulations nor fitting with the military thinking at the time of the request<sup>140</sup>, the study was constrained to a post-mission analysis. During my stay at the Dutch Royal Military Academy in Breda in 2002 I had the chance to talk to Dutch officers who had been deployed with Romanian troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of them had worked together with Romanian officers while others observed and connected with Romanian troops during their off-duty hours. Their stories and open attitude inspired me to focus on the more peaceful, close-to-home environment offered by this cooperation.

Generally, the Romanian platoon was formed by soldiers belonging to different units and for this reason I decided to investigate those subjects working together in a few units, during the summer of 2004. Toward the end of this part of the study, in May 2005 another contingent returned home after a six-month

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<sup>140</sup> In 2004 the Chief of the General Staff, General Bădălan Eugen, explicitly refused my personal request for a short stage deployment in theatre of operations for a short research stage with the troops. In the same year, the Romanian MoD approved and supported the show of Romanian musical band Amadeus in Afganistan

tour in Bosnia. A few soldiers were willing to become respondents. In the Netherlands, a compact battalion was deployed, while, after the mission, many soldiers either changed their unit or they left the military due to high organizational mobility. This helped to decide the focus of the research part on the Dutch soldiers from the unit I visited in 2005. In total, 36 soldiers of both nations were interviewed, in two stages: 27 Romanians (4 officers, 24 enlisted) in July 2004 and May 2005 in Romania, and 9 Dutch respondents (2 officers, 6 enlisted) in August/September 2005, in the Netherlands. In order to maintain anonymity the respondents' name was coded according to their participation order: D1, D2, etc. for the Dutch respondents and R1, R2, etc. for the Romanian respondents.

Although I emphasized that all their answers and comments were confidential, the presence of the tape-recorder during the interviews with Romanian military personnel, made some participants change their verbal and non-verbal behavior. Rather indirectly, they admitted mistrust of having their answers recorded. For this reason I regretted my lack of stenographic skills, or at least a partner able to help me. Other respondents spoke too fast or inaudible to allow the transcription, while others told me straight: "Watch what you say. You never know what's going to hit you". This is a saying in the Romanian military as a reflex of communist times. For these reasons 7 semi-structured interviews with Romanian soldiers were eliminated from the analysis. Nothing alike occurred with Dutch soldiers, whose openness and desire to cooperate were expected and proved to be normal. The interviews followed a structured list of topics related to mission it self (motivation, preparation and feedback, leadership and integration conditions), interactions with Dutch/Romanian soldiers and perceived cultural differences. Each participant was given the required privacy for the interview of 35 minutes in Romania and Netherlands.

Soldiers were asked to complete a questionnaire on leadership issues and auto- and xeno-images (in average, 10 minutes) and In the Netherlands I was able to arrange a short meeting with each soldier, individually in their private space of the office. One Dutch soldier missed the quantitative inquiry.

	<b>Qualitative semi-structured interviews</b>	<b>Quantitative inquiry</b>
<b>Romanian</b> soldiers R1, R2, R3 etc.	21 respondents (4 officers, 17 enlisted soldiers)	27 respondents (4 officers, 24 enlisted)
<b>Dutch</b> soldiers D1, D2, D 3 etc.	9 respondents (2 officers, 7 enlisted)	8 respondents (2 officers, 6 enlisted one missing)

**Table 54** Demographical data about participants in the study about Dutch and Romanian cooperation in Bosnia

Secondly, the general Dutch Armed Forces interest in sociological research to improve international military cooperation became the main window open for conceiving a deployment stage, with troops in the Netherlands. Since the first interactions between Romanian and Dutch soldiers took place here, the acculturation process and perceived cultural differences gave the opportunity to be analyzed. The Romanian Armed Forces Chief of Staff favored this approach and agreed to my presence among the troops for in the Netherlands for 2005. In September 2005, I immersed as a participant observer of the

Romanian-Dutch detachment before its deployment as part of European Force 3. The one-month pre-deployment training period at a military base in The Netherlands had two periods. In the first two weeks troops were separated and had specific training while the last weeks brought them together with unified mixed command in order to start the mission preparation. Accordingly, I tailored the participant observations for two phases: (1) accommodation with the troops and the following of their training program and (2) the final pre-deployment exercise, each of them during one week.

## **Findings**

### ***2004 and 2005: post-mission interviews***

#### **Motivations for the mission**

Although they have one of the lowest rates of pay of all NATO countries, the increased income, in international currency for multinational missions is an attractive incentive for Romanian soldiers. Their earnings during the mission increase their personal and family standard of living at home (e.g. buying a car or an apartment, renovating their apartment, investing in their children's future). The Dutch soldiers, who, unlike their Romanian counterparts, participated to the mission because it was ordered, connected the motivation for the mission more often with a sense of duty: it is their job. "Bosnia is a more secure and stable environment, I was curious about the role of the soldiers in a stable environment" (officer, D2). The decrease of the mission's risk was a reality perceived as positive for the home front.

#### **Mission preparation**

The Netherlands pre-deployment training was focused on diverse and pragmatic issues connected to "what is happening in the mission", appreciated by Romanian veteran soldiers<sup>141</sup>. Physical and driving training and tests, shooting and rescue exercises, stress and trauma lessons, mine awareness and chemical attack simulation were completed in two weeks. Especially, due to the Dutch soldiers' feedback, in time, cultural lessons about the two countries became part of the training. All soldiers of both nations positively evaluated the pre-deployment training received in the Netherlands that offered the necessary basis of pre-mission bonding and better mutual understanding. Romanian soldiers considered their home training rather obsolete – with too much emphasis on rules and home country regulations. Instead, they prized the two-week intensive English language course introduced in their home-preparation module, to enhance

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<sup>141</sup> Due to the short tour (six months), and recruitment open to all potential candidates around the country, we could find soldiers in the Romanian detachment who participated in missions two or three times. These soldiers became *veterans* of the mission

their language proficiency. The one-week joint presence of the troops in the field during the contingents' rotation period was considered extremely important for the adaptation of the new contingent and success of their mission.

### **Leadership and organizational issues**

Romanian soldiers evaluated the Romanian's commander leadership style from home units as authoritarian-paternalistic, and it was easy for them to observe the different Dutch system. "They (the Dutch) can contradict very easily. In our case there may be some commanders who do not accept to discuss with subordinates" (officer, R16). In this period of profound changes undergone by the Romanian military, its members perceive a positive trend: "Something from this democratic spirit is tried in Romania as well..." (enlisted, R13). Romanian soldiers acknowledged the differences in terms of respect-disrespect, normal-abnormal and old-new: "With them (the Dutch) it is possible to discuss like human beings. You respect the rank but the boss listens to you and certainly does not say <Don't bother me...>" (enlisted, R5). "They (Romanian commanders) still have a communist mentality, especially the high-ranking ones, when they talk to you." (enlisted, R7). "In Romania, you knock at the door, but you're afraid...are you going to be sent out? With the Dutch commander it was not like that. No matter what problem I had." (enlisted, R2). "The leader-follower interaction in the Netherlands is totally different. People speak openly with a commander. You are asked about your opinion and the commander takes it into account. Everything is normal." (enlisted, R3). And the effects are visible: "The Dutch soldiers respect their commanders who behave like simple persons. They respect each other, and the soldiers salute not from obligation. In Romania, you salute and after a few paces you make grimaces." (enlisted, R15). The military saying "The order is executed not discussed" gives a certain impression of what (in)subordination means in the Romanian perspective. "I wouldn't call it insubordination, if the commander gives an order and people discuss it" concluded one of the Dutch soldiers (enlisted, D9). "We, the Dutch are not taking authority for what it is: people have to gain trust not because of the rank. In the Romanian group, if one had a higher rank, then he always had the authority without question. And the Dutch are always questioning", observed another (officer, D1).

The observations went deeper to the level of tone differences in communication portrayed by both sides. "Their discussions are friendlier (about the Dutch soldiers)" (enlisted, R7). "They talk normally with each other. In our case, it is authoritarian" (enlisted, R3). The tone differences were noticed also by one of the Dutch soldiers who said, "They (Romanians) are more explosive when talking with each other, we are calmer" (enlisted, D6).

When comparing the leadership within the two military organizations, soldiers observed clear differences: "If they (the Dutch) saw that you were confused, they would explain again. For Romanians,

the order cannot be discussed. There are many times when you don't know something and you are not always understood" (enlisted, R6). The Dutch soldiers' way is to ask "Why?" just because "*Information means communication*" (enlisted, D7). But there is no ideal way for subordinate behavior. Sometimes it is good to ask, but other times, in critical situations, there is not too much room for questioning and it is better just to execute. "I cannot say that the Dutch system is good. When I tell a soldier to do something, the Dutch ones ask 'Why? Why?' and the Romanians just obey without questioning. Sometimes that is good, but sometimes not...." (enlisted, D3).

Dutch commanders of the mission, both SFOR and EUFOR, noticed the high power distance characterizing Romanian military culture. "There is a strong hierarchy in decision making. Romanian officers were very capable, but the links with Bucharest were too strong. During the mission, the Romanian commander had very little room for maneuver. He was very hesitant in making decisions without calling Bucharest" (officer, D1). They also described the strong Romanian military formal hierarchy in terms of:

- Fear of repercussions: "If they (Romanians) had the feeling of a potential contradiction with a higher-ranking person, they would usually stop the action or discussion. If I (Dutch) didn't agree with the Minister of Defense, I would call my general telling him about a wrong decision" (officer, D2)
- Formal behavior: "It took them a lot of time to say 'Hey ... (commander's first name), do you have some time for me?'" (officer, D2).
- Lack of communication between commanders and followers: "I meet the Romanian soldiers after two-three weeks. I told them jokes and discussed things with them. They didn't expect a commander to talk with the soldiers" (officer, D2). "When a lieutenant-colonel walks among soldiers doing their jobs, the Dutch soldiers just say 'Good morning!', continue to do their job, and, if questioned, they answer. Romanian soldiers were a little bit paralyzed: 'Hey, there is a lieutenant-colonel walking around!'" (officer, D1).

The Dutch also noticed the need for permanent guidance of the Romanians, explainable by the dependency created by living with a highly centralized style of decision making. "When a problem appears, the first thing a Romanian does is to call his boss and ask 'What are we to do now?'. I try to solve the problem and then I tell my boss about it" (enlisted, D3). "Romanians are more disciplined. They comply easily" (enlisted, D5). "In a carriage with frogs, the Dutch ones will jump off and you have to take care of them; but not the Romanian ones. They will stay in the place you put them" (officer, D1).

The differences in command styles were connected also to the meaning of respect although this rarely caused friction. Romanian NCOs' expected more "respect" from lower ranks than the Dutch. "We

have respect toward an older or higher ranking person but they don't bother with that..." noted a Romanian soldier. "The rank is great, but hey, we are here to solve the problem, to do the task!" was the contrasting view of a Dutch soldier.

The death of a Romanian soldier's father was a situation which emphasized different human resources philosophies when people issues are addressed: "The Dutch way is to bring the soldier home. First, a colleague has a problem, and second, his mind is at home, and he could endanger his colleagues if he did not attend the funeral" (officer, D1). For Romanian soldiers, there was no room to return home before the end of the six-month mission, except in case of injury, death or the two-week holiday. Issues other than these were labeled rather as "personal" and the specific organizational response from home leadership was to step back and let the individual find a solution alone without breaching military regulations.

Differences in organizational job descriptions were observed by both parts. Also, the Dutch soldiers were astonished by the age of their Romanian colleagues who were doing the same job for a long time. A Dutch enlisted soldier was very explicit:

*"NCOs in my army receive a lot of responsibilities; I knew from the Russian army that a NCO is like a soldier plus and the officer decides. But if you kill the officer the platoon is lost...I was surprised that a simple truck driver was a NCO. And not the lowest NCO rank but higher. That would be impossible in our army. No. We have the soldiers or corporals who do the driving. And the NCOs are trained to do something else. We are more leaders. You stay in the Army for 25 years and you are still a truck driver?!? I have not one, but 27 vehicles and 27 people so I have a lot of tasks."*

### **The ideal versus actual commander**


The Dutch soldiers were aware that in their cooperation with the Romanians "the command was very important and the key player is the commander of the platoon" (enlisted, D3). For this reason soldiers were asked to rate the most important five<sup>142</sup> qualities for an ideal commander of a multinational structure from a list. Next, using the same list of qualities both nations' soldiers were asked to describe the way they perceived the Romanian and Dutch commanders<sup>143</sup>. Following figures reflect these compared profiles in order to grasp a better understanding of the dynamics of leadership.

The qualities rated as important for the ideal type commander of a multinational unit were relatively similar for Romanian and Dutch soldiers (see **Figure 24** and **Figure 25** below), with two exceptions, empathy and charisma. But these concepts were perhaps misunderstood by the Romanian soldiers because during the later interviews two subjects asked about the meaning of these concepts. "Trusting subordinates" was the most frequently rated common feature for both nations' soldiers.


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<sup>142</sup> In this respect, COMIDEAL RO are the answers of Romanian soldiers and COMIDEAL NL those given by the Dutch soldiers


<sup>143</sup> In this respect, ROCOM RO reflects the Romanian soldiers' and ROCOM NL the Dutch soldiers' opinions about Romanian commander. NLCOM RO represent the Romanian soldiers' and NLCOM NL the Dutch soldiers' opinion about the Dutch commander



**Figure 23** Romanian soldiers' comparative profiles: the ideal commander (ROCOM IDEAL), the Romanian (ROCOMRO) and the Dutch (ROCOM NL) commanders (N=27)



**Figure 24** Dutch soldiers' comparative profiles: the ideal commander (NLCOM IDEAL), the Romanian (NLCOM NL) and the Dutch (NLCOM RO) commanders (N=8)



**Figure 25** The profiles of the ideal commander in the both nation soldiers' representations: Romanian (ROCOM IDEAL) and Dutch (NLCOM IDEAL) (N=35)

Another common social representation could enhance the premises for a good cooperation. Dutch soldiers noticed a low level of tolerance and trust in subordinates by the Romanian commanders. Both



Romanian and Dutch soldiers desired a less controlling and more open-minded commander. However, one Romanian participant concluded that in a multinational context the national command style is considered totally inappropriate and the HR recruiters should “realize that if a commander says ‘I decided, good or bad doesn’t matter, this is it!’ this surely has a different significance in an international context. In Romania such a commander is commended, but is not fit to be sent abroad. It is outmost important for a commander to be a person with knowledge of a lot of areas (e.g. culture) and to be an open minded and diplomatic person” (officer, R10).

### **Stereotyping: about “Them and Us”**


Soldiers were asked about what they liked and did not like about themselves and others. One of the Romanian soldiers expressed the essence of the social categorization process in terms of the national group: “There (in a multinational structure), you do not represent your own individuality but a country. Nobody says this person did something, rather one speaks about “Romania or the Romanian(s)” (enlisted, R1). Certainly this approach becomes an additional load on soldiers’ overall performance when cooperating with others in a multinational environment.

Romanian soldiers pointed out some features of the Dutch soldiers’ way of being: correct behavior, desire to cooperate, initiative, their lifestyle, but they also identified an attitude of superiority, different food, and a frequent mistake in not differentiating the Romanians from other nationalities in former communist Europe. At the same time, Romanians were proud of their Latin-temperamental spirit, sociability, professionalism and their own national group cohesion, although the group was formed only one month before the pre-deployment training from personnel from different units from ROAF. They disliked their easy tendency toward submissive behavior and the communist mentality. Dutch soldiers perceived the Romanians as being friendly, open, polite, industrious, trying to solve problems and to do their best, always with the smile on their faces. They were pleasantly surprised by the Romanians’ determination to learn Dutch words”.

As expected, it was not very comfortable for the Dutch leadership to work directly with people from high power distance and high contextual culture when to solve a problem: “They came to us with an issue, but it took some time until pointing out the exact problem. We realized that if we have had been too direct, it could have sounded like an insult” (officer, D1). The Dutch soldiers perceived relatively negatively the different level of individualism between them and their Romanian colleagues. “Sometimes, Romanians hardly understood that we (Dutch) needed our privacy and they wanted to do different things together” (enlisted, D3). The Dutch soldiers appreciated their membership of the same home unit with prior experiences and the friendships which facilitated the communication, sharing of impressions and in-

group relationships. These were the reasons why the Romanian detachment was not perceived as a real group.



Subjects were asked to rate from 1 to 10 different features which apply or not to their national group and to the other. Clearly, the differences between national pair-images (each nation's auto- and xeno-images compared) are less different in magnitude comparing to mirror-images (each nation's auto-image compared with the other nation's xeno-image). Generally, after a six-month common experience, each nation pair-image is unique in shape and has a uniform variation, as shown in **Figure 26**. This implies that people see the other group members' as similar to them, rather than different. However, the Dutch pair-image suggests that Dutch soldiers describe themselves in a more modest manner than they perceived Romanian soldiers a bit more different than Romanians in their pair-image.



**Figure 26** Pair-images: each nation's auto- and xeno-images. How do I see myself and how I do see others? (N=35)

Encapsulated in a majority Dutch structure, the Romanians perceived themselves in positive terms and it looks like the Dutch endorsed the positive perceptions about Romanians (in their pair-image), at least for the features investigated. This was a very important input for the cooperation and for the institutional memory of the cooperation, different from Gareis's et al. (2003: 78) result after studying a

difficult cooperation: “each nationality tended to consider itself in a more positive way than was perceived by the others”. Worth mentioning is Dutch soldiers’ image of less independent behavior of Romanian colleagues, congruent with the cultural settings described earlier on Romanian high power distance culture and perceptions of people coming from low power distance cultures, like the Netherlands.



**Figure 27** Mirror-images: a nation auto-images and other nation xeno-image. How do I see myself and how do others see me? (N=35)

Next, in both nations’ mirror-images (about Dutch and Romanians, see **Figure 27** above), Romanian soldiers’ images are stronger than the Dutchs’ mirror-images. The image Romanians have about themselves was not endorsed by the Dutchs’ mirror, while Romanian mirror intensified Dutch qualities. The exception deserving attention is about Romanian soldiers perceiving Dutch soldiers less sociable. “They are always with the group”, observed a Dutch soldier (enlisted, D5). This observation has to be carefully analyzed in the terms of the specific situation: Romanians were trying to build cohesion because they were recruited from different units and they needed to become a group in order to accomplish the mission. In all this time Dutch soldiers were deployed from the same structure and were

part of an already cohesive group. Moreover, there was another factor with implications on the ingroup-outgroup dynamics that will be addressed in the next session: communication.

### **Communication**

From their answers during the interviews, I concluded that soldiers acknowledged the importance of communication in the integration process and understood its influence on the mission. “When groups need to work together, a lot of time is necessary to integrate them. Maybe, a lot of the integration difficulties are linked with communication or the lack of it. If you are afraid to speak English and to make mistakes, you will never succeed in communicating. *Everything comes and goes with communication. Language is so important.*” (enlisted, D8). “Sometimes, we were unable to understand each other, we had communication problems. The ones who were in mission for the first time didn’t speak English. That’s why they (Romanians) stayed all together, separated from us. Later on, we were able to cooperate with each other and the interaction was very good during the last part of the mission” (enlisted, D9).

These communication problems were mostly identified at the beginning of the cooperation. To reduce and avoid problems related to the lack of English knowledge, the Dutch command decided to hire a translator and adopted a strategy of “simple words use” (enlisted, D4). During the last missions (EUFOR1, EUFOR2), the Dutch line of commanders observed that the Romanian soldiers’ English proficiency increased, especially for some NCOs. This happened due to the introduction of the English language course in Romanian’s soldier’s pre-deployment training.

Communication problems were observed also among the Dutch contingents. “The commander was very good in English. But a lot of us (Dutch), including myself, were not. There are a lot of Dutch soldiers who think they speak English or German, but this is not true.” (enlisted, D3). “My English is not good, and Romanians’ proficiency was not good either.” (enlisted, D7).

The fact that the “Dutch and Romanian soldiers learned some words from each others language” (officer, D1) was an element that gave strength to the cooperation in the perceptions of the Dutch soldiers. Soldiers of both nations described this kind of open atmosphere which could be created by people’s readiness to learn words and expressions in each other’s language. Romanian and Dutch soldiers worked together and spent their leisure time mostly together. In fact, during one of my interviews, I was corrected by a Dutch commander: “We didn’t work together all day long, in fact we lived together”. This was the spirit of most of the experiences – birthday celebrations, parties, and ceremonies - when “they (Dutch) tried to include us (Romanians) also” (enlisted, R11).

During every deployment, the Dutch and Romanian soldiers had common symbols: a bee, an ant or something made by taking “a little from them, a little from us.” (enlisted, R15). The command group organized a contest in SFOR16 for a common flag, as a few Romanian soldiers remembered. This striving

for a common identity in a temporary mission is a mechanism used by an intercultural competent leadership in helping troops' integration (Elron, Shamir & Ben Ari, 1999: 89-90).

The identification of sensitive topics and taboos can reduce the potential barriers in the communication process and facilitate cooperation (vom Hagen, Moelker & Soeters, 2008). Romanian soldiers noticed the Dutch soldiers' open way of discussing things, especially after the language barrier was surpassed. The Dutch soldiers perceived as sensitive topics for Romanians: money, pensions and their communist-past experiences. Then "a lot of them confused us with the Bulgarians, which was a big mistake. In time they realized that", a Romanian soldier told me. For the Dutch soldiers it seemed that Srebrenica and the confusion of the Dutch language with German were sensitive matters. Anyway, both Romanian and Dutch soldiers alike were rather hesitant to talk to me about other sensitive issues. "It is not up to me to talk about it", concluded a Dutch soldier when he spoke about the Dutch command's decision to send the Romanian platoon commander to Sarajevo. "Previous experiences between Dutch and Romanians weren't so good. A platoon commander was removed. You could see that people already had an impression. They were reserved at the beginning. They tried to ignore the past and to work together until cooperation was better." (enlisted, D8). Later, in an informal discussion, a Romanian soldier, who I was about to meet under different circumstances in Romania, gave me the clue about this collision in the hierarchy issue: "For him (the Romanian platoon commander) it was difficult to accept reporting to a Dutch lower rank. Something like that is unacceptable in Romania".

Some Romanians were surprised by the "more equal" treatment applied to Dutch military women by their male peers: "It is not allowed to help her to carry her vest or rucksack. It was considered that she is as well prepared a soldier as everyone else" (enlisted, R2) or "They (males) treat them (females) like they were men" (enlisted, R18). Lacking female colleagues in similar roles in home military culture, the gender identity, instead of the professional one, shaped Romanian soldiers' reaction.

### **The feedback about the mission**

Some soldiers mentioned that "The mission itself is easy" especially when compared to other in Iraq or Afghanistan. Generally during the mission the information came almost at the right time, enough to have people and cars ready for mission. However, there were differences in perceptions from mission to mission. "In the case of routine tasks the speed was perfect; with new tasks, it took longer to cross all the lines toward Romanian soldiers. The Romanian command general principle in Bugojno was to get in touch first with Sarajevo and after that with Bucharest. The Dutch command called The Hague directly", observed a respondent (officer, D1). For this reason, sometimes communication with the Romanian line of command was slow, and this affected the Romanian detachment's image, as a Romanian officer

observed. Communication with families was a rather Romanian issue, due to the high costs of a mobile phone, and was solved by the introduction of a specific military communication line.

The Romanian soldiers found room for the open expression of their ideas and their impact on organizational life: “It is better to let the subordinate express his/her point of view and to see what his /her ideas really are” (enlisted, R13). “They (the Dutch) are very flexible. They were very happy about any initiative, even if not all of them were successful. They were happy that you were not apathetic, and amorphous. Initiatives can really improve the climate at work” (officer, R10). The Romanian commanders and some soldiers provided positive feedback about the open climate for initiative and communication created by Dutch command line.

The strong points of cooperation in the Romanian perception were the Dutch equipment and management, and the Romanian hard work. “They are very good organizers and have good equipment, and we are skillful technicians” (enlisted, R13). Having a larger area of specialization when compared to their Dutch colleagues, the Romanians succeeded in solving problems when the equipment broke down. Rather than call the Dutch maintenance team to solve a “10 minute problem”, they preferred to intervene. “It was not our job, but we fixed the minor problems when necessary and the Dutch leadership appreciated that” (enlisted, R14).

Regarding the Romanians’ proposals for better cooperation, a skeptical attitude came up: “I have no authority to say anything about this. Here (in Romania) this is the way: who has the right to make proposals? The commanders and the chiefs have” (enlisted, R14). I also had to encourage Romanian soldiers to answer the questions and they recommended the improvement of English proficiency for lower ranks, some changes in the home pre-deployment phase and lessons about the life style and cultural differences, “with good and bad sides...” (enlisted, R3). The mission should not be a place for inferiority feelings: “You simply cannot withdraw from daily interactions only because you are poorer or because your English is not so brilliant” (officer, R10). If soldiers’ selection would be from the same home-unit, concluded a few Romanians, it would become easier to focus on the mission instead of on group cohesion building. During the interviews, it became clear that nobody had explained to the Romanians soldiers the necessity of double physical abilities testing, in Romania and in the Netherlands.

The positive feedback on cooperation was reinforced by a Dutch commander: “It was a very nice cooperation with my two Romanians and Bulgarians. It cost me a lot of emotion to say ‘Good bye!’ to them. [...] When I left Bosnia, my both Romanian and Bulgarian officers came to the air base, and it was really emotional. They really meant it when they said: ‘We never had a commander like you... (officer, D2). It is also noteworthy that during the two-week rotation period in Bosnia, a commander heard his

predecessor talking about “my Romanians”. Treating the people from both nations similarly “like it was his unit” (enlisted, D1) showed a maximum point of integration in the bi-national structure.

For the Dutch, the strength of the cooperation between the Dutch and Romanians came from soldiers’ openness to others cultures, their desire to work together and enjoy the same work – the driving. The weakest point of cooperation was communication. “Communication is the biggest struggle for Dutch and Romanians” (enlisted, D6). Accordingly, as in any type of peace support mission in which “talking is [...] more important than shooting” (Van Dijk & Soeters, 2008: 304) the major proposal for a better cooperation was the improvement of soldiers’ English skills.

What should the Dutch know before interacting with Romanians? “They are nice people to work with.”(enlisted, D5). The need for cultural information about their future colleagues appeared regularly in Dutch soldiers’ interviews. “A lot of Dutch people still think Eastern European people are not educated. That’s why cultural lessons about them would be very good in order for people to see that we have a lot in common” (enlisted, D4). “I thought that Romanians and Bulgarians are alike, but they are not. I understood that only after I met them” (enlisted, D8).

What should Romanians know before interacting with the Dutch? They should know more about “our culture, our country, our army” (enlisted, D7), but especially about the differences between the military systems, on “how the Dutch Army works” (enlisted, D6). In this context, the introduction of the cultural training in the common pre-deployment stage in the Netherlands, with lessons about both nations and people was a successful tool for the improvement of cooperation. “It is important to work together before the mission, to have interactions at least one or two days, not only during the final exercise” was a proposal from another Dutch soldier.

All in all, soldiers expressed, generally, good and very good opinions about their cooperation “with the guys” in Bosnia. The answer to the question about a next mission together can be considered a good premise for future cooperation. During the interview, one of the Dutch soldiers was preparing to join Dutch troops in EUFOR3, again. Talking about his expectations, he said: “Good cooperation. One platoon - one mission.” (enlisted, D7). It is more than a simply military courtesy attitude that can be inferred, after analyzing all the findings.

## ***2005 - Joining the troops***

### **Spionita**<sup>144</sup>

In 2005 during my post-mission assessment stage, the Romanian soldiers were informed by the Sociology Department's management subordinated to the Chief of Staff of ROAF, and all the units' leaders knew about my study. Myself, I made calls to all units to prepare the ground and to help me with my stay. Instead, when I received the official approval to do the research with EUFOR 3, I was already in the Netherlands doing my stage at the National Defense Academy so I couldn't get directly in touch with the Romanian troops before their pre-deployment training started. Although I had all the formal approvals, nobody from Romania had considered it necessary to inform the troops, or at least their commanders, about my intentions in the Netherlands. This created the opportunity for the Romanian soldiers to question my identity and intentions in the Netherlands from the very beginning and jeopardized all my efforts to do the research, although I was constantly open and answered all their questions about me and my work.

After I sensed a lack of desire to cooperate, I asked the Romanian soldiers about this. "We were not informed about your coming so we supposed that you belong to the intelligence structure", answered one of the Romanian veteran soldiers. Once this rumor spread within the group, everything became like a social-psychology lesson: once the label was accepted by the group, change was impossible. No rational argument could clarify the situation, because "Qui s'excuse, s'accuse" was the reaction from one of the soldiers. It did not matter that I spoke openly about my research and my personal efforts to accomplish it. I was labeled as "the spy". But the hardest things for me was to cope, day by day, with all kind of false but self-fulfilling prophecies (e.g. I was nice just because I tried to gain people's trust and only a spy acts like that) and suspicion. It seemed that in soldiers' opinions I "asked too much about the armed forces" and in their thinking such people who ask questions could only be spies. It did not matter that my questions were the same as the interviews taped before, and a few soldiers were subjects already in May 2005. "Be careful what you say, you never know..." answered again another young Romanian soldier from EUFOR 3. I realized that sociologists are still labeled as "dangerous for the system". I didn't have too much to do in the two short stages, so I decided that it was worth at least to stay and explain more about sociology and its methods.

During this experience, it was important for me to discover a new role, as a researcher immersed in a military group, but I am sure it was also difficult for the soldiers to have someone different around

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<sup>144</sup> *Spionita* is a pejorative Romanian term for a more or less imaginary sickness of people who always suspect there are spies around. No doubt, this is the consequence of social history, transmitted in time in the form of this expression.



them during the preparation stage, when they had to learn and to discover their own role, in a new mission and new environment. While I needed from them an effort to accept my presence to do the research, they were not ready to do it. In this context, I decided to suspend interviews with the Romanian soldiers. In the first days I took notes during the day in a pocket notebook. Because of its red covers, my notebook also became the subject of jokes: the red booklet is a reminder of communist times; I decided to take notes only in the evenings to avoid more comments on this matter.

The situation was different with the Dutch soldiers. I explained my situation to the Dutch company commander and asked him to help me. Next day in the morning I was officially introduced to all soldiers at the morning meeting and I informed them about my research. As consequence of their different social and cultural background, the Dutch soldiers expressed their opinion openly and straightforwardly. Instead, for Romanians, it was too late: my situation fitted too well to their social image of a spy. I could join all the preparation stages with the Romanian platoon, due to the agreement of the Dutch command, experiencing my first weapon firing session with real ammunition (Dutch and Romanian too) and the first driving lesson in a military vehicle.



**Photo 4** Dealing with soldiering – a personal experience

As a novice among the troops, I was interested in my own outward appearance to the soldiers. The Dutch soldiers' answers were grouped in a "civilian-doesn't matter" cluster. "It is a two way of doing things here" a Dutch soldier advised me: "If you are doing interviews and you are interested in personal things, people are more relaxed with civilian clothes. But if you want to see how we are working as the military, better to be part of the group; from the inside you see better how things are done within the group".

The Romanian soldiers' opinions on this topic were balanced between military and civilian clothing. Soldiers whose choice "to wear uniform" was justified in different ways: from "not to focus people's attention", "it gives you the impression that the sociologist is one of us, at least for the moment" or to a clear and straight: "She is working for the armed forces. She should wear a uniform". The older

soldiers, the key players in the Romanian platoon, rather subscribed to this point of view. Since in the ROAF a civilian is not permitted to wear military uniform, even without insignia, as in other armed forces, I decided to try, at least, to ask for a Dutch uniform. This was for me another example of Dutch organizational flexibility. I received the temporary right to wear a civilian uniform specific to transport units, in the second part of my stage, during the simulation.



**Photo 5** Wearing a Dutch civilian land forces uniform with flags of both nations

### **Observing the troops**

The Romanian platoon comprised volunteers as well as professional soldiers – officers and NCO's. In order to ensure a proper communication, in case of need, a Romanian female soldier with medical training and previous experience in international military field was included in the platoon and deployed in order to prepare for the mission. As a personal protection measure to cope with an overwhelming masculine presence she preferred to stay away from soldiers' daily interactions almost all the time. "If you mix with pigs, they can eat you"; as she expressed her belief when I asked her about her distance and lack of socialization. Some of the soldiers thought she was under the protection of the detachment leadership. However, on one of the first days of the stage she celebrated her birthday. Male colleagues found small gestures to greet her, starting with the formal announcement at the morning report, to the informal attitude of congratulation during the small gathering at the company's bar in the evening.

During the first two weeks, the direct interactions between soldiers were limited to the morning meetings and few common activities like a soccer game, the common driving course and the driving course graduation party. For Romanian soldiers it was a good way to know each other better since they came from several different units. Inside the canteen the Romanian soldiers had a special spot arranged with care and taste in their national colors, a gesture that created a pleasant feeling among the visitors. The Dutch base offered diverse ways of spending leisure time by doing different sports. "I never did so much sport before as I did in these weeks. If Romanians had the same sport conditions and standards, for

sure they would look different”, a Romanian soldier shared his opinion with me. As Romanian soldiers accommodated in the company barracks, they received the keys of the company bar in order to spend also some time socializing in the afternoon, after program. It offered room for tennis and playing cards, space for parties and for enjoying a beer or a coffee while watching a movie or listening to music. Soon after their arrival in the base, the Dutch leadership agreed to ensure a car for Romanian soldiers to enable them to travel outside the base after the program and to visit the surroundings. Also due to Dutch logistics and hospitality, the Romanians could enjoy different locations in the Netherlands every weekend. Two excursions were organized by the Dutch colleagues so the Romanians could enjoy their stay far away from home and family.

At the start, the Dutch company command posted the Romanians insignia of rank on the notice board. This was a sensitive cultural approach from Dutch side, since there was awareness that soldiers are interacting with much more formal military behaviors. Romanian soldiers were not warned before about the ban on wearing jewelry, and for this reason, the flexible Dutch command made an exception “only during this stage”. The Romanian soldiers were accommodated in two different areas of the camp with no means of communication, and sometimes lacked information in time and were initially late to morning meetings. These started, as a soldier said, in “the good Dutch way”: with a coffee at the bar. These were almost all the time in Dutch, and someone from the liaison structure always translated the commander’s orders and guidance for the Romanians.



**Photo 6** “Together, it works!”

The use of the Dutch language for orders created some confusion among the Romanian troops, who, in a couple of days, coped with it by learning to execute the basic Dutch commands ordered by the Romanian platoon commander. However, this situation was perceived as a domination strategy which affected early integration of the Romanian troops, whose “preparation was rather more for the English

language”, as a soldier emphasized. The next day, the Romanian soldiers were assessed by the Dutch command line for their physical fitness. Soldiers were surprised by this new situation and felt great discontent because nobody explained why it was mandatory to repeat the physical test they had in Romania, as part of the selection process.

During this stage, the Romanian soldiers had a full program from morning to evening, most of the time separate from the Dutch troops. Doing a few things together during the driving classes was very good for the start of the interaction: “they do the same job as we do, with no differences”. The Dutch commander’s consultative style created satisfaction among Romanians for they could express their opinions and give their suggestions.

SFOR 13 seemed to be a landmark in Romanian-Dutch cooperation. The discussions with soldiers from both nations offered, in time, the impression of good cooperation. “Past time was OK”, a Dutch soldier concluded about his experience in this mission, where he built a positive attitude toward Romanian soldiers. The Company Bar, where people spend their time together, was decorated with an emblem commemorating that mission. During discussions with a few Romanian soldiers, SFOR 16 came up as another mission to remember in Dutch-Romanian cooperation.



**Photo 7** Memories from SFOR 13: a landmark in Dutch and Romanian cooperation; an artifact in the custody of Dutch company

The Commander’s name was pronounced by Romanian soldiers with respect and always accompanied by positive words. A Romanian soldier told me that because of these experiences the commander accepted the invitation of Romanian soldiers and spent his holiday in Romania. When sharing his experience with the next commanders, this lieutenant-colonel “talked about <My Romanians>, like it was his unit”, mentioned a Dutch respondent (officer, D1). In fact, a few soldiers from both nations running the mission for the second or third time were eager to share with me the fact that they still keep in touch with their colleagues of the other nationality from Bosnia.

Frictions arose in past cooperations, and a critical moment was the replacement of the Romanian platoon commander, due to different views on hierarchical issues. Refusing to report to a lower rank in the chain of command, the Romanian military decision was to change the commander of the Romanian platoon. Still, such an event was discretely mentioned for the first time in a private discussion during the research with EUFOR 3, while nobody mentioned it in Romania during the research in 2004. After this “You could see that people had already some impressions about our inflexibility”, added the soldier without wishing to comment further.

The two groups’ final cooperative effort before the mission was the common training at the end of the pre-deployment stage. As research strategy for this second stage, I decided to stay with the troops and simply observe what was going on. The transport from the camp to the exercise’s location was done separately, for the Dutch soldiers in a modern bus and for the Romanians, in a military truck that allowed all the dust to get in and be inhaled by the soldiers. After the arrival, the Romanian command line informed the Dutch company commander that the Romanian soldiers felt discriminated. They let me know that Dutch line of command admitted the mistake and made the promise that discriminatory situations would be avoided in future.



**Photo 8** Common training: preparing the car for the harsh winter

The Dutch liaison structure and the Romanian command lived in the same tent during the entire simulation and used to discuss until late at night to reach common solutions or simply just socialize. Soon after the beginning of the simulation, both Romanian and Dutch staffs started to eat together. The troops slept in different places. The socialization started agreeably with a “Bingo” party on the very first evening. “Usually they stay apart, but they came to play Bingo”, somebody from the Dutch staff was pleased to observe. The bar offered a room for interaction, but as Romanian soldiers let me know, the

high cost of a beer was a barrier for much Romanian presence in the evenings, but everyone was present for a football game that created a cheerful atmosphere.

As different groups coming into contact for the first time, the soldiers enjoyed their meals apart. The two separate rooms in the dining facility maintained the isolation. After two days, one of the rooms was closed and the groups were in the situation to get physically closer. Romanian soldiers were very impressed by the Dutch commander who stayed in line, together with the soldiers, to take his meal. Some of the Romanian soldiers, the veterans with prior experience in working with Dutch soldiers used their knowledge of the Dutch language to salute, to thank or to greet their colleagues although acknowledging the differences in pronunciation. Instantly, like something “clicked” you could see the smiles of pleasant surprise on the Dutch soldiers’ faces.

This is what I called the “*Wow effect*” and it refers to people’s reaction with a big, open smile when foreigners greet them in their own language. The consequence of such gesture was a positive atmosphere and courtesy between troops while I saw later Dutch soldiers trying to do the same using similar greeting Romanian expressions. This was the clue, the very moment when the soldiers started to get closer and set the tone for future interactions. The same openness to learning identified during the interviews, came from the Dutch liaison structure members. It was the Romanians turn to be impressed by their desire to learn to communicate in Romanian. I was there when a Dutch NCO used sentences from a Dutch-Romanian conversation guide. The same Dutch NCO sewed both national flags on his uniform, to show respect toward each national contingent. His gesture inspired me to decorate my uniform as well.



**Photo 9** The sign of cooperation under the European flag in EUFOR 3

Because a lot of things had to be solved, the first day was “chaotic as always” as a Dutch soldier observed. During this time the Romanians found something to do. “They are hard working people. That’s why I like them. Yesterday, nobody told them to put up the tents, but they did it!” observed a pleasantly surprised Dutch staff NCO. “In 10-15 minutes the tents were up. Ours.... The Romanians are hardworking people!” another Dutch soldier acknowledged.

Several things observed by the Dutch soldiers were people's faces and their more obedient and formal behavior. "It is easy to recognize them from their face. It is still visible that they have been suppressed", a Dutch soldier told me. The silence due to lack of communication skills can be interpreted in any way possible: "They look different: they are very quiet. I thought that they are angry; unsmiling...", "are more obedient, they execute orders" added others. Studying Romanian formal behavior, a Dutch officer remembered that change was possible: "35 years ago we were like Romanians now. "Attention!" and we stood if a superior came into the room. Romanians are stressed. When they see a major around, they become much more stressed. Now, Dutch youth is very relaxed. Sometimes too relaxed, I could say. They sit down with their legs on the table, without saluting. It is not good; neither too stressed, but neither too relaxed." The similarity to Bulgarians came up again in a discussion about a past mission: "But just after I knew them I realized that they are different".



**Photo 10** "Nobody told them! They just got up and put up the tents!"

International cooperation within the armed forces was positively perceived by both nations' soldiers who expressed also the same attitudes toward their colleagues. Each nationality had something to contribute to the mission was the opinion of a Dutch soldier. The Dutch soldiers saw themselves rather as peacemakers: "Peacekeeping is better than fighting. For the Dutch, peacekeeping is better. They have experience with that and they do it better". "Fighting, I guess will not work; you will never see the Dutch fighting" added another.

My experience ended with a Romanian soldier's "innocent joke" to another, loud enough to be heard by the group to whom I was talking,: "Be careful, she has for sure something to tape what you are saying, hidden somewhere..." It was the indirectly revealed suspicion of another, hidden, identity which soldiers ascribed to me. I left the camp bearing this false label in mind. My intention was to get at least a

paper signed by the leaders of both intelligence services, civilian and military, that I have never worked nor currently work for such/or other intelligence structure.

I called the office of the Chief of General Staff, and his secretary let me understand that such a procedure was not possible. I could not see any other way to prove my innocence and make the soldiers doubt their stereotype. In the end, after months of restlessness without another valid solution, I remembered what I heard so many times: a signed piece of paper could not mean anything in a social and military culture in which the given word was totally compromised. A paper could not make more difference when first hand contact is compromised in this way, at least not in Romanian culture. These thoughts helped me to accept the situation, bad as it was.

After the group returned home, in time, I contacted some of the participants and asked them to talk with me about my identity issue. There was no reply to my request. Nobody considered it worthwhile to make such an effort.

### ***Summary***

To test the way Romanian military culture operates during mission in an international environment, Dutch-Romanian cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was pursued. The Dutch-Romanian cooperation had its own positive and critical moments, as reflected by the 30 post-mission interviews with respondents from both nations and by the participative observation of the pre-deployment training stage for EUFOR 3 in The Netherlands.

### **Leadership style: “The Dutch system definitely gives you more freedom of action”**

All Romanian soldiers from the study in Romania (2004) assessed the leadership style in home-units as authoritarian-paternalist, while their narratives portray a fear of speaking openly, formal behavior, the lack of upward communication and treatment with contempt by their home-unit commanders. The Romanian soldiers’ fear of speaking with me during EUFOR 3 pre-deployment stage confirms this orientation. This is a result consistent with the historical analysis in Chapter 3 and the conclusion about the authoritarian management style in the ROAF, in Chapter 4. At the opposite pole, while working with Dutch commanders, Romanian soldiers experienced a new way of command. They were involved in decisions, their opinions listened and used in decisions; they were trusted and treated with respect. These were enough to create among Romanian soldiers a huge frustration with the current home-unit autocratic style:

*“I found the communist system again...At first, I was disgusted. The system is too Soviet. ‘Don’t say anything!’, ‘Do it like that!’ regardless whether it’s good or bad... But come on guys, let’s think a bit and let’s move forward...The Dutch system definitely gives you more freedom of action.”*



To such attitudes the answer from superiors seems to be in the style of: “Hey, wake up now you’re not in Netherlands/ mission anymore. You are here, back in Romania!” In this respect it seems that a short period of time (six months tour) is sufficient to experience a real cultural shock on re-entry in the home culture, a shock to re-adapt to a reality of an autocratic style so much rejected. The cooperation between troops had its positive and negative moments on hierarchical issues, as described by soldiers. The low power-distance military culture created an open atmosphere for communication without the fear Romanian soldiers were accustomed to at home. This, for Romanian soldiers, created a positive image of the Dutch line of command. Diplomacy and an open mind, cooperation and trust in subordinates were the qualities that soldiers of both nations rated as the most important for an ideal commander of a multinational unit. Compared to Romanian soldiers, the Dutch described the Romanian commanders in a more positive way than their national commanders in respect to the qualities required for international cooperation (open minded, empathic, cooperative, diplomatic), while portraying their leadership style (trust in subordinates, getting things done, tolerant) in a more negative way. This confirms Hofstede’s (2001) observations about the functionality of a consultative style (low PDI) when doing business in countries with autocratic style (high PDI), but not vice versa. The clash of the two military cultures was produced when one of the commanders of the detachment, a young lieutenant, refused to report to a lower rank in the Dutch hierarchy, a subject carefully hidden by the respondents of the interviews in Romania, but revealed during my stage in Netherlands. The discriminatory situation between troops in EUFOR 3 was discussed after the Romanian command line brought it up, while soldiers received a firm promise from the Dutch line of command that such situations would not be repeated.

Romanian officers were described by the Dutch commanders of the missions as capable and prepared for their task. They gave them responsibilities that created a strong feeling of achievement, so important at the beginning of a military career. While Romania was lacking support for home front issues, the coping solution was similar to what people learned during communism – to exploit the legal “windows” left open by the current military regulations. Due to their understanding of these problems, Dutch commanders took responsibility for the wellbeing of their Romanian subordinates and compensated for the absence of Romanian rules and commanders from home. The understanding and help for personal problems by a foreign commander impressed Romanian soldiers and built up their morale. From this perspective we can trust the Dutch commander’s memory when recalling one of his Romanian subordinates saying at departure: “We never had a commander like you”.

More specifically in the EUFOR 3 case we could see the Dutch and Romanian commanders being aware of the importance of their example, so the common early socialization and cooperation in different matters (including language) was the way to set the standard. Soldiers defined command as a key player

in this cooperation because of their role in guiding troops' behavior. Both nations' commanders and soldiers struggled and desired to meet the challenges and to do their best for the accomplishment of the tasks that were assigned. At least I could see this during my short stage.

### **Troop interactions**

Communication was the big challenge for Dutch-Romanian cooperation. The lack of language proficiency was a source of separation, especially for the Romanian soldiers on mission for the first time. The two-week pre-deployment intensive English course, although useful, was rated by Romanian soldiers as insufficient, especially when working in mixed teams. Also, language became a sensitive issue during the pre-deployment stage in The Netherlands, when the Romanian command had to learn, and Romanian troops to understand, orders in Dutch. This was perceived as dominant behavior and generated some negative feelings among Romanian troops, until the simulation begun. The functioning of the initially mixed-designed structure was hampered by this minus in communication.

Due to the training objectives, groups were isolated at the beginning of the pre-deployment stage. For this reason, when the mission simulation time came, soldiers needed an impetus, a momentum when the barriers are cracking and people can interact. For EUFOR 3 this moment was generated by the Romanian soldiers' cultural openness and thoughtful gesture of greeting the Dutch soldiers in Dutch at their first common meal. The "WOW effect" of pleasant surprise and smiles on soldiers' faces opened the communication and interaction. Dutch soldiers joined the "game" and learned, in turn, Romanian greetings. A similar atmosphere was described in past missions with Dutch and Romanians when common activities gathered both nations' fun and imagination. Since no other research reported similar events I consider this benevolent attitude and openness to learn other soldiers' language a distinctive feature that has to be mentioned in the cooperation between Dutch and Romanian soldiers. Moreover, it sustains the fifth condition mentioned by Pettigrew (1998) and Elron, Ben Ari & Shamir (1999) in the revised social contact hypothesis.

The assessed post-mission pair-images reflected a good joint mission. Each nation soldiers' pair-images (each nation's auto- and xeno-images) were found not too distant and displaying good consistency (auto- and xeno-images have similar patterns lines of evolution for each nation). This means that for the images studied people were perceived not so differently from the others. Analysing a nation's mirror-images (compare one nation auto- with the other nation xeno- images) it is easy to observe the good image that Romanian soldiers have of their colleagues after the mission and about themselves. When comparing the Romanian auto- and Dutch xeno- images, Dutch soldiers have a less positive image of the Romanians' than they have about themselves. During interviews, the Dutch soldiers desire to change their pre-conceptions about Romanian colleagues was revealed. One of the Romanian soldiers, running the

mission for the third time exclaimed firmly about each other's images: "They are very good organizers and have good equipment and we are skillful masters".

Veterans were a facilitating factor for Dutch-Romanian cooperation, due to their previous experience(s). During the participant observation, the contribution of veterans to painting a picture of "the Dutch way" was observed which made the integration process of their novice colleagues easier. Veterans helped the transmission of "the institutional memory" of cooperation, full of positive experiences and feelings which was a benefit for the mission. They were those soldiers who knew how to greet the Dutch troops in their own language and generate a warm and friendly atmosphere.

Romanian soldiers' financial motivation for participation in the mission is a finding consistent with previous studies (Manea, 2005). The increased earnings during the mission compared to their home salaries were well planned by Romanian soldiers for improving their family life style (to buy or renovate their house, school fees for their kids) and this made them careful with their spending. For this reason perhaps the Dutch soldiers, whose motivation had a different orientation - could negatively perceive their Romanian partners. In order to avoid embarrassment (face-saving strategies are present in their home culture) Romanian soldiers tried to find other ways to get closer to their Dutch colleagues, other than those involving higher expense. Knowing this, Dutch commanders found ways to balance the financial issues with group bonding in situations. Romanian soldiers did this by sharing their food and drinks brought from home on return from leave. However, despite their materialist motivation and the fact that Romanian soldiers have one of the lowest European pay scales, the feedback offered by Dutch soldiers and commanders portrayed the Romanian soldiers as doing their duty and working hard for mission success.

At the same time, I perceived a pressure in Romanian soldiers' behavior: their permanent awareness that they represented Romania, since they were outnumbered by a majority who pointed this out. This situation was converted into an opportunity to explain more of Romanian history and culture to their Western colleagues. Although difficult, Romanian soldiers seemed ready to take this responsibility and to see themselves as "ambassadors of their own countries". This desire could be transferred into another motivational pillar developed rather during the mission as a consequence of the open and friendly interactions between troops.

**Organizational (un)learning: "Who has the right to make proposals? The commanders and the chiefs have!"**

Pre-deployment training programs improved over time. The Dutch soldiers' needs to improve their cultural awareness when interacting with foreign soldiers found a capable Dutch Armed Forces leadership to help with a pre-deployment cultural module comprising lessons about Romania and for the

Romanian soldiers about the Netherlands and the way to run military life in Dutch style. This cultural training combined with two sources of pressure, vertical and horizontal, in the same military structure, made the Romanian soldiers' acculturation to "the Dutch way" easier. In time, the Romanian pre-deployment training was improved with two-week English course.

When I asked to make proposals to improve cooperation with Dutch soldiers, Romanians' low rank attitudes mirrored the awareness of the limits of the current organizational culture, in which "only the commanders and the chiefs have the right to speak and may be listened to". This attitude reveals more about subordinates' alienation in their own organizational life dominated by autocratic command. Even the officers declared that some of them were asked to report in detail to the leaders of the unit and at MoD level, but said that they were very skeptical about fast and major changes.

**Doing sociology with the Romanian troops: "Be careful, she has for sure something hidden to record what you say!"**

The unexpected topic of mistrust emerged during the participatory observation stage. It regards the current relation between sociologists and the military organization and the contribution that sociology can bring to the organizational development.

First, there is the relation between the sociologist and the military chain of command. Although I was working for the military and the results of the research were supposed to help leadership improve Romanian participation in operations, I experienced reluctance and a lack of support for field research in the theatre of operations. Only when the communication channel was opened by the Netherlands I could receive a positive answer and support in my efforts to join the troops in their pre-deployment stage. In my effort to study the way Romanian military culture interacts with other cultures, basic information, like the names of soldiers previously deployed, was classified and time-consuming to access it.

Second, I could experience two ways of doing sociology, two different ways of visions of social research and its contribution to organizational life which I tried: one, more formal, full of secrecy and time-consuming in the Romanian way and the other, the Dutch way, more flexible, open and interested in the sociological approaches to the cooperation. In the Romanian system I needed the agreement of the entire command line, up to the Chief of General Staff and the Sociology Department under his command, which took some time. In the Netherlands, the company commander was informed about my participation and I was able to do my research without special reports or security clearances. To my verbal request, the Dutch Human Resource Department kindly offered a list with the phone numbers of the participants without hesitation, while at home in ROAF the names of soldiers deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were classified and I needed to make a special written request.

Third, it was the relationship between the sociologist and the respondent soldiers, especially during participative observation in the Netherlands. This relationship is mediated by a key variable: interpersonal trust. Respondents manifested mistrust and a feeling of lack of protection, combined with fear of expressing their own opinions when their statements were tape-recorded. The perceived association of the sociologist with the intelligence services had grave consequences for the field research, jeopardizing personal efforts to do research according to all ethical standards. I was “asking too much about the armed forces, and only someone belonging to the intelligence services could ask that much”. Confronted with the image of military intelligence services after 20 years of freedom, reactions are the same as during Communist times: fear, and need for protection by non-cooperation. The fear was strong enough for the Romanian soldiers from EUFOR 3 to mistrust even my original report, approved by the General Chief of Staff of ROAF, stating my organizational status together with his permission to study cooperation between Dutch and Romanian soldiers in Netherlands.

No doubt these experiences could be explained by the history of Romania. Since early 1970s, sociology and psychology have been banned from Romanian university curricula. Although sociology was reintroduced in the early 1990s both in universities and the military, there is still a lack of sociological research, information and consequently support about what sociology is or can do for the military. At the same time, the period when people could be recorded and reported to the feared “Securitate” is still fresh in collective memory. In this chain, another negative contribution was the lack of official information at command level. Once I arrived in the Netherlands, all worked together and re-activated some of the fears people held long before from previous experiences.

### ***Closing the loop – learning issues***

From all elements integrated in the military culture diagnosis approach, in Chapter 2 (Figure 2, p. 60) the one remaining to be addressed regards the organizational learning process. This means bringing together the answers of research both in peace and action time in order to answer the following questions which help to depict and understand the learning development in the ROAF.

- a. Does the military encourage suggestions from the field?

In their narratives the Romanian soldiers spoke about a specific “right to make proposals” that applies only to leadership, a reality, which portrays a certain alienation of people within their own organizational life. The Romanian soldiers belonged to different units and were asked if, after their return, their home-unit commanders were interested in their experience or asked them to present it publicly. Their answer was generally negative. Rather, the leadership was invited to relate their experiences in communication sessions with their superiors, but not to share them publicly within

their home units. This doesn't imply that, if encouraged in a more open, different cultural setting, Romanian soldiers' behavior will be the same as in their home-culture. Dutch commanders appreciated Romanian suggestions and ideas and used them to enhance the chances of mission success. In the same spirit, the culture of the military academies was diagnosed as having a low permeability to new ideas and to innovation in general. There is a congruence with the answer given to organizational innovation scales within the military academies and Air Force subculture that portrayed a real lack of participation of the respondents in organizational changes (Chapter 4 and 5).

b. Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?

From an historical perspective it was possible to register the abuses of power based on formal position and formal discipline which created a culture of (social, organizational) power and relations, instead of competence and knowledge. Cultivated during many years, enough to survive until today, this style incorporates disrespect, bad treatment of subordinates and their indifference to support practices in organizational life.

c. Are high-ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the ground and open to their suggestions?

From an autocratic posture as command style, the answer is rather negative. Romanian soldiers were "paralyzed" when Dutch commanders came to meet and speak to them while working.

d. Are standard operating procedures (SOPs) generated locally and informally, or imposed from the center?

Answer derived from recent experience: internally, the low innovation scores in evaluative and descriptive scales of organizational culture make the communication of new ideas and the permanent collection of information impossible. As a recent NATO member, the Romanian Armed forces adopted this organization's specific operating procedures (SOP) in order to become interoperable. Moreover, since 2004 a Lessons Learned Section consisting of two officers was incorporated in the general structure of the MoD. The facile direct translation of American manuals into Romanian became futile as long as the philosophy behind their functioning was not fully understood and accepted by everyone in the organization. The connection with the command style puts in danger this structure to become "a form without substance", an organizational structure imported from another military, with its own history and assumptions different from the Romanian one.

Altogether, these answers give an idea of the strong inertia in integrating soldiers' experiences in current organizational life. Considering the results of previous research there is an obvious conclusion

that seems incompatible with a post-communist mentality in which subordinates cannot challenge their chief's point of view, cannot experiment new ways to improve their activity nor report malfunctioning procedures or systems without fear of repercussions. Due to its cultural heritage transferred to the current national and organizational culture, the organizational learning process in the Romanian Armed Forces looks rather inhibited, and the proper functioning of structures designed to help the learning is clearly impeded. Due to its recent past ROAF displays serious difficulties in understanding and thus practicing the management of knowledge as main source for organizational development and growing.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS, FURTHER ISSUES AND REFLECTIONS

#### *Conclusions*

Although several previous studies explored the the cultural profile of the Romanian military, no integrative research has been conducted to provide an insight into its system of values, practices and beliefs. In this respect, this thesis consolidates theory and empirical evidence to show how the Romanian Armed Forces “think and act” in peacetime and during actions. It extends our knowledge and understanding of military culture and multinational cooperation, with hitherto uncollected information. The aim of the thesis was to diagnose the current culture of the Romanian Armed Forces, by triangulating data from surveys, observations and interviews and by using a complex model, combining past (a historical perspective) and present (current situation and practices).

The argument that understanding the present culture of an organization requires stepping back in recent history helped in building an overall view of “*What happened with Romania and its Armed Forces after 1944? How were changes from royal to communist armed forces possible? What is the evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces after the fall of communism?*” 1989, with its political changes, was taken as a landmark to identify what changed in the ROAF during this time. In Soviet hands, in international political isolation after an exhausting war, the Romanian military was transformed into a dependent and submissive tool. The abuses of the population combined with the massive imprisoning of ROAF members for political reasons and direct liquidation of opponents left deep wounds in the collective mind of the Romanian people. Without giving up hope, Romanians organized groups of resistance against the Soviet invasion, of which little was heard in the rest of Europe. Their members were pursued and annihilated in a few years by Soviets or their favorites, who where assigned to all important decision making positions in the Romanian state, including the Armed Forces. Under control and domination by the Soviets, Romanians were stifled for decades with the same repertoire of fear and mistrust of their commanders and highly centralized decision-making, imposed first by Soviet communist leaders and later by their own compatriots. Communism in Romania politicized the armed forces, de-professionalized them from their main mission and changed the very essence of the relation between people within society and organizations: from trust and openness to suspicion, lies and fear. The younger generation of Romanians discovers these things only today, since the communists’ falsified Romanian history until their political fall.

After 1989 Romania was challenged to find a new partner for national security and launched structural reforms to become compatible and interoperable with NATO requirements. Policy-makers



initiated changes of such magnitude (downsizing, restructuring, new rules and regulations and a new human resources philosophy relating to an all-volunteer system) without questioning basic assumptions, values and practices at play in the military organization. The analysis portrays civil-military relations still affected by low ethical standards, a military organization with difficulties in retaining personnel, poorly equipped, diminished legitimacy in public trust, and following low academic standards in the training of its cadets. The complex answers to such matters were used to underpin the hypotheses and expectations for a current diagnosis of Romanian military culture for peace and mission time.

The first question addressed in Chapter 4 is *“What is the current cultural profile of Romania in the international cluster of the military?”* Using the survey designed according to Hofstede’s methodology, the VSM 82 was applied within military academies, on a representative sample of 257 respondents. Results showed that military Romania combines a high power distance and uncertainty avoidance with moderate levels of individualism and short-term temporal thinking in a feminine oriented culture. Several sources of concern for current Romanian military culture were identified. The first regards Romanian cadets’ rejection of the current authoritarian management style of their commanders and their desire for a more consultative way of organizational management. It is in striking contrast to what the ROAF offers at the moment. The second one is the ambivalence in applying organizational rules as a reflex of social influences and organizational ambiguity. The third considers why cadets at the Technical and Air Forces Academies lose their desire for a military career after the first year of study. The fourth describes low stress level cadets perceive in the first year of study so important for socialization and in the last year of study, quite unexpected in an organization committed to change and in a period of intense academic activity, required by graduation. Another important contribution is that the present thesis offered strong statistical evidence to question the “Y-X-Y hypothesis” launched by the Romanian military sociologist Niculae (2004) to describe the management style within the current ROAF. The PD index measured the distance between current and desired management styles, with four distinct answers. It is this important distinction that helped to emphasize the magnitude of the gap between commanders and their followers in an institution that socializes the future officers of the country. Indeed, the autocratic management style is one of the management styles in the ROAF, to paraphrase Niculae (2004) but more than that: it is the dominant one and is clearly rejected as obsolete by respondents. The values barometer of the Romanian cadets identified as top five positions: to live in a desirable area, to work with people who cooperate well, advancement opportunities, personal steadiness and stability and to have sufficient private time. Some are consistent with the general social system tendencies (e.g. desire to work with people who co-operate well), while others are specific to organizational realities and should be

considered by current organizational decision-making (to live in a desirable area, importance of personal stability and advancement opportunities).

*When comparing military academies, are there cultural differences in values and practices?* To answer this second question in Chapter 4, the FOCUS 93 questionnaire (van Muijen et al., 1994) adapted for military organizations, describes an organization that is mainly rule oriented. The analysis portrays commanders who require a high degree of respect for formal authority combined with a strict division of work, rationality in procedures and written communication, in a strict hierarchy. Support and innovation are the least encouraged dimensions in the current organizational culture of the academies. Values such as: flexibility and others' disposition to change or having a good work environment are absent in current organizational culture. The results should become a concern for the period of change that was declared. Subordinates' skills are seldom used in order to improve organizational performance, and the commanders express little concern for subordinates' personal problems. Of all academies, the Air Force surprisingly displays the lowest level of support for innovation and goal orientated practices. Military academies displayed no significant differences in regard to military discipline and orientation. Formal discipline, focused on outward appearance issues, prevails in an organization preoccupied by the formal participation of its members. The peaceful orientation to solve international conflicts, and the experience accumulated since 1990 recommend ROAF soldiers' rather for assistance and reconstruction type of missions. This does not exclude the possibility of expecting some changes, especially in the ethos of special troops who can be seen training with American soldiers and fighting in counterinsurgency and antiterrorist actions. To conclude, despite their different specializations and locations on national territory, the culture of military academies looks fairly homogeneous.

Chapter 5 adressed a new question aimed at exploring cultural differences between generations: *"Did the Air Force change its cultural orientation over time?"* However, to answer such a question, consistent longitudinal analysis is required in order to separate the different effects. The present research was not able to separate the generational and cultural level, since it is based on a crosssectional design and the results should be analyzed with caution. The sample of 84 career officers from various Air Force units was statistically compared with the one of 64 cadets from the Air Forces Academy for the items comprising all questions applied in research using the conclusions derived from previous chapters (3, 4 and 5 first question). The statistical analysis found some significant changes regarding dimensions of national culture, in items computing individualism and masculinity respectively. Romanian AF cadets' values look more individualistic and less achievement oriented than those displayed by senior career officers. The commanders' authoritarian management style, and their low propensity to accept constructive criticism, allow freedom in work, express concern about employees' personal problems, let

new ideas transmit upward, and apply people skills to improve organizational life, feature throughout Romanian military culture and the Air Forces Academy in particular. Although it seems that from all samples analyzed, AF subculture has the highest rate of participation in the decision making process, there is still no change in the most important facet of military culture through its consequences for a transformation process: the management style.

The post-mission assessment of Dutch-Romanian cooperation (in 2004 and 2005) and the two weeks participative observation period for the pre-deployment stage of the EUFOR 3 mission in September 2005 in The Netherlands, helped to form the answer to the question addressed in Chapter 6: *“How is the Romanian military culture manifested in intercultural interactions?”* Several factors with clear influence on military cooperation were underlined. Commanders were defined as the key element in successful military cooperation. In this respect, the rejection of the authoritarian management style measured in peace time explains why in another command setting, such as that offered by the cooperation with the Dutch military in Bosnia, Romanians were able to adapt and develop a mature superior-subordinate relationship based on commitment, mutual respect, trust and responsibility. Communication in English was the biggest challenge to cooperation. Romanian soldiers in EUFOR 3 applied a culturally intelligent solution of opening interaction by greeting their partners in Dutch. Veterans’ previous positive experiences enhanced the cooperation in the Romanian case. Again, the research brought up the strong control of the national command line from Bucharest as a consequence of the high power distance accumulated in time. The use of tape recorder for the semi-structured interviews generated in Romania (2004 and 2005) some suspicions in the mind of a small number of soldiers recruited later for EUFOR 3 mission. Under unfavorable organizational circumstances this doubt contaminated the mind of the other soldiers in the pre-deployment stage in the Netherlands. My presence, as a sociologist and a teacher in the post-communist Romanian military disturbed my co-national soldiers, suspecting a secret identity (military intelligence) and mission (to spy on soldiers’ behavior).

### ***Theoretical implications***

The study was designed to assess the culture of the military organization in its broad complexity during peace and action time. This research demonstrated that the quantitative methodology for analyzing culture should be completed with qualitative methodology in a multi-level approach, as mentioned initially in Chapter 2. With respect to the organizational culture stance, definition and measurement the current research showed that some issues are coagulated (values, organizational practices) while others are unclear (researcher presence and identity while doing group research). Applying such a mixed design made it possible to discover the particularity of Romanians’ deep wounds that the ex-communist political

police harassment practices' left in the collective mentality of its soldiers, even years after the collapse of the communist regime in Romania. The thesis presented the dramatically double change in the structure and culture of a public organization in a country facing a context of international isolation by a foreign political system. The Sovietization process was profound and its consequences are visible today. Such a perspective helped the understanding of the culture of the Romanian military organization. This integrative approach proved that the assessment of the culture of an organization is a very complex process of gathering consistent analyses of the past in order to understand the present, to a better projection of the future, especially when it is about a public organization like the military.

The main assumption of the study is that military academies are representative of the military organization to which they belong. Using a quantitative design, the results in Chapter 4 during peace time emphasized the current authoritarian command style and respondents' preference for more relaxed ways of being led. Despite their different places on Romanian territory and their different specializations, the result for national culture dimensions assessment (Chapter 4) was generally congruent with the observations made during the qualitative projects developed in Chapters 5 and 6. Hofstede's Value Survey Module 82 proved to be a useful tool for understanding national culture and its implications for the military cooperation. Although the ecological analysis of dimensions was not possible, the results generally confirmed expectations based on historical explanations combined with personal observations from the field. The other major instrument applied, the organizational culture module (Van Muijen et al., 1999), showed insufficient elaboration, especially for the evaluative scale, and revealed similar problems with factor analytical solutions, a conclusion similar to Albu & Pitariu's work (2000), which applied the same instrument in Romanian organizations.

Since the mission was developing in a more secure environment of reconstruction, the low stress level gave participants time and opportunity to focus more on the interpersonal relations level and cultural adjustments. In this respect, the present dissertation offers insights as to the acculturation theory and contact hypothesis applied to international military cooperation. Not having an assessment of the images held before the mission soldiers' observations to compare with those post-mission, as in the work of Elron, Shamir and Ben Ari (1999), the soldiers' narratives in the 6th Chapter sustain Pettigrew's fifth condition for successful contact between groups: the friendship potential/desire and openness to change preconceptions about each other. Veteran soldiers' input by creating the "wow effect" launched communication and interactions in EUFOR 3, and helped the mission to evolve with friendly attitudes and Dutch soldiers' similar answers continued the opened line. The positive Dutch and Romanian pair-images favored the cooperation. Moreover, positive stereotypes were transmitted by Romanian veterans in their second and third tour of the mission and steered soldiers' perceptions towards cooperative efforts.

Another observation for the growing body of theory on multinational cooperation emerged from Romanian soldiers' narratives. Nationality is still the way to be recognized, and, for the moment, the ultimate identity reference in multinational settings. The cooperation between soldiers is built on national samples coming together to work and there is no sign of developing, in such a short time, a common identity strong enough to overcome the national one especially when communication skills are problematic. Holding back on national lines means permanent tension for soldiers keeping a balance between national and international demands. However, the limits of the partner culture(s) can be overcome by a leadership trained in cultural intelligence, as shown by the cooperation between the Romanians and the Dutch. The qualities required to be displayed by a leader in such a multinational context include soft dimensions of negotiation and diplomacy, sustaining the theories advanced in modern sociology by Elron, Shamir and Ben Ari (1999) and Moskos (2000) about the officers' profile in multinational encounters.

Hofstede's theory (2005: 442) about national culture dimensions applied in a multicultural context became relevant in this thesis, especially with respect to the importance of the power distance dimension. The study of people coming from such distant cultural countries, as Netherlands and Romania during a common mission reinforces Hofstede's theory about the cooperation between culturally distant people. Romanian soldiers' testimonies about the difficulty in accepting the same routine at re-entry in the home culture, and their experience, reiterate the limits of an authoritarian management style in a multinational context, as Hofstede observed earlier in international business life.

At the same time using the Hofstede's instrument and framework, the findings in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 created the premises to gather information in order to test Nicolae's (2004) "YXY hypothesis" about the command styles in the main stages of the officers' career: cadet (consultative style) - inferior officer (authoritarian style) - superior officer (consultative style). The first argument to question this hypothesis was the lack of distinction between the command and academic levels in each military academy. It was generally applied to a type of organization that has double command lines: educational and military. This creates premises for "type one" statistical errors. The second concern was the high desirability of McGregor's statements used to measure the management styles. These led to "high desirability" answers in the Romanian military case (and thus misleading the conclusion). Using a direct question about their commanders' styles, cadets' answers led to a different conclusion: the authoritarian style is the main repertoire of the superiors in Romanian military academies. At the same time, the question about the desired command style shows that an authoritarian command style is rejected by the respondents. Comparing the Air Force officers' answers with cadets from the same branch on a sample representative of Air Force students, there is no doubt that the authoritarian style is dominant within the Air Force at

middle and higher levels. For the first time since its launch in Romanian sociology (2004) the findings of the present thesis suggests a re-vision of the hypothesis.

### ***Further research***

The statistical analyses combined with historical facts and personal experience suggested several directions for further investigations.

- A first direction was opened by the ambivalence of cadets from all four academies in answering the item: “Rules should not be broken, even when it is in company’s best interest”. Moreover, statistical analysis revealed no significant differences in the same item when comparing Air Force cadets and career officers. This is an unexpected result for an organization which should socialize its members toward respect for rules and regulations. For this reason, these findings suggest the need for more in-depth research in order to understand in respondents’ opinions what type of situations require the non-respect of organizational rules and on what basis these are assessed. At the same time this ambivalence should become a factor of concern for the military commanders and should clearly call for a discussion and careful analysis of the current organizational rules.
- A second direction is suggested by the low level of stress perceived in the first year of study, suprisingly lower than the second and third years in all military academies. This should be a finding of concern, mirroring a lack of challenges specific to military socialization. Connected to this reality, the perceived stress level for the last year it is the lowest from all years of study. Again an unexpected result for a period of final decisive exams and intense intellectual efforts to write the thesis for bachelor degree. At least theoretically neither military nor academic training are facile experiences if they would reflect a reference standard set for a military academy. Romanian cadets, in their majority are military highschool graduates and this fact could balance somehow the general answers, however not in such manner. These results suggest the need for reassessment of the military and academic standards within Romanian military academies.
- Further research is suggested by Romanian cadets’ desire to stay in the military. When the independent variable was organizational status, the statistical data indicated a split between the first and the last year in their desire to stay within the military for a long term career. A longitudinal analysis of the motivations to enter the military system and to stay within the military could clarify this reality better. However, my personal experience as a teacher in the Air Forces Academy and the many informal and formal discussions I had with cadets for about 10

years, suggested cadets' disappointment after the first year. Somehow, their expectations were not met by the current military system which has good advertising and a good national image, but which does not correspond to life inside. The analysis of young officers' resignation motivations (Cândeia, 2000) – the lack of material and spiritual fulfillment within the military – should be an even more useful input to analyze the distance between expectations and reality, especially when the bulk of cadets come from military high schools and they are partially socialized for uniformed life.

- The finding that the organizational cultures (values and practices) of military academies are fairly homogeneous, despite their different locations and their different specializations suggests the exploration of the hypothesis of uniformity of Romanian military culture. Involved in domestic economic activities until 1989, some of them unconnected to the military (harvest gathering, mining, construction and infrastructure work), the ROAF perhaps lacked the time to develop strong sub-cultural identities. An exception here is the Air Force subculture where the communist vision did not apply so much. The similar percentages of consultative management style found in the Air Force cadet and career officer samples, much higher comparing to the others academies, suggest a pattern specific to this sub-culture in accordance with other theories (Mastroianni, 2005). Extending the research on a representative sample for all branches of the ROAF will give a consistent answer to the issue of homogeneity or heterogeneity of current sub-cultures within the ROAF.
- Another question for research emerged from the thesis. This concerns the need to study the impact of Romanian soldiers' international military experiences (peace and mission time) on organizational life after returning in their home units. What assignments will they receive on their return to their home-culture and what is the career path they have? How knowledge they accumulate is spread within the organization?
- There is an old Romanian proverb that says: "One blossom doesn't make a spring". Cultural studies of international military cooperation of Romanian troops in all fields, especially those where Romanians are in command, will enhance organizational knowledge and will better prepare commanders for future missions. The study of civil-military relations to analyze the way Romanians are interacting with the local population can contribute to general knowledge about military cooperation.
- There are some differences detected in value orientation between the young and mature generations within the Air Force. A professional Human Resource approach should be interested in value differences within the military and have similar analysis as civilian organizations in

order to adapt the recruitment policies to different generation needs. Since the armed forces in Romania have a good recruitment market it is important to carefully select and prepare the future defense force of the nation. It is a matter of national security policy.

### ***Reflections***

The cadets' desire to stay within the organization and have a military career is of the utmost importance for current organizational development. According to this study, a very low percentage of cadets are inclined to decide on a long term career, especially in the Air Force and Technical Academies. A positive interpretation can assert a certain adaptation of the respondents to the new human resources politics of short term careers and the new Bachelor's Degree, compatible with civilian life; an idea pursued during their training in military academies. However, two more issues can be raised in this respect.

The first is connected with the quality of those who decide to leave the system. One may say that, in the end, society is the beneficiary of well trained personnel coming from the military, but the most important issue after 1989, is the socio-demographic profile and motivation of those choosing to become professional soldiers or officers, and ultimately deciding to leave the system. There is a need for systematic studies of soldiers' motivation in order to anticipate and prepare the military organization for these challenges. With a relatively low allocation of State funds, the ROAF cannot afford to invest in training a professional force that wants to leave the system way before the first contract expires. Such a prospect, especially within the Air Force, can jeopardize the current transformation goals in HR area: to retain highly trained officers.

Second are the consequences of the significant differences in value orientations of civilian students and cadets. Compared to civilian students, cadets appear more interested in the stability and steadiness which the military system offers (which indicates, a more traditional view of life) than the challenge of using skills, freedom to adopt a personal approach to the job and contributing to organizational success. The results are similar to Zulean's (2005) findings on cultural differences between materialist and post-materialist differences between cadets and civilian students. In these conditions, the short term desire to stay in the military raises the question of cadets' readiness and adaptability to a civilian society that displays different value orientations. Here, another path can be identified for future research into the adaptability of those who are leaving the system for civilian life. Meanwhile, the common desire to cooperate at work can be a fertile ground for managers able to create such conditions.



However, the difficulties faced by today's Romanian Air Force<sup>145</sup> in this time of a major loss of a good part of its personnel, most of them technicians and young pilots, has also to be viewed through the lens of the results: the low propensity of managers to accept constructive criticism and allow freedom in work, to express concerns about employees personal problems, to let new ideas to spring upward and to allow people's skills to improve organizational life. In this vein, when compared with professional officers' perceptions, cadets from the Air Forces Academy describe a much lower level of support practices and innovation values within their current organizational culture. This reality is in sharp contrast with official discourses about the new days of changes (reform, transformation) which the ROAF is going through.

Further, this thesis research strongly indicated the need to clarify to Romanian troops what sociology is, together with its methodology. Romanian soldiers were afraid that what they said would be revealed to their superiors, so they had to protect themselves from possible repercussions (harassment, loss of job) as they had learned from past experiences. This finding is a major source of concern and should raise serious questions about the depth of change within the ROAF. Some soldiers' reaction, in Romanian military units in 2004, of fear of speaking freely in the presence of the tape recorder, culminated in the EUFOR 3, 2005, case with a group rejection, because of false rumor spread that created doubts about my identity and mission within the group. This demonstrates the need to educate people about the work of sociologists and perhaps to create a legal framework to protect the respondents from organizational harassment. Moreover, the unacceptable confusion of informer (or "spy" in Romanian terms) and sociologist, should be addressed by the small community of Romanian military sociologists and, hopefully, this could become a source for future actions in Romanian military life.

There is also a need to reconsider the attitude toward sociological research within current military thinking. The barriers encountered while doing research in the post-communist ROAF (secrecy of the number of the students at military academies, the classified names of the participants in international missions, lack of financial resources for such research and desire to be sustained by the decision-makers) are linked to a certain way of thinking about what sociology can do for the military. It is only possible to change this attitude if there is a will to reconsider sociology and sociological work in another more open perspective. Sociological work is compatible with organizational interests (Moskos, 2003; Onuț, 2008). Top commanders could be better assisted in their reform by a stronger sociological structure to focus on a systematic cultural audit within the ROAF while being helped to define the desirable profile of ROAF's military culture.

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<sup>145</sup> According to [http://www.realitatea.net/1-985-de-militari-au-plecat-doar-in-acest-an-din-armata\\_403816.html](http://www.realitatea.net/1-985-de-militari-au-plecat-doar-in-acest-an-din-armata_403816.html) accessed in January 2009

It is no doubt that the above reconsideration is conditioned by another key variable: management style. There is no other organization where the relation with the commander is as strong as in the military; therefore, the impact of the commanders' values and behavior on current military culture is essential. Vertical cohesion is important for the accomplishment of operational tasks and for reducing the stress related to non-operational tasks. In the case of Romanian cadets, the results of quantitative inquiry indicated a clear difference between expectations and reality in current management style, and the qualitative study consistently sustained the same result: Romanian soldiers' clear rejection of the current management style on re-entry to their home culture, after international experience. There is a clear gap between commanders and their followers in this respect. However, neither of the published versions of The National Strategy of Transformation (STAR), from 2005 and 2007 acknowledges such tension and its implications for organizational life. To succeed, the actual transformation process needs to channel cooperation between ranks, collect the positive thinking and energy, and enhance organizational creativity. The current negative perception of command and the lack of creativity manifest in current organizational life endanger any kind of reform of the magnitude of a transformation, which basically is defined as a human related process of organizational change.

Another main question that can be raised for the Romanian military today is whether the current authoritarian management style fits with the new challenges of international military cooperation. A first answer derives from Hofstede's theory (2001) and its implications for the international military experience of cooperation. The author explained in detailed why managers coming from organizations (particularly in this case armed forces) with high power distance – displaying authoritarian management style - are not fit to lead troops with low power distance, because the authoritarian and paternalist styles create huge dissatisfaction among the soldiers from military cultures with low power distance. Bos-Baks and Soeters (2003) described several cases in which the tensions created by the big cultural distance in management styles caused disruption, with severe consequences, jeopardizing the international military cooperation process. Secondly, a highly authoritarian management style creates obedient, dependent subordinates, mis-matching the new type of soldier, able to handle network-centric warfare requiring upward communication and more entrepreneurial, rapid decision makers, and confident and adaptive soldiers (Howcroft, 2006). Authoritarianism as a single repertoire of management has serious limits, first, in approaching international military cooperation and second, in the soldiers' profile required by a complex, versatile and flexible war environment. Combining the two reasons with the omnipresent information and communication technology changing pressures, the change of the management style is critical (Crane et al., 2009: 221-222).

While both versions of the National Strategy for the Transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces from 2005 and 2007 define only the need to address the change in command structure, the conclusion of this thesis is that the current Romanian commanders' management style is inappropriate to the needs of internal command and control, to the new international military context of cooperation, and to the current demands of warfare. There is no greater urgency at this moment, other than the command style and its effects on the leadership process within the ROAF on the national and international stage, to be addressed in the terms of a national security matter.

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# Appendix

## *Questionnaire used to diagnose military culture*

### THE NATIONAL CULTURE MODULE – HOFSTEDE, VALUE SURVEY MODULE 82

1. Please think of an ideal job (disregarding your present job.) In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to....(please circle one answer in each line across):

- 1 = of outmost importance
- 2 = very important
- 3 = of moderate importance
- 4 = of little importance
- 5 = of very little or no importance

1) have sufficient time for your personal or family life	1	2	3	4	5
2) have challenging task to do from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment	1	2	3	4	5
3) have little tension and stress on the job	1	2	3	4	5
4) have good physical working conditions (good ventilation, and lighting, adequate work space, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5
5) have a good working relationship with your superior	1	2	3	4	5
6) have security of employment	1	2	3	4	5
7) have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to the job	1	2	3	4	5
8) work with people who cooperate well with one another	1	2	3	4	5
9) be consulted by your direct superior in his/her decisions	1	2	3	4	5
10) make a real contribution to the success of the unit or organization	1	2	3	4	5
11) have an opportunity for high earnings	1	2	3	4	5
12) serve your country	1	2	3	4	5
13) live in an area desirable to you and your family	1	2	3	4	5
14) have opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs	1	2	3	4	5
15) have an element of variety and adventure in the job	1	2	3	4	5
16) work in a prestigious, successful company or organization	1	2	3	4	5
17) work in a well-defined job situation where the requirements are clear	1	2	3	4	5

2. The descriptions below apply to different types of managers/commanders. First, please read through these descriptions:

**Manager 1:** usually makes decisions promptly and communicates them to his/her subordinate: clearly and firmly. He/she expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and without raising difficulties.

**Manager 2:** usually makes his/her decisions promptly, but before going ahead, tries to explain them fully to his/her subordinates. He/she gives reasons for the decisions and answers whatever questions they may have.

**Manager 3:** usually consults with his/her subordinates before he/she reaches his/her decisions. He/she listens to their advice, considers it and then announces his/her decision. He/she then expects all to work loyally to implement it whether or not is in concordance with the advice they gave.

**Manager 4:** usually calls a meeting of his/her subordinates when there is an important decision to be made. He/she puts the problem before the group and invites discussion. He/she accepts the majority viewpoint as the decision.

a. Now for the above types of managers/commanders, please mark the one which you would prefer to work under (circle one only):

1. manager/commander 1
2. manager/commander 2
3. manager/commander 3
4. manager/commander 4

- b. And, to which one of the above four types of managers/commanders would you say your superior most closely corresponds?
1. manager/commander 1
  2. manager/commander 2
  3. manager/commander 3
  4. manager/commander 4
  5. He/she does not correspond closely to any of them

3. In your private life, how important is each of the following to you? (please circle one answer in each line across):

- 1 = of outmost importance
- 2 = very important
- 3 = of moderate importance
- 4 = of little importance
- 5 = of very little or no importance

a. personal steadiness and stability	1	2	3	4	5
b. thrift, economy	1	2	3	4	5
c. persistence	1	2	3	4	5
d. respect for tradition	1	2	3	4	5

4. How often you feel nervous or tense at work?

1. never
2. seldom
3. sometimes
4. usually
5. always

5. How frequently, in your experience, are subordinates afraid to express disagreement with their superiors?

1. very seldom
2. seldom
3. sometimes
4. frequently
5. very frequently

6. How long do you think you will continue working for the organization you work for now?

- 1 two years at the most
- 2 from two to five years
- 3 more than five years (but I will probably leave before I retire)
- 4 until I retire

7. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement (please circle one answer in each line across):

- 1 = strongly agree
- 2 = agree
- 3 = undecided (neither)
- 4 = disagree
- 5 = strongly disagree

A company or organization's rules should be not broken – not even when the employee think it is in the company best interest	1	2	3	4	5
--	---	---	---	---	---

**ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE MODULE – VAN MUIJEN, 1999**

Using the next different options you can rate your current organization (how it is in your opinion) even that your experience is only for few weeks.

1 = never
2 = seldom
3 = sometimes
4 = usually
5 = always

8. How often in your organization is/ar/do/does ...:

	1	2	3	4	5
1...people with personal problems are helped?	0	0	0	0	0
2...people who wish to advance are supported?	0	0	0	0	0
3...people are treated in an impersonal manner?	0	0	0	0	0
4...performances are measured in organization?	0	0	0	0	0

5... constructive criticism accepted?	0	0	0	0	0
6... competitiveness in relation to other organizations measured?	0	0	0	0	0
7...an emphasis on stability?	0	0	0	0	0
8... individual appraisal directly related to the attainment of goals?	0	0	0	0	0
9...do managers/commanders express concern about employees' personal problems?	0	0	0	0	0
10...does management specify the targets to be attained?	0	0	0	0	0
11... it clear how performance will be evaluated?	0	0	0	0	0
12... instructions written down ?	0	0	0	0	0
13...does the organization search for new recruitment markets?	0	0	0	0	0
14... there hard criteria against which job performance is measured?	0	0	0	0	0
15...people try to solve their interpersonal conflicts?	0	0	0	0	0
16...people's skills are used in order to improve organizational performance ?	0	0	0	0	0
17... jobs performed according to defined procedures ?	0	0	0	0	0
18... new ideas about work organization encouraged ?	0	0	0	0	0
19...do employees have to perform according to specific norms ?	0	0	0	0	0
20...your organization looking for new challenges new challenges ?	0	0	0	0	0
21... management follow the rules themselves	0	0	0	0	0
22... management practices allow freedom in work ?	0	0	0	0	0
23... the organization make the best use of employee skills to develop better product/service?	0	0	0	0	0

9. Try to answer how typical is in your organization...

1	= totally not typical
2	= not typical
3	= a little bit typical
4	= typical
5	= very typical

	1	2	3	4	5
1...mutual understanding	0	0	0	0	0
2...clear objectives	0	0	0	0	0
3...compliance to standards	0	0	0	0	0
4...task orientation	0	0	0	0	0
5... responsibility	0	0	0	0	0
6...build team spirit	0	0	0	0	0
7...openness to criticism	0	0	0	0	0
8...focus on performance	0	0	0	0	0
9...compliance to rules	0	0	0	0	0

10...flexibility (others disposition to change)	0	0	0	0	0
11...risk taking	0	0	0	0	0
12...mutual support for personal problems	0	0	0	0	0
13... failure acceptance	0	0	0	0	0
14... searching for new challenges	0	0	0	0	0
15...efficiency	0	0	0	0	0
16...performance measurement	0	0	0	0	0
17...mutual support in solving work problems	0	0	0	0	0
18...interpersonal harmony (agree each other)	0	0	0	0	0
19...provide group-safety	0	0	0	0	0
20... the courage in proposing and discuss new ideas	0	0	0	0	0
21...job clarity	0	0	0	0	0
22...rethink old ways of doing things	0	0	0	0	0
23...have a good work environment (feeling at home)	0	0	0	0	0

**DISCIPLINE AND BUSINESS ORIENTATION – SOETERS, 1997**

**10.** I would like to give you some statements concerning military discipline. How important would it be for the quality of the military organization that.....(please circle one answer in each line across):

- 1 = of outmost importance
- 2 = very important
- 3 = of moderate importance
- 4 = of little importance
- 5 = of very little or no importance

a. Soldiers always wear their uniforms correctly	1	2	3	4	5
b. Soldiers wear their headwear (beret, caps) according to the rules	1	2	3	4	5
c. Military boots are polished	1	2	3	4	5
d. Soldiers to be on time in classes	1	2	3	4	5
e. Soldiers salute correctly their superiors	1	2	3	4	5
f. Soldiers according to informal group norms	1	2	3	4	5
g. Soldiers always to have to obey their superiors	1	2	3	4	5
h. Soldiers act according to the intention of their commanders	1	2	3	4	5

**11.** If there is an international conflict what do you think should happen? Circle just one answer, please.

- |               |
|---------------|
| 1 = never     |
| 2 = seldom    |
| 3 = sometimes |
| 4 = usually   |
| 5 = always    |

a. The international community should send an international peacemaking force as soon as possible.	1	2	3	4	5
b. The international community should impose economic embargoes on the conflict area in order to isolate it.	1	2	3	4	5
c. Engaged an international force in battle/ military operation on the ground.	1	2	3	4	5
d. The international community should try to get the warring parties to the negotiation (mediation) table.	1	2	3	4	5
e. Military units of the warring factions involved should be subdued by means of an international air campaign (and cause less collateral damage).	1	2	3	4	5
f. The UN and the international community should make a diplomatic appeal to the warring parties to settle their differences.	1	2	3	4	5

## STATISTICAL INFORMATION – HOFSTEDE, VSM 82 (adapted)

12. Information about your self are only for statistical purposes:

- a. Are you:
  - 1 male
  - 2 female
  
- b. How old are you:
  - 1 Under 20
  - 2 20-24
  - 3 25-29
  - 4 30-34
  - 5 35-39
  - 6 40-49
  - 7 50-59
  - 8 60 or over
  
- c. You belong to:
  - Air Forces Academy
  - Army (Land Forces) Academy
  - Navy Academy
  - Technical Academy
  - Air Force Structure
  
- d. Status in organization :
  1. CADET First year
  2. CADET Second year
  3. CADET Third year
  4. CADET Fourth year
  5. CADET fifth year
  6. Professional soldier
  7. Officer

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP!**

## *The post-mission guide assessment of military cooperation*

### INTERVIEW

1. Self-presentation, presentation of the research and its purpose, ethic and confidentiality of the research.
2. Why did you decide to go on the mission? If is to run again why would you choose to go?
3. Please compare the training from Romania and The Netherlands with what was needed to fulfill the mission. Which training was more useful? Please explain. Do you have proposals for the enhancement of the training in your home country?
4. How you would assess your English proficiency? How many Romanians/Dutch soldiers from your unit were able to communicate in English language?
5. How often did you interact with Dutch/Romanian soldiers? In what context (differentiating work from leisure time)? With whom you preferred to spend your leisure time? Please describe.
6. What kind of common activities did you attend?
7. Did you have a/some common symbol/s in your mission? Please exemplify. Did you have common ceremonies, activities?
8. What you expected to happened before the mission? Did happen? During the interaction or mission with Romanian/Dutch soldiers did something you didn't expect happen? Do you have knowledge about something unexpected happening during the mission regarding the Romanian and Dutch soldiers' interactions?
9. If tomorrow you would like to participate in another mission with the same Dutch and Romanian colleagues? Why?
10. During a very bad situation when your life is in danger, who would you rather trust to come and rescue you: a Romanian or a Dutch (sub)unit? Why?
11. What can you say about the Dutch/Romanian soldiers' and their behavior? Describe and explain, please, with examples.
12. What did you like about Romanian colleagues? What didn't you like?
13. What did you like about the Dutch colleagues? What didn't you like?
14. Please describe superior-subordinate relations among Dutch soldiers and Romanian soldiers. What differences did you observed? Which style do you prefer?

15. Express the strengths and weaknesses of the cooperation between Dutch and Romanian soldiers
16. What do you think the Romanian should know about the Dutch/Romanians before to cooperate with them?
17. There were some subjects you couldn't discuss with your Romanian/Dutch colleagues?
18. What topic should a foreigner should not discuss with a Dutch/Romanian soldier because of its sensitivity?
19. How satisfied are you with the assessment made by your superior in the mission?
20. Who prepared the food during the mission? How was the food for you?
21. How often you did communicate with your family? What should military authorities to do in order to improve this feature?

### QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT – VOM HAGEN ET AL., 2003

22. The next features can or cannot apply to the Dutch soldiers. Please evaluate using grades from 1 to 10 how much these features are specific or not to them:

Courageous	
Reliable	
Tough	
Sense of duty	
Comradeship	
Temperamental	
Reckless	
Prepared	
Stiff	
Industrious	
Sociable	
independent	
Competent	

23. The next features can or cannot apply to the Romanian soldiers. Please evaluate using grades from 1 to 10 how much these features are specific, or not, to them:

Courageous	
Reliable	
Tough	
Sense of duty	
Comradeship	
Temperamental	
Reckless	
Prepared	
Stiff	
Industrious	
Sociable	
independent	
Competent	

24. In the table below you have some features of an ideal leader. Please choose the most important five for a commander in a multinational unit.

Open minded	
Empathic	
Cooperative	
Eloquent	
Diplomatic	
Trust subordinates	
Charismatic	
Directive	
Get things done	
Patience	
Tolerant	
Controlling	
Others. Which?	

25. Using the features below please characterize the Romanian commander. Please choose the most important five:

Open minded	
Empathic	
Cooperative	
Eloquent	
Diplomatic	
Trust subordinates	
Charismatic	
Directive	
Get things done	
Patience	
Tolerant	
Controlling	
Others. Which?	

26. Using the features below please characterize the Dutch commander. Please choose the most important five:

Open minded	
Empathic	
Cooperative	
Eloquent	
Diplomatic	
Trust subordinates	
Charismatic	
Directive	
Get things done	
Patience	
Tolerant	
Controlling	
Others. Which?	

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!**





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