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Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market
Kort,P.M. Feichtinger,G. Hartl,R.F. Haunschmied,J.L.
Kort,P.M.
Feichtinger,G.
Hartl,R.F.
Haunschmied,J.L.
Abstract
In this paper an optimal control model is presented to design enforcement programs minimizing the social costs from both the market and crackdown.By using the maximum principle we show that performing an enforcement policy that leads to a collapse of the drug market is more likely to be optimal when the sales volume depends on the number of dealers.In case of a buyer's market the optimal enforcement policy leads to a saddle point equilibrium where the enforcement rate is fixed such that the number of dealers is kept constant at a positive level.
Description
Pagination: 22
Date
1996
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Publisher
Operations research
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29.pdf
Adobe PDF, 422.81 KB
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Keywords
optimal control, costs, microeconomics, drug market
Citation
Kort, P M, Feichtinger, G, Hartl, R F & Haunschmied, J L 1996 'Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-29, Operations research, Tilburg.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess