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A logical challenge to correlationism: The Church–Fitch paradox in Husserl’s account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning
Bös,Gregor E.
Bös,Gregor E.
Abstract
Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is actually known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox.
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Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2024.
Date
2024-06-11
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Alonzo Church, Anti-realism, Correlationism, Evidence, Frederic Fitch, History of philosophy, Husserl, Knowability, Michael Dummett, Phenomenology
Citation
Bös, G E 2024, 'A logical challenge to correlationism : The Church–Fitch paradox in Husserl’s account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning', Synthese, vol. 203, no. 6, 211. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04584-1