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Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection

Boone,J.
Abstract
This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.
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Date
2015-08
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
universal basic health insurance, voluntary supplementary insurance, public vs. private insurance, adverse selection, moral hazard, cost effectiveness, I13 - Health Insurance, Public and Private, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design, H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
Citation
Boone, J 2015, 'Basic versus supplementary health insurance : Moral hazard and adverse selection', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 128, pp. 50-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.009
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/64146
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
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