Strategic information disclosure and competition for an imperfectly protected innovation
Jansen,J.A.
Jansen,J.A.
Abstract
The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 1999-93 (rt)
Date
2010
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
SDG 9 - Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
Citation
Jansen, J A 2010, 'Strategic information disclosure and competition for an imperfectly protected innovation', Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 349-372.
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess