Fight or flight: Endogenous timing in conflicts
van Leeuwen,Boris Offerman,Theo van de Ven,Jeroen
van Leeuwen,Boris
Offerman,Theo
van de Ven,Jeroen
Abstract
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose between fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions, and document suboptimal predatory fighting.
Description
Date
2022-03
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
fight-or-flight, contest, sorting, theory, experiment, D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliance; Revolutions, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design, C90 - General
Citation
van Leeuwen, B, Offerman, T & van de Ven, J 2022, 'Fight or flight : Endogenous timing in conflicts', Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 104, no. 2, 231, pp. 217-231. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00961
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess