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A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games

Suijs,J.P.M.
Abstract
This paper extends the definition of the nucleolus to stochastic cooperative games, that is, to cooperative games with random payoffs to the coalitions. It is shown that the nucleolus is nonempty and that it belongs to the core whenever the core is nonempty. Furthermore, it is shown for a particular class of stochastic cooperative games that the nucleolus can be determined by calculating the traditional nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969) of a specific deterministic cooperative game.
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Pagination: 34
Date
1996
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Publisher
CentER Accounting Research Group
Collections
Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Nucleolus, cooperative game theory, random variables, preferences
Citation
Suijs, J P M 1996 'A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1996-90, CentER Accounting Research Group, Tilburg.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/26365
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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