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Supermodular NTU-games

Talman,Dolf
; 
Koshevoy,G.A.
; 
Suzuki,Takamasa
Abstract
An NTU-game consists of payoff sets for every coalition of players. We introduce the concept of supermodularity of a game to guarantee that all its marginal vectors are in the core. As solution we propose a set of payoff vectors that is determined by the average of all marginal vectors, the Shapley set. Conditions are given under which the Shapley set is in the core of the game or is a set of bargaining solutions of a well-defined bargaining problem.
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Date
2016-04-23
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
core, Shapley value, convexity, supermodularity, marginal vector
Citation
Talman, D, Koshevoy, G A & Suzuki, T 2016, 'Supermodular NTU-games', Operations Research Letters, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 446-450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.04.007
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/65587
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