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Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory

van der Heijden,E.C.M.
Nelissen,J.H.M.
Potters,J.J.M.
Verbon,H.A.A.
Abstract
We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon the unique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is that there are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange, respectively. Complex exchange gives higher payoffs than simple exchange but it requires not only mutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examine whether players are able to conclude simple and complex exchanges and how this is affected by the move and matching structure of the game.
Description
Pagination: 31
Date
1999
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Microeconomics
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
experiments, reciprocity, trust, coordination, gift exchange, C90 - General, D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions, SDG 1 - No Poverty
Citation
van der Heijden, E C M, Nelissen, J H M, Potters, J J M & Verbon, H A A 1999 'Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-78, Microeconomics, Tilburg.
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