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Preventing abuse by controlling shareholders
van Damme,E.E.C.
van Damme,E.E.C.
Abstract
This paper is a comment on Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwarz “Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review”. Together with that paper it will appear in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169 (1) in 2013, in a special issue devoted to Behavioral Theory of Institutions. I argue that the arguments of Gilson and Schwarz are convincing, but that the underlying assumptions may be stronger than the authors suggest. In particular, the G&S paper adopts a US shareholder perspective on corporate governance and is based on standard rationality assumptions. In this comment, I discuss whether and to what extent the recommendations are relevant in the EU context and whether the paper’s conclusions are robust when insights from behavioral economics are included.
Description
Date
2013
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
corporate governance, behavioral economics, G30 - General, G38 - Government Policy and Regulation, K22 - Business and Securities Law, D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics ; Underlying Principles
Citation
van Damme, E E C 2013, 'Preventing abuse by controlling shareholders', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 169, no. 1, pp. 190-196.
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess