An average lexicographic value for cooperative games
Tijs,S.H. Borm,P.E.M. Lohmann,E.R.M.A. Quant,M.
Tijs,S.H.
Borm,P.E.M.
Lohmann,E.R.M.A.
Quant,M.
Abstract
For games with a non-empty core the Alexia value is introduced, a value which averages the lexicographic maxima of the core. It is seen that the Alexia value coincides with the Shapley value for convex games, and with the nucleolus for strongly compromise admissible games and big boss games. For simple flow games, clan games and compromise stable games an explicit expression and interpretation of the Alexia value is derived. Furthermore it is shown that the reverse Alexia value, defined by averaging the lexicographic minima of the core, coincides with the Alexia value for convex games and compromise stable games.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2007-052 (rt)
Date
2011
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
game theory, Alexia value, convexity, comprise stability, big boss and clan games
Citation
Tijs, S H, Borm, P E M, Lohmann, E R M A & Quant, M 2011, 'An average lexicographic value for cooperative games', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 213, no. 1, pp. 210-220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.03.025