Deposit games with reinvestment
van Gulick,G. Borm,P.E.M. De Waegenaere,A.M.B. Hendrickx,R.L.P.
van Gulick,G.
Borm,P.E.M.
De Waegenaere,A.M.B.
Hendrickx,R.L.P.
Abstract
In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are introduced. These subclasses provide insight in two extreme cases. It is seen that each term dependent deposit game possesses a core element. Capital dependent deposit games are also shown to have a core element and even a population monotonic allocation scheme if the revenue function exhibits increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, it is shown that all superadditive games are deposit games if one allows for debt.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2007-22
Date
2010
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Research Projects
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Citation
van Gulick, G, Borm, P E M, De Waegenaere, A M B & Hendrickx, R L P 2010, 'Deposit games with reinvestment', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 200, no. 3, pp. 788-799.