Continuity, not Conservatism: Why We Can Be Existential and Enactive
De Haan,Sanneke
De Haan,Sanneke
Abstract
García's and Oblak's reviews of my book Enactive Psychiatry open up some fundamental debates with regard to my use of the term "enactive" for the kind of approach that I develop. Is my account still properly "enactive" (García) and how does my approach compare to the extended mind theory on the one hand and to constructivism on the other hand (Oblak)? In this response, I argue that (a) adding an existential dimension to enactivism is necessary to do justice to our way of being in the world and our specific sense-making and its problems; and (b) that this dimension can be incorporated within enactivism without giving up on either enactivism's commitment to naturalism or the enactive lifemind continuity thesis. My "existentialized" enactivism is very much enactive in that it adopts the thoroughly relational perspective that forms the core of enactivism. This relational perspective is also what distinguishes enactive theory from both extended mind theory and constructivism.
Description
Funding Information: This publication is part of the project "Is it me or my disorder?" (project number 275-20- 067) of the VENI research programme, which is financed by the Dutch Research Council (NWO). Publisher Copyright: © 2022 Vrije Universiteit Brussel. All rights reserved.
Date
2022-03
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Journal Issue
Keywords
Enactive, Sense-making, Mind Theory
Citation
De Haan, S 2022, 'Continuity, not Conservatism: Why We Can Be Existential and Enactive', Constructivist Foundations, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 173-178.
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess