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Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

Andersson,T.
; 
Andersson,C.
; 
Talman,A.J.J.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family.
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2013
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Andersson, T, Andersson, C & Talman, A J J 2013, 'Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders', Annals of Operations Research, vol. 211, no. 1, pp. 27-36. https://doi.org/10.1007%2fs10479-013-1344-1
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/60133
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