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Stable partial cooperation in managing systems with tipping points

Wagener,F.
; 
de Zeeuw,Aart
Abstract
Tipping of a natural system, entailing a loss of ecosystem services, may be prevented by stable partial cooperation. The presence of tipping points reverses the grim story that a high level of cooperation is hard to achieve and leaves large possible gains of cooperation. We investigate a tipping game with constant emissions and a piecewise linear response, and the well-known lake system with concave-convex dynamics and time-dependent emissions. Tipping back, leading to a gain in services, can also be induced by stable partial cooperation, but is harder to achieve. A physically reversible natural system may prove to be socially irreversible.
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Date
2021-09
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
CLIMATE-CHANGE, Ecological systems, MANAGEMENT, Multiple Nash equilibria, NASH EQUILIBRIA, POLICY, PRICE, Stable partial cooperation, Tipping points
Citation
Wagener, F & de Zeeuw, A 2021, 'Stable partial cooperation in managing systems with tipping points', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 109, 102499. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102499
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/75529
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