Loading...
Potential Maximizers and Network Formation
Slikker,M. Dutta,P.K. van den Nouweland,C.G.A.M. Tijs,S.H.
Slikker,M.
Dutta,P.K.
van den Nouweland,C.G.A.M.
Tijs,S.H.
Abstract
In this paper we study the formation of cooperation structures in superadditive cooperative TU-games.Cooperation structures are represented by hypergraphs.The formation process is modelled as a game in strategic form, where the payoffs are determined according to a weighted (extended) Myerson value.This class of solution concepts turns out to be the unique class resulting in weighted potential games.The argmax set of the weighted potential predicts the formation of the complete structure and structures payoff-equivalent to the complete structure.As by-products we obtain a representation theorem of weighted potential games in terms of weighted Shapley values and a characterization of the weighted (extended) Myerson values.
Description
Pagination: 19
Date
1998
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Microeconomics
Files
Loading...
758.pdf
Adobe PDF, 352.13 KB
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
game theory
Citation
Slikker, M, Dutta, P K, van den Nouweland, C G A M & Tijs, S H 1998, Potential Maximizers and Network Formation. FEW Research Memorandum, vol. 758, vol. 758, Microeconomics, Tilburg.