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Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms
de Bijl,P.W.J.
de Bijl,P.W.J.
Abstract
This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, each firm's manager can impose a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and produce the good. Quality is determined by his effort level, which depends on his private benefits. The managers compete on a product market by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management strategy are discussed
Description
Pagination: 25
Date
1995
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Volume Title
Publisher
Unknown Publisher
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Keywords
Oligopoly, Competition, Product Differentiation, Organizational Structure, Corporate Strategy, business economics, D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection, L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets, M21 - Business Economics, L20 - General
Citation
de Bijl, P W J 1995 'Strategic delegation of responsibility in competing firms' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-33, Unknown Publisher.