Item

Climate policy commitment devices

Dengler,Sebastian
; 
Gerlagh,Reyer
; 
Trautmann,Stefan T.
; 
Van De Kuilen,Gijs
Abstract
We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.
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Date
2018-11-01
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
climate policy instruments, intertemporal cooperation, climate change, experiments, C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, D62 - Externalities, D99 - Other, Q38 - Government Policy, Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming, SDG 13 - Climate Action
Citation
Dengler, S, Gerlagh, R, Trautmann, S T & Van De Kuilen, G 2018, 'Climate policy commitment devices', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 92, pp. 331-343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.10.004
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/70344
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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