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Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations

Ochea,M.I.
; 
de Zeeuw,Aart
Abstract
We study the success of generalised trigger strategies in the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations where the performance of these strategies is derived from asymmetric n-player prisoners’ dilemmas. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space—i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction—such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.
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Date
2015-12
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
International environemtnal negotiations, Tit-for-tat, Replicator dynamics, Asymmetric prisones' dilemma, C72 - Noncooperative Games, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games, D62 - Externalities, H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
Citation
Ochea, M I & de Zeeuw, A 2015, 'Evolution of reciprocity in asymmetric international environmental negotiations', Environmental & Resource Economics, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 837-854. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-014-9841-5
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/64288
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