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The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks
Englmaier,Florian Grimm,Stefan Grothe,Dominik Schindler,David Schudy,Simeon
Englmaier,Florian
Grimm,Stefan
Grothe,Dominik
Schindler,David
Schudy,Simeon
Abstract
Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.
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Publisher Copyright: © 2024, University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved.
Date
2024-08-01
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cesifo1_wp6903.pdf
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team work, bonus, incentives, leadership, non-routine, exploration, C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, C93 - Field Experiments, J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods, D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics ; Underlying Principles, M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Citation
Englmaier, F, Grimm, S, Grothe, D, Schindler, D & Schudy, S 2024, 'The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 132, no. 8, pp. 2695-2747. https://doi.org/10.1086/729443