Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas
Ghidoni,Riccardo Cleave,Blair Suetens,Sigrid
Ghidoni,Riccardo
Cleave,Blair
Suetens,Sigrid
Abstract
This paper focuses on social dilemma games in which players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. A novel prisoner's dilemma experiment, a meta-analysis of public goods experiments, and a meta-analysis of previous prisoner's dilemma experiments document high cooperation rates if the likelihood to meet the same partner again in the future is high. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Description
Date
2019-07
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Journal Issue
Keywords
cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study, C70 - General, C90 - General, D70 - General
Citation
Ghidoni, R, Cleave, B & Suetens, S 2019, 'Perfect and imperfect strangers in social dilemmas', European Economic Review, vol. 116, pp. 148-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.04.002