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Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

Beetsma,R.M.W.J.
; 
Bovenberg,A.L.
Abstract
This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the union once the EMU has been formed is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend largely on monetary arrangements in the union.
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Pagination: 23
Date
1995
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Publisher
Unknown Publisher
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Central Banks, Monetary Policy, EMS, Fiscal Policy, monetary economics, E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies, E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination, E62 - Fiscal Policy ; Modern Monetary Theory, E52 - Monetary Policy, F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission, SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals
Citation
Beetsma, R M W J & Bovenberg, A L 1995 'Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-58, Unknown Publisher.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/26246
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info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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