Loading...
Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games
van Heumen,R.W.J. Peleg,B. Tijs,S.H. Borm,P.E.M.
van Heumen,R.W.J.
Peleg,B.
Tijs,S.H.
Borm,P.E.M.
Abstract
Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.
Description
Pagination: 25
Date
1994
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Unknown Publisher
Files
Loading...
680.pdf
Adobe PDF, 518.76 KB
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Game Theory, Bayesian Games, game theory
Citation
van Heumen, R W J, Peleg, B, Tijs, S H & Borm, P E M 1994, Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. FEW 680, vol. FEW 680, Unknown Publisher.