Thumbnail Image
Item

Optimality of Imitative Behavior in Cournot Oligopoly

Possajennikov,A.
Abstract
The paper considers a model of imitation in the context of Cournot oligopoly. Purely imitative behavior can lead to an outcome inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. The question is when we can reconcile imitation with the concept of Nash equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior in two ways. First, imperfect imitation is introduced. Second, a random matching and local interaction model is analyzed. Such variations in the imitative behavior improve efficiency and restore Nash equilibrium as the likely outcome of the dynamic imitation process.
Description
Pagination: 20
Date
1999
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Microeconomics
Collections
Tilburg University Research Output Collection
Show all metadata
Files
Thumbnail Image
2.pdf
Adobe PDF, 232.35 KB
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Imitation, Cournot oligopoly, evolutionary games, C72 - Noncooperative Games, D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Citation
Possajennikov, A 1999 'Optimality of Imitative Behavior in Cournot Oligopoly' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-02, Microeconomics, Tilburg.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/26527
Embedded videos