Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
Estevez,Arantza Borm,Peter Fiestras
Estevez,Arantza
Borm,Peter
Fiestras
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.
Description
Publisher Copyright: © 2019, The Author(s).
Date
2020-04
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
NTU-bankruptcy problem, NTU bankruptcy game, coalition-merge convexity, ordinal convexity, compromise stability, adjusted proportional rule
Citation
Estevez, A, Borm, P & Fiestras 2020, 'Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games', Top, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 154-177. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-019-00527-z