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An auction market for journal articles

Prüfer,J.
; 
Zetland,D.
Abstract
We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2007-79
Date
2010
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Citation
Prüfer, J & Zetland, D 2010, 'An auction market for journal articles', Public Choice, vol. 134, no. 3-4, pp. 379-403. < http://www.springerlink.com/content/2q80214867370564/ >
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/52011
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