Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind
Colombo,Matteo Elkin,Lee Hartmann,Stephan
Colombo,Matteo
Elkin,Lee
Hartmann,Stephan
Abstract
Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this article, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research programme in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind.
Description
Funding Information: The authors would like to thank Dominik Klein, Joe McCaffrey, Jan Sprenger, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article. In addition, the authors are grateful for the financial support provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (DFG) priority programme ‘New Frameworks of Rationality’ ([SPP 1516]) and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Publisher Copyright: © 2018 The Author(s). All rights reserved.
Date
2021-03
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Research Projects
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Keywords
BRAINS, COGNITION, PROBABILISTIC MODELS, UTILITY
Citation
Colombo, M, Elkin, L & Hartmann, S 2021, 'Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind', The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 185-220. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy059