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Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?

Bester,H.
; 
Güth,W.
Abstract
We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome depends on whether the individuals' interactions are strategic complements or substitutes. Altruism and self-interest are context dependent.
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Date
1994
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Volume Title
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CentER
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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103.pdf
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Keywords
Game Theory, Altruism, game theory, C72 - Noncooperative Games, A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values, D64 - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Citation
Bester, H & Güth, W 1994 'Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1994-103, CentER.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/26208
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