The pernicious role of asymmetric history in negotiations
Dezso,L. Loewenstein,G. Steinhart,J. Neszveda,Gabor Szaszi,B.
Dezso,L.
Loewenstein,G.
Steinhart,J.
Neszveda,Gabor
Szaszi,B.
Abstract
The role of history in negotiations is a double-edged sword. Although parties can develop trust over time, there are also countless examples of protracted feuds that developed as a result of conflicting interpretations and invocations of history. We propose that, due to biased invocations of the past, history is likely to play a pernicious role in negotiations – particularly when given an asymmetric history in which one party benefited at the expense of the other. We test this prediction in two, two-stage experiments. We find that asymmetric history in a first stage leads to increased impasses in a second stage, but that this effect holds only when the second stage pairs the same two parties who shared the asymmetric history in the first.
Description
Date
2015-08
Journal Title
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Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Keywords
negotiation, bargaining impasse, compensation
Citation
Dezso, L, Loewenstein, G, Steinhart, J, Neszveda, G & Szaszi, B 2015, 'The pernicious role of asymmetric history in negotiations', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 116, pp. 430-438. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.016