Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions
Grundel,Soesja Borm,Peter Hamers,Herbert
Grundel,Soesja
Borm,Peter
Hamers,Herbert
Abstract
In a resource allocation problem, there is a common-pool resource, which has to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim on this pool and an individual concave reward function on assigned resources, thus generalizing the model of Grundel et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 78(2):149–169, 2013) with linear reward functions. An assignment of resources is optimal if the total joint reward is maximized. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of an assignment, based on bilateral transfers of resources only. Analyzing the associated allocation problem of the maximal total joint reward, we consider corresponding resource allocation games. It is shown that the core and the nucleolus of a resource allocation game are equal to the core and the nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy game.
Description
Date
2019-04
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
resource allocation games, concave reward function, core, nucleolus
Citation
Grundel, S, Borm, P & Hamers, H 2019, 'Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions', Top, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 37-54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-018-0482-7
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess