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Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered
Voorneveld,M. Borm,P.E.M. van Megen,F.J.C. Tijs,S.H. Facchini,G.
Voorneveld,M.
Borm,P.E.M.
van Megen,F.J.C.
Tijs,S.H.
Facchini,G.
Abstract
In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and the set of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal (1973). It clarifies the relations between existing models on congestion games, and studies a class of congestion games where the sets of Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria and potential-maximizing strategies coincide. Particular emphasis is on the computation of potential-maximizing strategies.
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Pagination: 21
Date
1999
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Publisher
Operations research
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98.pdf
Adobe PDF, 197.7 KB
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Keywords
potential games, congestion, strong Nash equilibrium, potential-maximizing strategies
Citation
Voorneveld, M, Borm, P E M, van Megen, F J C, Tijs, S H & Facchini, G 1999 'Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-98, Operations research, Tilburg.