Membership, governance, and lobbying in standard-setting organizations
Fiedler,Clemens Larrain Aylwin,M.J. Prüfer,Jens
Fiedler,Clemens
Larrain Aylwin,M.J.
Prüfer,Jens
Abstract
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are collectively self-governed industry associations, formed by innovators and implementers. They are a key organizational form to agree on and manage technical standards, and form the foundation for many technological and economic sectors. We develop a model of endogeneous SSO participation that highlights different incentives for joining (namely licensing, learning, and implementation). We analyze equilibrium selection and conduct comparative statics for a policy parameter that is related to implementer-friendly Intellectual Property Rights policies, or alternatively, minimum viable implementation. The results can reconcile existing evidence, including that many SSO member firms are small. The extent of statutory participation of implementers in SSO control has an inverted U-shape effect on industry profits and welfare.
Description
Publisher Copyright: © 2023 The Author(s)
Date
2023-07
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Journal Issue
Keywords
standard-setting organizations, associations, governance, lobbying, membership, D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations, D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility, O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Citation
Fiedler, C, Larrain Aylwin, M J & Prüfer, J 2023, 'Membership, governance, and lobbying in standard-setting organizations', Research Policy, vol. 52, no. 6, 104761. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2023.104761