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Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

Suetens,S.
Potters,J.J.M.
Abstract
On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.
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Date
2007
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Research Projects
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Suetens, S & Potters, J J M 2007, 'Bertrand colludes more than Cournot', Experimental Economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 71-77. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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