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Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

Bellemare,C.
; 
Sebald,A.
; 
Suetens,Sigrid
Abstract
Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.
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Date
2018-06
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
guilt sensitivity, psychological game theory, heterogeneity, stakes, dictator game
Citation
Bellemare, C, Sebald, A & Suetens, S 2018, 'Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects', Experimental Economics, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 316-336. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/69423
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