Feedback and dynamics in public good experiments
Bigoni,M. Suetens,S.
Bigoni,M.
Suetens,S.
Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and/or earnings on contributions and the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions are lower when feedback on earnings is provided compared to when feedback on contributions is provided. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions compared to individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2010-064 (rt)
Date
2012
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Research Projects
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Citation
Bigoni, M & Suetens, S 2012, 'Feedback and dynamics in public good experiments', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 86-95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.12.013