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Strength is still a weakness in coalition formation: Replicating and understanding the Strength-is-Weakness effect
Wissink,Joeri Beest,Ilja van Pronk,Tila Ven,Niels van de
Wissink,Joeri
Beest,Ilja van
Pronk,Tila
Ven,Niels van de
Abstract
A key observation in coalition formation is that bargainers with most resources are often excluded from coalitions: the Strength-is-Weakness effect. Previous studies have suffered from low sample sizes and lack of (appropriate) incentives and have rarely focused on underlying processes. To address these issues, we conducted a cross-platform replication using the Online Coalition Game. We replicated the Strength-is-Weakness effect in a psychology laboratory, on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and on Prolific. Moreover, our results showed that the equity norm shapes the Strength-is-Weakness effect in two ways. First, strong bargainers claim a higher larger of the payoffs than weak bargainers do, making them less attractive coalition partners. Second, weak bargainers expect strong bargainers to make these larger claims, directing weak bargainers to each other from the outset. Finally, the studies suggest that the Online Coalition Game is a viable tool for conducting high-powered coalition formation research.
Description
Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Date
2022
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Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Keywords
ALTERNATIVES, BEHAVIOR, EQUITY, EXPERIENCE, FAIRNESS, NEGOTIATION, PAYOFF, POWER, RESOURCES, Strength-is-Weakness, coalition formation, equity, online synchronous games, replication
Citation
Wissink, J, Beest, I V, Pronk, T & Ven, N V D 2022, 'Strength is still a weakness in coalition formation : Replicating and understanding the Strength-is-Weakness effect', Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 283-296. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211005883
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess