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On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

Bhaskar,V.
Abstract
Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result to the battle of sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.
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Pagination: 21
Date
1995
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Volume Title
Publisher
CentER
Collections
Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Game Theory, game theory
Citation
Bhaskar, V 1995 'On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-30, CentER.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/26281
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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