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Centrality and cooperation in networks

van Leeuwen,Boris
; 
Ramalingam,Abhijit
; 
Rojo Arjona,David
; 
Schram,Arthur
Abstract
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
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2019-03
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Cooperation, Centrality, Public Goods, Networks, C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact, D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics ; Underlying Principles, H41 - Public Goods
Citation
van Leeuwen, B, Ramalingam, A, Rojo Arjona, D & Schram, A 2019, 'Centrality and cooperation in networks', Experimental Economics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 178-196. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/69730
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