The salience of a recipient's alternatives: Inter-and intrapersonal comparison in ultimatum games
Handgraaf,M.J.J. van Dijk,E. Wilke,H. Vermunt,R.
Handgraaf,M.J.J.
van Dijk,E.
Wilke,H.
Vermunt,R.
Abstract
The social utility model suggests that in social decision-making, both inter- and intrapersonal comparisons are important in assessing the utility of a decision outcome. In the ultimatum game both these comparisons play a role. This is especially true for recipients reacting to an unfair offer. We propose that the relative weights inter- and intrapersonal comparisons receive in ultimatum games depend on the way the decision is structured. In three studies we show that presenting recipients with a straightforward choice instead of the usual accept/reject question makes recipients more inclined to accept unfair offers. Moreover, the existence of an alternative outcome, i.e., the fact that refusal of the offer also leads to a substantial outcome, similarly raises the level of acceptances in a standard ultimatum game. Results are discussed in relation to the joint/separate evaluation disparity and the distinction between occurrences and non-occurrences.
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2003
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Research Projects
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Handgraaf, M J J, van Dijk, E, Wilke, H & Vermunt, R 2003, 'The salience of a recipient's alternatives : Inter-and intrapersonal comparison in ultimatum games', Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 165-177.