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Coordination in continuously repeated games

Weeren,A.J.T.M.
; 
Schumacher,J.M.
; 
Engwerda,J.C.
Abstract
In this paper we propose a model to describe the effectiveness of coordination in a continuously repeated two-player game. We study how the choice of a decision rule by a coordinator affects the strategic behavior of the players, resulting in more or less cooperation. Our model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear differential game with a one-dimensional state space, and we propose a method to obtain numerically the stationary feedback Nash equilibria for such games. This method is based on solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations directly.
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Pagination: 28
Date
1995
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Unknown Publisher
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Repeated Games, game theory
Citation
Weeren, A J T M, Schumacher, J M & Engwerda, J C 1995, Coordination in continuously repeated games. Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research, vol. 9576, vol. 9576, Unknown Publisher.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/86627
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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