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Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability

Hendrickx,R.L.P.
; 
Thijssen,J.J.J.
; 
Borm,P.E.M.
Abstract
This article discusses interactive minimum cost spanning tree problems and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each player’s decision whether or not to cooperate is properly taken into account.
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Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2002-070 (rt)
Date
2012
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Citation
Hendrickx, R L P, Thijssen, J J J & Borm, P E M 2012, 'Minimum cost spanning tree games and spillover stability', Theory and Decision, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 441-451. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9262-7
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/55245
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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