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Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game: A framed field experiment

Noussair,Charles
; 
van Soest,Daan
; 
Stoop,Jan
Abstract
We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
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Date
2015-05-05
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Cooperative games, Field experiments, Renewable resources and conservation, C71 - Cooperative Games, C93 - Field Experiments, Q22 - Fishery ; Aquaculture
Citation
Noussair, C, van Soest, D & Stoop, J 2015, 'Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game : A framed field experiment', American Economic Review, vol. 105, no. 5, pp. 408-413. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151018
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/64314
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