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Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model

Klijn,F.
; 
Masso,J.
Abstract
In this note we introduceweak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of themembers can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. Our main result is that under the assumption of strict preferences, the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings coincides with the bargaining set of Zhou (1994) for this context.
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Pagination: 11
Date
1999
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Operations research
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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114.pdf
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Keywords
matching, (weak) stability, bargaining set, C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
Citation
Klijn, F & Masso, J 1999 'Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-114, Operations research, Tilburg.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/26620
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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