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The Consensus Value: A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games
Ju,Y. Borm,P.E.M. Ruys,P.H.M.
Ju,Y.
Borm,P.E.M.
Ruys,P.H.M.
Abstract
By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity.By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided.By defining the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established.We also show that this value is the average of the Shapley value and the equal surplus solution.Furthermore, we discuss a possible generalization.
Description
Subsequently published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2007 Pagination: 17
Date
2004
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Publisher
Microeconomics
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Keywords
cooperative games, game theory, C71 - Cooperative Games, D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations, D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Citation
Ju, Y, Borm, P E M & Ruys, P H M 2004 'The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2004-50, Microeconomics, Tilburg.