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Three-valued simple games

Musegaas,M.
; 
Borm,Peter
; 
Quant,M.
Abstract
In this paper we study three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. We analyze to which extent well-known results on the core and the Shapley value for simple games can be extended to this new setting. To describe the core of a three-valued simple game we introduce (primary and secondary) vital players, in analogy to veto players for simple games. Moreover, it is seen that the transfer property of Dubey (1975) can still be used to characterize the Shapley value for three-valued simple games. We illustrate three-valued simple games and the corresponding Shapley value in a parliamentary bicameral system.
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Date
2018-08
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Tilburg University Research Output Collection
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Keywords
Cooperative games, Three-valued simple games, Core, Vital players, Shapley value, Transfer property
Citation
Musegaas, M, Borm, P & Quant, M 2018, 'Three-valued simple games', Theory and Decision, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 201-224. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9630-z
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/69570
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