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The procedural egalitarian solution

Dietzenbacher,Bas
Borm,Peter
Hendrickx,Ruud
Abstract
In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.
Description
Date
2017-11
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
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Journal Issue
Keywords
egalitarianism, egalitarian procedure, procedural egalitarian solution, egalitarian stability, constrained equal awards rule, C71 - Cooperative Games
Citation
Dietzenbacher, B, Borm, P & Hendrickx, R 2017, 'The procedural egalitarian solution', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 106, pp. 179-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001
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