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Optimal Central Bank transparency

van der Cruijsen,C.A.B.
Eijffinger,S.C.W.
Hoogduin,L.H.
Abstract
Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private sector inflation forecasts. As a result, inflation is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence. By using a large scale panel data set on the transparency of central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while several central banks would benefit from further transparency increases, some already have reached the optimal level.
Description
Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2008-59
Date
2010
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals
Citation
van der Cruijsen, C A B, Eijffinger, S C W & Hoogduin, L H 2010, 'Optimal Central Bank transparency', Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 1482-1507.
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
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