Loading...
Sender-Receiver Games
Peeters,R.J.A.P. Potters,J.A.M.
Peeters,R.J.A.P.
Potters,J.A.M.
Abstract
Standard game-theoretic solution concepts do not guarantee meaningful commu- nication in cheap-talk games. In this paper, we define a solution concept which guarantees communication for a large class of games by designing a behavior pro- tocol which the receiver uses to judge messages sent by the sender on acceptability. For that, we will make use of the Nash equilibrium concept for which truth-telling is a consequence. Uniqueness is nevertheless not a consequence, but after reasonable selection it is. Further, we will come to a method to compute all equilibria very easily.
Description
Pagination: 18
Date
1999
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Econometrics
Files
Loading...
46.pdf
Adobe PDF, 225.85 KB
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Noncooperative game theory, signalling, sender-receiver games, C72 - Noncooperative Games, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Citation
Peeters, R J A P & Potters, J A M 1999 'Sender-Receiver Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-46, Econometrics, Tilburg.