Thumbnail Image
Item

Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs: Determanistic Equivalents

Suijs,J.P.M.
; 
Borm,P.E.M.
Abstract
This paper focuses on the subclass of cooperative games with stochastic payoffs in which the preferences of the agents are such that a stochastic payoff can be represented by a deterministic equivalent.To each game within this class one can associate a game with deterministic payoffs.It is shown that the core of such a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs is nonempty if and only if the core of the associated game is nonempty.
Description
Pagination: 14
Date
1996
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Operations research
Collections
Tilburg University Research Output Collection
Show all metadata
Files
Thumbnail Image
713.pdf
Adobe PDF, 213.08 KB
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Preferences, Stochastic Processes, Cooperative Games
Citation
Suijs, J P M & Borm, P E M 1996, Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs : Determanistic Equivalents. FEW Research Memorandum, vol. 713, vol. 713, Operations research, Tilburg.
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14602/86642
License
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
Embedded videos