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An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations

Xu,Xue
Potters,Jan
Abstract
We study experimentally whether an overlapping membership structure affects the incentives of short-lived organizational members. We compare organizations in which one member is replaced per time period to organizations in which both members are replaced at the same time. We find at best weak support for the hypothesis that an overlapping membership structure is conducive to cooperation in ongoing organizations. Incoming members are sensitive to the organizational history when membership is overlapping, as they should according to the cooperative equilibrium, but this is not enough to substantially increase cooperation levels in the organization.
Description
Date
2018-03
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
overlapping generations, cooperation, organization, experiments, C72 - Noncooperative Games, C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights, L23 - Organization of Production
Citation
Xu, X & Potters, J 2018, 'An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 147, pp. 28-40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.023
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